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-- Attention Webdesigners! HTML virus!
Attention Webdesigners! HTML virus!
Today a guy told me (work m8) that all of his homepages where deleted because of the NEW nimda virus that has been created....it infects all your HTML sites and you will have to delete them! I will try to find somewhere to upload the virus program for U all.....stay alert!
What do you mean HTML virus? That's impossible... HTML is just a scripting language, its harmless... it would have to be something serverside like perl or php...
It infects all files with the extension .html....
That's just one of the benifits of doing a site all in .swf (FLASH)!! 
| quote: |
| Originally posted by Stylez That's just one of the benifits of doing a site all in .swf (FLASH)!! |
Hummm, well thanx for the info, there is ways of locking the script, but this sounds like it will b hard to stop
Nimda - Admin
I remember this one
Nimda is Admin spelt backwards for all you dummies , it scans this
GET /scripts/root.exe?/c+dir
GET /MSADC/root.exe?/c+dir
GET /c/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /d/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /_vti_bin/..%5c../..%5c../..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /_mem_bin/..%5c../..%5c../..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /msadc/..%5c../..%5c../..%5c/..\xc1\x1c../..\xc1\x1c../..\xc1\x1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..\xc1\x1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..\xc0/../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..\xc0\xaf../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..\xc1\x9c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..%35c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..%35c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..%2f../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
Note: The first four entries in these sample logs denote attempts to connect to the backdoor left by Code Red II, while the remaining log entries are examples of exploit attempts for the Directory Traversal vulnerability.
Payload
The email addresses targeted for receiving the worm are harvested from two sources
the .htm and .html files in the user's web cache folder
the contents of the user's email messages retrieved via the MAPI service
These files are passed through a simple pattern matcher which collects strings that look like email addresses. These addresses then receive a copy of the worm as a MIME-encoded email attachment. Nimda stores the time the last batch of emails were sent in the Windows registry, and every 10 days will repeat the process of harvesting addresses and sending the worm via email.
Likewise, the client machines begin scanning for vulnerable IIS servers. Nimda looks for backdoors left by previous IIS worms: Code Red II [IN-2001-09] and sadmind/IIS worm [CA-2001-11]. It also attempts to exploit various IIS Directory Traversal vulnerabilities (VU#111677 and CA-2001-12). The selection of potential target IP addresses follows these rough probabilities:
50% of the time, an address with the same first two octets will be chosen
25% of the time, an address with the same first octet will be chosen
25% of the time, a random address will be chosen
The infected client machine attempts to transfer a copy of the Nimda code via tftp (69/UDP) to any IIS server that it scans and finds to be vulnerable.
Once running on the server machine, the worm traverses each directory in the system (including all those accessible through file shares) and writes a MIME-encoded copy of itself to disk using file names with .eml or .nws extensions (e.g., readme.eml). When a directory containing web content (e.g., HTML or ASP files) is found, the following snippet of Javascript code is appended to every one of these web-related files:
This modification of web content allows further propagation of the worm to new clients through a web browser or through the browsing of a network file system.
In order to further expose the machine, the worm
enables the sharing of the c: drive as C$
creates a "Guest" account on Windows NT and 2000 systems
adds this account to the "Administrator" group.
Furthermore, the Nimda worm infects existing binaries on the system by creating Trojan horse copies of legitimate applications. These Trojan horse versions of the applications will first execute the Nimda code (further infecting the system and potentially propagating the worm), and then complete their intended function.
ok i got the infection process but how do we sheild ourselves from it?
any ideas?
Re: Nimda - Admin
| quote: |
| Originally posted by DJ RozzeR I remember this one Nimda is Admin spelt backwards for all you dummies , it scans this GET /scripts/root.exe?/c+dir GET /MSADC/root.exe?/c+dir GET /c/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /d/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /_vti_bin/..%5c../..%5c../..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /_mem_bin/..%5c../..%5c../..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /msadc/..%5c../..%5c../..%5c/..\xc1\x1c../..\xc1\x1c../..\xc1\x1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..\xc1\x1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..\xc0/../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..\xc0\xaf../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..\xc1\x9c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..%35c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..%35c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..%2f../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir Note: The first four entries in these sample logs denote attempts to connect to the backdoor left by Code Red II, while the remaining log entries are examples of exploit attempts for the Directory Traversal vulnerability. Payload The email addresses targeted for receiving the worm are harvested from two sources the .htm and .html files in the user's web cache folder the contents of the user's email messages retrieved via the MAPI service These files are passed through a simple pattern matcher which collects strings that look like email addresses. These addresses then receive a copy of the worm as a MIME-encoded email attachment. Nimda stores the time the last batch of emails were sent in the Windows registry, and every 10 days will repeat the process of harvesting addresses and sending the worm via email. Likewise, the client machines begin scanning for vulnerable IIS servers. Nimda looks for backdoors left by previous IIS worms: Code Red II [IN-2001-09] and sadmind/IIS worm [CA-2001-11]. It also attempts to exploit various IIS Directory Traversal vulnerabilities (VU#111677 and CA-2001-12). The selection of potential target IP addresses follows these rough probabilities: 50% of the time, an address with the same first two octets will be chosen 25% of the time, an address with the same first octet will be chosen 25% of the time, a random address will be chosen The infected client machine attempts to transfer a copy of the Nimda code via tftp (69/UDP) to any IIS server that it scans and finds to be vulnerable. Once running on the server machine, the worm traverses each directory in the system (including all those accessible through file shares) and writes a MIME-encoded copy of itself to disk using file names with .eml or .nws extensions (e.g., readme.eml). When a directory containing web content (e.g., HTML or ASP files) is found, the following snippet of Javascript code is appended to every one of these web-related files: This modification of web content allows further propagation of the worm to new clients through a web browser or through the browsing of a network file system. In order to further expose the machine, the worm enables the sharing of the c: drive as C$ creates a "Guest" account on Windows NT and 2000 systems adds this account to the "Administrator" group. Furthermore, the Nimda worm infects existing binaries on the system by creating Trojan horse copies of legitimate applications. These Trojan horse versions of the applications will first execute the Nimda code (further infecting the system and potentially propagating the worm), and then complete their intended function. |
| quote: |
| Originally posted by DJ El Kay Dee ok i got the infection process but how do we sheild ourselves from it? any ideas? |
LOL I dont think so what you say there, if its true then in a week all internetpages all over the world are fucked if they want.
So no way, isnt possible
| quote: |
| Originally posted by DJ El Kay Dee u forgot???u can only access a swf within an html |
Just an FYI - That is one nasty bitch of a virus. 
I got it about a week ago and had to destroy my computer to get rid of it.
The virus replicates so fast, that if your system has a decent # of files on it, by the time you have cleaned out the system, it will have infected hundreds of more files in the meantime. It can be impossible to get rid of.
Not to mention that it corrupts windows when it implants itself into their executatbles.
If you want the solution:
1. Install EVERY service pack, every security pack, and every possible update to whatever version of Windows you have.
2. Have antivirus software running, with the most recent updates to it possible.
3. Run a firewall on your system if you have DSL or Cable
4. Don't download any unexpected attachments or files.
5. If you do get it, and your computer is barely infected, download the nimda removal tool at: http://securityresponse.symantec.co...moval.tool.html
Good luck.
I hope none of you get it...
Rankin i believe that could be the old nimda removal that we got posted last time nimda was around....Me myself got a great virus program called "Vexira" this is what my workm8 used to get rid of the virus....he still had to recode all his HTML sites though.... the great thing about this program is that you can set it to scan only files that are being read by your comp....that means that it reads all files you download and recieve...Everything that comes new to the computer...and it doesnt slow you down... Im trying to find somewhere to upload it for all of u!
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