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Posted by occrider on Sep-11-2006 05:27:

Marines begin to acknowledge defeat in Anbar province ... big surprise

quote:

Situation in Anbar province called dire
Marines report says little U.S. military can do in western Iraqi region

By Thomas E. Ricks

Updated: 1 hour, 47 minutes ago
The chief of intelligence for the Marine Corps in Iraq recently filed an unusual secret report concluding that the prospects for securing that country's western al Anbar province are dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there, said several military officers and intelligence officials familiar with its contents.

The officials described Col. Pete Devlin's classified assessment of the dire state of Anbar as the first time that a senior U.S. military officer has filed so negative a report from Iraq.


One Army officer summarized it as arguing that in Anbar province, "We haven't been defeated militarily but we have been defeated politically -- and that's where wars are won and lost."

The "very pessimistic" statement, as one Marine officer called it, was dated Aug. 16 and sent to Washington shortly after that, and has been discussed across the Pentagon and elsewhere in national security circles. "I don't know if it is a shock wave, but it's made people uncomfortable," said a Defense Department official who has read the report. Like others interviewed about the report, he spoke on the condition that he not be identified by name because of the document's sensitivity.

Devlin reports that there are no functioning Iraqi government institutions in Anbar, leaving a vacuum that has been filled by the insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq, which has become the province's most significant political force, said the Army officer, who has read the report. Another person familiar with the report said it describes Anbar as beyond repair; a third said it concludes that the United States has lost in Anbar.

Devlin offers a series of reasons for the situation, including a lack of U.S. and Iraqi troops, a problem that has dogged commanders since the fall of Baghdad more than three years ago, said people who have read it. These people said he reported that not only are military operations facing a stalemate, unable to extend and sustain security beyond the perimeters of their bases, but local governments in the province have also collapsed and the weak central government has almost no presence.

Those conclusions are striking because, even after four years of fighting an unexpectedly difficult war in Iraq, the U.S. military has tended to maintain an optimistic view: that its mission is difficult, but that progress is being made. Although CIA station chiefs in Baghdad have filed negative classified reports over the past several years, military intelligence officials have consistently been more positive, both in public statements and in internal reports.

Devlin, as part of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) headquarters in Iraq, has been stationed there since February, so his report isn't being dismissed as the stunned assessment of a newly arrived officer. In addition, he has the reputation of being one of the Marine Corps' best intelligence officers, with a tendency to be careful and straightforward, said another Marine intelligence officer. Hence, the report is being taken seriously as it is examined inside the military establishment and also by some CIA officials.

Not everyone interviewed about the report agrees with its glum findings. The Defense Department official, who worked in Iraq earlier this year, said his sense is that Anbar province is going to be troubled as long as U.S. troops are in Iraq. "Lawlessness is a way of life there," he said. As for the report, he said, "It's one conclusion about one area. The conclusion on al Anbar doesn't translate into a perspective on the entire country."

Intense debate
No one interviewed would quote from the report, citing its classification, and The Washington Post was not shown a copy of it. But over the past three weeks, Devlin's paper has been widely disseminated in military and intelligence circles. It is provoking intense debate over the key finding that in Anbar, the U.S. effort to clear and hold major cities and the upper Euphrates valley has failed.

The report comes at an awkward time politically, just as a midterm election campaign gets underway that promises to be in part a referendum on the Bush administration's handling of the Iraq war. It also follows by just a few weeks the testimony of Army Gen. John P. Abizaid, the top U.S. commander for the Middle East, who told the Senate Armed Services Committee early last month that "it is possible that Iraq could move toward civil war."

"It's hard to be optimistic right now," said one Army general who has served in Iraq. "There's a sort of critical mass of tough news," he said, with intensifying violence from the insurgency and between Sunnis and Shiites, a lack of effective Iraqi government and a growing concern that Iraq may be falling apart.


"In the analytical world, there is a real pall of gloom descending," said Jeffrey White, a former analyst of Middle Eastern militaries for the Defense Intelligence Agency, who also had been told about the pessimistic Marine report.

Devlin, who is in Iraq, could not be reached to comment. Col. Jerry Renne, a spokesman for the U.S. Central Command, said Saturday that "as a matter of policy, we don't comment on classified documents."

Anbar is a key province; it encompasses Ramadi and Fallujah, which with Baghdad pose the greatest challenge U.S. forces have faced in Iraq. It accounts for 30 percent of Iraq's land mass, encompassing the vast area from the capital to the borders of Syria and Jordan, including much of the area that has come to be known as the Sunni Triangle.


The insurgency arguably began there with fighting in Fallujah not long after U.S. troops arrived in April 2003, and fighting has since continued. Thirty-three U.S. military personnel died there in August -- 17 of them Marines, 13 from the Army and three from the Navy.

A second general who has read the report warned that he thought it was accurate as far as it went, but agreed with the defense official that Devlin's "dismal" view may not have much applicability elsewhere in Iraq. The problems facing Anbar are peculiar to that region, he and others argued.

�Very candid, very unvarnished�
But an Army officer in Iraq familiar with the report said he considers it accurate. "It is best characterized as 'realistic,' " he said.

"From what I understand, it is very candid, very unvarnished," said retired Marine Col. G. I. Wilson. "It says the emperor has no clothes."

One view of the report offered by some Marine officers is that it is a cry for help from an area where fighting remains intense, yet which recently has been neglected by top commanders and Bush administration officials as they focus their efforts on bringing a sense of security to Baghdad. An Army unit of Stryker light armored vehicles that had been slated to replace another unit in Anbar was sent to reinforce operations in Baghdad, leaving commanders in the west scrambling to move around other troops to fill the gap.

Devlin's report is a work of intelligence analysis, not of policy prescription, so it does not try to suggest what, if anything, can be done to fix the situation. It is not clear what the implications would be for U.S. forces if Devlin's view is embraced by top commanders elsewhere in Iraq. U.S. officials are wary of simply abandoning the Sunni parts of Iraq, for fear that they could become havens for al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.

One possible solution would be to try to turn over the province to Iraqi forces, but that could increase the risk of a full-blown civil war, because Shiite-dominated forces might begin slaughtering Sunnis, while Sunni-dominated units might simply begin acting independently of the central government.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14757615/page/2/


This would appear to be a bad weekend for the bush administration given the findings of the Senate intelligence committee. Stay the course!!!


Posted by Renegade on Sep-11-2006 19:48:

But at least Iraq's nascent democracy is flourishing, right?

quote:
BAGHDAD � A parliamentary vote on a Shiite proposal to grant greater autonomy to Iraq's provinces was scuttled Sunday when Sunni Arab legislators, fearing it would divide and weaken the central government, threatened a walkout.

Shiite Muslim lawmakers say they want to add a provision to Iraq's nascent constitution that will allow them to replicate the level of autonomy that the northern region of Kurdistan enjoys.

"The session was postponed because we lacked a quorum," said Nasser Saadi, a lawmaker with the ruling Shiite alliance.

Under the plan, Iraq would be divided into federal regions whose borders largely would fall along ethnic or sectarian lines. Sunni Arabs complain that such partitioning would leave them with resource-poor areas in the west, such as Al Anbar province, whereas Kurds and Shiites would lay claim to vast oil reserves in the north and south.

[...]

Shiite legislators said they would try to vote again on the plan in coming weeks, and noted that their proposal aimed to destroy the legacy of Saddam Hussein, whose Sunni Arab regime centralized government authority in Baghdad.

[...]

Meanwhile, authorities in the predominantly Kurdish city of Mandali, 75 miles northeast of the capital, ordered Iraqi flags removed from government buildings. Kurdistan regional President Massoud Barzani started a national debate when he prohibited Kurdish government buildings from flying the new Iraqi flag, a variation on a design used during Hussein's rule.

[...]

Authorities on Sunday reported at least 34 deaths in insurgent and sectarian violence across Iraq.

In Baghdad, a car bomb exploded near a police patrol, killing an officer and injuring seven people. A bomb hidden inside a nylon bag exploded near a cellphone shop, killing five people and injuring 17 others.

In Baqubah, 35 miles north of Baghdad, a shootout between Sunni and Shiite gunmen left at least five people dead and 14 injured.

And in two separate incidents, gunmen killed a police general and two bodyguards, and two brothers who were police intelligence agents. Baqubah authorities said there were at least 20 sectarian killings over the weekend.


http://www.latimes.com/news/nationw...ack=1&cset=true

Can someone please tell me how a country this destabalised in the Middle-East could have possibly made the world safer? Or has the Bush administration abandoned that rationale now? (I think somewhere in between "stay the course" and "adapt to win" I began to lose track of their rhetorical fads.)


Posted by Purple on Sep-11-2006 23:55:

All this defeat is/was not possible without Anbar people's will to help 'terrorists' in Anbar province.


Posted by pkcRAISTLIN on Sep-12-2006 01:14:

whats the alternative to 'stay the course' though?


Posted by Q5echo on Sep-12-2006 01:23:

Re: Marines begin to acknowledge defeat in Anbar province ... big surprise

quote:
Originally posted by occrider
Stay the course!!!

you're goddamn right!


Posted by Q5echo on Sep-12-2006 01:29:

quote:
Originally posted by Renegade
Can someone please tell me how a country this destabalised in the Middle-East could have possibly made the world safer?

no, but i can tell you how a stabilized country can make the world safer. i don't have to tell you that, do i?

quote:
Or has the Bush administration abandoned that rationale now? (I think somewhere in between "stay the course" and "adapt to win" I began to lose track of their rhetorical fads.)

i wouldn't focus so much on the rhetorical fads.


Posted by josh4 on Sep-12-2006 04:57:

quote:
Originally posted by Q5echo
no, but i can tell you how a stabilized country can make the world safer. i don't have to tell you that, do i?

Yes, a stable Iraq could have the chance of making the world safer. But you're missing the point of the two major sources in this thread: A stable Iraq does not seem likely.


Posted by Q5echo on Sep-12-2006 05:03:

quote:
Originally posted by josh4
A stable Iraq does not seem likely.

to me it seems inevitable.


Posted by occrider on Sep-12-2006 05:18:

quote:
Originally posted by pkcRAISTLIN
whats the alternative to 'stay the course' though?


'Stay the course' advocates have been chiming the same tune since 2003 in the face of critics who advocated a number of different strategies such as sending more troops to provide more security to civilians, aggressively warding off political catastrophes such as torture by bringing transparent accountability, diligently eliminating corruption with Iraqi funds, etc. The alternative to 'stay the course' didn't necessarily have to be withdraw the troops. However, the longer we continue this retarded, unadaptive 'stay the course' strategy the more inevitable withdrawal becomes as the only alternative.

But you tell me, should we 'stay the course' when staying the course will continue to result in failures whereby our chances to secure the strongest insurgent area are "dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there"?

The continual loss of American lives and countless more billions of dollars down the drain towards a lost effort should not be an acceptable situation to any sensical individual. At least not any indivdual that has compassion for their fellow countrymen or has the business savy to demand competance for their tax dollars.


Posted by pkcRAISTLIN on Sep-12-2006 05:29:

quote:
Originally posted by occrider
'Stay the course' advocates have been chiming the same tune since 2003 in the face of critics who advocated a number of different strategies such as sending more troops to provide more security to civilians, aggressively warding off political catastrophes such as torture by bringing transparent accountability, diligently eliminating corruption with Iraqi funds, etc. The alternative to 'stay the course' didn't necessarily have to be withdraw the troops. However, the longer we continue this retarded, unadaptive 'stay the course' strategy the more inevitable withdrawal becomes as the only alternative.


ahh, well thats where we agree. i kindve assumed that there was stay & leave as the only two options. as for trying new strategies, well of course they should be looking at each and every option for stabilising the country. but i dont automatically think that because things are bad now they will always be so.

quote:
Originally posted by occrider
But you tell me, should we 'stay the course' when staying the course will continue to result in failures whereby our chances to secure the strongest insurgent area are "dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there"?

The continual loss of American lives and countless more billions of dollars down the drain towards a lost effort should not be an acceptable situation to any sensical individual. At least not any indivdual that has compassion for their fellow countrymen or has the business savy to demand competance for their tax dollars.


yes we should. all nations that were a part of the coalition of the willing have an obligation to see this through as long as it takes. remember, even had the US not invaded, any dictatorship is prone to civil war once a power vacuum develops. i hardly think the current state of affairs can be 100% laid at the feet of the americans, an iraqi conflict was inevitable whether after saddam, after saddam's son, or after saddam's second cousin twice removed loses power

i really dont think pulling out and leaving the iraqi people to "sort out their differences" is a very honourable option in the slightest. i must say i think the billions of dollars and the loss of american personnel is of a (distant) secondary concern when compared to the fate of a nation.

until someone can show me that the foreign presence is actually making things worse, i will always argue against leaving as i worry as to what might occur without the buffer (as impotent as they might be) between warring parties.


Posted by Renegade on Sep-12-2006 05:33:

quote:
Originally posted by Q5echo
to me it seems inevitable.


Hmmm... care to elaborate on that?

quote:
Originally posted by pkcRAISTLIN
whats the alternative to 'stay the course' though?



Posted by Q5echo on Sep-12-2006 05:42:

quote:
Originally posted by occrider
The alternative to 'stay the course' didn't necessarily have to be withdraw the troops. However, the longer we continue this retarded, unadaptive 'stay the course' strategy the more inevitable withdrawal becomes as the only alternative.

first off you, occrider, do not have an alternative. if you do, spit it out. second you do not know what we do, or in your words, are not doing to adapt. so you cannot determine what is or isn't the only alternative.

quote:
But you tell me, should we 'stay the course' when staying the course will continue to result in failures whereby our chances to secure the strongest insurgent area are "dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there"?

strategically, yes. tactically, no. and this one is going to be hard for you to swallow being where and who you are right now, but some fights are just hard to win. i'm not here knock you about being critical. hell, i encourage it. however, i don't think this leaked report gives gives anyone any licence to be cynical about Iraq as a whole.

quote:
The continual loss of American lives and countless more billions of dollars down the drain towards a lost effort should not be an acceptable situation to any sensical individual. At least not any indivdual that has compassion for their fellow countrymen or has the business savy to demand competance for their tax dollars.

your right, but what does that have to do with success? and i know you didn't just call your military incompetent.


Posted by Q5echo on Sep-12-2006 05:44:

quote:
Originally posted by Renegade
Hmmm... care to elaborate on that?

yes...i like the word "inevitable"


Posted by pkcRAISTLIN on Sep-12-2006 05:52:

quote:
Originally posted by Renegade
Can someone please tell me how a country this destabalised in the Middle-East could have possibly made the world safer? Or has the Bush administration abandoned that rationale now? (I think somewhere in between "stay the course" and "adapt to win" I began to lose track of their rhetorical fads.)


well, i think most of us would agree that the war in iraq was a monumental mistake. pointing that mistake out ad nauseum isnt really achieving much though is it? yes, it was mistake. now, lets move on and see what we can do to overcome it.

if, as you imply, the region is more dangerous post 2003 i dont see how pulling out the largest security force in the region is going to make anything safer.


Posted by Renegade on Sep-12-2006 06:07:

quote:
Originally posted by pkcRAISTLIN
well, i think most of us would agree that the war in iraq was a monumental mistake. pointing that mistake out ad nauseum isnt really achieving much though is it? yes, it was mistake. now, lets move on and see what we can do to overcome it.

if, as you imply, the region is more dangerous post 2003 i dont see how pulling out the largest security force in the region is going to make anything safer.


I'm not advocating a withdrawal of coalition forces though. We (and that includes Australia) have a legal and moral obligation to leave the country we invaded in a stable, functional state: I agree entirely. I'm not a military strategist - so I'm not sure how this might be acheived - but those whose job it is to develop these strategies (Rumsfeld etc.) don't seem to be too sure either and yet Bush sticks with them.

It's all very well to talk about "staying the course" or "adapting to win" but these are just empty platitudes. So long as the highest levels of the US defence force are crippled by incompetence - and whose only strategy seems to be criticising those who have the gall to point this out - I don't think this war can be won. Pointing out the original mistake of going to war in Iraq may be futile, but pointing out the continuing mistakes made the coalition in Iraq certainly isn't: if only the bastards would pull their heads from the sand and start to listen!


Posted by occrider on Sep-12-2006 06:32:

quote:
Originally posted by Q5echo
first off you, occrider, do not have an alternative. if you do, spit it out. second you do not know what we do, or in your words, are not doing to adapt. so you cannot determine what is or isn't the only alternative.


No of course I don't have an alternative. The fact of the matter is, is that I'm not privy to classified information that would allow me to make informed decisions until 2-4 years after the fact. Based upon the evidence that has been declassified however, I have no doubts that I can make better decisions than some of the decisions these nitwits in the white house have made however. There have been plenty of SNAFUs the white house should have seen coming, that they were warned about by commanders, and the white house either ignored or subsequentely sidelined and removed these commanders who had the balls to stand by their convictions.

quote:

Before the war, the Army chief of staff, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, said publicly that he thought the invasion plan lacked sufficient manpower, and he was slapped down by the Pentagon's civilian leadership for saying so. After Baghdad fell, Rumsfeld dismissed reports of widespread looting and chaos as "untidy" signs of newfound freedom that were exaggerated by the media. And some State Department officials complained that their attempts to plan for postwar Iraq were largely disregarded by the Pentagon.

The concerns about troop strength expressed by retired generals during the war provoked angry denunciations by Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In April 2003, Rumsfeld, for example, commented that, "people were saying that the plan was terrible, and . . . there weren't enough people, and . . . there were going to be, you know, tens of thousands of casualties, and it was going to take forever."

Now a version of that criticism has been made by a panel appointed by Rumsfeld himself. One of the major factors leading to the detainee abuse, Brown said yesterday, was "the expectation by the Defense Department leadership, along with most of the rest of the administration, that following the collapse of the Iraqi regime through coalition military operations, there would be a stable successor regime that would soon emerge in Iraq."

As Schlesinger, the panel's chairman, tartly put it, the leaders of the military establishment "did look at history books. Unfortunately, it was the wrong history." He said they tended to focus on the refugee problems that followed the 1991 war, rather, he implied, than on other conflicts in which internal turmoil has followed an invasion.

Strikingly, given that Rumsfeld has made agility, adaptability and speed his bywords in pushing the military to transform itself, the panel also faulted the Pentagon's leadership for a flat-footed response to the outbreak of the anti-U.S. insurgency in Iraq last summer.

"Any defense establishment should adapt quickly to new conditions as they arise," Schlesinger said. "And in this case, we were slow, at least in the judgment of the members of this panel, to adapt accordingly after the insurgency started in the summer of 2003."

He added, "There was a failure to reallocate resources once it was seen that there were severe problems at Abu Ghraib."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dy...-2004Aug24.html


Not to mention the criticisms rendered by General Zinni at the time of the invasion. This isn't hindsight 20/20 vision, these were criticisms handed down at at the time of invasion. So if I had this information back in 2003/2004, than fuck yea I have an alternative. Put more troops in to provide greater security, prevent looting, and prevent the vacumn that allowed Al-qaeda to build such a strong base of operations where they previously lacked such a strong infrastructure. If I had to hazard a guess right now what would be my alternative? Well how about moving the entire Iraqi Army into the Anbar province (with US support) while sending as MUCH US troops as it takes to secure the parts of the country the Iraqi troops used to be in ... meaning upping troop levels far beyond 100,000. Why?? Well it's not like I'm privy to good intel and ffs the status quo isn't working now according to the marines now is it? The argument that I can't criticize the administration for being incompetant because I don't have access to information that they have does not fly particularly since they have a long, sordid history of being retards as we are finding out day by day.

quote:

strategically, yes. tactically, no. and this one is going to be hard for you to swallow being where and who you are right now, but some fights are just hard to win. i'm not here knock you about being critical. hell, i encourage it. however, i don't think this leaked report gives gives anyone any licence to be cynical about Iraq as a whole.


I think it's a clear indication that what we have been doing is not working. Not that it's hard ... the report says far more than that.

quote:

your right, but what does that have to do with success? and i know you didn't just call your military incompetent.


How many successful business models continually pump funds into an investment until it "succeeds"? I'm at a turning point. I have very little confidence that Iraq CAN succeed under this administration given the past 4 years in Iraq. And unless there is evidence to suggest our military is composed of gomer pyle's I would hardly characterize them as being incompetent. But there is a breakdown in competence somewhere. Whether that's at the Pentagon or among senior commanders you take your pick.


Posted by Q5echo on Sep-12-2006 09:55:

quote:
Originally posted by occrider
Not to mention the criticisms rendered by General Zinni at the time of the invasion. This isn't hindsight 20/20 vision, these were criticisms handed down at at the time of invasion. So if I had this information back in 2003/2004, than fuck yea I have an alternative. Put more troops in to provide greater security, prevent looting, and prevent the vacumn that allowed Al-qaeda to build such a strong base of operations where they previously lacked such a strong infrastructure. If I had to hazard a guess right now what would be my alternative? Well how about moving the entire Iraqi Army into the Anbar province (with US support) while sending as MUCH US troops as it takes to secure the parts of the country the Iraqi troops used to be in ... meaning upping troop levels far beyond 100,000. Why?? Well it's not like I'm privy to good intel and ffs the status quo isn't working now according to the marines now is it? The argument that I can't criticize the administration for being incompetant because I don't have access to information that they have does not fly particularly since they have a long, sordid history of being retards as we are finding out day by day.

ok. if it's just your's an Shinseki's "business model" to invest even more assets/capital (troops) than we did gearing up for invasion, who's to say that even more assets/capital wouldn't have ended up casualties of the insurgency? because we know that the original troop levels were more than enough to capture the country in two weeks with or without our options given by Turkey.

fact: we went in with 130,000 in capital. how many casualties would we be talking about today with say 200,000 or 300,000 in capital as targets for the insurgency? would it be fair to say more than -2500/capital today? be honest. would you have stood by him then?



quote:
I think it's a clear indication that what we have been doing is not working. Not that it's hard ... the report says far more than that.

what would you say has worked? if not nothing



quote:
How many successful business models continually pump funds into an investment until it "succeeds"? I'm at a turning point. I have very little confidence that Iraq CAN succeed under this administration given the past 4 years in Iraq. And unless there is evidence to suggest our military is composed of gomer pyle's I would hardly characterize them as being incompetent. But there is a breakdown in competence somewhere. Whether that's at the Pentagon or among senior commanders you take your pick.

i don't like the business model metaphor, but you deal with it however you want to deal with it. however, saying "somebody is incompetent" is not really saying much though.


Posted by Q5echo on Sep-12-2006 10:27:

quote:
Originally posted by occrider
Not to mention the criticisms rendered by General Zinni at the time of the invasion. This isn't hindsight 20/20 vision, these were criticisms handed down at at the time of invasion. So if I had this information back in 2003/2004, than fuck yea I have an alternative. Put more troops in to provide greater security, prevent looting, and prevent the vacumn that allowed Al-qaeda to build such a strong base of operations where they previously lacked such a strong infrastructure. If I had to hazard a guess right now what would be my alternative? Well how about moving the entire Iraqi Army into the Anbar province (with US support) while sending as MUCH US troops as it takes to secure the parts of the country the Iraqi troops used to be in ... meaning upping troop levels far beyond 100,000. Why?? Well it's not like I'm privy to good intel and ffs the status quo isn't working now according to the marines now is it? The argument that I can't criticize the administration for being incompetant because I don't have access to information that they have does not fly particularly since they have a long, sordid history of being retards as we are finding out day by day.

there are well over 150,000 Iraqi troops spread out over the country at different levels of force readiness. (a hell of an accomplishment in one year i might add.) to up and move them all into Anbar province
and replace their presence with 100,000 fresh troops isn't impossible just not practical. thats just my opinion. i'm glad to see someone around here thinking though. Anbar is very large. we have 30,000 Marines and soldiers there already. just saying.

i never said being critical is a crime. apparently the status quo isn't working in Al-Anbar province. it may have given the impression it was working at one time, but not now. okay, adjust. it shouldn't be a referendum on the entire effort.


Posted by occrider on Sep-13-2006 03:56:

quote:
Originally posted by Q5echo
ok. if it's just your's an Shinseki's "business model" to invest even more assets/capital (troops) than we did gearing up for invasion, who's to say that even more assets/capital wouldn't have ended up casualties of the insurgency? because we know that the original troop levels were more than enough to capture the country in two weeks with or without our options given by Turkey.

fact: we went in with 130,000 in capital. how many casualties would we be talking about today with say 200,000 or 300,000 in capital as targets for the insurgency? would it be fair to say more than -2500/capital today? be honest. would you have stood by him then?


Less than today? For one if security was properly restored after the invasion unlike the lawlessness that ensued, Al-Qaeda wouldn't have had their honeymoon period to capitalize on the lawlessness, build their network, and induce the atmosphere of sectarian strife that is no doubt helping their recruiting efforts and encouraging non-Al-qaeda groups to launch terrorist attacks. But why does my opinion matter ... Shinseki was the Chief of Staff of the Army. Would you say he didn't know what he was talking about? And he was talking about post-war planning, not what it would take to invade:

quote:

SEN. LEVIN: General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a successful completion of the war?

GEN. SHINSEKI: In specific numbers, I would have to rely on combatant commanders' exact requirements. But I think --

SEN. LEVIN: How about a range?

GEN. SHINSEKI: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point -- something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground- force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment, to ensure that people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this.


Of course this was strongly rejected by Wolfowitz. Hmmm who do I listen to here ... Chief of Staff for the army or a freaking beurocrat?

quote:

what would you say has worked? if not nothing


There is an elected government in place, the Iraqi army is so far non-sectarian, and our troops have prevented a full blown civil war. How long this will continue for is debatable.


quote:

i don't like the business model metaphor, but you deal with it however you want to deal with it. however, saying "somebody is incompetent" is not really saying much though.


It says if these people can't get the job done than find someone who can. If nobody can get it done than it's time to start thinking about pulling out.

quote:

there are well over 150,000 Iraqi troops spread out over the country at different levels of force readiness. (a hell of an accomplishment in one year i might add.) to up and move them all into Anbar province
and replace their presence with 100,000 fresh troops isn't impossible just not practical. thats just my opinion. i'm glad to see someone around here thinking though. Anbar is very large. we have 30,000 Marines and soldiers there already. just saying.

i never said being critical is a crime. apparently the status quo isn't working in Al-Anbar province. it may have given the impression it was working at one time, but not now. okay, adjust. it shouldn't be a referendum on the entire effort.


Yes if this was the only thing going wrong than you would be right. However, in my estimation this is the end result of a series of catastrophic mistakes that have happened in Iraq since invasion. The result is I have virtually no confidence that this administration can make the right decisions that will result in a successful Iraq.


Posted by Q5echo on Sep-13-2006 05:47:

The Political Situation
Prime Minister al-Maliki >continues his push< for national reconciliation, largely ignored by the U.S. media:
quote:
National Reconciliation was the headline of talks during the visit of Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki to Mosul City in Ninawa Province. Before a crowd of political and social figures in addition to Heads of Tribes representatives, Al-Maliki underlined the importance of establishing a free Iraq where only freedom, justice and equality rule among the people regardless of their orientations after long years of oppression, tyranny and murder.


As part of his reconciliation effort, 40,000 soldiers in Saddam�s army >are now eligible< to serve in the new Iraqi army.

The prime minister has a long way to go, and >Iraq�s parliament< is expected to debate the issue of splitting Iraq into three independent zones in the coming weeks. The Sunnis have the most to lose from breaking Iraq up:
quote:
At the top of the agenda was the controversial issue of whether to allow Iraq�s provinces to merge into larger autonomous regions, a move which some Sunni Arab lawmakers fear could tear the country apart.

Other groups, however, strongly support a plan which would create virtually independent zones in the oil-rich Shi�ite south and Kurdish north, and leave Sunni Arabs economically isolated in the barren western desert.


As of this Sunday, debate on the federalism issue >was suspended.<

General Abizaid >recently said< that Iraq was �far from civil war.� His sentiment >was echoed< by Iraq�s national security advisor:
quote:
"This is absolutely not a civil war," Rubaie told Reuters in an interview during a visit to Japan. "Al Qaeda tried for that for three years and failed miserably. But it has created a crack between Shias and Sunnis."


Rubaie went on to credit the security crackdown in Baghdad for a drop in violence in the capital.

Jordan became the first Arab country to have an >accredited ambassador< in Iraq.

The media focused on the negative in the recent DoD report to Congress on Iraq, but there was >plenty of positive news< to be found, especially on the political front:
quote:
On the political side, the last quarter saw the national government getting on its feet, the assistant secretary said. In June, the parliament approved the three national security ministers, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki introduced a national reconciliation plan to the Council of Representatives and the council began tackling legislation particularly in the economic area. "The point is that you have a national government that is functioning," Rodman said. "It is a national government that includes the leaders of all the major communities."


The fact that the national government is functioning is "one relevant data point" that shows Iraq is not engaged in a civil war, he said.

On September 8, the >Iraqis assumed< operational control of their armed forces.

Clerics across Iraq >called for an end< to sectarian violence:
quote:
"We lost all our feelings. We are saying goodbye to our sons every day," said Khaled Hassnawi, a Sunni imam, in his sermon at the Sheik Abdul Kadir mosque in Baghdad. "Wherever you go, you see the blood of Muslims being shed. When will this time pass? When will those playing with this fate be satisfied?"

Speaking at the largest Shiite mosque here, Imam Sayed Nail Musawi said: "These adversities that you are seeing every day is like training for us. God is testing our patience. ... The incident in Najaf, who was killed? Poor people in the market. More than 30 were martyred. Najaf's sacredness was violated by this attack."


Unfortunately, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani has >made the decision< that it is futile to do so:
quote:
Hopes for a peaceful transition were further eroded when the most influential moderate Shiite leader in Iraq announced that he had abandoned attempts to restrain his followers.

Aides say Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is angry that thousands of Shiites are ignoring his calls for calm and are switching their allegiance to more militant groups that promise protection from Sunni violence.


>He warned< that continued violence could risk an increase in other armed groups.

Iraq�s deputy prime minister >said recently< that the parliament had resolved the issue of how to share Iraq�s oil revenues.

Security, Part I: The Iraqis Stand Up
If there is one thing to be gleaned from the following section, it is that the Iraqis are becoming increasingly capable of handling their own security, and that the media in this country is pretty much ignoring the story. Much of this section focuses on the work the Iraqis are doing to secure their country.

As of the first week of September, the >accomplishments< of Operation Together Forward include:
quote:
ISF and MND-B have cleared more than 36,000 buildings, 32 mosques and 26 muhallas, detained 42 terrorist suspects, seized more than 900 weapons, registered more than 184 weapons and have found 18 weapons caches. The combined forces have also replaced 444 doors, 18 windows and 656 locks damaged during clearing operations and have removed more than 17,000 tons of trash from Baghdad streets.


The number of Coalition troops in the north of Iraq >has been cut< in half over the last year, thanks to an intensive training program for Iraqi forces. There are now two Iraqi divisions and 35 battalions of Iraqi forces operating in the area, compared to just one nearly one year ago.

Responsibility for security in much of Kirkuk >was transferred< to the Iraqis on September 2.

Security handovers could >allow the British< to withdrawal half of their troops from Iraq by the middle of next year, and >Iraq�s president< said that all British troops could withdraw by the end of the year.

During >recent operations< against anti-Iraqi forces, the country�s security forces showed their ability to operate independently:
quote:
"Over the past 24 hours Baghdad and its outskirts witnessed a series of military operations carried out by security forces from the defence and interior ministries to achieve security and stability," Maliki's office said, according to AFP.

"The units in charge of the southern and middle Euphrates district, the 8th and 10th army divisions, killed 14 terrorists and arrested 98 of them along with 95 more suspects," the statement said.


>All Iraqi battalions< in Tal Afar are now in the lead of security operations.

The 4th Brigade of the 6th Iraqi army >assumed control< of a 322 sq. kilometers located in the �Triangle of Death.�

In Rawah, >Iraqi police< killed one of the area�s most-wanted terrorists during an independent operation.

In Baghdad, soldiers of the >9th Iraqi army,< operating independently, uncovered a large weapons cache inside a mosque:
quote:
The IA soldiers seized 20 AK-47 assault rifles, 55 AK-47 magazines, a PKC rifle and 600 PKC rounds.


In another independent operation, Iraqi soldiers >uncovered a cache< consisting of 93 artillery shells and 23 mortar rounds.

Iraqi-army soldiers >freed a kidnapped policeman< in Fallujah.

Iraqi soldiers and police, accompanied by coalition advisors, >captured the leader< of an IED-making cell in Mussayib.

Three top-tier terrorists >were captured< during raids by the Iraqi army:
quote:
Iraqi army forces conducted precision raids on three separate objectives Aug. 18 capturing three death squad leaders, all of whom participated in a massacre of Iraqi families in al Jihad on July 9th. As Coalition advisers provided support, Iraqi forces captured all three of these individuals in the Al Rasheed district without incident. The three captured terrorists are senior-level insurgent-cell leaders believed to be responsible for the July 9 ambush of Iraqi families at a checkpoint in the al Jihad area. Their cells are also believed to be responsible for kidnappings and murders in two Baghdad districts; improvised explosive device, or IED attacks in the city; and burning and looting local businesses. One of the individuals is also believed to be responsible for kidnapping and murdering Iraqi citizens and then attaching the bodies to cars and dragging them through the streets.


>A tip from a citizen< led Iraqi soldiers to a weapons cache being hidden in a mosque:
quote:
A tip from a concerned citizen led the soldiers to the weapons, which included seven AK-47 assault rifles, two PKC machine guns, two pistols, 20 fully-loaded magazines of 7.62mm ammunition, three handheld radios rigged as bomb detonators and a set of body armor.


>Also based on a tip,< Iraqi soldiers rescued a kidnap victim and uncovered a weapons cache:
quote:
The Iraqi citizen lead soldiers from 1st Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division, to a house where the victims and a weapons cache were located.

Inside the building they seized two rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 20 RPG rounds, nine RPG propellant charges, an AK-47, two sniper rifles and 12 hand grenades.

Two suspected terrorists were detained in connection with the kidnapping.


>Acting on a tip,< Iraqi soldiers detained three terrorists accused of murdering a local.

Soldiers from the 6th Iraqi Division >captured four terrorists< after searching a suspect�s vehicle and finding weapons and propaganda material.

Iraqi police and army troops >repelled< a coordinated terrorist attack in Mosul:
quote:
Mosul police officers and Iraqi soldiers defeated a complex attack by terrorists in eastern Mosul Friday morning. The attack included a suicide bomber using a vehicle-borne improvided [sic] explosive device, several IEDs and small arms fire.


Iraqi security forces >conducted a raid< in Sadr City, capturing three terror suspects:
quote:
As they received sustained automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenade, or RPG fire from several insurgent positions in the Sadr City neighborhood, Iraqi forces and coalition advisers detained three suspected insurgents, conducted intelligence gathering on the objective, and then departed the area.


Minimal violence >was perpetrated< against one million Shiite pilgrims making their way to a shrine in Baghdad, with security planned and executed by Iraqis:
quote:
The event occurred with relatively little violence; security for the celebrants was planned, led and executed by Iraqi Security Forces from the Iraqi National Police, Iraqi police and the Iraqi army, who worked together to safeguard those participating in the religious event.

Iraqi military and civil leaders provided a comprehensive security plan to ensure there would be no recurrence of violence that marred last year�s event. As a result, there were no major attacks, and the ISF was effective in containing violent elements.


A religious festival >in Karbala< drew millions of Shiite pilgrims. No major security incidents were seen.

>Nine raids< in August resulted in the arrest of more than 100 suspected terrorists.

>Iraqi soldiers< freed three kidnapped Iraqi policemen in Babil Province.

During >an early morning raid,< Iraqi forces captured a top terrorist facilitator:
quote:
Soldiers from the 4th Iraqi Army Division, assisted by coalition advisers, conducted a precision raid and captured this facilitator whose alleged involvement in fraud, local corruption and embezzlement provides support to terrorist operations in the area. Additionally, he is believed to be responsible for improvised explosive device, or IED attacks against coalition forces, including one attack that killed a U.S. soldier.


Just two days earlier, >Iraqi police< captured a terrorist weapons dealer in Baghdad.

The Iraqi army >uncovered< a large weapons cache in a mosque in Baghdad:
quote:
The weapons cache consisted of four PKC machineguns, 13 AK-47 assault rifles, two rocket-propelled grenade launchers, three RPGs, four RPG fuses, five 60mm mortar rounds, a 60mm mortar tube, a box of mortar cartridges, a flare gun, various bomb-making materials and terrorist propaganda.


Three leaders of death squads >were captured< by Iraqi forces, supported by coalition advisors:
quote:
Iraqi army forces conducted precision raids on three separate objectives in Baghdad on August 18 capturing three death squad leaders, all of whom participated in a massacre of Iraqi families in Al Jihad in July.


Iraqi security forces >captured a terrorist< wanted in the shooting of an American soldier and his interpreter:
quote:
Iraqi Security Forces, supported by Coalition advisors, conducted the intelligence-focused, precision raid at a two-story residence in the Mansour district, capturing their primary target without incident. This individual is believed to be responsible for the shooting death of one U.S. soldier and one interpreter in January.


Iraqi and coalition troops >captured the third most-wanted terrorist< in Adhamiyah:
quote:
The suspect taken into custody is believed to lead criminal elements, which have conducted deadly road side bombings against Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces, as well as sectarian murders and kidnappings that resulted in murder. He is believed to act as a financier, planner and director of those criminal activities in east Baghdad.


>In west Baghdad,< the Iraqi army arrested four terrorists and uncovered a weapons cache.

>Iraqi police,< along with coalition troops, stopped a terrorist attack on a police station in Mosul.

>Raids conducted< by Iraqi security forces led to the capture of three terrorists suspected of being members of an IED cell.

>A Saudi member< of al Qaeda and 14 other terrorists were detained during an operation in Ar Ramadi. Intelligence indicated that the group were planning multiple suicide bombings in the area.


Posted by Q5echo on Sep-13-2006 07:03:

cont.

Iraqis continue to sign up for the police, even though they are therefore targeted by the terrorists. >In Fallujah,< 950 recruits began a 10-week training program, and a >recruiting drive< netted 176. >In Ramadi,< a recruiting drive netted 395 recruits for the police. And >in Anbar Province,< more than 500 men signed up for the Iraqi police.

>According to Major General Joe Peterson,< the majority of Iraqi police are now trained, although equipment problems still plague them:
quote:
The Iraqi police included in that total are 90 percent trained and 83 percent equipped, according to Major General Joe Peterson.

The National Police - formerly the Special Police - are 98 percent trained and 92 percent equipped, according to Peterson, who gave a briefing along with Army Major General William Caldwell, spokesman for Multi-National Force - Iraq, from Baghdad, Iraq, August 14 via videoconference to the Pentagon.

Also included under the Interior Ministry are Department of Border Enforcement police, which are now 92 percent trained though just 56 percent equipped, Peterson said.


Security, Part II: American Forces Stay Busy
Coalition forces killed >a wanted terrorist< during a raid in Baghdad in late July:
quote:
The raid targeted an al-Qaida in Iraq terrorist leader who is known for vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks against Iraqi civilians, security forces and Coalition troops. This individual was a known bomb maker and weapons dealer and had significant links to several high level al�Qaida in Iraq leaders.


Another >series of raids< on July 29 led to the capture of two high-level al Qaeda leaders:
quote:
A recent detainee provided information that led the security forces to one of the terrorists, a top leader for the Al Dhuluiyah area. The targeted individual was reportedly the main planner for the attack against Peshmerga forces at a checkpoint in Al Dhuluiya in May 2006. Credible intelligence also ties the terrorist leader to other al-Qaida leaders in the area.

In a separate raid, security forces detained a principal financial and logistical coordinator for al-Qaida in the MosulMosul. [sic] area. He also was reportedly the leader of a terrorist cell responsible for kidnappings and executing vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) and IED attacks.


Four terrorists >were killed< in an air strike while planting IEDs.

>In Bayji,< a senior al Qaeda leader was captured.

A tip from an Iraqi citizen led Coalition and Iraqi soldiers to >a weapons cache< consisting of 18 mortar rounds.

A >tip from an Iraqi< led U.S. troops to a gas station in a neighborhood of Baghdad where they found and rescued a kidnapping victim.

Soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division >detained four kidnappers< and rescued one kidnapping victim in New Baghdad.

Soldiers of the 4th ID >killed a terrorist< digging a hole for an IED.

Soldiers of the 3rd Marine Regiment detained 40 insurgents in Anbar Province:
quote:
Some of the insurgents captured are known for intimidating the local populace, attacking Coalition and Iraqi forces, and providing logistical support to local insurgents. In one captured insurgent�s home, a Marine patrol discovered various materials used to construct improvised explosive devices (IEDs), an AK-47 assault rifle with multiple round cartridges and binoculars.

Furthermore, a U.S scout sniper team fired upon anti-Iraqi forces, which were firing upon a Marine M1A1 tank on a road in Haditha. Two of the insurgents were killed; one was critically wounded and medically evacuated to a U.S. military medical facility for treatment. This follows a day after a separate scout sniper engagement which resulted in one insurgent being killed while digging a hole in a spot where numerous IEDs have recently been discovered or detonated.


The 172nd Stryker Brigade uncovered >a huge weapons cache< in a Baghdad neighborhood:
quote:
The weapons and munitions seized included more than 580 mortar rounds, about 39,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, more than 100 rocket-propelled grenades, more than 270 rockets, two landmines, a shape charge, a crater charge, 11 fragmentation grenades, several machine guns, ammunition drums, 5,000 feet of detonation cord, mortar tubes and bipods, land mines, more than 50 rocket motors and various other bomb-making materials and ordnance.


>Sixty terrorists< with suspected ties to al Qaeda were captured during a raid in Arab Jabour:
quote:
The targeted individuals are believed associated with a senior al Qaida in Iraq leader in a cell that specializes in bomb making and VBIED attacks in Baghdad. The group has been reported to be planning and conducting training for future attacks like the attack in Mahmudiyah July 17 that killed 42 and injured 90 innocent Iraqis.


The Economy & Reconstruction
Over the >last three years,< 2,500 reconstruction projects have been completed, and more than 3,500 started.
quote:
Since April 2003, completed U.S. projects have increased potable water availability in Iraq to an estimated 4.2 million additional residents; an estimated 5.1 million additional people have access to sewage treatment.

U.S. projects have added or restored an estimated 2,700 Megawatts of electrical generation capacity to Iraq's electrical grid. Peak electricity generation in Iraq is currently around 4,900 megawatts compared to an average of 4,300 in 2002.


A trade fair was >held in Cairo< to encourage investment in Iraq. Eight companies and 250 individuals attended the conference.

Oil companies >are already maneuvering< to win lucrative oil contracts in Iraq, as Iraq announced that it would >increase output< to three million barrels a day by the end of the year.

In other oil news, Iraq >has issued< a tender for six million barrels of oil stored in Turkey, and a pipeline to that country >has been repaired,< allowing Iraq to begin exporting 700,000 barrels a day.

Iraq has inked a contract to sell 10,000 barrels of oil a day to Jordan.

A >Denver firm< is expected to win a contract to build a $750 million refinery in northern Iraq.

A German company signed a contract worth more than $137 million to build a metal pipe factory in southern Iraq.

The Basra International Airport is >to be designated< a free-trade zone.

The governor of Iraq�s Central Bank expects $120 billion of Iraq�s $146 billion debt to be cancelled by year�s end. Dr. Al-Shabibi said that Iraq cannot undergo reconstruction and development if the debt is not cancelled.

U.S. >civil-affairs personnel< restored water to the village of Jurn:
quote:
Thus, when on Aug. 22 U.S. civil affairs personnel in the village of Jurn opened a restored water well to residents, it was cause for celebration. The well will provide a source of clean drinking water to the community, and thus help curb the spread of water-related illnesses.


Humanitarian >assistance was provided< to residents of Adhamiyah by the 414th Civil Affairs Battalion:
quote:
�We�re showing the Iraqi people that we�re here to help them,� said Capt. Andrew Corbin, native of Austin, Texas, and civil affairs team leader with 414th CA Bn.

The DAC and Soldiers from the battalion contracted with area vendors to provide more than 15 generators to local leaders, school headmasters and business owners as well as more than 3,000 bags of food to families in the Adhamiyah district.

�We�re giving out food to those who are in need,� said Mohammed, a local resident and member of the DAC through an interpreter. �It�s good to be able to cooperate with the people of the city.�


Contracts to operate >142 walk-in clinics< throughout Iraq have been awarded:
quote:
Building an Iraqi health-care system based on outpatient clinics and primary care is a high priority of the Government of Iraq. To that end, all contracts for the 142 primary healthcare clinics in the country have been awarded, according to the Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The contracts � the last of which was awarded on 31 Aug 06 � total more than $185 million.


Soldier of the 4th ID came up with >an ingenious solution to the challenge of providing all Iraqis with potable water:
quote:
As a way to resolve the local water problem and prevent tragedies such as this, leaders from 1st Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, requested the help of a college professor to teach local Iraqi potters how to make clay/sawdust ceramic filter pots capable of decimating 99.88% of water-borne disease agents.


The Baghdad police academy >has been expanded< in order to speed up the training process:
quote:
Baghdad Police Academy�s capacity has been significantly expanded with a $73 million investment. When finished, the Academy will feature seven new classrooms, eight cadet barracks, six new instructor barracks, a new dining facility, library, forensic laboratory, range control building, firing ranges, guard towers, motor pool, warehouse, armory, contractor shop, renovations to existing buildings, and new site utilities (water, sewer, internal power grid).

The cadet barracks are designed to house 6 to 8 cadets per room, 400 cadets per building.


A new telecommunications center >is being built< in Baghdad. The $22.7 million project will provide jobs to more than 400 Iraqis.

The residents of the village of >Hor al Bash< benefited from a free medical clinic and the delivery of school supplies by U.S. soldiers:
quote:
�Our mission was to conduct a medical operation at the Tartawar Primary School and provide local citizens with free pharmaceuticals and screening for the day,� said Capt. William LeFever, civil affairs officer in charge from Company C, 414th CA Bn. �We supplied about $5,000 worth of pharmaceuticals purchased from a local pharmacy.�

The combined effort also provided the Soldiers an opportunity to deliver school kits to the Tartawar School as faculty and community members prepare for the upcoming school year, he added.


�Today, we provided this school with notebooks, folders, chalk, pens, pencils, water coolers and other supplies valued at more than $2,500,� he added.

>In Erbil,< a new water treatment plant is providing almost 1 million Iraqis with safe drinking water.

Nine electrical substations, >built by Iraqis,< went online recently in Diyala Province:
quote:
Built by local construction companies and over-watched for quality assurance by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, these nine substations provide power to newly constructed areas, neighborhoods, businesses and industry. Two of the nine are 400 kV substations and considered to be important components of the national electrical system, having a significant impact on the stability of the national grid.


The only secondary school for girls in Najaf Province >reopened< after extensive renovations:
quote:
During the renovation, a new water closet, with clean flowing water, and tiled floors was added. Two water fountains were placed in the school as well as new desks and chairs in each office and classroom. New windows were installed, which included screens, drapes, doors and ceiling fans.

Handrails were installed in each stairwell. Cement sidewalks were laid down between each building, and the entrance gate was replaced with steel doors and flanked by a seven-foot exterior brick wall to protect the perimeter of the school.

Crumbling walls were replaced and repainted and new electrical circuit breakers were installed to run power to a new air-conditioning system and fluorescent lighting that was installed throughout the buildings.


A free medical clinic >was provided< to the residents of Tahrir:
quote:
With tears welling up, a little Iraqi girl reacts to receiving a shot from a coalition forces medic that will clear-up her upper respiratory infection. While pain is minimal, the after effects will provide her with a more healthy start in her young life.

The little girl�s medical treatment was courtesy of the Soldiers from 4th Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 5th Iraqi Army Division and Soldiers from 1-68 Combined Arms Battalion, 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Task Force Band of Brothers, who jointly conducted a Medical Civil Action Project in the town of Tahrir; a town that is not used to readily available medical care.

A building in the town had been converted into a waiting room, pharmacy and doctor�s offices where one Iraqi doctor, Capt. Farhan, from 2nd Brigade, 5th Iraqi Army Division and one American Maj. Jeremy Beauchamp, battalion surgeon, 1-68 Cab, prepared to see patients.


An asphalt plant in Tal Afar is >being upgraded.< When work is completed in late 2006, the plant will be able to produce 100 tons of asphalt per hour.


Posted by occrider on Sep-13-2006 07:19:

What is this? Am I supposed to respond to all of that ogvh5150? Shall we trade mountains of blog postings detailing insignificant minutia going 50mph in both directions whilst never connecting in any meaningful way whatsoever? Sorry I don't have time for that.


Posted by Fir3start3r on Sep-13-2006 08:31:

quote:
Originally posted by occrider
What is this? Am I supposed to respond to all of that ogvh5150? Shall we trade mountains of blog postings detailing insignificant minutia going 50mph in both directions whilst never connecting in any meaningful way whatsoever? Sorry I don't have time for that.


True, but his point was made regardless.

There's a lot of stuff happening we'll never see in MSM.

Albeit bad and good however it's the good we almost never see...


Posted by Q5echo on Sep-13-2006 09:45:

quote:
Originally posted by occrider
What is this? Am I supposed to respond to all of that ogvh5150? Shall we trade mountains of blog postings detailing insignificant minutia going 50mph in both directions whilst never connecting in any meaningful way whatsoever? Sorry I don't have time for that.

i had to take a break, but i just added much more to the second post. it's not mine i might add.

look, the twisted Fir3start3r is right. it's to make a point. some of that stuff small potatoes, other stuff is major. most of that stuff is not debatable. i don't expect you to respond to all of it. some of that stuff is is worth discussing if you like. together it brings perspective.

to give you even more perspective, that was just the month of August.
i could have posted a similar report every month for the last year, just as lengthy as this was.


Posted by Q5echo on Sep-13-2006 11:16:

quote:
Originally posted by occrider
Less than today? For one if security was properly restored after the invasion unlike the lawlessness that ensued, Al-Qaeda wouldn't have had their honeymoon period to capitalize on the lawlessness, build their network, and induce the atmosphere of sectarian strife that is no doubt helping their recruiting efforts and encouraging non-Al-qaeda groups to launch terrorist attacks.

the nature of an IED attack in Guerilla warfare, whether they be perpetrated by Saddam loyalist, Al-Queera wannabes, or Mahdi militiamen, gives very little in the way anticipation or prevention on the part of an exposed target like our soldiers. it is the perfect weapon as far as a Guerilla fighter is concerned. yes, we have anticipated and prevented literally thousands with the present force level. and yes we could have prevented even more with additional force, but with additional force would have been additional targets. what i am contending is that in your terms of -2500/capital could have easily been more thereby nullifying any advantage of your ideal business model of more troops. as a matter of fact we would have spent as much more in monetary capital sustaining twice as many troops with arguably the same result.
what i have just conceeded (but have never argued against)is that yes, this was not anticipated by our administration.



quote:
But why does my opinion matter ... Shinseki was the Chief of Staff of the Army. Would you say he didn't know what he was talking about? And he was talking about post-war planning, not what it would take to invade:

he was Chief of Staff of the Army, but he was one General. everyone in the U.S Army who is under him that doesn't have positional authority answers to him. however, there are around a dozen other Generals in the Unified Commands including the Joint Chief. i wasn't there when they haggled out the force levels but i can pretty much guarantee you he and others like him were outnumbered in their opinion.




quote:
Of course this was strongly rejected by Wolfowitz. Hmmm who do I listen to here ... Chief of Staff for the army or a freaking beurocrat?

no, you listen to your boss. and like i said, Shinseki was far from the final word or the only voice.


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