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-- Doug Feith next in line for Congressional hearings and trial?
Doug Feith next in line for Congressional hearings and trial?
Damn well should be, the little shit liar:
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| Captured Iraqi documents and intelligence interrogations of Saddam Hussein and two former aides "all confirmed" that Hussein's regime was not directly cooperating with al-Qaeda before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, according to a declassified Defense Department report released yesterday. The declassified version of the report, by acting Inspector General Thomas F. Gimble, also contains new details about the intelligence community's prewar consensus that the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda figures had only limited contacts, and about its judgments that reports of deeper links were based on dubious or unconfirmed information. The report had been released in summary form in February. The report's release came on the same day that Vice President Cheney, appearing on Rush Limbaugh's radio program, repeated his allegation that al-Qaeda was operating inside Iraq "before we ever launched" the war, under the direction of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the terrorist killed last June. "This is al-Qaeda operating in Iraq," Cheney told Limbaugh's listeners about Zarqawi, who he said had "led the charge for Iraq." Cheney cited the alleged history to illustrate his argument that withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq would "play right into the hands of al-Qaeda." Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.), who requested the report's declassification, said in a written statement that the complete text demonstrates more fully why the inspector general concluded that a key Pentagon office -- run by then-Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith -- had inappropriately written intelligence assessments before the March 2003 invasion alleging connections between al-Qaeda and Iraq that the U.S. intelligence consensus disputed. The report, in a passage previously marked secret, said Feith's office had asserted in a briefing given to Cheney's chief of staff in September 2002 that the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda was "mature" and "symbiotic," marked by shared interests and evidenced by cooperation across 10 categories, including training, financing and logistics. Instead, the report said, the CIA had concluded in June 2002 that there were few substantiated contacts between al-Qaeda operatives and Iraqi officials and had said that it lacked evidence of a long-term relationship like the ones Iraq had forged with other terrorist groups. "Overall, the reporting provides no conclusive signs of cooperation on specific terrorist operations," that CIA report said, adding that discussions on the issue were "necessarily speculative." The CIA had separately concluded that reports of Iraqi training on weapons of mass destruction were "episodic, sketchy, or not corroborated in other channels," the inspector general's report said. It quoted an August 2002 CIA report describing the relationship as more closely resembling "two organizations trying to feel out or exploit each other" rather than cooperating operationally. The CIA was not alone, the defense report emphasized. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had concluded that year that "available reporting is not firm enough to demonstrate an ongoing relationship" between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda, it said. But the contrary conclusions reached by Feith's office -- and leaked to the conservative Weekly Standard magazine before the war -- were publicly praised by Cheney as the best source of information on the topic, a circumstance the Pentagon report cites in documenting the impact of what it described as "inappropriate" work. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dy...7040502263.html |
...trying to remember all the things these same, now hopped up on power, Dimmicrats, were asserting about Saddam the 10 years prior to the war...in which they voted for btw.
but hey, Cheney said something on a radio show so...barf.
obligatory rebuttal article...
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| The lead headline in today's Washington Post proclaims "Hussein's Prewar Ties To Al-Qaeda Discounted: Pentagon Report Says Contacts Were Limited." Stated differently, neither the Post nor the Pentagon Report disputes that al Qaeda had contacts with Saddam Hussein regime. At the same time, according to the pre-war CIA's assessment which the Pentagon Report relies on, there was no evidence of a long-term relationship between the two outfits and "no conclusive signs of cooperation on specific terrorist projects." But the CIA acknowledged that its views on these matters were "necessarily speculative." In figuring out how to view this pre-war assessment, we should first recall that the contacts between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein were far from the primary reason for going to war with Iraq. There is no reason to believe either (a) that the administration would have gone to war on this basis alone or (b) that the adminstration would not have gone to war in the absence of concern about such contacts. So the real question concerning contacts boils down to this -- was it reasonable for the administration to believe that one benefit of overthrowing Saddam would be to end the risk of cooperation between his regime and al Qaeda in carrying out terrorism. The Post story confirms that it was reasonable for the administration to believe this. Saddam's regime, which nearly everyone thought possessed WMD and which certainly had the capacity to produce such weapons, was in contact with the folks who attacked us on 9/11. Under these circumstances, and keeping in mind that the Saddam-AQ contacts were not the core justification for the war, the CIA's "necessarily speculative" assessment that the contacts were "limited," and that evidence of deeper contacts was "based on unconfirmed information," does not seem terribly consequential. If the two rogue outfits were talking at all, the possibility of collaboration against their common arch-enemy was worth worrying about. The fact that the relationship between al Qaeda and Saddam was not as "mature" or longstanding as Saddam's relationship with other terrorist organizations was likewise irrelevant. Saddam did not need a longstanding relationship with al Qaeda in order to colloborate with its terrorists. It was perfectly reasonable for the administration to worry that Saddam, having formed significant relationships with other terrorist organizations over the years, would now form a significant one with the latest and greatest terrorist organization, with whom his regime already was in contact. The Post also jumps on claims that post-war intelligence shows Iraq and al Qaeda were not cooperating in all ten categories that Douglas Feith of the Defense Department alleged they were. Let's overlook the fact that this assesment is based in part on interviews with Saddam himself and his top henchmen, hardly reliable sources. Would the Post and other administration critics care to tell us how many categories of cooperation between Saddam and al Qaeda were required for the U.S. to be legitimately concerned? Paul Mirengoff |
Re: Doug Feith next in line for Congressional hearings and trial?
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| Originally posted by MisterOpus1 Read page two at that link if you like. |
I noticed you didn't link your story to your favorite blog Powerline � why was that?
No matter, let's deal with the substance of the rebuttal:
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| The lead headline in today's Washington Post proclaims "Hussein's Prewar Ties To Al-Qaeda Discounted: Pentagon Report Says Contacts Were Limited." Stated differently, neither the Post nor the Pentagon Report disputes that al Qaeda had contacts with Saddam Hussein regime. |
| quote: |
| not directly cooperating with al-Qaeda before the U.S. invasion of Iraq |
| quote: |
| Iraqi government and al-Qaeda figures had only limited contacts, and about its judgments that reports of deeper links were based on dubious or unconfirmed information. |
| quote: |
| At the same time, according to the pre-war CIA's assessment which the Pentagon Report relies on, there was no evidence of a long-term relationship between the two outfits and "no conclusive signs of cooperation on specific terrorist projects." But the CIA acknowledged that its views on these matters were "necessarily speculative." |
| quote: |
| the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda was "mature" and "symbiotic," marked by shared interests and evidenced by cooperation across 10 categories, including training, financing and logistics. |
| quote: |
| In figuring out how to view this pre-war assessment, we should first recall that the contacts between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein were far from the primary reason for going to war with Iraq. There is no reason to believe either (a) that the administration would have gone to war on this basis alone or (b) that the adminstration would not have gone to war in the absence of concern about such contacts. |
| quote: |
| So the real question concerning contacts boils down to this -- was it reasonable for the administration to believe that one benefit of overthrowing Saddam would be to end the risk of cooperation between his regime and al Qaeda in carrying out terrorism. |
| quote: |
| The Post story confirms that it was reasonable for the administration to believe this. Saddam's regime, which nearly everyone thought possessed WMD |
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| and which certainly had the capacity to produce such weapons, |
| quote: |
| was in contact with the folks who attacked us on 9/11. Under these circumstances, and keeping in mind that the Saddam-AQ contacts were not the core justification for the war, the CIA's "necessarily speculative" assessment that the contacts were "limited," and that evidence of deeper contacts was "based on unconfirmed information," does not seem terribly consequential. |
| quote: |
| If the two rogue outfits were talking at all, the possibility of collaboration against their common arch-enemy was worth worrying about. |
| quote: |
| The fact that the relationship between al Qaeda and Saddam was not as "mature" or longstanding as Saddam's relationship with other terrorist organizations was likewise irrelevant. |
| quote: |
| A declassified report released yesterday by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence revealed that U.S. intelligence analysts were strongly disputing the alleged links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda while senior Bush administration officials were publicly asserting those links to justify invading Iraq. Far from aligning himself with al-Qaeda and Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Hussein repeatedly rebuffed al-Qaeda's overtures and tried to capture Zarqawi, the report said. Tariq Aziz, the detained former deputy prime minister, has told the FBI that Hussein "only expressed negative sentiments about [Osama] bin Laden." ..... In a classified January 2003 report, for instance, the CIA concluded that Hussein "viewed Islamic extremists operating inside Iraq as a threat." But one day after that conclusion was published, Levin noted, Vice President Cheney said the Iraqi government "aids and protects terrorists, including members of al-Qaeda." ..... In February 2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency concluded that "Iraq is unlikely to have provided bin Laden any useful [chemical and biological weapons] knowledge or assistance." A year later, Bush said: "Iraq has also provided al-Qaeda with chemical and biological weapons training." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dy...90800777_2.html |
| quote: |
| Saddam did not need a longstanding relationship with al Qaeda in order to colloborate with its terrorists. |
| quote: |
| It was perfectly reasonable for the administration to worry that Saddam, having formed significant relationships with other terrorist organizations over the years, would now form a significant one with the latest and greatest terrorist organization, with whom his regime already was in contact. |
| quote: |
| The Post also jumps on claims that post-war intelligence shows Iraq and al Qaeda were not cooperating in all ten categories that Douglas Feith of the Defense Department alleged they were. Let's overlook the fact that this assesment is based in part on interviews with Saddam himself and his top henchmen, hardly reliable sources. |
| quote: |
| Would the Post and other administration critics care to tell us how many categories of cooperation between Saddam and al Qaeda were required for the U.S. to be legitimately concerned? Paul Mirengoff |
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