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Marines begin to acknowledge defeat in Anbar province ... big surprise
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Situation in Anbar province called dire Marines report says little U.S. military can do in western Iraqi region By Thomas E. Ricks Updated: 1 hour, 47 minutes ago The chief of intelligence for the Marine Corps in Iraq recently filed an unusual secret report concluding that the prospects for securing that country's western al Anbar province are dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there, said several military officers and intelligence officials familiar with its contents. The officials described Col. Pete Devlin's classified assessment of the dire state of Anbar as the first time that a senior U.S. military officer has filed so negative a report from Iraq. One Army officer summarized it as arguing that in Anbar province, "We haven't been defeated militarily but we have been defeated politically -- and that's where wars are won and lost." The "very pessimistic" statement, as one Marine officer called it, was dated Aug. 16 and sent to Washington shortly after that, and has been discussed across the Pentagon and elsewhere in national security circles. "I don't know if it is a shock wave, but it's made people uncomfortable," said a Defense Department official who has read the report. Like others interviewed about the report, he spoke on the condition that he not be identified by name because of the document's sensitivity. Devlin reports that there are no functioning Iraqi government institutions in Anbar, leaving a vacuum that has been filled by the insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq, which has become the province's most significant political force, said the Army officer, who has read the report. Another person familiar with the report said it describes Anbar as beyond repair; a third said it concludes that the United States has lost in Anbar. Devlin offers a series of reasons for the situation, including a lack of U.S. and Iraqi troops, a problem that has dogged commanders since the fall of Baghdad more than three years ago, said people who have read it. These people said he reported that not only are military operations facing a stalemate, unable to extend and sustain security beyond the perimeters of their bases, but local governments in the province have also collapsed and the weak central government has almost no presence. Those conclusions are striking because, even after four years of fighting an unexpectedly difficult war in Iraq, the U.S. military has tended to maintain an optimistic view: that its mission is difficult, but that progress is being made. Although CIA station chiefs in Baghdad have filed negative classified reports over the past several years, military intelligence officials have consistently been more positive, both in public statements and in internal reports. Devlin, as part of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) headquarters in Iraq, has been stationed there since February, so his report isn't being dismissed as the stunned assessment of a newly arrived officer. In addition, he has the reputation of being one of the Marine Corps' best intelligence officers, with a tendency to be careful and straightforward, said another Marine intelligence officer. Hence, the report is being taken seriously as it is examined inside the military establishment and also by some CIA officials. Not everyone interviewed about the report agrees with its glum findings. The Defense Department official, who worked in Iraq earlier this year, said his sense is that Anbar province is going to be troubled as long as U.S. troops are in Iraq. "Lawlessness is a way of life there," he said. As for the report, he said, "It's one conclusion about one area. The conclusion on al Anbar doesn't translate into a perspective on the entire country." Intense debate No one interviewed would quote from the report, citing its classification, and The Washington Post was not shown a copy of it. But over the past three weeks, Devlin's paper has been widely disseminated in military and intelligence circles. It is provoking intense debate over the key finding that in Anbar, the U.S. effort to clear and hold major cities and the upper Euphrates valley has failed. The report comes at an awkward time politically, just as a midterm election campaign gets underway that promises to be in part a referendum on the Bush administration's handling of the Iraq war. It also follows by just a few weeks the testimony of Army Gen. John P. Abizaid, the top U.S. commander for the Middle East, who told the Senate Armed Services Committee early last month that "it is possible that Iraq could move toward civil war." "It's hard to be optimistic right now," said one Army general who has served in Iraq. "There's a sort of critical mass of tough news," he said, with intensifying violence from the insurgency and between Sunnis and Shiites, a lack of effective Iraqi government and a growing concern that Iraq may be falling apart. "In the analytical world, there is a real pall of gloom descending," said Jeffrey White, a former analyst of Middle Eastern militaries for the Defense Intelligence Agency, who also had been told about the pessimistic Marine report. Devlin, who is in Iraq, could not be reached to comment. Col. Jerry Renne, a spokesman for the U.S. Central Command, said Saturday that "as a matter of policy, we don't comment on classified documents." Anbar is a key province; it encompasses Ramadi and Fallujah, which with Baghdad pose the greatest challenge U.S. forces have faced in Iraq. It accounts for 30 percent of Iraq's land mass, encompassing the vast area from the capital to the borders of Syria and Jordan, including much of the area that has come to be known as the Sunni Triangle. The insurgency arguably began there with fighting in Fallujah not long after U.S. troops arrived in April 2003, and fighting has since continued. Thirty-three U.S. military personnel died there in August -- 17 of them Marines, 13 from the Army and three from the Navy. A second general who has read the report warned that he thought it was accurate as far as it went, but agreed with the defense official that Devlin's "dismal" view may not have much applicability elsewhere in Iraq. The problems facing Anbar are peculiar to that region, he and others argued. �Very candid, very unvarnished� But an Army officer in Iraq familiar with the report said he considers it accurate. "It is best characterized as 'realistic,' " he said. "From what I understand, it is very candid, very unvarnished," said retired Marine Col. G. I. Wilson. "It says the emperor has no clothes." One view of the report offered by some Marine officers is that it is a cry for help from an area where fighting remains intense, yet which recently has been neglected by top commanders and Bush administration officials as they focus their efforts on bringing a sense of security to Baghdad. An Army unit of Stryker light armored vehicles that had been slated to replace another unit in Anbar was sent to reinforce operations in Baghdad, leaving commanders in the west scrambling to move around other troops to fill the gap. Devlin's report is a work of intelligence analysis, not of policy prescription, so it does not try to suggest what, if anything, can be done to fix the situation. It is not clear what the implications would be for U.S. forces if Devlin's view is embraced by top commanders elsewhere in Iraq. U.S. officials are wary of simply abandoning the Sunni parts of Iraq, for fear that they could become havens for al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. One possible solution would be to try to turn over the province to Iraqi forces, but that could increase the risk of a full-blown civil war, because Shiite-dominated forces might begin slaughtering Sunnis, while Sunni-dominated units might simply begin acting independently of the central government. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14757615/page/2/ |
But at least Iraq's nascent democracy is flourishing, right?
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| BAGHDAD � A parliamentary vote on a Shiite proposal to grant greater autonomy to Iraq's provinces was scuttled Sunday when Sunni Arab legislators, fearing it would divide and weaken the central government, threatened a walkout. Shiite Muslim lawmakers say they want to add a provision to Iraq's nascent constitution that will allow them to replicate the level of autonomy that the northern region of Kurdistan enjoys. "The session was postponed because we lacked a quorum," said Nasser Saadi, a lawmaker with the ruling Shiite alliance. Under the plan, Iraq would be divided into federal regions whose borders largely would fall along ethnic or sectarian lines. Sunni Arabs complain that such partitioning would leave them with resource-poor areas in the west, such as Al Anbar province, whereas Kurds and Shiites would lay claim to vast oil reserves in the north and south. [...] Shiite legislators said they would try to vote again on the plan in coming weeks, and noted that their proposal aimed to destroy the legacy of Saddam Hussein, whose Sunni Arab regime centralized government authority in Baghdad. [...] Meanwhile, authorities in the predominantly Kurdish city of Mandali, 75 miles northeast of the capital, ordered Iraqi flags removed from government buildings. Kurdistan regional President Massoud Barzani started a national debate when he prohibited Kurdish government buildings from flying the new Iraqi flag, a variation on a design used during Hussein's rule. [...] Authorities on Sunday reported at least 34 deaths in insurgent and sectarian violence across Iraq. In Baghdad, a car bomb exploded near a police patrol, killing an officer and injuring seven people. A bomb hidden inside a nylon bag exploded near a cellphone shop, killing five people and injuring 17 others. In Baqubah, 35 miles north of Baghdad, a shootout between Sunni and Shiite gunmen left at least five people dead and 14 injured. And in two separate incidents, gunmen killed a police general and two bodyguards, and two brothers who were police intelligence agents. Baqubah authorities said there were at least 20 sectarian killings over the weekend. |
All this defeat is/was not possible without Anbar people's will to help 'terrorists' in Anbar province.
whats the alternative to 'stay the course' though?
Re: Marines begin to acknowledge defeat in Anbar province ... big surprise
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| Originally posted by occrider Stay the course!!! |
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| Originally posted by Renegade Can someone please tell me how a country this destabalised in the Middle-East could have possibly made the world safer? |
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| Or has the Bush administration abandoned that rationale now? (I think somewhere in between "stay the course" and "adapt to win" I began to lose track of their rhetorical fads.) |
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| Originally posted by Q5echo no, but i can tell you how a stabilized country can make the world safer. i don't have to tell you that, do i? |
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| Originally posted by josh4 A stable Iraq does not seem likely. |
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| Originally posted by pkcRAISTLIN whats the alternative to 'stay the course' though? |
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| Originally posted by occrider 'Stay the course' advocates have been chiming the same tune since 2003 in the face of critics who advocated a number of different strategies such as sending more troops to provide more security to civilians, aggressively warding off political catastrophes such as torture by bringing transparent accountability, diligently eliminating corruption with Iraqi funds, etc. The alternative to 'stay the course' didn't necessarily have to be withdraw the troops. However, the longer we continue this retarded, unadaptive 'stay the course' strategy the more inevitable withdrawal becomes as the only alternative. |
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| Originally posted by occrider But you tell me, should we 'stay the course' when staying the course will continue to result in failures whereby our chances to secure the strongest insurgent area are "dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there"? The continual loss of American lives and countless more billions of dollars down the drain towards a lost effort should not be an acceptable situation to any sensical individual. At least not any indivdual that has compassion for their fellow countrymen or has the business savy to demand competance for their tax dollars. |

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| Originally posted by Q5echo to me it seems inevitable. |
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| Originally posted by pkcRAISTLIN whats the alternative to 'stay the course' though? |
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| Originally posted by occrider The alternative to 'stay the course' didn't necessarily have to be withdraw the troops. However, the longer we continue this retarded, unadaptive 'stay the course' strategy the more inevitable withdrawal becomes as the only alternative. |
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| But you tell me, should we 'stay the course' when staying the course will continue to result in failures whereby our chances to secure the strongest insurgent area are "dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there"? |
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| The continual loss of American lives and countless more billions of dollars down the drain towards a lost effort should not be an acceptable situation to any sensical individual. At least not any indivdual that has compassion for their fellow countrymen or has the business savy to demand competance for their tax dollars. |
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| Originally posted by Renegade Hmmm... care to elaborate on that? |
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| Originally posted by Renegade Can someone please tell me how a country this destabalised in the Middle-East could have possibly made the world safer? Or has the Bush administration abandoned that rationale now? (I think somewhere in between "stay the course" and "adapt to win" I began to lose track of their rhetorical fads.) |
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| Originally posted by pkcRAISTLIN well, i think most of us would agree that the war in iraq was a monumental mistake. pointing that mistake out ad nauseum isnt really achieving much though is it? yes, it was mistake. now, lets move on and see what we can do to overcome it. if, as you imply, the region is more dangerous post 2003 i dont see how pulling out the largest security force in the region is going to make anything safer. |
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| Originally posted by Q5echo first off you, occrider, do not have an alternative. if you do, spit it out. second you do not know what we do, or in your words, are not doing to adapt. so you cannot determine what is or isn't the only alternative. |
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Before the war, the Army chief of staff, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, said publicly that he thought the invasion plan lacked sufficient manpower, and he was slapped down by the Pentagon's civilian leadership for saying so. After Baghdad fell, Rumsfeld dismissed reports of widespread looting and chaos as "untidy" signs of newfound freedom that were exaggerated by the media. And some State Department officials complained that their attempts to plan for postwar Iraq were largely disregarded by the Pentagon. The concerns about troop strength expressed by retired generals during the war provoked angry denunciations by Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In April 2003, Rumsfeld, for example, commented that, "people were saying that the plan was terrible, and . . . there weren't enough people, and . . . there were going to be, you know, tens of thousands of casualties, and it was going to take forever." Now a version of that criticism has been made by a panel appointed by Rumsfeld himself. One of the major factors leading to the detainee abuse, Brown said yesterday, was "the expectation by the Defense Department leadership, along with most of the rest of the administration, that following the collapse of the Iraqi regime through coalition military operations, there would be a stable successor regime that would soon emerge in Iraq." As Schlesinger, the panel's chairman, tartly put it, the leaders of the military establishment "did look at history books. Unfortunately, it was the wrong history." He said they tended to focus on the refugee problems that followed the 1991 war, rather, he implied, than on other conflicts in which internal turmoil has followed an invasion. Strikingly, given that Rumsfeld has made agility, adaptability and speed his bywords in pushing the military to transform itself, the panel also faulted the Pentagon's leadership for a flat-footed response to the outbreak of the anti-U.S. insurgency in Iraq last summer. "Any defense establishment should adapt quickly to new conditions as they arise," Schlesinger said. "And in this case, we were slow, at least in the judgment of the members of this panel, to adapt accordingly after the insurgency started in the summer of 2003." He added, "There was a failure to reallocate resources once it was seen that there were severe problems at Abu Ghraib." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dy...-2004Aug24.html |
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strategically, yes. tactically, no. and this one is going to be hard for you to swallow being where and who you are right now, but some fights are just hard to win. i'm not here knock you about being critical. hell, i encourage it. however, i don't think this leaked report gives gives anyone any licence to be cynical about Iraq as a whole. |
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your right, but what does that have to do with success? and i know you didn't just call your military incompetent. |
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| Originally posted by occrider Not to mention the criticisms rendered by General Zinni at the time of the invasion. This isn't hindsight 20/20 vision, these were criticisms handed down at at the time of invasion. So if I had this information back in 2003/2004, than fuck yea I have an alternative. Put more troops in to provide greater security, prevent looting, and prevent the vacumn that allowed Al-qaeda to build such a strong base of operations where they previously lacked such a strong infrastructure. If I had to hazard a guess right now what would be my alternative? Well how about moving the entire Iraqi Army into the Anbar province (with US support) while sending as MUCH US troops as it takes to secure the parts of the country the Iraqi troops used to be in ... meaning upping troop levels far beyond 100,000. Why?? Well it's not like I'm privy to good intel and ffs the status quo isn't working now according to the marines now is it? The argument that I can't criticize the administration for being incompetant because I don't have access to information that they have does not fly particularly since they have a long, sordid history of being retards as we are finding out day by day. |
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| I think it's a clear indication that what we have been doing is not working. Not that it's hard ... the report says far more than that. |
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| How many successful business models continually pump funds into an investment until it "succeeds"? I'm at a turning point. I have very little confidence that Iraq CAN succeed under this administration given the past 4 years in Iraq. And unless there is evidence to suggest our military is composed of gomer pyle's I would hardly characterize them as being incompetent. But there is a breakdown in competence somewhere. Whether that's at the Pentagon or among senior commanders you take your pick. |
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| Originally posted by occrider Not to mention the criticisms rendered by General Zinni at the time of the invasion. This isn't hindsight 20/20 vision, these were criticisms handed down at at the time of invasion. So if I had this information back in 2003/2004, than fuck yea I have an alternative. Put more troops in to provide greater security, prevent looting, and prevent the vacumn that allowed Al-qaeda to build such a strong base of operations where they previously lacked such a strong infrastructure. If I had to hazard a guess right now what would be my alternative? Well how about moving the entire Iraqi Army into the Anbar province (with US support) while sending as MUCH US troops as it takes to secure the parts of the country the Iraqi troops used to be in ... meaning upping troop levels far beyond 100,000. Why?? Well it's not like I'm privy to good intel and ffs the status quo isn't working now according to the marines now is it? The argument that I can't criticize the administration for being incompetant because I don't have access to information that they have does not fly particularly since they have a long, sordid history of being retards as we are finding out day by day. |
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| Originally posted by Q5echo ok. if it's just your's an Shinseki's "business model" to invest even more assets/capital (troops) than we did gearing up for invasion, who's to say that even more assets/capital wouldn't have ended up casualties of the insurgency? because we know that the original troop levels were more than enough to capture the country in two weeks with or without our options given by Turkey. fact: we went in with 130,000 in capital. how many casualties would we be talking about today with say 200,000 or 300,000 in capital as targets for the insurgency? would it be fair to say more than -2500/capital today? be honest. would you have stood by him then? |
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SEN. LEVIN: General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a successful completion of the war? GEN. SHINSEKI: In specific numbers, I would have to rely on combatant commanders' exact requirements. But I think -- SEN. LEVIN: How about a range? GEN. SHINSEKI: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point -- something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground- force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment, to ensure that people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this. |
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what would you say has worked? if not nothing |
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i don't like the business model metaphor, but you deal with it however you want to deal with it. however, saying "somebody is incompetent" is not really saying much though. |
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there are well over 150,000 Iraqi troops spread out over the country at different levels of force readiness. (a hell of an accomplishment in one year i might add.) to up and move them all into Anbar province and replace their presence with 100,000 fresh troops isn't impossible just not practical. thats just my opinion. i'm glad to see someone around here thinking though. Anbar is very large. we have 30,000 Marines and soldiers there already. just saying. i never said being critical is a crime. apparently the status quo isn't working in Al-Anbar province. it may have given the impression it was working at one time, but not now. okay, adjust. it shouldn't be a referendum on the entire effort. |
The Political Situation
Prime Minister al-Maliki >continues his push< for national reconciliation, largely ignored by the U.S. media:
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| National Reconciliation was the headline of talks during the visit of Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki to Mosul City in Ninawa Province. Before a crowd of political and social figures in addition to Heads of Tribes representatives, Al-Maliki underlined the importance of establishing a free Iraq where only freedom, justice and equality rule among the people regardless of their orientations after long years of oppression, tyranny and murder. |
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| At the top of the agenda was the controversial issue of whether to allow Iraq�s provinces to merge into larger autonomous regions, a move which some Sunni Arab lawmakers fear could tear the country apart. Other groups, however, strongly support a plan which would create virtually independent zones in the oil-rich Shi�ite south and Kurdish north, and leave Sunni Arabs economically isolated in the barren western desert. |
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| "This is absolutely not a civil war," Rubaie told Reuters in an interview during a visit to Japan. "Al Qaeda tried for that for three years and failed miserably. But it has created a crack between Shias and Sunnis." |
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| On the political side, the last quarter saw the national government getting on its feet, the assistant secretary said. In June, the parliament approved the three national security ministers, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki introduced a national reconciliation plan to the Council of Representatives and the council began tackling legislation particularly in the economic area. "The point is that you have a national government that is functioning," Rodman said. "It is a national government that includes the leaders of all the major communities." |
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| "We lost all our feelings. We are saying goodbye to our sons every day," said Khaled Hassnawi, a Sunni imam, in his sermon at the Sheik Abdul Kadir mosque in Baghdad. "Wherever you go, you see the blood of Muslims being shed. When will this time pass? When will those playing with this fate be satisfied?" Speaking at the largest Shiite mosque here, Imam Sayed Nail Musawi said: "These adversities that you are seeing every day is like training for us. God is testing our patience. ... The incident in Najaf, who was killed? Poor people in the market. More than 30 were martyred. Najaf's sacredness was violated by this attack." |
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| Hopes for a peaceful transition were further eroded when the most influential moderate Shiite leader in Iraq announced that he had abandoned attempts to restrain his followers. Aides say Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is angry that thousands of Shiites are ignoring his calls for calm and are switching their allegiance to more militant groups that promise protection from Sunni violence. |
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| ISF and MND-B have cleared more than 36,000 buildings, 32 mosques and 26 muhallas, detained 42 terrorist suspects, seized more than 900 weapons, registered more than 184 weapons and have found 18 weapons caches. The combined forces have also replaced 444 doors, 18 windows and 656 locks damaged during clearing operations and have removed more than 17,000 tons of trash from Baghdad streets. |
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| "Over the past 24 hours Baghdad and its outskirts witnessed a series of military operations carried out by security forces from the defence and interior ministries to achieve security and stability," Maliki's office said, according to AFP. "The units in charge of the southern and middle Euphrates district, the 8th and 10th army divisions, killed 14 terrorists and arrested 98 of them along with 95 more suspects," the statement said. |
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| The IA soldiers seized 20 AK-47 assault rifles, 55 AK-47 magazines, a PKC rifle and 600 PKC rounds. |
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| Iraqi army forces conducted precision raids on three separate objectives Aug. 18 capturing three death squad leaders, all of whom participated in a massacre of Iraqi families in al Jihad on July 9th. As Coalition advisers provided support, Iraqi forces captured all three of these individuals in the Al Rasheed district without incident. The three captured terrorists are senior-level insurgent-cell leaders believed to be responsible for the July 9 ambush of Iraqi families at a checkpoint in the al Jihad area. Their cells are also believed to be responsible for kidnappings and murders in two Baghdad districts; improvised explosive device, or IED attacks in the city; and burning and looting local businesses. One of the individuals is also believed to be responsible for kidnapping and murdering Iraqi citizens and then attaching the bodies to cars and dragging them through the streets. |
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| A tip from a concerned citizen led the soldiers to the weapons, which included seven AK-47 assault rifles, two PKC machine guns, two pistols, 20 fully-loaded magazines of 7.62mm ammunition, three handheld radios rigged as bomb detonators and a set of body armor. |
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| The Iraqi citizen lead soldiers from 1st Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division, to a house where the victims and a weapons cache were located. Inside the building they seized two rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 20 RPG rounds, nine RPG propellant charges, an AK-47, two sniper rifles and 12 hand grenades. Two suspected terrorists were detained in connection with the kidnapping. |
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| Mosul police officers and Iraqi soldiers defeated a complex attack by terrorists in eastern Mosul Friday morning. The attack included a suicide bomber using a vehicle-borne improvided [sic] explosive device, several IEDs and small arms fire. |
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| As they received sustained automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenade, or RPG fire from several insurgent positions in the Sadr City neighborhood, Iraqi forces and coalition advisers detained three suspected insurgents, conducted intelligence gathering on the objective, and then departed the area. |
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| The event occurred with relatively little violence; security for the celebrants was planned, led and executed by Iraqi Security Forces from the Iraqi National Police, Iraqi police and the Iraqi army, who worked together to safeguard those participating in the religious event. Iraqi military and civil leaders provided a comprehensive security plan to ensure there would be no recurrence of violence that marred last year�s event. As a result, there were no major attacks, and the ISF was effective in containing violent elements. |
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| Soldiers from the 4th Iraqi Army Division, assisted by coalition advisers, conducted a precision raid and captured this facilitator whose alleged involvement in fraud, local corruption and embezzlement provides support to terrorist operations in the area. Additionally, he is believed to be responsible for improvised explosive device, or IED attacks against coalition forces, including one attack that killed a U.S. soldier. |
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| The weapons cache consisted of four PKC machineguns, 13 AK-47 assault rifles, two rocket-propelled grenade launchers, three RPGs, four RPG fuses, five 60mm mortar rounds, a 60mm mortar tube, a box of mortar cartridges, a flare gun, various bomb-making materials and terrorist propaganda. |
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| Iraqi army forces conducted precision raids on three separate objectives in Baghdad on August 18 capturing three death squad leaders, all of whom participated in a massacre of Iraqi families in Al Jihad in July. |
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| Iraqi Security Forces, supported by Coalition advisors, conducted the intelligence-focused, precision raid at a two-story residence in the Mansour district, capturing their primary target without incident. This individual is believed to be responsible for the shooting death of one U.S. soldier and one interpreter in January. |
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| The suspect taken into custody is believed to lead criminal elements, which have conducted deadly road side bombings against Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces, as well as sectarian murders and kidnappings that resulted in murder. He is believed to act as a financier, planner and director of those criminal activities in east Baghdad. |
cont.
Iraqis continue to sign up for the police, even though they are therefore targeted by the terrorists. >In Fallujah,< 950 recruits began a 10-week training program, and a >recruiting drive< netted 176. >In Ramadi,< a recruiting drive netted 395 recruits for the police. And >in Anbar Province,< more than 500 men signed up for the Iraqi police.
>According to Major General Joe Peterson,< the majority of Iraqi police are now trained, although equipment problems still plague them:
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| The Iraqi police included in that total are 90 percent trained and 83 percent equipped, according to Major General Joe Peterson. The National Police - formerly the Special Police - are 98 percent trained and 92 percent equipped, according to Peterson, who gave a briefing along with Army Major General William Caldwell, spokesman for Multi-National Force - Iraq, from Baghdad, Iraq, August 14 via videoconference to the Pentagon. Also included under the Interior Ministry are Department of Border Enforcement police, which are now 92 percent trained though just 56 percent equipped, Peterson said. |
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| The raid targeted an al-Qaida in Iraq terrorist leader who is known for vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks against Iraqi civilians, security forces and Coalition troops. This individual was a known bomb maker and weapons dealer and had significant links to several high level al�Qaida in Iraq leaders. |
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| A recent detainee provided information that led the security forces to one of the terrorists, a top leader for the Al Dhuluiyah area. The targeted individual was reportedly the main planner for the attack against Peshmerga forces at a checkpoint in Al Dhuluiya in May 2006. Credible intelligence also ties the terrorist leader to other al-Qaida leaders in the area. In a separate raid, security forces detained a principal financial and logistical coordinator for al-Qaida in the MosulMosul. [sic] area. He also was reportedly the leader of a terrorist cell responsible for kidnappings and executing vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) and IED attacks. |
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| Some of the insurgents captured are known for intimidating the local populace, attacking Coalition and Iraqi forces, and providing logistical support to local insurgents. In one captured insurgent�s home, a Marine patrol discovered various materials used to construct improvised explosive devices (IEDs), an AK-47 assault rifle with multiple round cartridges and binoculars. Furthermore, a U.S scout sniper team fired upon anti-Iraqi forces, which were firing upon a Marine M1A1 tank on a road in Haditha. Two of the insurgents were killed; one was critically wounded and medically evacuated to a U.S. military medical facility for treatment. This follows a day after a separate scout sniper engagement which resulted in one insurgent being killed while digging a hole in a spot where numerous IEDs have recently been discovered or detonated. |
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| The weapons and munitions seized included more than 580 mortar rounds, about 39,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, more than 100 rocket-propelled grenades, more than 270 rockets, two landmines, a shape charge, a crater charge, 11 fragmentation grenades, several machine guns, ammunition drums, 5,000 feet of detonation cord, mortar tubes and bipods, land mines, more than 50 rocket motors and various other bomb-making materials and ordnance. |
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| The targeted individuals are believed associated with a senior al Qaida in Iraq leader in a cell that specializes in bomb making and VBIED attacks in Baghdad. The group has been reported to be planning and conducting training for future attacks like the attack in Mahmudiyah July 17 that killed 42 and injured 90 innocent Iraqis. |
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| Since April 2003, completed U.S. projects have increased potable water availability in Iraq to an estimated 4.2 million additional residents; an estimated 5.1 million additional people have access to sewage treatment. U.S. projects have added or restored an estimated 2,700 Megawatts of electrical generation capacity to Iraq's electrical grid. Peak electricity generation in Iraq is currently around 4,900 megawatts compared to an average of 4,300 in 2002. |
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| Thus, when on Aug. 22 U.S. civil affairs personnel in the village of Jurn opened a restored water well to residents, it was cause for celebration. The well will provide a source of clean drinking water to the community, and thus help curb the spread of water-related illnesses. |
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| �We�re showing the Iraqi people that we�re here to help them,� said Capt. Andrew Corbin, native of Austin, Texas, and civil affairs team leader with 414th CA Bn. The DAC and Soldiers from the battalion contracted with area vendors to provide more than 15 generators to local leaders, school headmasters and business owners as well as more than 3,000 bags of food to families in the Adhamiyah district. �We�re giving out food to those who are in need,� said Mohammed, a local resident and member of the DAC through an interpreter. �It�s good to be able to cooperate with the people of the city.� |
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| Building an Iraqi health-care system based on outpatient clinics and primary care is a high priority of the Government of Iraq. To that end, all contracts for the 142 primary healthcare clinics in the country have been awarded, according to the Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The contracts � the last of which was awarded on 31 Aug 06 � total more than $185 million. |
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| As a way to resolve the local water problem and prevent tragedies such as this, leaders from 1st Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, requested the help of a college professor to teach local Iraqi potters how to make clay/sawdust ceramic filter pots capable of decimating 99.88% of water-borne disease agents. |
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| Baghdad Police Academy�s capacity has been significantly expanded with a $73 million investment. When finished, the Academy will feature seven new classrooms, eight cadet barracks, six new instructor barracks, a new dining facility, library, forensic laboratory, range control building, firing ranges, guard towers, motor pool, warehouse, armory, contractor shop, renovations to existing buildings, and new site utilities (water, sewer, internal power grid). The cadet barracks are designed to house 6 to 8 cadets per room, 400 cadets per building. |
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| �Our mission was to conduct a medical operation at the Tartawar Primary School and provide local citizens with free pharmaceuticals and screening for the day,� said Capt. William LeFever, civil affairs officer in charge from Company C, 414th CA Bn. �We supplied about $5,000 worth of pharmaceuticals purchased from a local pharmacy.� The combined effort also provided the Soldiers an opportunity to deliver school kits to the Tartawar School as faculty and community members prepare for the upcoming school year, he added. |
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| Built by local construction companies and over-watched for quality assurance by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, these nine substations provide power to newly constructed areas, neighborhoods, businesses and industry. Two of the nine are 400 kV substations and considered to be important components of the national electrical system, having a significant impact on the stability of the national grid. |
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| During the renovation, a new water closet, with clean flowing water, and tiled floors was added. Two water fountains were placed in the school as well as new desks and chairs in each office and classroom. New windows were installed, which included screens, drapes, doors and ceiling fans. Handrails were installed in each stairwell. Cement sidewalks were laid down between each building, and the entrance gate was replaced with steel doors and flanked by a seven-foot exterior brick wall to protect the perimeter of the school. Crumbling walls were replaced and repainted and new electrical circuit breakers were installed to run power to a new air-conditioning system and fluorescent lighting that was installed throughout the buildings. |
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| With tears welling up, a little Iraqi girl reacts to receiving a shot from a coalition forces medic that will clear-up her upper respiratory infection. While pain is minimal, the after effects will provide her with a more healthy start in her young life. The little girl�s medical treatment was courtesy of the Soldiers from 4th Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 5th Iraqi Army Division and Soldiers from 1-68 Combined Arms Battalion, 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Task Force Band of Brothers, who jointly conducted a Medical Civil Action Project in the town of Tahrir; a town that is not used to readily available medical care. A building in the town had been converted into a waiting room, pharmacy and doctor�s offices where one Iraqi doctor, Capt. Farhan, from 2nd Brigade, 5th Iraqi Army Division and one American Maj. Jeremy Beauchamp, battalion surgeon, 1-68 Cab, prepared to see patients. |
What is this? Am I supposed to respond to all of that ogvh5150? Shall we trade mountains of blog postings detailing insignificant minutia going 50mph in both directions whilst never connecting in any meaningful way whatsoever? Sorry I don't have time for that.
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| Originally posted by occrider What is this? Am I supposed to respond to all of that ogvh5150? Shall we trade mountains of blog postings detailing insignificant minutia going 50mph in both directions whilst never connecting in any meaningful way whatsoever? Sorry I don't have time for that. |
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| Originally posted by occrider What is this? Am I supposed to respond to all of that ogvh5150? Shall we trade mountains of blog postings detailing insignificant minutia going 50mph in both directions whilst never connecting in any meaningful way whatsoever? Sorry I don't have time for that. |
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| Originally posted by occrider Less than today? For one if security was properly restored after the invasion unlike the lawlessness that ensued, Al-Qaeda wouldn't have had their honeymoon period to capitalize on the lawlessness, build their network, and induce the atmosphere of sectarian strife that is no doubt helping their recruiting efforts and encouraging non-Al-qaeda groups to launch terrorist attacks. |
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| But why does my opinion matter ... Shinseki was the Chief of Staff of the Army. Would you say he didn't know what he was talking about? And he was talking about post-war planning, not what it would take to invade: |
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| Of course this was strongly rejected by Wolfowitz. Hmmm who do I listen to here ... Chief of Staff for the army or a freaking beurocrat? |
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