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-- Democrats trying to keep their word?
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| Originally posted by ResonantDrag this administration?  |
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| Originally posted by ResonantDrag this administration? |
yep.
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| Originally posted by MisterOpus1 Now that was a zinger! |
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| Originally posted by ResonantDrag Please protect me from the big, bad neo-con. his knowledge of government far exceeds that of my own, and i suspect he even knows a word that rhythms with orange. |
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| Originally posted by ResonantDrag hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha! stop making me laugh. it hurts. and yet part of me thinks you don't detect the irony of your statements |
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| Originally posted by Krypton Still waiting for an counter-point...don't care for the bullshit. |
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| Originally posted by ResonantDrag for the past 6 years, we have faced an administration that has taken liberties that far exceed what is constitutionally defined for the executive branch. |
shall we start with the alleged misuse of signing statements?
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| The Problem with Presidential Signing Statements: Their Use and Misuse by the Bush Administration By JOHN W. DEAN Presidential signing statements are old news to anyone who has served in the White House counsel's office. Presidents have long used them to add their two cents when a law passed by Congress has provisions they do not like, yet they are not inclined to veto it. Nixon's statements, for example, often related to spending authorization laws which he felt were excessive and contrary to his fiscal policies. In this column, I'll take a close look at President Bush's use of signing statements. I find these signing statements are to Bush and Cheney's presidency what steroids were to Arnold Schwarzenegger's body building. Like Schwarzenegger with his steroids, Bush does not deny using his signing statements; does not like talking about using them; and believes that they add muscle. But like steroids, signing statements ultimately lead to serious trouble. Relying On Command, Rather Than Persuasion Phillip Cooper is a leading expert on signing statements. His 2002 book, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action, assesses the uses and abuses of signing statements by presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Cooper has updated his material in a recent essay for the Presidential Studies Quarterly, to encompass the use of signing statements by now-President Bush as well. By Cooper's count, George W. Bush issued 23 signing statements in 2001; 34 statements in 2002, raising 168 constitutional objections; 27 statements in 2003, raising 142 constitutional challenges, and 23 statements in 2004, raising 175 constitutional criticisms. In total, during his first term Bush raised a remarkable 505 constitutional challenges to various provisions of legislation that became law. That number may be approaching 600 challenges by now. Yet Bush has not vetoed a single bill, notwithstanding all these claims, in his own signing statements, that they are unconstitutional insofar as they relate to him. Rather than veto laws passed by Congress, Bush is using his signing statements to effectively nullify them as they relate to the executive branch. These statements, for him, function as directives to executive branch departments and agencies as to how they are to implement the relevant law. President Bush and the attorneys advising him may also anticipate that the signing statements will help him if and when the relevant laws are construed in court - for federal courts, depending on their views of executive power, may deem such statements relevant to their interpretation of a given law. After all, the law would not have passed had the President decided to veto it, so arguably, his view on what the law meant ought to (within reason) carry some weight for the court interpreting it. This is the argument, anyway. Bush has quietly been using these statements to bolster presidential powers. It is a calculated, systematic scheme that has gone largely unnoticed (even though these statements are published in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents) until recently, when President Bush's used a signing statement to attempt to nullify the recent, controversial McCain amendment regarding torture, which drew some media attention. Pumping Up the Bush Presidency With Signing Statements Generally, Bush's signing statements tend to be brief and very broad, and they seldom cite the authority on which the president is relying for his reading of the law. None has yet been tested in court. But they do appear to be bulking up the powers of the presidency. Here are a few examples: Suppose a new law requires the President to act in a certain manner - for instance, to report to Congress on how he is dealing with terrorism. Bush's signing statement will flat out reject the law, and state that he will construe the law "in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties." The upshot? It is as if no law had been passed on the matter at all. Or suppose a new law suggests even the slightest intrusion into the President's undefined "prerogative powers" under Article II of the Constitution, relating to national security, intelligence gathering, or law enforcement. Bush's signing statement will claim that notwithstanding the clear intent of Congress, which has used mandatory language, the provision will be considered as "advisory." The upshot? It is as if Congress had acted as a mere advisor, with no more formal power than, say, Karl Rove - not as a coordinate and coequal branch of government, which in fact it is. As Phillip Cooper observes, the President's signing statements are, in some instances, effectively rewriting the laws by reinterpreting how the law will be implemented. Notably, Cooper finds some of Bush's signing statements - and he has the benefit of judging them against his extensive knowledge of other President's signing statements -- "excessive, unhelpful, and needlessly confrontational." The Constitutional and Practical Problems With Bush's Use of Signing Statements Given the incredible number of constitutional challenges Bush is issuing to new laws, without vetoing them, his use of signing statements is going to sooner or later put him in an untenable position. And there is a strong argument that it has already put him in a position contrary to Supreme Court precedent, and the Constitution, vis-�-vis the veto power. Bush is using signing statements like line item vetoes. Yet the Supreme Court has held the line item vetoes are unconstitutional. In 1988, in Clinton v. New York, the High Court said a president had to veto an entire law: Even Congress, with its Line Item Veto Act, could not permit him to veto provisions he might not like. The Court held the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional in that it violated the Constitution's Presentment Clause. That Clause says that after a bill has passed both Houses, but "before it become[s] a Law," it must be presented to the President, who "shall sign it" if he approves it, but "return it" - that is, veto the bill, in its entirety-- if he does not. Following the Court's logic, and the spirit of the Presentment Clause, a president who finds part of a bill unconstitutional, ought to veto the entire bill -- not sign it with reservations in a way that attempts to effectively veto part (and only part) of the bill. Yet that is exactly what Bush is doing. The Presentment Clause makes clear that the veto power is to be used with respect to a bill in its entirety, not in part. The frequency and the audacity of Bush's use of signing statements are troubling. Enactments by Congress are presumed to be constitutional - as the Justice Department has often reiterated. For example, take what is close to boilerplate language from a government brief (selected at random): "It is well-established that Congressional legislation is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality. See United States v. Morrison ('Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt.')." Bush's use of signing statements thus potentially brings him into conflict with his own Justice Department. The Justice Department is responsible for defending the constitutionality of laws enacted by Congress. What is going to happen when the question at issue is the constitutionality of a provision the President has declared unconstitutional in a signing statement? Does the President's signing statement overcome the presumption of constitutionality? I doubt it. Will the Department of Justice have a serious conflict of interest? For certain, it will. Should thus Congress establish its own non-partisan legal division, not unlike the Congressional Reference Service, to protect its interests, since the Department of Justice may have conflicts? It's something to think about. These are just a few practical and constitutional problems that arise when a president acts as if there is his government, and then there is the Congress' government. Signing statements often ignore the fact the only Congress can create all the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, and only Congress can fund these operations. And the power to create and fund is also, by implication, the power to regulate and to oversee. Congress can, to some extent, direct how these agencies will function without infringing on presidential power. Impact Of Presidential Signing Statements The immediate impact of signing statements, of course, is felt within the Executive Branch: As I noted, Bush's statements will likely have a direct influence on how that branch's agencies and departments interpret and enforce the law. It is remarkable that Bush believes he can ignore a law, and protect himself, through a signing statement. Despite the McCain Amendment's clear anti-torture stance, the military may feel free to use torture anyway, based on the President's attempt to use a signing statement to wholly undercut the bill. This kind of expansive use of a signing statement presents not only Presentment Clause problems, but also clashes with the Constitutional implication that a veto is the President's only and exclusive avenue to prevent a bill's becoming law. The powers of foot-dragging and resistance-by-signing-statement, are not mentioned in the Constitution alongside the veto, after all. Congress wanted to impeach Nixon for impounding money he thought should not be spent. Telling Congress its laws do not apply makes Nixon's impounding look like cooperation with Congress, by comparison. The longer term impact of signing statements is potentially grave - and is being ignored by the Bush administration. But it cannot be ignored forever. Defiance by Bush of Congressional lawmaking will come back to haunt this President. Watergate was about abuse of power. Nixon, not unlike Bush, insisted on pushing the powers of the presidency to, and beyond, their limits. But as Nixon headed into his second term with even grander plans than he'd had in the first term, the Congress became concerned. (And for good reason.) Bush, who has been pushing the envelope on presidential powers, is just beginning to learn what kind of Congressional blowback can result. First, there are the leaks: People within the Executive branch become troubled by a president's overreaching. When Nixon adopted extreme measures, people within the administration began leaking. The same is now happening to Bush, for there was the leak about the use of torture. And, more recently, there was the leak as to the use of warrantless electronic surveillance on Americans. Once the leaks start, they continue, and Congressional ire is not far behind. The overwhelming Congressional support for Senator John McCain's torture ban suggests, too, that Congress will not be happy if leaks begin to suggest the President - as his signing statement foreshadows - is already flouting the ban. In short, Bush's signing statements, which are now going over the top, are going to cause a Congressional reaction. It is inevitable. If Republican lose control of either the House or Senate - and perhaps even if they don't, if the subject is torture or an egregious violation of civil liberties -- then the Bush/Cheney administration will wish it had not issued all those signing statements. Indeed, the Administration may be eating its words - with Congress holding the plate out, and forcing the unconstitutional verbiage back down. That, in the end, is the only kind of torture Americans ought to countenance. |
Because George Bush Jr is such a wonderful up-holder of our governmental institutions. The words "checks and balances" aren't even in his vocabulary.
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| Originally posted by ResonantDrag aww. i could just squeeze your cheeks. for the past 6 years, we have faced an administration that has taken liberties that far exceed what is constitutionally defined for the executive branch. we've heard phrases such as "activist judges" to define any one who has tried to spell out the administrations rights to resemble checks and balances. and have had a congress that rubberstamped the president's policy. now that there has been a voter mandate telling bush and the neo-cons that americans want change, we hear screaming from the noise machine about one trip to the middle east. btw. personally, i don't believe pelosi has any right to go abroad. i just don't think that the far right has any right to try to define what she can or can't do until our president starts to represent the people and constitution he has sworn to protect. so please don't try to take the high road by giving 3rd grade civics lessons on checks and balances. this pot/kettle thing grows old. |
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| Originally posted by Krypton Somehow we're back to Bush. We're talking about Pelosi. The white house AND state department both were against her trip. But I guess if I don't believe in the "Bush is Hitler" camp, i'm supposed to shut up. |
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| Originally posted by Krypton Somehow we're back to Bush. We're talking about Pelosi. The white house AND state department both were against her trip. But I guess if I don't believe in the "Bush is Hitler" camp, i'm supposed to shut up. |
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| Originally posted by Krypton Somehow we're back to Bush. We're talking about Pelosi. |
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| Respondents from both parties expressed strong support for the recommendations released last week by the Iraq Study Group, which urged the administration to make a new diplomatic effort to engage Iraq's neighbors in stabilizing the country. By 64% to 28%, respondents favored the group's recommendation to open direct talks with Iran and Syria. "Dialogue is important in any resolution," said Terry Katz, 52, who runs a landscaping company in Cincinnati. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationw...-home-headlines |
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| 32. (HALF SAMPLE) Some people say (the United States should include direct talks with Syria as part of a regional dialogue about the situation in Iraq because Syria has influence in the region). Others say (the United States should not directly engage with Syria because the U.S. has identified Syria as a sponsor of terrorism.) What do you think? Do you think the United States should or should not hold direct talks with Syria about the situation in Iraq? Should include Syria in talks - 58 Should NOT directly engage with Syria - 37 No opinion - 5 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-sr...poll_121206.htm |
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| The white house AND state department both were against her trip. |
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| But I guess if I don't believe in the "Bush is Hitler" camp, i'm supposed to shut up. |
Legislators are not ambassadors..
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| Originally posted by Krypton Legislators are not ambassadors.. |
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| Originally posted by MisterOpus1 And did I mention that it's also in line with what the Bush-appointed Iraq Study Group's proposal led by Republican and long time Bush Sr. friend, James Baker? |
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| Originally posted by Q5echo you cannot possibly even pretend to mean Baker wanted the Speaker of the House, or even the leader of the opposition party, to communicate on behalf of the State Department. |
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| look i'm not that bent about this, really. as purely an academic dicussion of seperate powers there is a fair amount of criticism to be had. but what is done is done and i hope this doesn't set precedent for future administrations, Red or Blue. |
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| Originally posted by MisterOpus1 You mean the Democratic House leader alongside of Republicans? |
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| Perhaps a bit more dialogue between this Administration and it's Congressional members are in order |
Congress playing a key roll in opposing the executive branch in foreign policy? Why I've never heard of such a thing ... particularly conservatives advocating such a thing!
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Imperial conservatives? - argument against limiting Congress's power in foreign affairs National Review In the early Fifties, conservatives were combating the proto-Imperial Presidency, now the enemy of choice has become the Imperial Congress. But the way to resist a left-leaning, irresponsible legislature, the author contend,s is not to put more power in the hands of the Secretary of State. AMERICAN CONSERVATIVES have come a long way since 1952, when Ohio's Senator John Bricker introduced a constitutional amendment to restrict the President's treaty-making power. Perhaps they've come too far. Today nothing brings foam to the conservative mandible more reliably than a favorable allusion to the Boland Amendments or the War Powers Act, and cries against "congressional micromanagement" and "535 Secretaries of State" became watchwords among Washington conservatives during the Reagan Presidency. John Bricker certainly would never have endorsed either Boland or War Powers-both are stupid measures, the one as harmful as the other is frivolous-but he surely would have agreed with their basic assumption of legislative supremacy. The idea that the legislative branch has a vital role to play in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and the disposition of American troops was fundamental to the principles espoused by Bricker, Robert Taft, Barry Goldwater, and other spokesmen of the Right. Taft, in the words of Russell Kirk and James McClellan, asserted "the right and the necessity, in the American democratic republic, for Congress to participate with the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs," and "Mr. Republican" himself wrote in A Foreign Policy for Americans: If in the great field of foreign policy the President has the arbitrary and unlimited powers he now claims, then there is an end to freedom in the United States not only in the foreign field but in the great realm of domestic activity which necessarily follows any foreign commitments. In a recent issue of Policy Review, Representative Mickey Edwards undertook to articulate and defend the Taft-Bricker view that the U.S. Congress has a strong role in foreign policy. He did so with learning and eloquence, urging that the intent of the Framers and the conservative principles that "the separation of powers and the balance of powers were the greatest protectors of our freedoms" support his conclusion that "foreign policy is an arena in which the powers and responsibilities of the Congress and the executive share a poorly defined playing field, each with important roles to play." But Mr. Edwards's effort, valiant as it was, has generally been greeted ferociously by his conservative critics and colleagues. Nevertheless, conservatives ought to pause and re-trace the steps that have brought them close to being what Mr. Edwards calls "New Age monarchists." Constitutional arguments aside, there are plenty of sound pragmatic reasons for conservatives to defend a strong congressional role in foreign policy. Even under Mr. Reagan, conservatives in the Senate and House were vital in resisting efforts to circumvent the Taiwan Relations Act and adhere to the unratified SALT 11 treaty, among other silly State Department ideas. And senatorial efforts have not stopped there. Conservative Republicans like New Hampshire's Gordon Humphrey have been instrumental in pushing the Administration into greater support for the Afghan resistance. Moderate Democrats like Arizona's Dennis DeConcini have played similar roles with policies toward Angola's UNITA. Steve Symms, Orrin Hatch, the late John East, and Jeremiah Denton have all at one time or another (and Jesse Helms in some fields almost continuously) opposed executive-branch policies on arms control, trade with the Soviet bloc, and involvements with Latin America, southern Africa, and the Far East. If such congressional activities aren't "micromanagement," the term has little meaning. YET MOST conservatives, even while denouncing micromanagement, have applauded all these instances of it. Their view of who should run U.S. foreign policy seems to be approaching incoherence, and as Mr. Edwards warns, "conservatives need to remember that the powers we would give to a Ronald Reagan or a George Bush will someday be used by a Walter Mondale or a Michael Dukakis." Indeed, as recent history shows, these powers are already being used by a foreign-policy bureaucracy uncontrolled by elections and often independent of Congress and President alike. It's easy for conservatives today to defend virtually exclusive presidential powers in foreign affairs by citing not only left-wing congressional partisanism in foreign policy but also clear instances of legislative irresponsibility: security leaks, junketeering that compromises official U.S. policy, and general dithering, appeasement, and catering to special interests. But the conservative shift in perspective on Congress and the Presidency transcends current policy disputes and partisan bickering. It implies, logically and eventually in practice, a decisive erosion of some of the fundamental premises of conservative thought on which a good many conservative positions depend. |
good article. should we then expect the same contempt when it becomes a Demorat/liberal Administration and an opposition leader in dealings with sworn enemies of our trusted allies?
right or wrong, of course we should.
Listen, I didn't write up the official roles of governmental positions. I don't care how many people want extra dialogue with terrorists sponsors. It isn't anyone's role but those entitled to foreign relations. It IS NOT the legislative's role.
We don't need 400 secretaries of state. We have 1.
...more on the state department later..
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| Originally posted by Krypton It IS NOT the legislative's role. |
Hmmm so naturally criticism was rained down upon the Republican lead congress and Hastert in particular for his foreign policy sticking his nose where it don't belong mistakes:
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At the same time Congress was attaching human rights conditions to U.S. security assistance programs and negotiating a formal end-use monitoring agreement with the Colombian defense ministry, other lawmakers were secretly assuring Colombian officials that they felt such restrictions were unwarranted, and would work to either remove the conditions or limit their effectiveness. One example of this was a congressional delegation led by Rep. Dennis Hastert (R-IL) which met with Colombian military officials, promising to �remove conditions on assistance� and complaining about �leftist-dominated� U.S. congresses of years past that �used human rights as an excuse to aid the left in other countries.� Hastert said he would to correct this situation and expedite aid to countries allied in the war on drugs and also encouraged Colombian military officials to �bypass the U.S. executive branch and communicate directly with Congress.� In another cable (See Document 54) U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette decries the fact that a shipment of items destined for the military � which had been held up pending negotiation of an end-use monitoring agreement � arrived in Colombia while the Hastert delegation was in country, undermining Frechette�s leverage with the Colombian military leadership. http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAE...BB69/part3.html |
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