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Originally posted by Q5echo i had to take a break, but i just added much more to the second post. it's not mine i might add. look, the twisted Fir3start3r is right. it's to make a point. some of that stuff small potatoes, other stuff is major. most of that stuff is not debatable. i don't expect you to respond to all of it. some of that stuff is is worth discussing if you like. together it brings perspective. to give you even more perspective, that was just the month of August. i could have posted a similar report every month for the last year, just as lengthy as this was.

Sure, and I could post the crap that's on commondreams or dailykos on a daily basis and probably outnumber you 5 times to one. Now what exactly will that accomplish? What I posted was a strategic assessment from Marine intelligence operating in Iraq. Who gives a shit if we caught one more terrorist in August. It's just meaningless noise that does little to distract from the strategic assessment (by those who would know the best ) that we are heading in the direction of the shitter.

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the nature of an IED attack in Guerilla warfare, whether they be perpetrated by Saddam loyalist, Al-Queera wannabes, or Mahdi militiamen, gives very little in the way anticipation or prevention on the part of an exposed target like our soldiers. it is the perfect weapon as far as a Guerilla fighter is concerned. yes, we have anticipated and prevented literally thousands with the present force level. and yes we could have prevented even more with additional force, but with additional force would have been additional targets. what i am contending is that in your terms of -2500/capital could have easily been more thereby nullifying any advantage of your ideal business model of more troops. as a matter of fact we would have spent as much more in monetary capital sustaining twice as many troops with arguably the same result. what i have just conceeded (but have never argued against)is that yes, this was not anticipated by our administration.

And I'm contending that with a significant force deterrant in place, Al-Qaeda would have never been able to built up the capabilities to operate as freely as they do despite their being more "targets" to attack. We've lost the "political" battle which will prevent a military success. Furthermore I don't really buy the argument that having more "targets" over there will result in a greater cost. According to that line of reasoning who's to say that 120,000 isn't giving the terrorists too many "targets"? It's not like the majority of our hundred thousand + troops aren't going out on patrols on a daily basis. I highly doubt it's very difficult for Al-Qaeda to find American targets if they really decided to find them. With the population they don't have directly assissting them, they have the rest cowed in fear because frankly, who's going to protect them?

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he was Chief of Staff of the Army, but he was one General. everyone in the U.S Army who is under him that doesn't have positional authority answers to him. however, there are around a dozen other Generals in the Unified Commands including the Joint Chief. i wasn't there when they haggled out the force levels but i can pretty much guarantee you he and others like him were outnumbered in their opinion. no, you listen to your boss. and like i said, Shinseki was far from the final word or the only voice.

There is no higher rank in the Army other than the Joint Chief of Staff for the Army. The other joint chiefs are in command of other services. Do you really think that Sheldon, the JCS for the air force was in a better position to dictate to Shinseki what he could and could not do with his army? That doesn't make any sense whatsoever. Furthermore, we've all seen what this administration has done with dissenters whether it be appointments in the administration, generals in any forces, the pentagon, the state department, the CIA, etc (please don't make me dig up specific examples in each of these cases). Firing everyone around you until everyone agrees with you, or people are too scared to dissent does not make your judgement the best judgment in the real world.

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Originally posted by occrider Sure, and I could post the crap that's on commondreams or dailykos on a daily basis and probably outnumber you 5 times to one. Now what exactly will that accomplish? What I posted was a strategic assessment from Marine intelligence operating in Iraq. Who gives a shit if we caught one more terrorist in August. It's just meaningless noise that does little to distract from the strategic assessment (by those who would know the best ) that we are heading in the direction of the shitter.

i'm sorry but those reports were not pulled off of blogs. each one of those links is either and independent (impartial as best of my knowledge) news organizations (Arab, Iraqi and international) and milirary sources. i must repeat though, it's not my work. i try not to plagarize without credit.

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There is no higher rank in the Army other than the Joint Chief of Staff for the Army. The other joint chiefs are in command of other services. Do you really think that Sheldon, the JCS for the air force was in a better position to dictate to Shinseki what he could and could not do with his army? That doesn't make any sense whatsoever.

again i'm sorry but you're wrong about this one. your thinking one dimensional in terms of rank within the Army itself and the Joint Chiefs. CENTCOM and the other unified commanders fall directly under the SECDEF and are given orders by the President through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. the service component commanders are subordinate in operation to the COCOM.

Shinseki's opinion was not only in minority, but subordinate to the operational authority given by the President through the SECDEF. that is indisputable. besides, that you cannot sit there and tell me he was the only voice or the final word on this matter. you may not intend for it to sound that way, but thats what happens when you, and the left, and critics of the war hold him up to be being a 4 star General and nothing else.

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Originally posted by Q5echo i'm sorry but those reports were not pulled off of blogs. each one of those links is either and independent (impartial as best of my knowledge) news organizations (Arab, Iraqi and international) and milirary sources. i must repeat though, it's not my work. i try not to plagarize without credit.

Yea and where do you think dailykos or a lot of other biased sites (or did your source include all the bad things going on in Iraq such as this marine intelligence report??) pull their data? If you visit the site, it references articles from independant and impartial (as best of my knowledge) news organizations (Arab, Iraqi, and International). What's your point?

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again i'm sorry but you're wrong about this one. your thinking one dimensional in terms of rank within the Army itself and the Joint Chiefs. CENTCOM and the other unified commanders fall directly under the SECDEF and are given orders by the President through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. the service component commanders are subordinate in operation to the COCOM. Shinseki's opinion was not only in minority, but subordinate to the operational authority given by the President through the SECDEF. that is indisputable. besides, that you cannot sit there and tell me he was the only voice or the final word on this matter. you may not intend for it to sound that way, but thats what happens when you, and the left, and critics of the war hold him up to be being a 4 star General and nothing else.

I know that the JCS are subordinate to the Secretary of Defense and the Commander in Chief ... where the hell did I ever insinuate otherwise? Furthermore I know that the JCSs do not have operational control over the military. However, the Joint Chiefs constitute the second-highest deliberatory body for military policy, after the National Security Council. So please praytell, how am I holding him up to be a 4 star general and "nothing else"? Do I not understand the function of the JCS that you can explain to me in some way? To dismiss the arguments of a JCS is not to be taken likely, and in this case I don't understand why you're fighting this because Shinseski turned out to be right. Were you looking for operational commanders who dissented against the White House? There are plenty of high level army operational commanders such as those as well:

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washin...-generals_x.htm

The fact that you see so many former top commanders openly dissenting against this administration during a time of war is a rather disturbing sign in and of itself that perhaps you should take into consideration given the military's standard code of standing by their commander and chief in order to support the mission and the troops. Are we just dealing with a shitty crop of high level generals here? Is that your explanation for what's going on?

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Originally posted by occrider What's your point?

the good will not be marginalized if i can do anything about it. thats my point. you can do whatever you like with the bad.

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where the hell did I ever insinuate otherwise?

you didn't. you just have a fundamental misunderstanding about who has what pull and who doesn't have as much.

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Furthermore I know that the JCSs do not have operational control over the military.

yes they do. the question is how much and in what capacity during operational combat build-up inside a parallel command structure.

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However, the Joint Chiefs constitute the second-highest deliberatory body for military policy, after the National Security Council.

it's a parallel command structure that Shinseki was a player at the highest of levels but not the only one and within operational combat control was subordinate in his authority and opinion.

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So please praytell, how am I holding him up to be a 4 star general and "nothing else"?

how? have you taken into account all of the players at his level? no. you haven't.

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Do I not understand the function of the JCS that you can explain to me in some way?

yes.

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To dismiss the arguments of a JCS is not to be taken likely, and in this case I don't understand why you're fighting this because Shinseski turned out to be right.

since when has Shinseki turned out to be right? what is "right" during war? 2000 in lost capital or 4000 in lost capital? we know where we stand today but all you have is, "what if?" and you honestly don't know.

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Were you looking for operational commanders who dissented against the White House? There are plenty of high level army operational commanders such as those as well: http://www.usatoday.com/news/washin...-generals_x.htm

oh snap you got six people. all but one (Zinni) are subordinates. you must think that constitutes some insider majority or something.

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Are we just dealing with a shitty crop of high level generals here? Is that your explanation for what's going on?

we could be talking about just six shitty former generals here. i mean if they had the courage to come out now as critics of their former boss why haven't others?

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Originally posted by Q5echo the good will not be marginalized if i can do anything about it. thats my point. you can do whatever you like with the bad.

Ah I see, so you're the defender of the good from being marginalized yet you don't give two shits about any of the bad ... ONCE again what's the POINT? I don't give two shits about the minutia of the good or the bad. If the marines are saying things are going good and they are credible than fucking boo ya ... if they say things are going shitty and they are credible than we've got problems, that's my point, what's yours?

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you didn't. you just have a fundamental misunderstanding about who has what pull and who doesn't have as much.

Well than why don't you take the time to explain why I have a fundamental misunderstanding as opposed to merely taking the time to point out that I have a fundamental misunderstanding? FYI, I don't like to play fucking games.

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yes they do. the question is how much and in what capacity during operational combat build-up inside a parallel command structure.

What??? I'm going to have to ask you to be very explicit in your explanation here. They are prohibited by law from having operational control over the armed forces:

"Since its establishment in 1947, statute has prohibited the Joint Staff from operating or organizing as an overall armed forces general staff; therefore, the Joint Staff has no executive authority over combatant forces."
http://www.jcs.mil/cjs/jcs_mission_statement.html

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it's a parallel command structure that Shinseki was a player at the highest of levels but not the only one and within operational combat control was subordinate in his authority and opinion.

The JCSs are parallel to what exactly? I'm very curious because I've never heard of any parallel organization to the JCFs. Please elaborate. Are you saying that there is another instiution that is the second-highest deliberatory body for military policy? Out with it man.

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how? have you taken into account all of the players at his level? no. you haven't.

Yes I did. As I alluded to, there is a JCS of the navy, army, marine corp, and airforce. What other player "at his level" did I miss??? And yet I asked you as to whether any of these people, at "his level", could speak intelligently about the Army with them not being in the army. Well?

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yes.

This is your response to my question, "Do I not understand the function of the JCS that you can explain to me in some way?"

What? It was a serious question that you could have intelligently responded to with your unique (as you implied) insight, and the best you can come up with is a useless binary
response?

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since when has Shinseki turned out to be right? what is "right" during war? 2000 in lost capital or 4000 in lost capital? we know where we stand today but all you have is, "what if?" and you honestly don't know.

Did you not acknowledge that the military went in with too few troops for the purposes of invasion and occupation after the invasion? Are you saying that we didn't?

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oh snap you got six people. all but one (Zinni) are subordinates. you must think that constitutes some insider majority or something.

Yes well you seem to be the subject matter expert. Why don't you explain to everyone how insignificant 2 divisional commanders are (who implied other divisional commanders shared the same beliefs), the former Pentagon top operations officer, and the general in charge of training the Iraqi Army are besides the former JCS of the army and the former Commander of Chief CENTCOM.

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we could be talking about just six shitty former generals here. i mean if they had the courage to come out now as critics of their former boss why haven't others?

The Army is incompetant such that it has bred a high volume of shitty military men who have EXCELLED over the past 40 years to the point that they've reached general status and ultimately commanded thousands if not hundreds of thousands of troops? I'm not serious, but come on.

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Originally posted by occrider Do I not understand the function of the JCS that you can explain to me in some way?

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Well than why don't you take the time to explain why I have a fundamental misunderstanding as opposed to merely taking the time to point out that I have a fundamental misunderstanding? FYI, I don't like to play fucking games.

dude just stfu and listen.

Chain of Command
By the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, Congress clarified the command line to the combatant commanders and preserve civilian control of the military. The Act states that the operational chain of command runs from the President to the Se cretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. The Act permits the President to direct that communications pass through CJCS. This authority places CJCS in the communications chain. Further, the Act gives the Secretary of Defense wide latitude to assi gn the Chairman oversight responsibilities over the activities of the combatant commanders. Authority

The effective use of the nation's Armed Forces requires a unity of effort in the operation of diverse military resources. This goal is achieved through:


-strategic direction of the Armed Forces,
-operations under unified command,
-integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces,
-prevention of unnecessary duplication of efforts or resources, coordination of operations, and
effective combined operations.
-Commensurate with the responsibility placed on combatant commanders to achieve unity of effort, they have been given increased authority by law (Title 10, U.S. Code) and DOD Directive.

The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 makes the combatant commanders accountable to the NCA for performing their assigned missions. With this accountability comes the assignment of all authority, direction, and control that Congress considers necessary to execute the responsibilities of the combatant commanders. The Act defines the command authority of the combatant commanders to give authoritative direction to subordinate commands, including all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics:


-prescribe the chain of command within the command;
-organize commands and forces to carry out assigned missions;
-employ forces necessary to carry out assigned missions;
-coordinate and approve administration, support, and discipline; and
exercise authority to select subordinate commanders and combatant command staff.
NOTE: List not complete; see UNAAF (Joint Pub 0-2) page III-3.

This authority is termed "combatant command" and resides only in the combatant commander.

Combatant Command (COCOM)
Following an October 24, 2002, memo by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, the title of "Commander in Chief" (CINC) used for each of the four-star officer heading one of the Unified Combatant Commands was replaced by the more generic title of "Commander". As for example, "Commander, US Atlantic Fleet", or "Commander, US Central Command". Following this directive, the use of the term "Commander in Chief" and of the acronym "CINC" was to be used exclusively in reference to the President.
Combatant command (COCOM) is the command authority over assigned forces vested in the CINCs by Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 164, and is not transferable. COCOM is exercised only by the commanders of unified and specified combatant commands. It is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, ass igning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM furnishes full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the Combatant Commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

COCOM is not shared with other echelons of command. It should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations, normally the Service component commanders, subordinate unified commanders, commanders of joint task forces, and other subo rdinate commanders.

Directive authority for logistics supports the combatant commander's responsibility to execute effectively operational plans, maintain effectiveness and economy of operation, and prevent duplication of facilities and resources. Military Departments a re still responsible for logistics and administrative support of forces assigned or attached to the combatant commands.

In peacetime, the scope of the logistic and administrative authority exercised by the Combatant Commander is consistent with legislation, Department of Defense policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions and other specific conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the CJCS. The combatant commander refers disputes to the military department, if he fails to receive timely resolution there, the CINC may forward the matter through CJCS to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

During crisis or war, the Combatant Commander's authority and responsibility are expanded to include use of facilities and supplies of all forces under their command. Joint logistics doctrine developed by CJCS establishes wartime logistics policy.

The CINCs have approval authority over Service logistics programs that affect operational capability or sustainability within their theaters (e.g., base adjustments, force beddowns). Disputes in this area may be settled by the Secretary of Defense th rough CJCS.

Operational Control (OPCON)
Operational control is another level of authority used frequently in the execution of joint military operations. OPCON authority may be delegated to echelons below the combatant commander. Normally, this is authority exercised through component commande rs and the commanders of established subordinate commands. Limitations on OPCON, as well as additional authority not normally included in OPCON, can be specified by a delegating commander.

OPCON is the authority delegated to a commander to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction nece ssary to accomplish the mission. It includes directive authority for joint training. Commanders of subordinate commands and joint task forces will normally be given OPCON of assigned or attached forces by a superior commander. OPCON normally provides fu ll authority to organize forces as the operational commander deems necessary to accomplish assigned missions and to retain or delegate OPCON or tactical control as necessary. OPCON may be limited by function, time, or location. It does not, of itself, in clude such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training.

Tactical Control (TACON)
The term tactical control is used in execution of operations and is defined as: "the detailed and usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned."

Role of CJCS
The role of CJCS in the chain of command of the combatant commands is threefold: communications, oversight, and spokesman.

Communications between the NCA and the combatant commanders may pass through CJCS. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 permits the President to place the Chairman in the communications chain and the President has in fact directed th at such communications pass through the Chairman.
Oversight of the activities of combatant commands may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense to CJCS.
CJCS is the spokesman for the combatant commanders on the operational requirements of their commands.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires that forces under the jurisdiction of the Military Departments be assigned to the combatant commands, with the exception of forces assigned to perform the mission of the military department, (e.g., recruit, supply, equip , maintain). In addition, forces within a Combatant Commander's geographic area of responsibility fall under the command of the combatant commander except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

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Originally posted by Q5echo dude just stfu and listen.

Ummm did we not highlight my original statement that the "Joint Staff has no executive authority over combatant forces"? Or do they have operational control of the military (contrary to what I said) in spite of your highlights?

Look I'm finished with this for tonight. It's going nowhere productive.

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Originally posted by occrider Ah I see, so you're the defender of the good from being marginalized yet you don't give two shits about any of the bad

i do give two shits, but the bad isn't marginalized is it. thats what i thought.

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and the best you can come up with is a useless binary response?

yes. you should have waited.

Hehe ok this is fun maybe tonight isn't over.

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Originally posted by Q5echo i do give two shits, but the bad isn't marginalized is it. thats what i thought.

Oh yea ... what you thought, I'm marginalizing all the good marine intelligence reports about Iraq and solely focusing on the bad . Do you not understand that I don't give a shit about day to day operations? That I'm focusing on our strategic position in Iraq? As such I don't care about the terrorist that is caught or the Iraqi that is tortured and made public, I want to know where we fucking stand at the end of the day. Sorry if you can't realise the importance of an accurate risk/performance/efficetivness assessment.

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yes. you should have waited.

[/quote]

Why? You made your fucking post. And you obviously felt it was insuffcient for good reason. Good day to you sir.

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Originally posted by occrider Why? You made your fucking post. And you obviously felt it was insuffcient for good reason. Good day to you sir.

WTF? i was busy. i had to go do something. i knew what i wanted to post but had to find it first. sorry i didn't explain myself but i do get busy sometimes seeing as how i'm at work right now.

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Originally posted by occrider Ummm did we not highlight my original statement that the "Joint Staff has no executive authority over combatant forces"? Or do they have operational control of the military (contrary to what I said) in spite of your highlights?

if you would just read the Chain of Command i just posted you would understand that Shinseki, Zinni (who was nowhere f**king near the AOR in 2003) and the other four Generals were far from being the final authority or opinion on troop levels prior to Mar03.

Wolfowitz didn't just go off all willy nilly on his own recomendations to Congress or the President. he had help. plenty of it. from many players. not just Shinseki. i'm not taking anything away from his role in this but you guys just won't stop holding Shinseki up like he's the f**kin Messiah of combat operations. i think mainly, because thats all you guys have.

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Originally posted by Q5echo if you would just read the Chain of Command i just posted you would understand that Shinseki, Zinni (who was nowhere f**king near the AOR in 2003) and the other four Generals were far from being the final authority or opinion on troop levels prior to Mar03.

The four battlefield commanders were in the heart of the AOR to provide insight as to what was being done wrong after the war started. Shinseski and Zinni were some of most senior of army officials such that they are tasked to provide strategic military advise to civilians such as Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz before the war started. That's their jobs. Of course they're not battlefield commanders, I pointed out that fact myself. A fact that you attempted to discredit but have yet to provide any evidence that I misspoke when I said that the JCS don't have operational command of their respective services. They're strategic not tactical strategists.

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Wolfowitz didn't just go off all willy nilly on his own recomendations to Congress or the President. he had help. plenty of it. from many players. not just Shinseki. i'm not taking anything away from his role in this but you guys just won't stop holding Shinseki up like he's the f**kin Messiah of combat operations. i think mainly, because thats all you guys have.

Well let's forget altogether the willing ignorance this administration has demonstrated in heeding sound intelligence if it departs from their preconceived notions (such as WMDs for one). So Wolfowitz heeded the advice from all players involved (like the Iraqi National Congress) and Shinseki just sat at his desk and formulated his opinion without taking any input from anyone?? Give me a freaking break, you don't think Shinseki talked to top military commanders to forumulate his strategy? This guy rised up the ranks of the Army to become the JCS and he's a freaking idiot? Are you saying that these are the type of morons the army cultivates to the most preeminent army position?? And don't fucking pidgeon hole me into the arguments of others as you keep trying to do ... I don't hold Shinseki up like he's the "fucking Messiah of combat operations" if you had bothered to read my post that you keep trying to dispute, yet keep reaffirming when you respond to it, the JCS do not have operational command of their service branches. They are forbidden to.

No when I want to talk about operational SNAFUs committed by this administration after the war started I can simply refer to the Divisonal commanders (who ARE in the heart of the fucking AOR in 2003) who have spoken up against this administration. But who gives a fuck about a divisional commander ... they're only in command of 10,000-20,000 troops (10%-20% of the total fighting forces in the region) so wtf do they know? Or conversely I can bring up Bremer and/or Powell who both said there weren't enough troops, or I can simply reference the facts on the ground. Widespread looting and lawlessness after the invasion over the course of several months. Right, the entire region was destabilizing, Al-Qaeda was taking advantage of the chaos and amassing in record numbers, and yet this administration is doing everything right .

We have failed in Anbar province yet this administration escapes blame! So WHO is responsible? Are you telling me nobody is accountable for failure?

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