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-- Free will & physics
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Of course, with the state of our prison systems, both would be out in half the time onto parole anyway, but that's not the point...

I am of the opinion that nothing that does its 'thinking' with a physical body can have free will, because of the the reasons stated earlier.

However, I reckon that beings that can think without a physical body (like 'God' supposedly does so - if this is possible) would be able to have proper free will, because nothing constrains them. The real problem with this is getting something that can think without existing in the conventional sense - but it's of course possible that some as yet undiscovered phenomena would make this possible.

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Originally posted by Chris Larkin I am of the opinion that nothing that does its 'thinking' with a physical body cannot have free will, because of the the reasons stated earlier.

Watch those double-negatives--makes things make no sense!

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Originally posted by Shakka Watch those double-negatives--makes things make no sense!

Fixed. I should really bother proof reading before posting.

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Originally posted by Dupz Okay, before I start I have to admit that I'm not much of a filosofical person. I usually catch the philosophical threads by the time they're 14 pages long, and I never have the time to catch up. Anyway, I'll contribute my useless opinion anyway Psy-T, you mention that you would never make decisions that will lead to more pain than pleasure. I'm guessing you suggest that you will always, by instinct/physics or whatever, make a choice that will lead to your optimal outcome. Suggesting that our choices are already preconceived.. perhaps?? I have a problem with this..... The reason why I disagree is because of a little thing called "game theory". If you have watched the movie "A Beautiful Mind" with Russel Crowe in it, you'd be familiar with the concept. How does economics come into this discussion? Well, recall the scene in the bar where Crowe's character and his friends are trying to hit on some hot bird. I'm not going to use the example from the movie but of an example known as "prisoners dilemma". What I will demonstrate is that the logical choices that people make are not always in their own best interest, even though the logical viewpoint would suggest otherwise. What I have show, below, is what is called a 'payoff' matrix, where we have two people, Joe and Bob, who have been questioned by police about a crime. -----------------------------------Joe-------------------------------- --------------------------Confess------Dont Confess------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------Confess---------10,10----------0,20------------------------ Bob------------------------------------------------------------------- ------Dont Confess---------20,0-----------1,1------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- The table is read like this: Each prisoner chooses one of the two strategies. In effect, Joe chooses a column and Bob chooses a row. They either confess, or dont confess to the crime. The two numbers in each cell (ie. 10,10 or 0,20) tell the outcomes for the two prisoners when the corresponding pair of strategies is chosen. The number to the left of the comma tells the payoff to the person who chooses the rows (Bob) while the number to the right of the column tells the payoff to the person who chooses the columns (Joe). Thus (reading down the first column) if they both confess, each gets 10 years jail, but if Joe confesses and Bob does not, Bob gets 20 and Joe goes free. So: How does this situation resolve itself? What strategies are "rational" if both men want to minimise the time they spend in jail? Joe might reason as follows: "Two things can happen: Bob can confess or Bob can keep quiet. Suppose Bob confesses. Then I get 20 years if I don't confess, 10 years if I do, so in that case it's best to confess. On the other hand, if Bob doesn't confess, and I don't either, I get a year; but in that case, if I confess I can go free. Either way, it's best if I confess. Therefore, I'll confess." But Bob can and presumably will reason in the same way, so that they both confess and go to prison for 10 years each. Yet, if they had acted "irrationally," and kept quiet, they each could have gotten off with one year each. My point. Making a choice that leads to 'pain' is often better than a choice that leads to 'pleasure'. Logic is not always "logical", and if logic is merely a result of chemical reactions in our brain, perfected over millions of years, then being able to act irrationally and still coming out on top (or to be in a 'pleasurable' state) is an example of our minds working against the laws of nature.. So, yes, I do believe in free will.

you made your choice because you thought it will bring you the least amount of pain. i dont see how this contradicts my point

Okay I thought about this just now while I was in the shower (yes I'm geeky enough to keep thinking about subjects like these all day) and no I haven't had a chance to read any of the other responses that have been made since the last time I posted but I will get to those when I get back from my PT.

What about the person who commits adultery on their significant other? Theoritically, they are choosing the pleasure path of the moment but we all know affairs don't work out, so in the end, they are choosing the path with more pain. Because that path is the one and the same that will bring pain and torment to their significant others and their families.

So it could be said!

That you are choosing the path which leads to more pain.

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Originally posted by squirrelly Okay I thought about this just now while I was in the shower (yes I'm geeky enough to keep thinking about subjects like these all day) and no I haven't had a chance to read any of the other responses that have been made since the last time I posted but I will get to those when I get back from my PT. What about the person who commits adultery on their significant other? Theoritically, they are choosing the pleasure path of the moment but we all know affairs don't work out, so in the end, they are choosing the path with more pain. Because that path is the one and the same that will bring pain and torment to their significant others and their families. So it could be said! That you are choosing the path which leads to more pain.

some people who commit adultery do get away with it, i can only assume most of them hope to get away with it, or maybe even believe they'll get away with it.
thus, i believe they are considering the opportunity to have an affair a more pleasurable option than the option to refuse it.

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Originally posted by squirrelly Okay I thought about this just now while I was in the shower (yes I'm geeky enough to keep thinking about subjects like these all day) and no I haven't had a chance to read any of the other responses that have been made since the last time I posted but I will get to those when I get back from my PT. What about the person who commits adultery on their significant other? Theoritically, they are choosing the pleasure path of the moment but we all know affairs don't work out, so in the end, they are choosing the path with more pain. Because that path is the one and the same that will bring pain and torment to their significant others and their families. So it could be said! That you are choosing the path which leads to more pain.

Well they choose the way cause they dont really consider the consequences as much as they should. So they choose less pain, but not a smart decion. As trancaholic said before, just because you think you choose the best way, doesnt meant that it is, especially not in the eyes of someone else, and in hindsight.

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Originally posted by squirrelly Okay I thought about this just now while I was in the shower

pics or stfu

No, I agree with Psy-T and St_Andrew: I guess adultery usually is initiated in the throes of passion, and not the result of a long deliberation. Or it might be that the person commiting the adultery doesn't really appreciate his or her family.
Similar reasoning explains why (some?) fat people keep eating candy. In the long run it's the wrong choice, but given the craving for the candy in the moment, that desire can suppres the desire to become slim and healthy.

hmm, i was hoping for some more ideas & comments.

guess this is it though, kraftwerk said it best: "we are the robots"

but on a more serious note, how and why are we skipping the randomness idea brought out from the movie (on the basis of qunatum physics)?

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Originally posted by trancaholic I would say that the negative consequences of suicide is 1: the pain involved in killing yourself, 2: the sadness you know you will bring those who love you, and 3: if you believe in "something after death", the risk of not knowing if you end up in a situation worse than the one you're in right now. As to 1, I think that we can agree that it is a non-issue if you're already in pain due to some illness. If you're "only" suffering psychologically then you must somehow value psychological well-being much higher than physical well-being if you take the suicide route. For 2, the same kind of reasoning would say that a person who's already without loved ones (the majority of suicidal people I would venture to claim) has no issues here. And if the suicidal person do have loved ones, it might be that other concerns outweigh this concern. About 3, then I guess it's a toss up whether you think that the action of suicide is in someway affecting what afterlife you will get, or if you foresee anything happening, if you live on, that will change your afterlife. And again, other concerns might outweigh the risk (like someone about to go broke might run the risk of commiting an armed robbery). Obviously, 3 is not an issue if you don't believe in an afterlife. I've had suicide pretty close in my life, and can promise you that I have seen situations where people are only living because they know how much they mean to other people, and value not hurting these loved ones more than the relief of not having to live. As an agnostic who lives as a materialist, I don't myself see any particular reason to live, yet I don't have any reason to kill myself either. If I was put in a situation where I was diagnosed with, say, terminal cancer, that would change, and I would most definitely off myself before too much pain set in, even if it meant that my loved ones would have to do without me for a little while longer than if I endured the natural route to death. Same goes for senility, where suicide would be a great escape from being a lonely undignified baby in a retirement home.

Great escape but it could still be considered a painful route can it not? Are we looking at decisions that bring pain only to yourself or to everyone around you? Because you might be bringing pain to yourself because you never know what the future might bring you, so in ending your life too quickly, you might actually be choosing the unwise, and more painful route. Again we have to consider if we are talking about psychological pain or physical pain. Because suicide might be a psychological escape but a very painful physical decision. Not only that but if we are talking about the whole situation rather than just the specifics of one person, you could be causing more pain for all of those around you, thus bringing about a more painful situation.

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Originally posted by Aquarian It just depends on your definition of free will. By it's official definition, yes, we have free will. The point of the argument is that whatever you choose, you will have chosen because it is in your nature to do so.

Yes but we are trying to break down the true meaning of free will and based on evidence if there really is such a thing as free will. As Derek already stated, if we are incapable of making the choice that would bring us more pain than pleasure, do we really have free will?

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Originally posted by Psy-T some people who commit adultery do get away with it, i can only assume most of them hope to get away with it, or maybe even believe they'll get away with it. thus, i believe they are considering the opportunity to have an affair a more pleasurable option than the option to refuse it.

Yes, but there are exceptions to every case, you cannot base an entire theory on the fact that a few people get away of it. It can be agreed by a majority that MOST who commit adultery do NOT get away with it. Again, we have to decide what kind of situation we're dealing with when we're talking about pain.

Situation one: One person vs. pleasure/pain vs. the current timing.

If we go with situation one, then it can be said that the ONE person is choosing PLESURE at the CURRENT time.

Situation two: One person vs. pleasure/pain vs. the future.

Now, if we go with this situation we have to look ahead a bit into the future. If we do this, and we're making the assumption that eventually this person will get caught. Whether or not the marraige is saved or there is a divorce, the person then goes through pain because his past decisions led to a painful situation where his family falls apart and there is distrust and a very sticky and messy situation for all parties involved.

Situation three: Everyone connected through the decision vs. pleasure/pain vs. the future.

Now, if we go with THIS one, we can see that the person who commits adultery really does choose the more painful of the situations. Why? Because the person who he/she is committing adultery with goes through pain because they cannot truly be with the person but have to live a lie. The person commiting also has pain because they are torn between giving up a life that they already have and giving up a momentary pleasure. The person committing's significant other/family is put through a painful situation because of the fact that he is committing adultery and thus in the end, the person ends up choosing the more painful situation because everyone in the family goes experiences great pain because of his decision.

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Originally posted by St_Andrew Well they choose the way cause they dont really consider the consequences as much as they should. So they choose less pain, but not a smart decion. As trancaholic said before, just because you think you choose the best way, doesnt meant that it is, especially not in the eyes of someone else, and in hindsight.

How are they choosing less pain by committing adultery? They will get caught eventually (most people do) and in the end they will be in a painful, not pleasureable situation. The option of less pain would be to end things with the current significant other rather than committing adultery, would it not?

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Originally posted by Psy-T hmm, i was hoping for some more ideas & comments. guess this is it though, kraftwerk said it best: "we are the robots" but on a more serious note, how and why are we skipping the randomness idea brought out from the movie (on the basis of qunatum physics)?

Without actually watching the movie I can't really make a good argument.

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Originally posted by squirrelly Great escape but it could still be considered a painful route can it not? Are we looking at decisions that bring pain only to yourself or to everyone around you? Because you might be bringing pain to yourself because you never know what the future might bring you, so in ending your life too quickly, you might actually be choosing the unwise, and more painful route. Again we have to consider if we are talking about psychological pain or physical pain. Because suicide might be a psychological escape but a very painful physical decision. Not only that but if we are talking about the whole situation rather than just the specifics of one person, you could be causing more pain for all of those around you, thus bringing about a more painful situation.

first of all, we're talking about pain/pleasure to yourself and only yourself, be it psychological or physical, immediate or ultimate.
whichever is more important to you at the very moment.

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Originally posted by squirrelly Yes, but there are exceptions to every case, you cannot base an entire theory on the fact that a few people get away of it. It can be agreed by a majority that MOST who commit adultery do NOT get away with it. Again, we have to decide what kind of situation we're dealing with when we're talking about pain.

i just doubt they'd do it if they didnt want to get caught and thought they would get caught. furthermore i doubt their mental proccesses are the same when presented with the opportunity to commit adultery.

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Originally posted by squirrelly How are they choosing less pain by committing adultery? They will get caught eventually (most people do) and in the end they will be in a painful, not pleasureable situation. The option of less pain would be to end things with the current significant other rather than committing adultery, would it not?

1. they are not expecting pain.
2. they might be aware of the risk but that might even be hightening their pleasure - doing something bad.
3. it's not the ultimate path that matters in this case, but the instant one, of feeding the crave.

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Originally posted by squirrelly Without actually watching the movie I can't really make a good argument.

you're only missing the hand gestures and the distracting animation, i typed the entire relavant scene, other scenes are completely unattached to it.

More data is required than is currently available to draw any conclusions regarding the particular nature of the human will.

But I question the assumption that a choice made deterministically is less "free" than a choice made non-deterministically. Whether one reaches an ultimate decision based upon a deterministic or non-deterministic process, the choice still existed and was made freely.

Put another way: if we assume any sort of "free will" to exist in either case, then what we are "free from" must be external constraints. If we consider that internal constraints as well as external would preclude our will from being "free," then the limitation of our own intellect, among other things, would already exclude the possibility of a genuinely "free" will. Now, if our minds come to decisions deterministically, it is an internal constraint - an aspect of our state of being just as much as our limited ability to see all possible choices and, therefore, not a constraint which can be considered to be interfering with the "freedom" of our will.

One is not a prisoner simply because it never occurred to one to leave. Likewise, one is not a prisoner simply because one would never choose to leave.

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Originally posted by Arbiter But I question the assumption that a choice made deterministically is less "free" than a choice made non-deterministically. Whether one reaches an ultimate decision based upon a deterministic or non-deterministic process, the choice still existed and was made freely.

Exactly. Whenever I hear strict-determinists categorise free-will as nothing but an empty illusion, I can only wonder what the difference between "illusory" choice and "real" choice is. Is there any practical difference between the two? Can we ever know if a choice is actually "real" or not? If so, on what basis can the choices we seem to experience be dismissed as entirely illusory? If it isn't choice we're experiencing exactly, then what is it?

Secondly, much of the deterministic argument seems to boil down to the assertion that conscious choices cannot possibly be made due to the fact that we are slaves to the neurological process that exist beyond our control. This view, if I'm reading it right, seems to be positing a bifurcation of brain and consciousness, where the "consciousness", as we experience it, is somehow separate from yet inexorably linked to the brain. To argue in this manner, however, is to miss the point: "we" are not controlled by neurological processes beyond our control, "we" are these same neurological processes. We are neither our brains nor an entity that resides within our brains, we are, simply, a electro-chemical process. Consciousness is to neurological activity what fire is to combusting material - "we" are the result of a process and the "we" begins and ends with this process.

I know this can't be very clear (it's 9.35am and I haven't slept yet - perhaps I'll be more lucid after a few hours sleep ) but my point is that saying, as the determinists do, that choice is necessarily illusory because "we" do not have any control over the processes that create that choice, is to miss the point. We are, ultimately, those processes that are making the choice. We cannot consciously alter these processes (which is perhaps what the determinists are arguing) but these process are our consciousness, they are who we are. The determinists would probably argue that it is the very fact that we cannot alter the nature of these processes that makes free choice an illusion, but I'll ask again: if choice is only illusory because we cannot transcend what we are (by going beyond the processes that constitute our consciousness and altering them), then what is to be gained by talking of a "real" state of choice that cannot ever be acheieved? Again, what is the practical difference between the choices we feel we are making and "real" choices?

Fuck it, I'm too tired. Bed time.

(Oh, and read up on Hume's compatibilism. That's more or less how I view the whole free will vs determinism debate.)

very nice posts arbiter & renegade.
they address the issue of free will vs. physics completely and cover all grounds.

but what about free will vs. pleasure?
are we not always constrained to choose the option that we see as bringing us the most pleasure?

We are constrained by instinct - the first to survive, the second to pass on genes. Pain and pleasure are just things that guide us on our way -

In order to survive, we need to feed. That's why, when you've eaten, you feel good - your body rewards you for doing something that will keep it alive.

In order to pass on our genes, we need to reproduce (no shit, Sherlock). That's why, when we do, we feel good - it's our body's way of encouraging us to do this again, and ultimately pass on more genes.

Adultery, although it might upset people, is actually good for the race, because it passes on genes - you may like to take a look at another thread about this theory. Also, as one clever person said "God gave men a brain and a penis - but only enough blood to use one at a time." Stuff like this is done without thinking of consequences. Therefore, we choose pleasure now, ignoring the chance of pain later. You could say that we choose what we think will bring the most pleasure, rather than what will.

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Originally posted by Renegade I know this can't be very clear (it's 9.35am and I haven't slept yet - perhaps I'll be more lucid after a few hours sleep ) but my point is that saying, as the determinists do, that choice is necessarily illusory because "we" do not have any control over the processes that create that choice, is to miss the point. We are, ultimately, those processes that are making the choice. We cannot consciously alter these processes (which is perhaps what the determinists are arguing) but these process are our consciousness, they are who we are.

I'm not sure of what you mean, and most certainly not whether you consider me a "determinist" (given that I've stated that I think that free will is an illusion), so this reply might make a lot, some, or no sense at all.
As far as I can understand your point, you think that "we" are equivalent to the structure of our synapses, the electrical signals between these, and any other physical processes that alter the states of our synapses (such as gas concentrations in the brain). If this is the correct interpretation of your stance, then I can of course find no logical flaws in it. However, I do think that most people define "I" as only a strict subset of these signals/synapses/processes, or to put it in mental terms, consider the I to be those parts of our selves that we can reason about and communicate to others.
If your definition of "I" is taken to heart, one must deal with a string of consequences that conflict with everyday/common sense perception. For instance, it follows that I am in control of my dreams. Not only that, I also arrange them, and decide to forget them. Furthermore, when the I is seen as being the grand sum of the processes in the brain, notions such as "consciousness" and "subconsciousness" become vaguely defined. Similarly with "the will" (which we are debating here). So when your definition is accepted, the original question of whether the will is free loses its meaning.
When I'm stating that the will is not free, I'm equating the will with consciousness, and what I think it is bound by is the preferences and mental mechanisms of the subconsciousness. If one or more of these are "wrong" (say, your sex drive craves people of your own sex rather than those of the opposite, and your desire to fit in with others is low) then your choices will be "wrong" as well.

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Originally posted by Renegade What is to be gained by talking of a "real" state of choice that cannot ever be acheieved? Again, what is the practical difference between the choices we feel we are making and "real" choices?

There's something to be gained if you have a spiritual inclination, I think: If your choices are only illusionary, then God cannot give you guidance, but only control you directly by affecting your sense input. Furthermore, the notions of sin and repent become meaningless, as your consciousness has no possibility for vetoing along the way or initiating remorse for its actions anyway. So even if the question of real vs. percepted is irrelevant from many a philosophical viewpoint (including yours and mine), it does matter for some people.

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Originally posted by Arbiter Put another way: if we assume any sort of "free will" to exist in either case, then what we are "free from" must be external constraints. If we consider that internal constraints as well as external would preclude our will from being "free," then the limitation of our own intellect, among other things, would already exclude the possibility of a genuinely "free" will. Now, if our minds come to decisions deterministically, it is an internal constraint - an aspect of our state of being just as much as our limited ability to see all possible choices and, therefore, not a constraint which can be considered to be interfering with the "freedom" of our will.

Interesting post, although as with Renegade's I'm not following everything you say: How do you define "we", "the will", and "minds"? That is, is it on purpose that you use three words instead of just one? (The talk of external/internal constraints would make a lot more sense to me if I knew that).

As to the limitations caused by our own intellect, I don't think that these are what is normally at issue when the "free" will is debated. I think that "free" should be interpreted as "free within the boundaries of inherent abilities", just as we speak of a person as being "free" even if he can't teleport himself to Mars or turn invisible. So while I of course agree that lack of intelligence or time can force an individual to make suboptimal choices, I just don't see it as the point of Psy-T's question.

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Originally posted by squirrelly Great escape but it could still be considered a painful route can it not? Are we looking at decisions that bring pain only to yourself or to everyone around you? Because you might be bringing pain to yourself because you never know what the future might bring you, so in ending your life too quickly, you might actually be choosing the unwise, and more painful route. Again we have to consider if we are talking about psychological pain or physical pain. Because suicide might be a psychological escape but a very painful physical decision. Not only that but if we are talking about the whole situation rather than just the specifics of one person, you could be causing more pain for all of those around you, thus bringing about a more painful situation.

My answer would be the same as Psy-T's:

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Originally posted by Psy-T first of all, we're talking about pain/pleasure to yourself and only yourself, be it psychological or physical, immediate or ultimate. whichever is more important to you at the very moment.

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Originally posted by Chris Larkin We are constrained by instinct - the first to survive, the second to pass on genes. Pain and pleasure are just things that guide us on our way

you can surpass your instinct to breed though, and suicide cases prove that you can surpass the survival instinct aswell.

i think you cant surpass your desire for pleasure.

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Originally posted by Psy-T very nice posts arbiter & renegade. they address the issue of free will vs. physics completely and cover all grounds. but what about free will vs. pleasure? are we not always constrained to choose the option that we see as bringing us the most pleasure?

That depends upon how you define pleasure. Many things can be considered pleasurable in some sense, and when the definition of what constitutes pleasure is left as open-ended as possible the line between "what we see as bringing us the most pleasure" and "what we see as most likely to produce the desired outcome" begins to blur.

For example, the satisfaction one gets from eating one's favorite food and the satisfaction one gets from exacting revenge upon another person are clearly very different feelings. However, they could both be classified as "pleasure" in some sense.

In fact, the only thing that all these different types of pleasure seem to have in common is that they all arise from the fulfillment of some desire.

From this, we can instead hypothesize, "given a pre-existing set of desires, we are constrained(*) to choose the option which based on our cognitive and emotional analysis we perceive as being most beneficial to the fulfillment our set of desires as a whole with respect to their individual intensities and inter-dependencies."

It doesn't seem quite so simple put that way, and we haven't even gotten into analyzing the process(es) by which we form this set of desires to begin with.

(*)This "constraint" would be inherent to our minds and, therefore, could not accurately be said to make our "will" any less "free."

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Originally posted by trancaholic Interesting post, although as with Renegade's I'm not following everything you say: How do you define "we", "the will", and "minds"? That is, is it on purpose that you use three words instead of just one? (The talk of external/internal constraints would make a lot more sense to me if I knew that). As to the limitations caused by our own intellect, I don't think that these are what is normally at issue when the "free" will is debated. I think that "free" should be interpreted as "free within the boundaries of inherent abilities", just as we speak of a person as being "free" even if he can't teleport himself to Mars or turn invisible. So while I of course agree that lack of intelligence or time can force an individual to make suboptimal choices, I just don't see it as the point of Psy-T's question.

We: Human beings. Our physical bodies and the internal processes they engage in.
Mind: That aspect of us (human beings) responsible for cognition, emotion, the storage of knowledge, and the consciousness that allows us to perceive things internal and external to our minds.
Will: That specific aspect of the mind responsible for conscious decision-making.

You are correct that the limitations of our own intellet is not normally at issue when "free" will is debated. That is, precisely, why I raised it as an issue. This is because, for the very same reason that free will and our limited intellect are not said to be at odds, neither are free will and determinism.

If we interpret "free" as "free within the boundaries of inherent abilities" as you suggest, then we are forced to draw the same conclusion. After all, if we make decisions deterministically, then that is also an inherent attribute. And, therefore, when we speak of "free will" we would be speaking of free will within the boundaries of our inherent abilities, including our deterministic nature. It is on this basis that I conclude that choices made if we operate deterministically are equally "free" to choices made if we operate non-deterministically in the context of a discussion regarding "free will."

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Originally posted by Arbiter That depends upon how you define pleasure. Many things can be considered pleasurable in some sense, and when the definition of what constitutes pleasure is left as open-ended as possible the line between "what we see as bringing us the most pleasure" and "what we see as most likely to produce the desired outcome" begins to blur. For example, the satisfaction one gets from eating one's favorite food and the satisfaction one gets from exacting revenge upon another person are clearly very different feelings. However, they could both be classified as "pleasure" in some sense. In fact, the only thing that all these different types of pleasure seem to have in common is that they all arise from the fulfillment of some desire. From this, we can instead hypothesize, "given a pre-existing set of desires, we are constrained(*) to choose the option which based on our cognitive and emotional analysis we perceive as being most beneficial to the fulfillment our set of desires as a whole with respect to their individual intensities and inter-dependencies." It doesn't seem quite so simple put that way, and we haven't even gotten into analyzing the process(es) by which we form this set of desires to begin with. (*)This "constraint" would be inherent to our minds and, therefore, could not accurately be said to make our "will" any less "free."

in other words, you support my theory, but disagree about the implications of it. correct?

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Originally posted by trancaholic I'm not sure of what you mean, and most certainly not whether you consider me a "determinist" (given that I've stated that I think that free will is an illusion), so this reply might make a lot, some, or no sense at all.

My post was made generally and was never speficially directed at your posts. As for whether or not you're a determinist, while you don't have to be a determinist to reject the notion of free will, it does help.

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As far as I can understand your point, you think that "we" are equivalent to the structure of our synapses, the electrical signals between these, and any other physical processes that alter the states of our synapses (such as gas concentrations in the brain). If this is the correct interpretation of your stance, then I can of course find no logical flaws in it. However, I do think that most people define "I" as only a strict subset of these signals/synapses/processes, or to put it in mental terms, consider the I to be those parts of our selves that we can reason about and communicate to others.

But when you examine the neurological nature of consciousness, you'll find that there is no fixed place in which the "I" resides. The "I" - that is, the sensation of "I" - is simply the composite result of different areas of the brain firing in a certain way. The "I" that listens to music, is inherently different to the "I" playing sport which is inherently different again from the "I" which writes these posts. In this sense, there is no fixed "I" and consciousness is simply the sensation we experience when different parts of the brain function in tandem.

This is why I tend to view consciousness and the Freudian "Ego" as a process rather than as an entity in itself. This is a post I wrote on another forum, and while it deals more with the impossiblity of heaven and the impermanency of the self, I think it's relevent to what I'm talking about here (i.e. the nature of consciousness):

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The most important part of understanding death, for me at least, is that consciousness (that is, who we are) is not an entity, it's a process. We are not our brains, we are the processes that occur within those brains. As such, once the process comes to an end (that is, the electrical and chemical impulses within our brain cease) so does consciousness and - as such - our very existence. Think of it like fire. As material combusts, we witness the emergence of flames. These flames, however, are not really what we could classify as objects or entities in themelves, they're merely the manifestation of a process (in this case, the combustion of matter). Now when the fire is extinguished and the flames disappear, they haven't really "gone" anywhere, it's just that the process (the combustion of matter) has ceased and with it the physical manifestation of that process (that is, the fire). In this sense, it doesn't really make sense to ask where fire goes after the process of combustion ceases, as the fire is itself just the manifestation of this very process - does this make sense? Therefore, if we think of consciousness the same way, once the neurological processes stop, so too does consciousness. It doesn't go anywhere, because it never really existed (in the conventional sense of the word, at least) at all. When we die our brains cease their internal combustion and the flames of consciousness are left forever extinguished. Unless there is a way to make these biological processes go on for ever (which there isn't), there isn't really anywhere for consciousness to "go" once these processes do cease, anymore than there is anywhere for fire to go once the processes of combustion cease. I know it might not make a lot of sense, especially since I'm not much good at explaining scienctific stuff (should... have sent... a poet!) but if you can get your head around thinking about consciousness in this way, then issue of human mortality probably won't seem quite so vexing.

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If your definition of "I" is taken to heart, one must deal with a string of consequences that conflict with everyday/common sense perception. For instance, it follows that I am in control of my dreams.

Depending on how you define "I", the self most definitely controls dreams. They are not controlled by a conscious self (as you are, by definition, unconscious when they happen) but they are still "created" by the processes of certain parts of your brain.

With regards to free-will, you cannot "choose" the nature of your dreams, but - neurologically at least - they are, depending on your definition anyway, most certainly controlled by the self.

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Not only that, I also arrange them, and decide to forget them.

Forgetting dreams is more of a physical / biological issue than a free will issue. You cannot choose to forget your dreams (which you will if you awake more than a few seconds after REM sleep) any more than you can choose to digest the food resting in your stomach. This process is still ultimately controlled by your brain, but you do not have any "choice" in the matter.

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Furthermore, when the I is seen as being the grand sum of the processes in the brain, notions such as "consciousness" and "subconsciousness" become vaguely defined.

Precisely.

As I said, consciousness is not fixed. It is the sensation acheived when different parts of the brain fire in tandem. Our thought process may be influenced by parts of the brain that we cannot directly "sense" and this forms the basis of much of the body of psychological theory (particularly early psychological theory, like those of Freud and Jung). Given this, the conscious decisions we make - as the determinists argue - are not directly under our conscious control, but if you define consciousness as the pattern of neurological activity that - at any given point - allows us to be "aware" of what it is that we are doing, then choices, at the very least, are made "consciously". The determinists argue that choice is an illusion because we cannot directly influence all the factors (neurological or otherwise) that go into us making a choice, but I would argue that this is irrelevent. The self (or, rather, the processes that compose the self) cannot choose in the sense that we cannot transcend that which we deterministically are, but the self can, nonetheless, make conscious choices. It is this consciousness, for me, that make choice real and I do not believe that the facticity of human nature precludes the possiblity of free choice.

In other words, if consciousness is the result of all these neurological factors, then the fact that we cannot transcend our deterministic facticity and alter these processes does not alter the possibility of free choice, so long as we can say that these choices are, indeed, made consciously (that is, we are "aware" of the choices we are making). If consciousness is the result of neurological processes and choices are the result of the same neurological processes, how can anyone say that "we" (that is, our conscious self) are not making these decisions ourselves?

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Similarly with "the will" (which we are debating here). So when your definition is accepted, the original question of whether the will is free loses its meaning. When I'm stating that the will is not free, I'm equating the will with consciousness, and what I think it is bound by is the preferences and mental mechanisms of the subconsciousness.

I think you're creating too great a schism between the conscious and the subconscious. As I said, we may not be aware of absolutely every mental process that is involved in a decision - and we certainly don't have autonomous control over the nature of these processes - but we still make that decision consciously, otherwise it wouldn't be a decision at all, it would be the action of base instinct.

As for whether a decision is entirely free? It depends on your definition of "free", I suppose. We are not - and by definition cannot be - free from our environment and the mental processes that compose consciousness (and therefore the processes that dictate conscious choice) when we make a decision. However, given that our facticity cannot be transcended, again, I can only ask, if conscious choice is merely "illusory" choice, then what is the nature of "free" choice? What, practically, is the difference? Every decision that is made by a human - or even any decision made by a being that exists beyond our own anthropic contraints (like a deity, for instance) - is still going to be made entirely within the nature of that being. Insofar as a being cannot transcend its own facticity (how can it escape what it is?) then, by the arguments of the determinists, free choice cannot be real. But if real choice is impossible, how can it, in any sense, considered real in the first place?

As I suggested earlier, I still have never been given a satisfactory answer by those who deny the possiblity of free will, as to what the difference between "real" choice and "illusory" choice actually is.

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If one or more of these are "wrong" (say, your sex drive craves people of your own sex rather than those of the opposite, and your desire to fit in with others is low) then your choices will be "wrong" as well.

Have you ever read Sartre? This sounds suspiciously like his argument against the existential authenticity of homosexuality...

In any case, coming from the angle of existential authenticity, if you are conscious that a certain mode of action is wrong, then to act in that fashion regardless is to act in a state of mauvaise fois or, in English, in "bad-faith". In other words, as much as you can argue that an action was encouraged by factors beyond your control (be they neurological, environmental or anything else) so long as you are conscious that the action is wrong, then there can be no excuses. And this, ultimately, is what I'm saying: consciousness of choice amounts, to some degree at least, to freedom of choice. If you are aware, before performing an action, that the action is wrong, then to perform that action is wrong or, at best, "inauthentic".

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There's something to be gained if you have a spiritual inclination, I think: If your choices are only illusionary, then God cannot give you guidance, but only control you directly by affecting your sense input. Furthermore, the notions of sin and repent become meaningless, as your consciousness has no possibility for vetoing along the way or initiating remorse for its actions anyway. So even if the question of real vs. percepted is irrelevant from many a philosophical viewpoint (including yours and mine), it does matter for some people.

I'm not saying that the differences between real and perceived choices are irrelevent, I'm saying that, for all intents and purposes, they are indistinguishable. Again, if you believe, as you have stated, that free will is an illusion ("I think that free will is an illusion") then you're going to need to define what real choice is, what illusory choice is and how, exactly and in practical application, they differ.

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Originally posted by Renegade I'm not saying that the differences between real and perceived choices are irrelevent, I'm saying that, for all intents and purposes, they are indistinguishable. Again, if you believe, as you have stated, that free will is an illusion ("I think that free will is an illusion") then you're going to need to define what real choice is, what illusory choice is and how, exactly and in practical application, they differ.

if, and only if you can choose an option that will cause you more pain in your opinion (as long as you're not intrested in experiencing that pain), which is something i dont believe you can, you would be able to define a free choice as one that doesnt take pleasure/pain into account.

and that would be a major difference.

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Originally posted by Psy-T if, and only if you can choose an option that will cause you more pain in your opinion (as long as you're not intrested in experiencing that pain), which is something i dont believe you can, you would be able to define a free choice as one that doesnt take pleasure/pain into account. and that would be a major difference.

Yeah, but it all comes back to how you define "pleasure". If you argue that we are always condemned to choose the option which brings us the most pleasure, then it's pretty easy to make the post-hoc rationalisation that any action we commit to - regardless of how aware we are, beforehand, that it will lead to some degree of pain or suffering - is the most "pleasurable" or "desirable" of all available choices. That is, even if we commit to a superficially painful action (say, taking a bullet for the president) we only do so because the alternative (allowing the president to take a bullet for himself) will bring us less pleasure. This, however, strikes me as circular, tautological reasoning: merely because we have committed to an action, I don't necessarily think we have committed to it because we think it will, in the long run, bring us the most "pleasure". If you argue that every choice is made with the aim of bringing us the most possible pleasure, then it's pretty easy to contort the definition of "pleasure" to support this conclusion. However, give me a fixed definition of pleasure (without referring to choice or will, which would constitute circular reasoning) and I'm fairly sure I could give you an example of how a choice could be made that eschews pleasure, rather than seeking it.

Having said all this, I think there's a lot of parallels that can be drawn between your view of free-will and Schopenhauer's own conception of "will". Schopenhauer believed that the "will" which drove the activity and world-view of human beings was irrational (that is, not guided by any conscious reason), egoistic (that is, entirely self-serving) and always sought pleasure (or, in Schopenhauerian terminology, an "absense of suffering"). Ultimately, I do believe that human action is, for the most part, irrational (how many actions do you commit to on a daily basis that you thoroughly think through or even think about at all? How much thought can you remember putting into all the actions you've committed over the past hour, for instance?), egoistic (it's only natural to look out for oneself afterall) and pleasure-seeking (why would we actively seek out anything that brought us suffering?). However, Shopenhauer also believed that this "will" could be usurped, if you like, by conscious reason and it was this assumption that ultimately formed the basis of his theory of moral conduct (for Schopenhauer, moral conduct is that form of conduct which ignores the impulses of the "will" and benefits others via its self-sacrificial nature). In other words, while the "will" is fixed (as you said, it is in our nature to always seek pleasure) the "will" can still be overridden by conscious reason, which goes back to what I was saying earlier about conscious choice equalling free choice. So long as we are aware of the choices we are making, then I believe that the choices are being made freely.

If this is illusory choice, then, while it may not be inherently "perfect" or free from deterministic influences, it's still the best we can aspire to. I am, however, on this issue, still awaiting an adequate defintion of "real" choice.

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Originally posted by Renegade Yeah, but it all comes back to how you define "pleasure". If you argue that we are always condemned to choose the option which brings us the most pleasure, then it's pretty easy to make the post-hoc rationalisation that any action we commit to - regardless of how aware we are, beforehand, that it will lead to some degree of pain or suffering - is the most "pleasurable" or "desirable" of all available choices. That is, even if we commit to a superficially painful action (say, taking a bullet for the president) we only do so because the alternative (allowing the president to take a bullet for himself) will bring us less pleasure. This, however, strikes me as circular, tautological reasoning: merely because we have committed to an action, I don't necessarily think we have committed to it because we think it will, in the long run, bring us the most "pleasure". If you argue that every choice is made with the aim of bringing us the most possible pleasure, then it's pretty easy to contort the definition of "pleasure" to support this conclusion. However, give me a fixed definition of pleasure (without referring to choice or will, which would constitute circular reasoning) and I'm fairly sure I could give you an example of how a choice could be made that eschews pleasure, rather than seeking it. Having said all this, I think there's a lot of parallels that can be drawn between your view of free-will and Schopenhauer's own conception of "will". Schopenhauer believed that the "will" which drove the activity and world-view of human beings was irrational (that is, not guided by any conscious reason), egoistic (that is, entirely self-serving) and always sought pleasure (or, in Schopenhauerian terminology, an "absense of suffering"). Ultimately, I do believe that human action is, for the most part, irrational (how many actions do you commit to on a daily basis that you thoroughly think through or even think about at all? How much thought can you remember putting into all the actions you've committed over the past hour, for instance?), egoistic (it's only natural to look out for oneself afterall) and pleasure-seeking (why would we actively seek out anything that brought us suffering?). However, Shopenhauer also believed that this "will" could be usurped, if you like, by conscious reason and it was this assumption that ultimately formed the basis of his theory of moral conduct (for Schopenhauer, moral conduct is that form of conduct which ignores the impulses of the "will" and benefits others via its self-sacrificial nature). In other words, while the "will" is fixed (as you said, it is in our nature to always seek pleasure) the "will" can still be overridden by conscious reason, which goes back to what I was saying earlier about conscious choice equalling free choice. So long as we are aware of the choices we are making, then I believe that the choices are being made freely. If this is illusory choice, then, while it may not be inherently "perfect" or free from deterministic influences, it's still the best we can aspire to. I am, however, on this issue, still awaiting an adequate defintion of "real" choice.

in accordance with my (or schopenhauer's ) theory, "real" choice is actually one that doesnt seem real at all. the only choice that might be free from the pleasure/pain constraint would be an option between objects that are completely equal to each other, and to which you can not equate different values.

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Originally posted by Psy-T in accordance with my (or schopenhauer's ) theory, "real" choice is actually one that doesnt seem real at all.

So "real" choice is actually the choice that is illusory? You've confused me now.

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the only choice that might be free from the pleasure/pain constraint would be an option between objects that are completely equal to each other, and to which you can not equate different values.

So a "free" choice would be a choice in which there is no actual choice at all (i.e. selecting between options that are not discernably different)?

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Originally posted by Renegade So "real" choice is actually the choice that is illusory? You've confused me now. So a "free" choice would be a choice in which there is no actual choice at all (i.e. selecting between options that are not discernably different)?

exactly

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