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-- LRA Tells US To "Bring It On"
LRA Tells US To "Bring It On"
These peace talks can't possibly be headed for much success - Museveni and Kony are equally stubborn and refuse to yield any ground, and Kony has certainly shown an inclination for perpetuating violence over the years. But this latest twist is interesting. The United States has threatened to send in troops and get involved militarily, and the LRA basically just laughed in our face. I suppose they have a better understanding of the American public's tolerance for helping Africans than the State Department.
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| Uganda: LRA Blames Govt for Delays, Dares U.S. to Bring It On East African (Nairobi) 2 October 2007 Posted to the web 2 October 2007 Zachary Ochieng Nairobi Lord's Resistance Army spokesman Godfrey Ayoo has said the Uganda peace talks have been dragging on aimlessly because of the attitude of the Uganda government. Mr Ayoo told The EastAfrican, "The task that lies ahead is respecting the agreements already signed. If the government agrees to work with the LRA as stipulated in the agreements, the peace talks will soon come to a conclusive end." He discounted claims that the talks were being delayed by the absence of LRA leader Joseph Kony and his deputy Vincent Otti. The International Crisis Group has suggested in its latest report, Northern Uganda Peace Process: The Need to Maintain Momentum, that both Kony and Otti should be directly involved in the talks, failing which the rebels must be presented with a credible military threat. Mr Ayoo said the LRA delegation at the peace talks acts on instructions from Kony and his physical presence is, therefore, not be required. "The ICG knows very well that the International Criminal Court warrants against the LRA commanders have not been lifted. How then does it expect Kony to go to Juba?' he asked. He said Uganda President Yoweri Museveni and the ICC warrants are the stumbling blocks to the peace process and not Kony's absence from the talks. Mr Ayoo, however, said that at a later stage, Kony and Museveni may have to meet face to face. The ICG also suggested that the mandate of the ceasefire monitoring team be extended to Garamba forest in eastern Congo, where most of the LRA soldiers are based. But Mr Ayoo said the ceasefire monitoring team consists of only 10 soldiers and it would be logistically impossible to extend their mandate to Congo. It would also entail a lot of negotiations with all the parties represented at the Juba peace talks. In its report, the ICG also recommends that food supply to the LRA be closely monitored lest the rebels acquire excess stocks that could help them regroup. But Ayoo dismisses this recommendation as a non-starter, saying LRA's food delivery is always monitored. "To regroup, we don't need food supplies," said Mr Ayoo. "When we decided to talk peace, it was not that we were lacked food, but we wanted to see an end to the war. The best way to stop us from regrouping is to ensure that the peace talks succeed." He also scoffed at the recent US threat to galvanise a regional military operation to flush out the LRA if the talks are not concluded by year end. He noted that previous efforts to end the northern Uganda insurgency failed because of such threats and ultimatums. "It is unfortunate that the US is rallying regional governments to fight the LRA, when we are not involved in the ceasefire violations. We know the US has always branded us as terrorists. This attitude should change, with the US looking for a better way to assist in the talks," said Mr Ayoo. Mr Ayoo said that the US should instead direct its anger at the Uganda government, which he claims is training a group of people to destabilise northern Uganda, while blaming it on the LRA. The training is allegedly taking place along the Uganda/Sudan border. About two weeks ago, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer said should the talks fail, Washington would combine its military might with that of regional governments to flush out the LRA from Congo. Then last week, William Lacy Swing, head of the UN peacekeeping force in Congo (Monuc), said in Kampala that the force would back the Congolese army to drive the LRA and other armed groups out of eastern Congo in order to ensure peace in the Great Lakes Region. According to Mr Ayoo, such threats are frightening residents of northern Uganda who were eagerly awaiting the signing of a peace agreement. He, however, rules out the possibility of a regional military offensive against the LRA, given that most of the countries are represented in Juba as observers as well as in the ceasefire monitoring team. "The way to get rid of rebels is not through military threat but respect for human rights, the rule of law and equitable distribution of resources. Why should we be attacked when we have not violated the ceasefire and have been in the talks for over a year?" he asked. Mr Ayoo assured northerners that the LRA would stick to the peace agenda, but warned that extreme provocation by the US will not be tolerated. He said should the US attack the LRA, it should be prepared to face the same humiliation that befell it in Somalia in 1992 when it sent its troops there. If we are attacked, we shall consider it an extreme act of provocation, an act of aggression, a declaration of war, a reopening of the war theatre in Uganda and an end to the Juba peace talks," he said. "This would mean all our forces outside Uganda will go back to the country and repel the attackers. It will be the mother of all wars. We'll move our forces into Kampala and dislodge Museveni's dictatorship. We'll prove to him that the LRA is not militarily weak as he has been made to believe." Peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA began in the Southern Sudanese capital of Juba in July 2006. |
I completely misread the thread title: I thought I was the one telling you guys to "Bring it On", which doesn't really make much sense 
If there's one conflict that I haven't followed, its this Ugandan one, I feel very ashamed. Truly an important one, but the oil trail doesnt lead there. I'm reading the article ...
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| Originally posted by Magnetonium If there's one conflict that I haven't followed, its this Ugandan one, I feel very ashamed. Truly an important one, but the oil trail doesnt lead there. I'm reading the article ... |
And I imagine if the US does get involved it actually will be at least somewhat because of oil reserves - there's quite a large supply in southern Sudan, where the LRA fighters often hang out and make their raids into Uganda from.
A little more on Kony:
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Portrait of Uganda's rebel prophet, painted by wives Beatrice Debut | Gulu, Uganda 10 February 2006 06:00 His rebel group is one of world's most notorious, reviled for an incongruous mix of religion and brutality, but Joseph Kony, the chief of Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), is a mystery to most. For nearly 20 years, the elusive guerrilla supremo's fighters have terrorised vast swathes of northern Uganda with an unholy blend of murder, mutilation, rapes, kidnapping and wanton destruction. Yet the self-styled mystic and religious prophet who claims to be waging war on God's direct orders to replace the Ugandan government with one based on the Biblical Ten Commandments is as unknown as he is feared. Wanted on war crimes charges by the International Criminal Court, Ugandan authorities say Kony has fled under pressure into the Democratic Republic of Congo and possibly to the Central African Republic from a base in south Sudan. But his whereabouts are impossible to confirm, pictures of him are rare and few outside the LRA have even met Kony, a 45-year-old primary school dropout who likes to be called "the teacher" by his family of 27 wives and 42 children. "I saw him for the first time when I was in the operations room," says one of those wives, Margaret, recalling how she met Kony as a teenage LRA abductee learning how to break down and assemble weapons at a guerrilla base. "Two of his wives were pregnant, he chose me," says the now 33-year-old woman who was freed from LRA captivity in an army raid last year after living in the bush since 1991. "I don't know why. I was a virgin." "It was a chance, because I was better treated than the others," she says, referring to horrific atrocities other abductees, mainly children, were subjected to. Ex-LRA abductees speak of being forced to brutally kill and maim friends and neighbours as well as participate in grotesque rites such as drinking their victims' blood. "I never killed," Margaret tells a reporter in this northern Ugandan town that has been at the epicenter of the fighting that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced nearly two million people. But according to other liberated Kony wives, concubines and nannies, the rebel chief who took over leadership of a two-year-old regional rebellion in 1998 is not a killer himself. "He doesn't kill, he gives orders to the commanders and the commanders give the orders to the small children," says Nancy (16) who served as a babysitter for Kony's prolific brood before being freed in an Ugandan army raid. Kony's hold over his largely uneducated and impoverished followers appears based on a combination of ruthless repression and alleged supernatural abilities. "He says he has spiritual powers and I believe it," says Nancy, who speaks with difficulty since being shot in the jaw during the attack that freed here. "Once, he spotted a person who talked to him while he was not even there." "He says he's doing God's will," says 23-year-old Evelyn who was "married" to Kony in 1994. "He says he's a prophet. He wants to overthrow the government [and] replace the Constitution with the Ten Commandments." "He had four palaces in southern Sudan," Evelyn says, recounting her day-to-day activities as one of Kony's wives as she suckles her youngest daughter, one of three children she has borne Kony. "I mopped the house, I prepared the breakfast, I prepared his bath." Margaret interjects. "He used to beat me with a stick or his fist if the bath wasn't ready or if the food wasn't ready," she says. The bizarre domestic life with Kony and the abuse he meted out, however, was not enough in itself to turn these women against him. "I grew a kind of love for him," says Evelyn. "But when I came back, I realised that a war took place in my village: two of my brothers, two aunties and my dad had been killed. I grew a lot of hatred." "He said that he would come back one day to take care of our three children, but I don't believe him," she says. "He only tells lies." Still, some wives remain convinced that Kony, now apparently on the run with a small group of die-hard loyalists, had some ability to predict the future. "He said that one day he would be alone without any children and wives, with only 300 fighters, and these things are happening," Margaret says. |
This article hits on a topic I've been dealing with a lot lately.
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| Justice or peace? By Andr�-Michel Essoungou Friday, April 20, 2007 KAMPALA, Uganda: Jan Egeland, the UN under-secretary general for humanitarian affairs, had difficulty believing what he heard when he spoke with refugees during a visit last September in northern Uganda. "We don't want the International Criminal Court. We want peace," the head of a camp of 25,000 displaced people told him. "But you want justice to be done?" Egeland asked. "Of course," replied the camp's leader, "but how will the trial of five people bring us back those we have lost? Will the court really bring peace, or fuel the war again?" The Lord's Resistance Army's rebellion is part of the oldest conflict in Africa, a conflict that has defied some 40 mediation attempts. In 2003, Uganda asked the international court to investigate rebel atrocities. The court has since accused five rebel commanders of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Yet, despite tens of thousands of deaths over the past 20 years, the court's presence in Uganda is controversial. There are some, including the victims, who feel that court prosecutions will hinder peace negotiations that began last July. Uganda is a test case for the international court, based at The Hague, but progress has been slow. Wherever it goes in Uganda, the court has encountered doubts and criticism. Although progress was reported at the peace talks in Juba, southern Sudan, last summer, a new controversy flared in October when Vincent Otti, second-in-command of the Lord's Resistance Army, announced that there could be no overall agreement unless the international court dropped the prosecutions. He added that the rebels would prefer to be tried by a Ugandan court, if there ever was a trial. The threat was well timed, for a peace agreement had never seemed so close. Kampala's response was divided. Arguing that peace must be the priority, some supporters of President Yoweri Museveni, along with aid organizations like Save the Children, called for the international court to withdraw. But the court has insisted on continuing its efforts. People on both sides of the conflict are trying to use the international court's presence to their advantage. By insisting on pursuing its prosecutions, the court is affirming its independence, but it has become a target for manipulation by both the government and the rebels, who hold it responsible for the breakdown in negotiations. We may well see a peace agreement in the next few weeks, in exchange for an official request to abandon the prosecutions. The request would be hard to refuse. If the court were to insist on pursuing the judicial process, it would run the risk of prolonging the conflict. Uganda is committed to cooperating with the court and any request to drop the prosecutions would be poorly regarded under international law. Nevertheless, UN organizations and the major powers would still turn a blind eye, given the political and humanitarian circumstances. The criminal court's own statute could offer Uganda the strategy it may need to defend its position. Unlike the international tribunals for former the Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the International Criminal Court can cede jurisdiction to the national judiciary of the states concerned. It cannot intervene if the state itself engages genuine criminal proceedings against an offender, although the criteria for what constitutes "genuine" have not been defined. The international court may only step in if a state fails to take action. Despite its founders' intentions, the court seems to be facing the same problems as its predecessors: In its desire to do justice, it will have to come to terms with the complexities of its political and diplomatic environment. Meanwhile, in the camps in northern Uganda, there are huge numbers of refugees who would find it hard to understand why they are being made to suffer for so long. Andr�-Michel Essoungou is a journalist in Kampala. This article was translated by Robert Corner. This article was distributed by Agence Global. |
Fascinating read:
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Freedom and the Individual: Existentialist Crisis in Acholiland By Okello Lucima MAKING AUTHENTIC CHOICES IN TIME OF CRISIS. Sverker Finnstrom�s recent work on northern Uganda picks up and continues a particular theme of existential inquiries that echo Shakespeare, de Sade, Tolstoy, Proust, Kafka and Moravia. Living With Bad Surrounding re-states the nature of daily human and individual struggles to live under turbulent circumstances (Piny Marac) in northern Uganda. Read in broad existentialist terms, the Ugandan State and regime are absurd worlds, from which its citizens in the north have been alienated from themselves and estranged from the popular view of national normalcy. Trumpeted NRM/A revolution, liberation, peace and prosperity, contrast very sharply with their lived realities of violence, abduction, murder, rape, diseases and social dislocation. The fish-bowl existence in the concentration camps, characterised by rights abuses, sexual violence, suicide, prostitution, idleness, and a host of other social ills and diseases, is for many individuals and families, not unlike living on the edge of a precipice, from where there is no margin for the slightest error in judgment. Aware of their problems and conscious of their fate and palpable possibilities of violent death, whether in the hands of the LRA, UPDF, Boo Kec-gangsters spawned by the fluid security situation- people in Acholi, surprisingly still demonstrate determined, consuming passion for survival (Cing Pe Tum) In Living With Bad Surrounding: War and Existential Uncertainty in Acholiland, Northern Uganda, Finnstrom convincingly demonstrates that, despite the LRA violence, UPDF abuses and oppression from local Acholi government eyes, ears and mouthpieces (Kadi ibut ki maru ite pii, wang ma owinye), the majority of Acholi people have rejected the loss of the self, and time and again, confounded the NRM government and its overzealous agents, by maintaining independence and conscientious resistance against intimidation and blackmail. The study also shows that there are those who have opted for surrendering the self and joining the movement (Rwot Ineka), thereby evading the difficult personal responsibility of making choices that originate from within the self, rather than imposed by an institution that one merely has to conform to in an automated fashion. Erich Fromm in his Escape From Freedom, calls such surrender to forces and circumstances outside of the individual as �escape from freedom�, because those who do so, lose their individuality, identity, freedom to choose or make their own decisions, and with it also the loss of the self. This is why, any statement from NRM leaders in and from Acholi, contrast very sharply with the realities of the lives of their people who lead sub-human existences in the concentration camps. In his inquiry, Finnstrom is one with traditional existentialist philosophy in suggesting that, one cannot escape oneself; for at the end of the tentative peace one professes to enjoy, the individual inevitably must come face to face with the essence one tries so hard to disguise-our mortality. Imperatively, the actions one takes must be authentic, because there can be no space for deception, and protective veils of illusions inevitably become too transparent. The implication for us is that, various Ugandan social and political groups need to shed the illusions and deceptions they have lived by, and examine themselves and their motives realistically. The imperative is compelling, knowing we must come to terms with our past and history in order to chart a meaningful future. This necessity cannot be overstated, as exemplified by the passionate debate and the he-said-he-said that greeted serialisation in The Monitor, of Milton Obote�s autobiographical reminiscences on our post independence social and political history. As the exchanges showed, our nationhood has been fragmented and indelibly scarred by our violent history, and the deception and illusions we have lived by have forced nationalities, regions and ethnic groups to turn inwards in search of support and meaning, against an increasingly acrimonious, meaningless, disordered, dysfunctional and alienating nation-state. The inevitable dialectic opposition between the aims of the state and that of individual or community existence, often have not been resolved dialogically and accommodatingly with intent to achieving a constructive balance and often ended disastrously. The NRM efforts to establish a one party state, by force of arms and to fancifully construct and practise a whimsical conception and brand of democracy, are the hallmarks of totalitarian ideological bankruptcy, which served to exacerbate national disintegration and further ethnic nationalism, bigotry, deceptions and illusions. Under such democratic fa�ade, limited degree of freedom of expression in the press is allowed, but the fundamental question of individual freedom to think, self-determine and decide as an individual with unique and independent interests, is gravely degraded. Consequently, people are forced to chorus what Yoweri Museveni and the NRM thinks or says in the name of a fictionalised people. Such authoritarian perception of politics and power excises from the public policy process, the individual as a conscious, rational and self-interested being with particular needs and aspirations, which collectively constitute public interest, needs and aspirations. At the practical level, movement politics seeks to mould every Ugandan in its image, using Ofwono Opondo or Betty Akech Okullu as a prototype; a robotic, automated, unthinking, rabid running dog that will chew its own tail for ideological orthodoxy. Their politics eschews any difference, social and ideological diversity in favour of a monoculture of thought and ideology. Their limited success east of the Nile and north of Kafu , partly explains why the greater northern Uganda remains unstable, deprived and marginal in national politics. Because from day one, the northerners, particularly in Bukedi, Teso, Lango, Acholi and West Nile, dared to be different; to hold onto their individuality and independence, and reserve the rights to determine and choose what is best for themselves and resist attempts to degrade their freedom to make personal and authentic decisions in existential circumstances. Finnstrom�s subjects lucidly validate the existential thesis that left alone, people are bound to resist loss of self and struggle to affirm that, even though they suffer the virulence of the same pestilence, they do so as individuals and their experiences and responses are unique. Their existentialist narratives demonstrate that, in northern Uganda, where life seems to lack any purpose, a person must reach deep within oneself or turn outwards to find meaning, reason and purpose of life outside the familiar props of nation-statehood and degraded cultural and traditional social capital. It further attests to the existential and nihilistic axiom that as conscious beings, we do not submit willingly to losing our freedom and independence, and that sometimes we need to come face to face with death in order to affirm our faith in the values we stand for. The spirit of individual resistance and humanism we discern in Finnstrom�s informants, draw parallels with the themes of revolt and resistance in Dostoyevsky, Kafka, Malraux, Shakespeare, Moravia, Pavese, Satre and Beckett. Disorientation and despair pervade Living With Bad Surrounding. In northern Uganda, subjectivity, rather than objectivity and reason, is of primacy. Finnstrom persuasively depicts a tradition, customs, culture and beliefs that have disintegrated or under tremendous stress, leaving the individual isolated, to make his own judgement and seek his own truths. The sense of alienation from the Ugandan polity; the feeling that the gods have abandoned Acholiland, is pervasive and confusing; not unlike Kierkegaard�s depiction of the despair and dilemma of man in a technological civilization, and the primacy of one�s consciousness and preoccupation with his existence in a hostile environment. Since the gods seems to have abandoned Acholiland, the Acholi in Living With Bad Surrounding seem to respond to Nietzche�s admonition to grow up and take responsibilities for themselves. In the same manner that Nietzche suggests that science and technology stifle human passion and alienate man from himself, Living With Bad Surrounding seems to intimate that the extreme violence of the insurgency, counter-insurgency and government control of thought and freedom in northern Uganda, represses social diversities, individual freedom and alienate many Acholi from both themselves and the Ugandan polity. In other words, both the LRA and the movement have robbed people of the freedom of will and freedom to self-determine good from evil, which is a god-given moral right, for which individuals alone must be responsible. Alienation in the northern concentration camps parallel that in Leo Toltoy�s Memoirs of a Lunatic and The Death of Ivan Ilych, as eloquent statements of the estrangement of the individual from himself, resulting from his forcible containment within a society that is unresponsive to his greatest needs and aspirations. As Eric Fromm remarks, a good society should afford its members or an individual, opportunity for the greatest happiness. Once that is possible, the individual can meet his social roles, responsibilities and fulfil the expectations of his society, while at the same time maximizing his own individual development and happiness. However, there is always apparent opposition between the purpose of existing society and that of the aims of the maximum individual progress. Therefore, a healthy society does not necessarily mean its individuals are healthy and happy. But in our case, the movement does not even recognise the individual but constructs a straw man called �people�, in whose name it has arrogated to itself the right to speak, completely disregarding the fact that we individually, community by community, are part of � the people�, and we have particular needs, feelings and aspirations as well as moral principles and choices to make and be met. Therefore, we have the right as members of society, as people, to choose our issues, priorities and platforms, and who and how to articulate these demands. We are neither nameless nor abstract, nor are we as people are outside and alien to those speaking out in UPC, DP, CP, FDC, and other political and social groups. Indeed we are the people, and NRM ideologues that claim to speak for the people, must recognise their theoretical falsities and conceptual limitations and begin to deal with the needs and interest of the integral parts and percentage of the Ugandan People represented by and in the various political and social groups outside of the NRM /& O. The drama of our struggle for democratic rights and individual freedom is consonant with Leo Toltoy�s Lunatic�s struggle for individual happiness and reason, which in turn is met by a meaningless world, whose celebrated normalcy is in fact disorder, deceit, absurdity and meaninglessness. This is because, as Eric Fromm observes, the health of society is prescribed by social necessity, while that for the individual is dictated by personal morality that defines the meaning of life for a person. Consequently, sycophants who tailor their behaviour with the expectations of societal orthodoxy are treated favourably as normal citizens, but those who reject the status quo, such as opposition to the movement, are labelled and dismissed as misfits and not part of �the people�. Those who conform gain acceptance by giving up their individuality and self in order to display character traits that satisfy those they must please. However, the misfit, the rebel, rejects and resists giving up his self and individual freedom to think and act according to the personal and individual need of a happy and moral existence. In Living With Bad Surrounding and in Escape From Freedom, we learn that when social, communal, cultural and customary and traditional relationships are broken down, and one left on his own to make decision about his own existence, the individual is left isolated, alone and insecure. In attempt to overcome his loneliness and powerlessness, one of two options or mechanisms of escape are open to him: to either surrender or choose positive freedom. Positive freedom means independence from external control and domination; ability to express and exercise genuine emotion and personal thoughts. In contrast, one who surrenders loses individual freedom and self, as the price he must pay to bring his alienated self in harmony with the needs and expectations of the world external to himself. Eric Fromm observes that, since the adverse condition that force the choice of surrender persists, the individual who surrenders his freedom does not gain any genuine happiness and his actions henceforth is compulsive, externally driven and inauthentic. A clear example of this is the recent flap and flip-flop of the Vice President, Prof. Gilbert Bukenya, and the external forces to which he surrendered his freedom and individuality. Even as Vice President of the State of Uganda, he cannot in his own right as deputy head of state and as a moral individual, meet certain members of certain ethnic groups; regardless of the fact these persons or groups are either servants of the state or private individuals. These are also the problems and dilemmas afflicting the characters and behaviour of NRM ideologues in Acholi, eg. Betty Akech Okullu or Henry Oryem Okello, whose sycophancy and reliance on external command, but not the needs and aspirations of Acholi constituents, is rationalised as nationalism and responsibility to the country, when in fact it expresses the loss of their freedom and integrity and surrender to external needs and commands. Without the LRA insurgency and without the UPDF carte blanche in northern Uganda, where army commanders supersede elected officials, leaders such as Akech Okullu or Henry Oryem Okello, would be nowhere in the centre of the narratives of Acholi social and political history. |
From the same author, this is a very good synopsis of where the talks currently stand in Northern Uganda.
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| Why Museveni is undermining a negotiated settlement Garamba Sideshow: Divide and Conquer Dead or alive, the fate of Vincent Otti, if Joseph Kony is to be believed, may well have been foreshadowed a year ago (LRA leader speaks out on deputy Otti, Monitor 8 Nov. 2007). It was reported then that the Ugandan government had focused its efforts at a parallel contact with the LRA fighters, rather than the official Juba Talks, as a preferred means to ending the conflict (Kony wants to talk to Museveni, Monitor, 23-29 July 2006). Such a strategy aimed to achieve one or more of the following objectives: to avoid addressing the root causes of the conflict; to isolate the LRA military leaders and fighters from its political leadership; and also to pre-empt the risk of issues raised at the Juba talks cohering with grievances and concerns over abuses in northern Uganda, which had sporadically been raised by civil society, political leaders, opposition parties, the media and rights groups. The sideshow in Garamba, led by Walter Ochora, Gulu RDC, also aimed to sow discord, mistrust and suspicions among LRA military leaders. These were to be achieved by all means of enticements including money, promises of presidential amnesty to induce high level and mass defections. Achieving one or a combination of these possible objectives was hoped to effectively pre-empt and scuttle a possible comprehensive settlement at the negotiating table. Coming as it did, the rumours of Vincent Otti�s death, or a possible fall-out between him and Joseph Kony, therefore, would have unfolded along a script authored by the UPDF High Command, and stage-managed by Walter Ochora and the 4th division hierarchy in northern Uganda. Accordingly, Lt. Chris Magezi�s denial to the BBC, of a possible UPDF plot to foment unrest within or portray the LRA as defeated and disintegrated force without organisation and unified command with whom negotiations was no longer necessary, is at best disingenuous, and crocodile tears at worst (Uganda rebel deputy feared dead, BBC online, Wed. 7 Nov. 2007). Undoubtedly, it is in the express interest of Yoweri Museveni for the LRA to surrender (Talks resume tomorrow, Monitor, 6 August 2006). At the beginning of the talks-any change to the contrary is doubtful-defence minister Chrispus Kiyonga insisted that despite the talks in Juba, the UPDF would still attack the LRA. And indeed they did attack, resulting in the killing of Raska Lukwiya, one of the indicted LRA commanders. It is no secret that, for Museveni and the government, the preferred means to force LRA capitulation is first through military pursuit, psychological warfare and subversive counter-intelligence (ICC wants rebel�s corpse, Monitor, 13 Aug. 2006). Part of the determination to achieve military victory, is not simply to end the insurgency, but what Onyango Obbo�s inside sources revealed as Museveni�s unyielding mission to defeat and explode the myth of northern tribal martial invincibility (Who wins if peace comes-Museveni or Kony? Monitor 31 Aug. 20-06). This view is supported by Olara Otunnu, who shows that the war has provided a perfect cover for Museveni to pursue inexplicable agendas other than defend the human rights of the citizens of northern and eastern Uganda (A Nation in Crisis, allAfrica.com, 19 Sept. 2006). The second tier of preferences is threats with the sticks of ICC arrests weighed on the opposite end by carrots of presidential pardon. As far as Museveni and the government are concerned, it would be best if the LRA were decisively defeated or if the ICC warrant and military pressure could force a surrender or popular disaffection, mass defection and collapse of the LRA as an insurgent force in order to avoid the difficult and unpredictable prospects of a trial by the ICC or a special court in Uganda. This, for Museveni, would also mark his crowning as the indomitable southern military leader who brought the so-called insuperable martial tribes of the upper Nile to their knees. This sham goal matters to Museveni more than anything else he has ever accomplished in his career. Defeating and punishing northerners, for obscure reasons best known to Museveni, was the obsession that took him to Luwero in 1981. It will do anything to achieve something of a military victory. Therefore, suspicions that the UPDF has been investing heavily in convert activities to undermine LRA leadership and command, or cause rifts among senior LRA commanders for the insurgent organisation to implode, are not without merits (LRA leader speaks on deputy Otti, New Vision, 8 Nov. 2007). History punishes those who do not learn its lessons We will recall that, at the beginning of the Juba talks in 2006, Uganda tried and failed to alienate the LRA military leaders from their civilian delegation to the talks. A strategy of dividing and isolating insurgent fighters from their political leadership is not new. In 1988, the Museveni government did just that, in its negotiations with the UPDM/A (Reaching the 1988 Pece Agreement, Accord, No.11, 2002). Then UPDA insurgent forces were predominantly semi-literate and politically and socially unconscious, and without significant capacity to raise fundamental issues greater than their self-interests:limited concerns for their welfare and privileges. To such men, Museveni could posture with false empathy that the UPDM political leadership in exile was a breed of discredited politicians who messed up the country and were ensconced in foreign capitals sipping whiskey, while the fighters were suffering in the bushes. Essentially, the argument sought to exploit a supposed brotherhood between the NRA and UPDA fighters as soldiers first and foremost, and therefore, comrades- in -arms. The attractive yet deceptive logic it appealed to was that, as comrades, the NRA had no fundamental problems with the UPDA fighters, but the politicians who misled them; first to war in Luwero, and later hoodwinked them into rebellion after Museveni defeated them and seized power. Museveni feared to negotiate with the UPDM/A as a unified military and political organisation in 1988 for two principle reasons. First, he did not want to address the root causes of the rebellion and it was best if he avoided equally seasoned UPDM/A political leadership. Second, he did not know how to deal with the questions of trust and credibility arising from his unilateral abrogation of the 1985 Nairobi peace agreement and framework for national reconciliation and unity that had offered Uganda the best hope for peace and stability. After cheaply disposing of the fighters, it was no surprise that two years later in 1990, Museveni sought and concluded the Addis Ababa agreement with the political wing of the UPDM/A. At this time, the fighters were already demobilised. Some of its more politically conscious leaders, including but not limited to Kilama, Obote, and Ochero, were executed, imprisoned or forced to flee. In the end, UPDM/A political leadership had no strength to put up demands it could not back up with a fighting force strong enough to impose its will or engage in a contest of wills in case of NRM/A intransigence. As a result, UPDM leadership in exile had no choice but to capitulate and accept offers of personal gratification and privileges on Museni�s terms. In retrospect, it should be clear to those who should have learned from the histories of peace processes with Museveni that it is not for nothing that he would rather talk to the functionally illiterate former abducted children in Garamba. In addition, his initial criticisms and casting of the LRA delegation in Juba as non-authentic, aimed to remove a more enlightened group of players from the scene. This would have left him with people he could easily manipulate and dispose of without conceding anything he did not want to give. It did not matter to him that the team in Juba were appointed by Kony and mandated to speak for the LRM/A. However, our curiosity should be aroused at the new LRA Juba delegation that were disparaged by the Uganda government a year ago, but as late as this week, being embraced in Kampala, to do business with Museveni. This begs the question: Do they still represent the LRA and Kony? Sensing the need to answer that question, the permanent secretary, ministry of internal affairs, Dr. Stephen Kagoda, had to assuage the nation that the delegation was legit, to allay public scepticisms about plenipotentiary standing of the LRA delegation in representing Kony or the LRM/A (Kony backed Ojul, New Vision, 12 Nov. 2007). Public worries had been aroused by the rumours of Vincent Otti�s death. And we should all be worried over these inexplicable rumours and unexpected camaraderie that include bear hug embraces; when barely over a year ago, handshakes were taboo. Every Man has his price We should wonder what the nature of the business is that should have belatedly endeared the much maligned Juba delegation of the LRA to the Kampala regime. In our considered view, intrigue cannot be too far down the list. Intrigues and divide and rule tactics have worked well for Museveni over the years. It is possible that, after failing to create a rift between LRA military leaders and the peace delegation in Juba, in order to create opportunity of talking to semi-literate men as they did in 1988, the government set about to maximise potential for covert activities to set the LRA military hierarchy against each other. This strategy must have become a priority after the Juba talks took on a life of its own, and acquired a higher profile with the appointment of Joachim Chissano as UN Secretary General�s Envoy to the region and the talks. Coupled with the unexpected plenipotentiary suave and political astuteness of the LRA delegation, the government of Uganda lost control of the Juba talks agenda and process and needed to scramble a strategy and agenda it could control that could still undermine a possible comprehensive settlement reached by negotiations and a peace treaty in Juba. The motivation for this is that any settlement that leaves room for a trial of any kind, other than mato oput or Acholi traditional justice system, risks opening cans of worms that the Uganda government would rather avoid, if it could. It is therefore reasonable to ask: Have the people who are supposed to read the fine prints for the LRA military leadership and cut a good deal for Kony & Co., not been compromised to shove just anything under his nose for trinkets? Given the circumstances, such a question is not idle. Two critical events raised the stakes and forced active pursuit of option B. First, the Uganda government was taken off-guard by the LRA Juba delegation; virtually upstaged at the opening session of the talks. The LRA/M Juba delegation exploded on the scene as more sophisticated; politically conscious; articulate; world -wise; underestimated and capable of raising credible issues of the causes of the war and its impact on Acholi and other northern and eastern Ugandan communities (LRA opening address at the Juba Talks, 15 July 2006; LRA position papers on Accountability and Reconciliation, 20 June 2007; Peace talks need focus, New Vision, 26 June 2007; Will geographical north rally around political LRA? Monitor, 31 Aug 2006). In addition, goings-on in Juba had revealed that among the delegation, there were young and old alike; men and women who were ambitious and whose lifestyles and personal needs fortified the axiom that every man has his price. Second, the Ugandan delegation and government could not countermand the plausibility of the LRM/A delegation position, and chose the only defence that had often worked for them-to character assassinate and discredit its critics. For instance, in a lengthy guest column on allAfrica.com, Museveni attacked Olara Otunu as a supporter of former murderous regimes (Our People Embrace Peace, allAfrica.com, 19 Sept. 2006). This was in response to Otunnu's insistent campaign to draw national and international attention to the northern Uganda genocide, co-authored by Yoweri Museveni and Joseph Kony. Similarly, the LRA delegates in Juba mounted a strong contest to Uganda governmnet view that the LRA was the sole perpetrator of atrocities in northern Uganda. In response, the Uganda delegation and Museveni sought to question their credibility, authenticity and authority of non-combatant diaspora-based LRA spokespersons to speaking on behalf of the fighters in Garamba. LRA. Revealingly, the problem of the Uganda government did not seem limited to who was raising theses issues or that they were being raised at all. The regime was worried that it should be raised in a manner that echoes and integrates the concerns of the civil population in eastern and northern Uganda, the opposition parties, and rights groups with that of the rebel fighters. But the government opposition to and strategy to discredit the LRA delegates collapsed in the face of strong Kony and Otti backing of their team in Juba, even allowing them to shuttle between Garamba and Juba for consultations. It seemed that things were not going Museveni's way, even after he flew with a full military squadron to Juba to intimidate the delegates. The Uganda government was therefore scared and desperate to re-assert itself. Museveni was determined to undermine the talks and achieve LRA surrender under UPDF peace terms. And it was obvious that divide and conquer tactics would be used, among other things. Isolating one group from or setting one against the other has always been Museveni's grand political strategy, particularly in northern Uganda. For instance, Uganda is nominally operating under a parliamentary dispensation. One would think that parliament, incorporating government and opposition parties would be involved in a high national profile issue like peace talks to end insurgency that has devastated more than 27% of the country. That the opposition is not represented in Juba is no accident. The opposition has been raising the same issues of governance and human rights that the LRA delegation raised in Juba. Furthermore, the community and political leaders from eastern and northern Uganda have not been given a place at the Juba Talks as legitimate stakeholders and primary parties to the process and terms of agreements that arise from it. Instead, they are relegated to the sidelines as mere observers, not expected to present any grievances, articulate the urgent need for a just peace, or influence the outcome to include mechanisms that would ensure the kind of peace they want. In the NRM�s grand scheme of things, religious leaders, traditional leaders, district council political leaders and representatives of parliamentary groups from eastern and northern Uganda, must be kept at bay. It is necessary that they are not substantively involved, lest their respective knowledge and memory of the war, its causes, as well as their demands for its end, correspond with and reinforce some of the issues the LRA raised. It is feared that a possible confluence of demands, and a meeting of minds and hearts between opposition politicians and insurgents, would constitute an unacceptable and unsettling unity of northern and north-eastern grand political spectre and possibilities (Will geographical north rally around political LRA? Monitor 31 Aug. 2006). No one, including the government, has any illusion about the truth behind most, if not all of the issues the LRA raised at the Juba Talks regarding the history of the war and its origins; the brutal methods of counterinsurgency; forced movement of people into camps; shared culpability for abuses and atrocities committed; and the need for reparation and reconstruction of the region. As far as Museveni is concerned, a peace talk on the Juba framework is unacceptable, because its agenda must necessarily address the root causes of the conflict, which inevitably must highlight abuses and atrocities on both sides. But talking with the LRA directly, and without a mediator, would cut out pertinent accountability for war crimes and rights abuses as well as political and governance reforms questions. Consequently, this would then give Museveni and the LRA the opportunity to address only the basic needs and personal privileges and gratifications of the rank and file of the fighters with incentive for money, houses, ranks in the UPDF and amnesty from criminal prosecutions. Under such disguised surrender terms, Museveni and the UPDF are shielded from exposure and accounting for their own counter-insurgency strategies that harmed more than vindicated human rights of non-combatants in eastern and northern Uganda. This is precisely why mato oput or traditional justice is more acceptable to Museveni, not because he has recently had a revelation of and conversion to a newer and conciliatory self; but rather, he dreads the double-edged sword of the ICC that could cut both ways in an adversarial trial, testimony and cross examination of evidence and witnesses. Juba remains the best hope for a semblance of a just peace On balance, the prospect of a Museveni-Kony deal outside of the Juba Talks does not bode well for long term peace and stability for Uganda and particularly the eastern and northern communities. First, the need for peace, the conditions and mechanisms necessary for a comprehensive settlement and durable peace will have not been addressed at all. In other words, the plight and needs of the people in concentration camps at the centre of the Juba Talks will have been displaced by the needs of the LRA fighters and Museveni�s self-interested calculations as the impetus for ending the conflict. Second, the LRA fighters would be reintegrated into these societies and many others absorbed into the UPDF and deployed in eastern and northern Uganda. Such a course would forever make demobilised LRA combatants grateful and beholden to Museveni personally, and only too eager and willing to do his biddings. Fears for such prospects are not borne out of unfounded cynicisms but concrete experiences. Witness the pro-Museveni overzealousness of former UPDM/A commanders such as Col. Walter Ochora and Col. Otema Awany; the exploits of Maj. Okot Wiilit and Maj. Fearless Obwoya; and the activities of former LRA honchos Brig. Kenneth Banaya, Brig. Sam Kolo, Maj. Ray Apire, and Col. Onen Kamdulu, to mention but a few. It did not bother anyone in Uganda, and internationally, that this latter group returned from the bushes and kept as wives, girls they abducted, raped and used as sex slaves. Furthermore, a person like Brig. Banya, Brig. Kolo, and Maj. Apire are the original LRA. As officers and commanders, they should be more responsible for alleged abduction, extrajudicial execution and destruction in northern Uganda. But since their return and willingness to serve Museveni's whims, they are shielded and the ICC not bothered about them. This is despite the fact that while these three were not abducted but are former soldiers and adults who joined the LRA willingly, the other commanders such as Raska Lukwiya and Dominic Ongwen, who have been indicted by the ICC, were abducted as children and trained by the Banyas and Kolos in the trade they now stand accused of. For those interested in a negotiated settlement and a just peace through the success of the Juba Talks, there is need to understand the objective history of the war (Accord, No. 11, 2002) and not let the methods of the LRM/A insurgency and its alleged brutalities dim our own memory of the war or cloud our judgements on how best durable peace can be achieved. No doubt, there are enough evidence of atrocities on both sides to warrant summary, public executions of the highest ranking leaders and their generals on both sides. But what is needed now is a mechanism to bring the war and the suffering of the eastern and northern population to an end. This implies that, the Juba Talks, rather than some sideshow in Garamba, is the best framework and prospects for comprehensive ceasefire and the road to peace. Culpability for atrocities should be left to the next stage of the process, which must necessarily envisage addressing the inadequacy of the ICC indictments, and the preference for a UN Special Tribunal for Northern Uganda, to investigate and try all perpetrators guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity over the entire history of the war from 1986. As a meaningful way forward, and for a sustainable peace afterwards, the Juba Talks must also suppose the setting up of a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Anything short of an honest, just and equitable peace and settlement, will only act as a temporary band aid measure that is bound to rapture with irreparable consequences. There should be no shortcuts. And in keeping with our moral quest for a just and equitable peace, we must avoid falling prey to making a moral distinction between atrocities committed by non-state parties and that perpetrated by the state. Neither public tears of remorse nor wrapping oneself in the national flag should obstruct our perception and even-handed judgment of criminal acts and responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in northern Uganda. |
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| Originally posted by Magnetonium If there's one conflict that I haven't followed, its this Ugandan one, I feel very ashamed. Truly an important one, but the oil trail doesnt lead there. I'm reading the article ... |
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| Originally posted by atbell Esentially it wouldn't take much to see Sudan erupt into an even more complicated mess and the LRA is right in the middle of it. |
I completely agree that Central Africa isn't looking good, but what amazes me most is the thought that it could get WORSE 
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| Originally posted by atbell I completely agree that Central Africa isn't looking good, but what amazes me most is the thought that it could get WORSE |
I completely agree that Central Africa isn't looking good, but what amazes me most is the thought that it could get WORSE
I completely agree that Central Africa isn't looking good, but what amazes me most is the thought that it could get WORSE
The rumor mill is churning following the death of one of Joseph Kony's top deputies. There are reports that Kony himself had him killed, which has caused a large amount of dissent among the foot soldiers. Apparently there have been a lot of defections, so here's hoping this is signaling an end to Kony's ability to hold half of Uganda hostage. Purely speculation at this point, but one can hope.
However, Uganda faces a pretty big problem on another front it would seem:
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| PRESIDENT Yoweri Museveni has urged all Ugandans to stop shaking hands until the Ebola pandemic is completely contained, including people in places where the disease has not been reported. Museveni said the Government was doing everything possible to contain the Ebola pandemic across the country. |
For those interested, the recent breakthrough in peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandan government seems promising... but it still leaves a lot of issues about accountability and justice outstanding. This is turning into a classic case study for the debate surrounding justice vs. peace - can there be reconciliation (positive peace) without justice, and can there be an end to violence (negative peace) without some form of amnesty for the aggressors?
From the US Institute of Peace:
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| The Justice Dilemma in Uganda By Scott Worden February 2008 * Introduction * Over Two Decades of Violence * The Possibility of Peace * Key Issues Affecting the Justice Framework * Recommendations for Ugandan Accountability Mechanisms * Notes * Further Reading Rule of Law USIP Press: Africa In the Field: Uganda May 16, 2006 Introduction On February 18, 2008 the Ugandan government and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) reached agreement on an accountability and reconciliation accord that would provide for prosecution in Uganda of senior LRA leaders most responsible for atrocities committed over the course of the country's 20-year long civil conflict. The agreement also provides that lower level perpetrators will be held accountable by traditional justice mechanisms indigenous to Northern Uganda, where much of the violence occurred. Now detailed planning must begin to establish the judicial bodies created by the new agreement and to address the inevitable social problems that will arise when thousands of former fighters from the LRA return to live side-by-side with villagers who were victims of their attacks. So far, the focus has been on how to hold the top LRA leadership accountable�including its head, Joseph Kony, and two others whom the International Criminal Court (ICC) has indicted for crimes against humanity. Less attention has been paid to the greater problems associated with the thousands of perpetrators who have committed terrible crimes for which prosecution is not envisioned. While the Accountability Agreement emphasizes that traditional reconciliation mechanisms practiced by tribes in conflict-affected areas will play a large role in addressing the atrocities committed on the part of the LRA, many questions remain unanswered as to the capacity, credibility, and compatibility of these mechanisms to deal with the large scale atrocities including rape, kidnapping and mutilation, that occurred frequently during the LRA conflict. This briefing provides a background of the conflict and ongoing attempts at peace, reflects the diverse views expressed during the consultations about justice priorities, and offers recommendations on how to move forward with a comprehensive justice plan. TOP Over Two Decades of Violence A main street in the Pabo Camp for Internally Displaced Peoples. A main street in the Pabo Camp for IDPs, located 40 km north of Gulu, reflects the typical life of a villager, but in supremely overcrowded conditions. Many have been living in the 40,000 person camp for more than 10 years. The current conflict traces its roots to 1986, when current President Yoweri Museveni's faction prevailed in a struggle to overthrow the Milton Obote regime. Northern Ugandan rebel groups organized the National Resistance Movement (NRM) to prevent Museveni from consolidating power. This armed insurgency was organized along ethnic and regional lines, with the rebels residing mostly in the North and comprised largely of the Acholi ethnic group. In time, the NRM insurgency was taken over by Alice Lakwena, a mystic who claimed supernatural powers and led poorly trained soldiers into battle under the banner of her Holy Spirit Movement, promising that spells and amulets could fend off enemy bullets. Lakwena's movement faltered in November 1987 but was taken over by her cousin, Joseph Kony. He also claimed spiritual powers and carried on the battle against the Museveni government as leader of the LRA, which, with rather tragic irony, purports allegiance to the Ten Commandments as a basis of government. Extreme forms of brutality have characterized the LRA's insurgency. In the past 15 years, the group has kidnapped tens of thousands to be used as fighters, laborers, and concubines. In the process, thousands of others have been killed in attacks, or maimed to set an example for other civilians who would consider resisting. This violence, in turn, produced up to 1.8 million IDPs who were gathered in refugee camps throughout Northern Uganda. Meanwhile, the Ugandan army has also been accused of atrocities including rapes and killing of civilians, and many Northerners blame the Ugandan government for forcing them into inhumane camps and for failing to protect them from the marauding LRA. Since a government offensive led to a new wave of violence and counterviolence in 2003, fighting has moved away from Northern Uganda. The LRA first relocated to bases in neighboring South Sudan, from which it led attacks against both Ugandans and Sudanese (causing the government of South Sudan to request reparations for harm done to their citizens). As support from Sudan waned, however, Uganda enlisted South Sudan as a broker of peace. (South Sudan has ethnic links to LRA fighters and has a strong incentive to intervene to end raids on its people and instability beyond its southern border.) In 2006, the government of Uganda and representatives of the LRA began peace talks mediated by Riek Machar, Vice President of the Government of South Sudan, resulting in a framework peace agreement in June 2007 that lays the foundation for a cessation of hostilities, disarmament, return and rehabilitation of fighters, and justice and accountability. A key element of the June package was an Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation (the Accountability Agreement). This document calls for barring impunity for atrocities committed during a twenty-year civil war, pursuing reconciliation through traditional justice mechanisms, and engaging in historical analysis of the causes and consequences of the conflict. (Note: a separate USIPeace Briefing on this topic, from an observer at the talks, can be found here) In the last several years, thousands of LRA fighters have given up arms in return for a comprehensive government amnesty program. Those that remain in the movement under Kony have relocated to the jungles of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where they have begun to attack and kidnap Congolese civilians to sustain their movement even as the peace talks with the Ugandan government proceed. No one knows for certain, but credible estimates are that the LRA has only around 500 fighters remaining in the bush, with possibly double that number in family members and servants/slaves who support their camps. The Government of South Sudan has provided a safe haven in Ri-Kwangba, near the border of Congo, for the LRA to gather and negotiate for peace. But the senior leadership have remained in hiding. Peace negotiations between the Ugandan government and the LRA resumed on January 29, 2008 in Juba, South Sudan, where negotiators are working out detailed protocols for implementing the June 2007 framework agreement. On February 19, 2008 the parties signed an annex to the Accountability Agreement providing further details on how accountability and reconciliation shall be achieved. At the urging of the Ugandan government, a USIP delegation consisting of Senior Fellow Betty Bigombe, Associate Vice President Neil Kritz, and Rule of Law Advisor Scott Worden visited Uganda from December 9-19, 2007 to conduct consultations with a wide range of stakeholders in the peace process about the prospects for progress at the peace talks in Juba (the capital of South Sudan) and plans to implement the justice mechanisms outlined in the Accountability Agreement. The delegation met with government officials and negotiators, the LRA negotiating team, judges and other legal officials, the chairman of the Amnesty Commission, civil society organizations, religious and tribal leaders, members of the chief mediator's team for the talks, and victims of the conflict, in Kampala and in Gulu, the regional capital in the North and epicenter of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps that still hold hundreds of thousands of Northern Ugandan refugees.1 TOP The Possibility of Peace Residents of an IDP camp met to discuss their views on justice. Residents of an IDP camp meet to discuss their views on justice for the LRA with Senior Fellow Betty Bigombe, who all know well from her prior service as the Ugandan Minister for Northern Affairs. The talks that resumed in January 2008 are the continuation of a long and fitful attempt at peace that began when Betty Bigombe, then Minister for the North, initiated the first direct talks with the LRA in 1993. These talks ended with resumed fighting when the LRA failed to respond to a negotiation ultimatum in 1994. Bigombe then re-initiated talks on behalf of the government in 2003, which also ended without agreement. The current Juba round is in many ways the most promising yet. No element of the Accountability Agreement has been implemented yet, but it contains several promising provisions addressing the challenge of justice and accountability. First, the recently completed agreement on prosecutions states that "a special division of the High Court of Uganda shall be established to try individuals who are alleged to have committed serious crimes during the conflict." This special division will "have a registry dedicated to the work of the division and in particular, shall make arrangements to facilitate the protection and participation of witnesses, victims, women and children" and may use special procedures to account for the unique complexity of the conflict. Given limited resources and the complexity of proving cases of mass atrocity, these trial proceedings would not resolve the majority of crimes committed, but would only apply to a select few individuals "who are alleged to bear particular responsibility for the most serious crimes, especially crimes amounting to international crimes, during the course of the conflict." For the broader range of crimes, the agreement introduces a role for traditional, community- based justice mechanisms as "a central part of the framework for accountability and reconciliation" which the latest agreement indicated would be applied to lower-level perpetrators and those who have already received amnesty.2 The Accountability Agreement recognizes the need for "a comprehensive, independent and impartial analysis of the history and manifestations of the conflict, especially the human rights violations and crimes committed during the course of the conflict." The Accountability Agreement also recognizes "the need for an overarching justice framework" as well as the need for "modifications...within the national legal system to ensure a more effective and integrated justice and accountability response." Finally, the agreement provides for a range of individual and collective reparations. But very little has been done to date to develop an overall justice framework or to work through the particulars of any component thereof. USIP's consultations revealed a wide range of conflicting opinions among stakeholders and policymakers as to both the demand for justice and the ability of various institutions to deliver it. In the North, there was strong demand for peace at (almost) all costs. Many officials and observers the team spoke with had interesting ideas about possible paths to justice and reconciliation, but there is no consensus and many questions remain unresolved. Overall, it was clear that the problem is large, complex, and requires significant immediate attention. TOP Key Issues Affecting the Justice Framework Beyond the provisions of the framework agreement, negotiators in Juba will have to recognize several legal and practical constraints in fashioning implementation mechanisms for accountability and reconciliation. ICC Indictments: In 2003, the Ugandan government requested that the International Criminal Court investigate serious crimes committed during the LRA conflict. In 2005 the ICC announced five indictments against the following top LRA leaders: Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, Vincent Otti, and Dominic Ongwen (although Ongwen has since died and Kony is believed to have killed Otti in November 2007. The ICC indictments have been controversial. On the one hand, they served to put pressure on the LRA by turning their leadership into international outlaws and making it more difficult for countries like Sudan to harbor and support the movement. ICC engagement in the case was a crucial factor in weakening support for the LRA and moving them towards the current round of negotiations, and in then ensuring that the parties addressed the question of accountability mechanisms in the negotiations. This has been an extremely important precedent for this young new international institution. Many Ugandans also believe that the ICC trials would be more fair and credible than local trials. On the other hand, the indictments have arguably made negotiations with the LRA more difficult, because Joseph Kony has declared that he will not surrender until the ICC indictments are lifted. This stance has led many in the North to view the ICC as an obstacle to peace�at least in the short term. The ICC's current position is that the indicted individuals must be apprehended and tried by the international court and not in the courts of Uganda. The ICC is also widely seen as biased because it has not indicted any military officials for what Northerners perceive to be widespread abuses.3 This attitude, however, may reflect general ignorance among the public as to the ICC's mandate and jurisdiction as well. Although government abuses against civilians have occurred, the ICC's jurisdiction only permits it to pursue crimes committed after July 2002, and the most significant of these abuses were perpetrated by the Ugandan military prior to that date. The ICC has been investigating atrocities on an ongoing basis, and has stated explicitly that it will consider any crimes committed by government that meet its jurisdictional criteria. The Juba agreement acknowledges the ICC and obliges the government to "address conscientiously the question of the ICC arrest warrants." At the same time, it invokes the ICC�s principle of complementarity�under which, at least prior to the launch of an ICC investigation, a case is inadmissible before the ICC if the local justice system is capable and willing to pursue the matter�and states that accountability will be pursued through national institutions "insofar as practicable." The recent agreement on prosecutions signals that the Ugandan government anticipates its domestic trials of senior LRA leaders will meet international standards, and thus the government will have grounds to argue that the ICC need not pursue its own prosecutions. In the end, the ICC indictments may turn out to be a moot point because it is doubtful that Joseph Kony or the other two remaining indictees will in fact turn themselves in, and capturing them has so far proved impossible. But the ICC may also pursue indictments against other LRA leaders that have committed grave crimes and are not prosecuted domestically, and the court will have a vital role in requiring that any such local proceedings satisfy international standards. Comprehensive Amnesty: Another key component of the justice picture is the Amnesty Act, which the Ugandan government enacted in 2000 as a response to popular demand to end the stalemated conflict. The amnesty granted is exceptionally broad, stating that from 1986 onward "any Ugandan who has...engaged in war or armed rebellion against the government by either participating in combat, engaging in any other criminal activity connected with the conflict, or aiding or abetting insurgents shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any form of punishment" as long as they agree to renounce their affiliation with rebel groups. Therefore, the state may not prosecute, even for such crimes as rape, mutilation, or murder, once amnesty has been given. The Amnesty Commission created to implement the law has no discretion to deny amnesty to any applicant meeting these basic criteria. So far, 15,000 people have been granted amnesty under this law, more than half of whom are LRA fighters. Under a 2006 amendment to the amnesty law, the Minister of Internal Affairs can declare an individual ineligible if the parliament agrees, but this provision has never been invoked, even with respect to Joseph Kony and other ICC indictees. Residents of the Pabo Camp for Internally Displaced Peoples 40 km North of Gulu listen to each other's views on peace and justice in Northern Uganda at a town hall-style meeting. Many demand peace now, but want justice later. Residents of the Pabo Camp listen to each other's views on peace and justice in Northern Uganda at a town hall-style meeting. Many demand peace now, but want justice later. The fact of the amnesty law presents two dilemmas for the overall policy on justice and reconciliation. First, it precludes prosecution or any other form of punishment from being assigned to thousands of perpetrators who have gone through the amnesty process, regardless of the gravity of their offense. Therefore, many heinous crimes will go completely unpunished, and victims may be inclined to resist reconciliation and possibly attempt revenge. This appears to contradict the statement in the Juba agreement that "formal criminal and civil justice measures shall be applied to any individual who is alleged to have committed serious crimes or human rights violations in the course of the conflict." The annex to the Accountability Agreement remains silent on the amnesty law, stating simply that "prosecutions shall focus on individuals who are alleged to have planned or carried out widespread, systematic, or serious attacks directed against civilians"�presumably leaving it up to the courts to sort out which provision takes precedence under Ugandan law. Second, the act presents a challenge for dealing with LRA fighters who are still in the bush. On the one hand, the government actively encourages defections to avoid the need for further fighting, and the current amnesty is a key incentive. On the other hand, the parties have committed to no impunity for serious crimes in the Juba agreement, and the Amnesty Act is at odds with this principle. Even if exceptions are to be made for the most egregious offenders, there is no mechanism currently in place to evaluate the remaining fighters who may have committed grave offenses and therefore should be denied amnesty pending further investigation. Perpetrators as Victims: One tragic aspect of the conflict that cannot be overlooked when considering appropriate justice and accountability mechanisms is that the majority of the LRA's fighters over the years have been kidnapped, often as children, and thus can be considered victims as well as perpetrators. In fact, it has been standard operating procedure for the LRA to attack villages whenever it needed supplies or fighters. It would then kill or maim some members to spread fear, kidnap girls and women to serve as concubines, kidnap boys to become fighters, and men to serve as human mules transporting heavy loads through the jungle. In the case of young captives, they would often be forced to immediately commit atrocities themselves, both to prevent their ability to return to their communities, and to break down their resistance to committing violent acts. Therefore, when many Northerners talk about their desire to forgive the LRA, they are often speaking of their own children or those from their communities, many of whom had no choice but to fight. Separating more culpable leaders from relatively innocent fighters can be a morally arduous task. The possibility of revenge: Stakeholders presented a significant range of views about the extent of the problems that will arise when thousands of ex-combatants return to villages and seek to live alongside victims of the conflict. For the past ten years, much of the population of Northern Uganda, particularly within the Acholi community, has been displaced. At the peak, 1.8 million people were internally displaced, and nearly one million people remain either in IDP camps or have relocated to cities and towns. In recent years, thousands of former LRA combatants have returned from the bush as part of the government's amnesty program, including some senior commanders. So far, there has been no retaliation against the returnees, although former fighters do report that they are ostracized in some communities. This scenario gives rise to two competing schools of thought. The more optimistic view is that due to varying combinations of battle fatigue, longstanding tribal traditions of forgiveness, or out of sheer necessity there will be no significant retaliation or revenge. Members of this camp maintain that anger or a sense of injustice among victims can be dealt with through traditional justice mechanisms, symbolic reparations, and compensation from the government. This viewpoint is reinforced in the lack of retaliation so far against rebels who have been granted amnesty and have returned from the bush, as well as through surveys that indicate many Northern residents view forgiveness as a required price for peace. On the other hand, several interlocutors pointed out that LRA returnees are mostly living in towns, where current residents were less affected by the conflict, and have not yet reintegrated into their own villages where they will be known by their victims, or lived among community members who are aware of what they have done. Moreover, although the situation in Northern Uganda has been peaceful in recent years, the fear of the LRA's return is pervasive, and victims are very cautious not to provoke new conflict with the future of the peace process so uncertain. Therefore, many are concerned that victims' true attitudes will only be known after there is a durable peace, and that if there is no visible and significant justice component to the peace agreement, they will take matters into their own hands. Some victims interviewed directly expressed the view that they are ready to forgive the LRA now in order to have peace, but that once they move home, killers and rapists must be punished, regardless of any amnesty that may have been given. Conflicting ethnic and regional views: Stakeholders have considerably different perspectives on who should ideally be held accountable for the abuses that have occurred. In the South, including Kampala, the focus of blame is on the LRA, which is comprised mostly of Northern tribes, has committed the most visible atrocities, and has hindered the South's otherwise promising economic development. In the North, however, blame is expressed almost equally toward the LRA for its overt attacks and toward the Ugandan government, both for alleged abuses carried out against civilians by the Ugandan army and for the government's failure to protect citizens from the LRA. Blame is also placed on the government for insisting that Northern Ugandans relocate into IDP camps, where they have remained for years in overcrowded conditions with poor education, health, and lack of other services. These differing perspectives on what is needed for justice is also framed by a northern general resentment of Kampala for a perceived exclusion of the northern population from the government and from the equitable distribution of national resources. With respect to accountability for atrocities committed by the Ugandan military, the ICC, as noted above, will in all likelihood not be able to prosecute these cases because its jurisdiction does not extend to the time frame when the principal crimes occurred. The Juba agreement provides that "state actors shall be subjected to existing criminal justice processes and not to special justice processes under this Agreement." From the perspective of many victims, the military justice system is not viewed as a credible and impartial option for dealing with these crimes. If trials of senior LRA are conducted in a national civilian court chamber (discussed below), a variety of interlocutors suggested that such chamber also be given jurisdiction over military atrocities during the conflict. While expressing a desire for justice for LRA leaders, Northerners have also said that they are willing to forgive the LRA if it will bring peace. The sense of war fatigue is palpable among those affected in the North, and the expressed desire to have peace at any cost is understandable in that context. But the level of longer-term satisfaction with a reconciliation process that does not include accountability at either a high or low level is unclear. The official position of the government, as expressed in its signature on the June 2007 agreement, is that there will be no impunity for crimes committed by either side of the conflict. However, there have been discussions about including reduced penalties for senior LRA leaders that would amount to house arrest as an incentive to bring about a final peace agreement. Moreover, the government has been encouraging LRA commanders and fighters to defect now and return to Uganda from the bush, whereby they would benefit by the comprehensive amnesty law. The fact that former LRA commanders have not been punished reinforces the impression that prosecutions can, in fact, be avoided for peace. How competent are the national courts? As noted, the annex to the Accountability Agreement establishes a special division of the Ugandan High Court to prosecute the most serious offenses. This court is generally well-regarded and can be a viable institution for fulfilling the prosecution provisions of the Accountability Agreement. Although the USIP visit did not include a formal assessment of the court, the Ugandan judiciary includes many highly qualified jurists with extensive national and international experience. The High Court and Supreme Court are viewed to have integrity and have an established record of judgments. And a sophisticated legal community of the bar, academics and NGOs can serve as an effective watchdog over the domestic court process. Each of these factors is a positive sign for establishing a court that could be as independent, impartial, and fair as international standards require. Still, prominent members of the legal community readily admit that the Ugandan courts have never tried cases as large and complex as the atrocities, and the Ugandan courts have no experience in dealing with charges involving war crimes or crimes against humanity. In addition, the Ugandan criminal code lacks specific charges relating to international crimes. And some of those interviewed expressed a concern as to whether the Ugandan judiciary could remain completely independent in these high-profile cases. A Ugandan boy waits in line for water at the Pabo Camp. A Ugandan boy waits in line for water at the Pabo Camp. Several legal adaptations may therefore be required to meet international standards, including training members of the special judicial chamber in international criminal law; providing for international participation both on the bench and within the prosecution and investigation services; and incorporating international crimes into Ugandan criminal law. Prosecutions may also require an amendment of the current amnesty law. Various legal officials suggested the need to have foreign experts serve not only as advisors but possibly as judges, prosecutors and investigators alongside their Ugandan counterparts, which follows a long tradition for foreign jurists sitting as members of the judiciary. These steps would be important to enhance both local capacity to try these complex crimes and the credibility of the process in the eyes of the local and international community. How viable are traditional reconciliation mechanisms? Another wide divergence of opinion was the extent to which traditional justice mechanisms can be relied on to deliver justice for LRA atrocities. The Acholi and other Northern tribes do have a longstanding tradition of resolving intra-tribal disputes through apology, negotiation, compensation, and forgiveness. Many Northerners urge that these tribal ways are alive and well, and will serve as a firm foundation for peace. The government is hoping that tribal chiefs will be able devise an effective system for mass reconciliation through traditional methods. The most carefully thought out plans envision a large-scale buttressing of traditional institutions with outside funding and training, as well as modifications of customary methods to fit the LRA's massive crimes. But critics point out that the traditional methods are in fact not widely practiced today, and are not well-suited to the scale and diversity of LRA crimes. Critics also point out that: the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms have not been used in years and are not familiar to the younger generations; that they do not include provisions for atrocities like rape, mutilation, and abduction (all frequently carried out by the LRA); and that women are under-represented and their rights are under-protected under the traditional system. Moreover, years of war and displacement from villages has weakened the knowledge and authority of the traditional chiefs upon whom the customary systems rely. A key element of traditional justice is the payment of compensation, generally in the form of livestock. Today, however, perpetrators generally do not have the resources to pay this compensation; in addition, the livestock population has been decimated and is unavailable. It is clear that some modifications must be made to the traditional rituals for them to be a viable path toward reconciliation among thousands of perpetrators and victims. The question is who should determine which modifications are needed and who will implement them? On the one hand, communities lack the capacity to implement such a complex and important task. On the other hand, the government is greatly mistrusted by citizens in the North, and too much government involvement in a traditional system will eliminate the local trust and consensus that informal systems of reconciliation rely on to be effective. An integrated approach to the massive challenge of justice and reconciliation in northern Uganda would likely entail the use of a combination of justice mechanisms, sequenced over a period of time. Traditional rituals might be relied on initially, to be followed later by criminal investigations and trials and or a truth commission or reparations program. A rule of traditional justice such as the Acholi mato oput, however, is that once the case has been addressed through the traditional process, the matter is put to rest and it is forbidden to speak of it again. This would significantly hamper any staggered approach to justice and reconciliation. Truth processes: The June 29 Accountability Agreement calls for "a comprehensive, independent and impartial analysis of the history and manifestations of the conflict, especially the human rights violations and crimes committed during the course of the conflict" and states that "truth-seeking and truth-telling processes and mechanisms shall be promoted." The February 19, 2008 annex goes further in establishing a �body' that will examine the nature and causes of the conflict, the violations that occurred, hold public hearings, and make recommendations on reparations and governmental reforms. Thus, without calling it by name, the agreement provides the foundation of a truth commission. For various reasons, a truth commission process appears to be warranted. The amnesty program, as well as the likely limits to any ICC or national trials, suggest that prosecutions will probably not be sufficient to address the challenge of justice and reconciliation. Local traditional justice will not establish the mandated national "analysis of the history and manifestations of the conflict." It is worth noting, however, that some senior tribal chiefs propose introducing a more robust system of recording the facts established through traditional resolution of cases into a national database to contribute to the truth-telling process. As noted earlier, this may be particularly relevant if traditional rules bar parties from discussing the case following its resolution through traditional justice. Truth-telling can benefit from implementation of the provisions of the Accountability Agreement that would encourage confessions and other forms of cooperation with legal proceedings. In addition, if given power of subpoena as has been done in some other countries, a truth commission could require even those who have received amnesty to testify with respect to the crimes committed, thereby establishing a more complete record. Lastly, a truth commission process may be the most realistic venue through which to examine the broader issues of the nature of the LRA, abuses by the Ugandan military, and the broader social, political and economic inequities that were drawn upon by the LRA and that underlay continuing tensions and resentments between north and south Uganda. Almost nothing has been done to date to plan for the historical inquiry mandated in the June Accountability Agreement. Justice and Economic Assistance. Regardless of whether LRA and government perpetrators are held accountable for atrocities, Uganda will struggle to deal with the massive costs of the conflict. There was terrible physical and mental destruction, and a nearly complete loss of material wealth. Most rural homes have been destroyed, fields lie fallow, and infrastructure such as roads and wells must be rebuilt. Moreover, the pastoral region has almost no livestock left, which had been the main form of wealth in the Northern communities and a key component of paying the compensation upon which the traditional justice reconciliation mechanisms. In short, a near total reconstruction will have to be accomplished in the North to enable IDPs to return home in large numbers. The Ugandan government has announced a three-year, $600 million plan to rebuild and rehabilitate the Northern regions affected by the conflict, and this will be the primary resource that resettled families will draw on to restart their lives. Little attention has been paid, however, to how this redistribution of wealth will impact the reparations and reconciliation process. One wonders whether questions of justice and blame will not become intertwined with competition for what will surely be scarce resources. For example, even if a victim's family is willing to initially forgive, what will their attitude be when an ex-LRA commander receives what they perceive to be a better plot of land, or begins a more successful business, if there has been no public accountability for past crimes? TOP Recommendations for Ugandan Accountability Mechanisms Planning mechanisms for accountability and reconciliation are lagging far behind fast moving events on the ground, and the government and civil society must move now from ideas to action if they are to be prepared to deliver a form of accountability that is acceptable to victims of the conflict and can form the foundation for a lasting peace. The following recommendations suggest next steps to address a range of transitional justice challenges. * Conduct an independent international assessment to determine the technical capacity of the Ugandan justice system to conduct trials of the most responsible perpetrators�possibly including the ICC indictees�that meet international fair trial and due process standards. * Establish a �hybrid' trial procedure that would try the most responsible perpetrators referenced in the Accountability Agreement in Ugandan courts, but with involvement of international participants, such as foreign judges or counsel. * Conduct a legislative review to determine which Ugandan laws need to be modified to prosecute the "international crimes" that LRA perpetrators have committed, including crimes against humanity, war crimes, and command responsibility. * Establish a high-level working group to assess the feasibility of relying on traditional justice mechanisms to resolve war-related crimes that are not within the jurisdiction of the courts that will prosecute the most responsible perpetrators. * Modify the Amnesty Act to provide conditional amnesty for the remaining LRA fighters still in the bush, which would require truthful information about criminal activity and ensure that the most responsible perpetrators of the greatest crimes are not barred from prosecution. * Ensure that equivalent investigation and accountability measures are taken for atrocities alleged on the part of the government/military as those committed by the LRA. * Establish rules and procedures for the truth/historical examination process that is to evaluate root causes of the conflict and make policy recommendations on appropriate reparation and prevention measures as part of the overall justice and reconciliation strategy. * Explore the means for compensation/reparation for past crimes and its interaction with the Ugandan government's comprehensive redevelopment plan for the North. Implementation of the principles outlined in the Accountability Agreement and its implementation annex will necessarily be thorny. And while each of these proposals has been considered to varying degrees by outside actors, they have so far been discussed in an ad hoc and unofficial capacity. The urgent next step is for these deliberations to occur at the highest levels within a framework that leads to concrete policy decisions. TOP Notes 1. Specifically, USIP met with officials from the Ministry of [Interior], Ministry of Justice, High Court, Supreme Court, Prosecutor General, Amnesty Commission, Office of the Mediator of the Juba talks, the LRA Negotiation Delegation, and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights as well as representatives of non-governmental organizations including the Faculties of Law, Religious Studies and Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies at Makarere University, Acode, the Refugee Law Project, Gulu Forum, the Acholi Paramount Chief, and the Gulu Religious Leaders Forum, and the Gulu University Human Rights and Peace Center, residents of two IDP camps near Gulu, and former LRA fighters. 2. The most prominent traditional mechanism is Matu Oput, which is practiced the Acholi people practice as a means to address cases of murder or theft. Traditionally, a perpetrator will fully confess his misdeeds to his family and clan, who then admit and apologize for the offence to the victim, and compensation is agreed. The parties will then reconcile without retribution or service of jail time. Other tribes affected by the conflict follow similar practices, but there are significant differences between the groups that will have to be respected. 3. The ICC�s image is still hurt by the fact that, after issuing indictments against the LRA, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo appeared at a press conference with Museveni, which many interpreted as indicating the ICC�s alliance with the government. The ICC has since clarified its independence, but the taint of bias remains. |
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| Originally posted by Lebezniatnikov For those interested, the recent breakthrough in peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandan government seems promising... but it still leaves a lot of issues about accountability and justice outstanding. This is turning into a classic case study for the debate surrounding justice vs. peace - can there be reconciliation (positive peace) without justice, and can there be an end to violence (negative peace) without some form of amnesty for the aggressors? From the US Institute of Peace: http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_b...ice_uganda.html There's a good deal in the way of further reading at their site as well. |
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| Originally posted by jerZ07002 how do you find time to stay informed on such varied topics?? do you stay informed on market information also? i wish i had the time. |
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| Originally posted by Lebezniatnikov Haha, the market is far out of my domain. Anything with imaginary money and count me out. I'm an International Affairs major in graduate school, with dual concentrations in conflict resolution and international development in sub-Saharan Africa. So this is actually more along the lines of my academic interests. Following elections is just a hobby (and procrastination tool). |
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