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-- Dangerous Cycle.
Dangerous Cycle.
this article isn't hawkish. i'm not as hawkish as a lot of you may think. the article is fairly non-partisaned IMO. it's fairly sane too.
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| Dangerous Cycle North Korea, Iran, and repetitive diplomatic failure. By Michael Rubin Ignoring both international calls for moderation and Washington�s warnings, North Korea launched seven missiles on July 4 and 5, including the long-range Taepogdong-2, which will be capable of delivering a nuclear payload to the United States. That the Taepogdong-2 apparently failed after 40 seconds is irrelevant; engineers test missiles to identify and rectify problems, and so each test brings them closer to their goal. The Bush administration denounced Pyongyang�s actions. �The United States strongly condemns these missile launches and North Korea�s unwillingness to heed calls for restraint from the international community,� a July 4 White House statement read. Unfortunately, recent U.S. diplomacy has undercut the value of such condemnation. Pyongyang need only look at Tehran for an understanding of how illusionary U.S. red lines are. Both North Korea and Iran�s nuclear diplomacy are testaments to how Western diplomats reward intransigence. Take North Korea: During a June 30, 2006, American Enterprise Institute panel, Danielle Pletka pointed out the pattern: On August 31, 1998, Pyongyang fired the Taepodong-1 missile over Japan. Three months later, U.S. officials held the first round of high-level talks in Pyongyang. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il demanded to be rewarded for ceasing his provocations. He was. The following year, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry visited North Korea to offer normalized relations and a lifting of economic sanctions if Pyongyang froze and eventually dismantled its long-range-missile program and stopped its missile exports. On September 17, 1999, President Clinton eased sanctions against the north. Two months later, a U.S.-led consortium signed a $4.6 billion contract for two Western light-water nuclear reactors for the Stalinist police state. The Clinton administration began shipping food aid to the famine-ridden north, which Pyongyang used to grease its war machine even as ordinary citizens starved. Having been given everything it had asked for, Kim Jong Il decided he wanted more. On July 1, 2000, he threatened to restart the nuclear program if Washington did not compensate it for electricity lost by delays in plant construction. Pyongyang then threatened to reverse course on its missile test moratorium. It did. On July 2001, it conducted a Taepodong-1 engine test. All the while, Kim Jong Il cheated. The Bush administration did not initially agree to accept North Korean smoke-and-mirrors. In October 2002, the Bush administration announced that Pyongyang had operated a covert nuclear-weapons program in violation of its 1994 agreement. Diplomats may celebrate treaties. Many who helped negotiate the 1994 Agreed Framework have meritorious service certificates framed on their wall. But agreements are meaningless if not adhered to, and seldom do autocracies stick to agreements if they gain more through noncompliance. The Iranian government has followed a similar pattern. In order to moderate hardliners and encourage Iran both to scale back terror financing and cease its obstruction of the Middle East peace process, the European Union pursued a policy of critical dialogue and engagement. It did not work. In 1992, the same year that Germany launched its critical engagement policy, Tehran purchased what it anointed the Shihab-2 missile from Pyongyang. The Shihab-3 missile, basically the North Korean Nodong-1 by another name, soon followed. Meanwhile, Europe�s dialogue continued. Between 2000 and 2005, the European Union almost tripled its trade with the Islamic Republic. But rather than invest its hard currency windfall in hospitals, schools, and civilian infrastructure, the Iranian leadership accelerated its military and nuclear programs. In March 2001, just a year after U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright lifted tariffs on Iranian products as an olive branch to the regime, Iranian president Muhammad Khatami traveled to Moscow to arrange a $7 billion arms purchase. The Iranian arms binge continued, even as Khatami promoted his Dialogue of Civilizations and his U.N. ambassador charmed U.S. officials. On September 24, 2005, the International Atomic Energy Agency found Iran to be in noncompliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty�s safeguards agreement. It may be fashionable to blame Bush and the War on Terror for all the Middle East�s ills, but the Islamic Republic built up its nuclear program during the terms of former presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Khatami (1997-2005), both of whom took advantage of Western na�vet� and the willingness of European governments to subordinate long-term security to short-term commercial interests. In a January 12, 2006, the foreign ministers of Great Britain, France, and Germany, along with European Union high representative Javier Solana issued a statement tacitly acknowledging the failure of years of engagement and dialogue with their Iranian counterparts. Their proposal to break the impasse? Further incentives. Without demanding either a firm timeline for negotiations or reaching agreement upon measures to be taken in event of Iranian noncompliance, Condoleezza Rice signed on. She directed U.S. negotiators to agree to a European request for Washington to offer Iran several hundred million dollars in nuclear and aviation technology. Today, Tehran refuses to give a direct answer, and instead demands more. Her State Department can talk about new deadlines and red lines, but the Iranian government has every reason to believe Rice will offer further concessions. In some quarters, concession is popular. The New York Times cheered both Warren Christopher�s concessions to Pyongyang and Rice�s outreach to Tehran. On October 19, 1994, the paper�s editorial board opined, �Diplomacy with North Korea has scored a resounding triumph,� while on June 3, 2006, it declared, �Smart diplomacy scored a rare victory inside the Bush administration this week.� But as the tests show, the North Korea model is one of failure, not success. Condoleezza Rice should not believe her own press. The White House should condemn Pyongyang�s provocations. But it should also recognize the process by which the Stalinist state acquired such capabilities. That the Bush administration now seeks to replicate the same process with the Islamic Republic is little more than dereliction. The future of Iran�s nuclear program lies in the North Korean crystal ball. � Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is editor of the Middle East Quarterly. |
Yea, I've never understood this cycle either.
Why do we reward those that break their agreements.
It's like choosing not to punish an errant child after specially giving them a set of easy to follow rules.
And the West wonders why we're having so many problems... 
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| Originally posted by Fir3start3r Yea, I've never understood this cycle either. Why do we reward those that break their agreements. It's like choosing not to punish an errant child after specially giving them a set of easy to follow rules. And the West wonders why we're having so many problems... |
You can point to the failures of incentive-based diplomacy all you like, but as NYC just said, I fail to see what the alternatives are. You could argue for taking a more hardline stance against the governments of North Korea and Iran, but that just runs the risk of driving them away from the negotiation table, severely limiting the courses of action available to us. So long as we can keep these governments in dialogue, we can keep the situation under control.
While I'm sure it will offend your sensibilities to acquiesce to madmen, if you want to see a peaceful resolution to these crises then you'll recognise the necessity of offering them incentives to begin complying with international protocol. The fact is, we are not in a strong negotiating position here: Iran and North Korea have nothing to lose by spurning world-opinion and developing nuclear weapons, but we do. They are aware that they hold all the cards here and that is why they can afford to act belligerently and make these demands. If we want to resolve this diplomatically, then we will necessarily have to make concessions. I know that it might be difficult to accept, but I think that's just the reality of the situation.
Besides, I'm curious as to why the author of that editorial places all the blame for the current situation at the feet of diplomacy. One could hardly look at the testament left by its alternative - military action - in the second half of the 20th century and suggest that it has produced many clear-cut successes either. In fact, one could almost look to the West's selective use of its military power during this period as a means of understanding exactly why North Korea and Iran are actively seeking out nuclear weapons now.
There has been much made about no two democracies ever going to war with other, but I think that the same could be said of any two countries with weapons of mass destruction. The North Korean and Iranian regimes recognise that the best way to protect their power from the threat of foreign intervention is to develop a nuclear weapon, which would act as a serious disincentive for the West - regardless of how ideologically opposed to these regimes they may be - to even make forceful threats, let alone carry them out. The misuse of military power under the current US administration has not only acted as an incentive for the other members of the "axis of evil" to speed up their WMD programs, but it also deprives western negotiators of a powerful bargaining chip: the credible threat of force. So long as the US military is stretched in Iraq and the American public weary of war, there is no possibility of the US employing force against either Iran or North Korea and the regimes of these countries know this. The failure of military action has forced our hand here: we have to negotiate and we have to negotiate from the weaker position. Complain about diplomacy all you want, but it really is the only option we have.
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| Originally posted by Renegade You can point to the failures of incentive-based diplomacy all you like, but as NYC just said, I fail to see what the alternatives are. |
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| The fact is, we are not in a strong negotiating position here |
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| In fact, one could almost look to the West's selective use of its military power during this period as a means of understanding exactly why North Korea and Iran are actively seeking out nuclear weapons now. |

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| There has been much made about no two democracies ever going to war with other, but I think that the same could be said of any two countries with weapons of mass destruction. The North Korean and Iranian regimes recognise that the best way to protect their power from the threat of foreign intervention is to develop a nuclear weapon |
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| The misuse of military power under the current US administration has not only acted as an incentive for the other members of the "axis of evil" to speed up their WMD programs, but it also deprives western negotiators of a powerful bargaining chip: the credible threat of force. So long as the US military is stretched in Iraq and the American public weary of war, there is no possibility of the US employing force against either Iran or North Korea and the regimes of these countries know this. The failure of military action has forced our hand here: we have to negotiate and we have to negotiate from the weaker position. Complain about diplomacy all you want, but it really is the only option we have. |
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| Originally posted by Renegade The misuse of military power under the current US administration has not only acted as an incentive for the other members of the "axis of evil" to speed up their WMD programs, but it also deprives western negotiators of a powerful bargaining chip: the credible threat of force. So long as the US military is stretched in Iraq and the American public weary of war, there is no possibility of the US employing force against either Iran or North Korea and the regimes of these countries know this. The failure of military action has forced our hand here: we have to negotiate and we have to negotiate from the weaker position. Complain about diplomacy all you want, but it really is the only option we have. |
was an abhorent failure. North Korea became mad because the current administration would not engage in the same free donations that took place under the prior administration. Someone finally told North Korea like it is and they did not appreciate that. I see no reason why they cannot sit down in a six party talks on the nuclear issue, instead they want to create a U.s. vs North Korea criteria so as to play on public opinions and anti-Americanism, the U.S. is not falling for that path.
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| Originally posted by Q5echo well for starters you have to find out what the hell is it he wants. simple, right? it is if your dealing with rationality. by all indicators it most definately isn't. do you know what he wants? or are we dealing with a 13 yr old boy in a 50 yr old man's body? your guess is as good as mine. |
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| no shit. in Iran's case we apparently are making concessions. |
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| i hope you wouldn't make the mistake of suggesting that the Bushitler doctrine instigated their nuclear desires. of course it's the West's fault. i blame Fermi myself ![]() |
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| pretty shallow argument. you think thats what Khomeni was thinking when he revived the Shah's nuclear program. or was it Israel? or was it Hussein? hmmm? |
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| again, a shallow argument that ignores history but hates Bush. bravo. a little more imagination would help. |
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| see, to "speed up" a process that started a decade ago in response to a doctrine set forth by a series of events that had nothing to do with the original purpose of the said process (if your argument is true that their nukes are for exclusively defensive purposes and not terror related)is the kind of hollow justification that Ahmadinejad would make if he were smart. you know what? he hasn't made it. |
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| Originally posted by NYCTrancefan One could also then assert that the acquiescence to North Korea under the Clinton Administration in giving them what they wanted while they in turn built weapons right under the nose of the U.N. who was in the country to "monitor" was an abhorent failure. |
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| Another can of worms then becomes that no one can criticize the U.S. and its Missile Shield policy and militarization of space after all it is just making sure that if the international community cannot stop weapons from being posessed by an unpredictable North Korea and Iran then the U.S. is forced to go ahead and rapidly develop the Missile Shield. See how the circle of assertions can become a 360 degrees argument. |
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