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Philosophical Question: Is "Moral Relativism" really relative?

Take note of the following statement.

"Morality, ethics, and law are relative."




Isn't this an absolute statement?

Re: Philosophical Question: Is "Moral Relativism" really relative?

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Originally posted by Krypton Take note of the following statement. "Morality, ethics, and law are relative." Isn't this an absolute statement?

The statement, in the english language context, is absolute...

Perhaps the contents of the idea are much less absolute, unless you can somehow brilliantly orchestrate a map of all the moralities and ethics and laws of the world through moving time and map them relative to one another.

How does one even relate morality, a non-object, without moving into abstraction (abstraction itself being the core of most things that exist in this universe)? Seems like they may be many, many things, relative included.

You didn't give much to go on there though, you'll have to elucidate a bit.

Is truth relative or absolute? Is murder ALWAYS wrong?

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Originally posted by Krypton Is truth relative or absolute? Is murder ALWAYS wrong?

hahaha

Better question time to answer better questions. Here we go.

Is relativity and absolution quantifiable units to define the REAL reality?

Is murder an act, an energy, or both? Divide it, then answer your own question on those terms. Act and idea. Go.

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Originally posted by DJ Shibby hahaha Better question time to answer better questions. Here we go. Is relativity and absolution quantifiable units to define the REAL reality? Is murder an act, an energy, or both? Divide it, then answer your own question on those terms. Act and idea. Go.

Yes they are because you can measure both matter and energy and the effects each have on each other. So murder is both an act and the squelching of another's energy because the victim had life. So, is murder wrong in all societies at all times?

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Originally posted by Krypton Yes they are because you can measure both matter and energy and the effects each have on each other. So murder is both an act and the squelching of another's energy because the victim had life. So, is murder wrong in all societies at all times?

By definition "murder" is wrong.

You don't "murder" when your armies kill foreign civilians, right? You don't "murder" when your government electrocutes or poisons a killer, right?

Carr kills his gay lover in the 50s, claims he was assaulted and straight in court, gets off. Not murder. Relative indeed, and something else as well. Hmm.

Relativity is only the icing on the cake on this sociopathic messmurder.

PS: I contend you can not measure anything accurately.

Hmm interesting. Getting back to the original question.



Can morality be absolutely relative?

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Originally posted by Krypton Hmm interesting. Getting back to the original question. Can morality be absolutely relative?

Arg. I'm going to bed.

Re: Philosophical Question: Is "Moral Relativism" really relative?

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Originally posted by Krypton Take note of the following statement. "Morality, ethics, and law are relative." Isn't this an absolute statement?

Morality and ethics are merely opinions. Opinions have no truth value at all... they can neither be true absolutely nor true relative to anything. To the extent that a moral proposition is an inference, it can be ill-founded if the individual drawing the inference relies upon mistaken facts or invalid logic. For example, someone who believes that abortion is wrong and that people who do not want to have children should simply abstain from intercourse on the grounds that life is inherently valuable clearly has an ill-founded opinion, as even that very brief inference contains both an error of fact and an error of logic.

It is probably worth noting that it is entirely possible for two people to hold the same moral opinion and that it is for one of them ill-founded and for the other not. The question of whether an opinion is ill-founded is a question of the grounds on which it rests, and that is a matter necessarily relative to the individual. It should also be noted that this is different from an evaluation of a moral opinion's merit, for which I believe there is a reasonably objective standard, and further that an ill-founded opinion may be incidentally meritorious while a well-founded opinion may not be.

Law is a somewhat different case... the common law, for example, is by its very nature relative in that it applies only within some specific jurisdiction. In theory there may be a fact of the matter for the particular court hearing the case, but oft-inconsistent interpretations of the law muddy the waters a bit.

Re: Re: Philosophical Question: Is "Moral Relativism" really relative?

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Originally posted by Krypton "Morality, ethics, and law are relative." Isn't this an absolute statement?

I'd say it's an objective statement. An absolute statement would imply that "morality, ethics, and law must always be relative".

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Originally posted by Arbiter Morality and ethics are merely opinions. Opinions have no truth value at all... they can neither be true absolutely nor true relative to anything.

I disagree. The truth value of a moral claim lies in the objective consequences of the actions it gives rise to. If the acting out of a moral belief can be objectively demonstrated to cause suffering, for instance, then we have to reject its claim to being a "moral" belief in the first place. Consequentially, beliefs and actions cannot in themselves be moral or immoral, but must rather be judged entirely by the consequences they arrive upon other human beings.

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To the extent that a moral proposition is an inference, it can be ill-founded if the individual drawing the inference relies upon mistaken facts or invalid logic.

I don't think morality lends itself so easily to the demands of logic though. The parts of the brain that process logic and those that process moral judgements are largely separate, the latter being governed largely by the emotional centers of the brain (lymbic system, amygdala etc.). In fact, those who suffer damage to their amygdala in childhood often display amoral behaviour for the simple reason that they cannot properly read the emotional states of other human beings. So the capacity for empathy, I would argue, is a necessary prerequisite for moral behaviour, while the capacity for logic is not.

That is not to say that actions and moral decisions cannot (or should not) be informed by reason: in fact I would argue that they should. But any moral action guided by reason must also begin with a moral norm that cannot be arrived at via logic alone. That is to say, logic is only useful in moral decisions if we start with a simple moral norm such as "suffering is bad" which informs the logical process from the beginning. Blind logic, however, will not get us very far, as every rational investigation into the nature of morality throughout the history of philosophy has shown us.

You might find this interesting reading Krypt.

Objectivist Values

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Originally posted by Renegade I disagree. The truth value of a moral claim lies in the objective consequences of the actions it gives rise to. If the acting out of a moral belief can be objectively demonstrated to cause suffering, for instance, then we have to reject its claim to being a "moral" belief in the first place. Consequentially, beliefs and actions cannot in themselves be moral or immoral, but must rather be judged entirely by the consequences they arrive upon other human beings.

I think our disagreement may to some degree be one of language as opposed to substance. I certainly agree that if we assume some particular goal(s) or valuation(s) we can create a framework with respect to which we might evaluate the truth of moral assertions. The issue is that I find that the nature of this framework necessarily reduces to a matter of opinion.

When you say "logic is only useful in moral decisions if we start with a simple moral norm such as 'suffering is bad' which informs the logical process from the beginning," you are saying exactly what I mean. At some foundational level, we must simply assume some moral proposition (in this case, that suffering is bad.) I do not find there to be any objective basis upon which to judge what, if any, such foundational moral propositions ought to be assumed. If the underlying assumptions cannot be said to be a matter of fact, then what follows from them cannot either. We can, however, still evaluate the validity of the reasoning by which that which follows is reached (if any.)

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I don't think morality lends itself so easily to the demands of logic though. The parts of the brain that process logic and those that process moral judgements are largely separate, the latter being governed largely by the emotional centers of the brain (lymbic system, amygdala etc.). In fact, those who suffer damage to their amygdala in childhood often display amoral behaviour for the simple reason that they cannot properly read the emotional states of other human beings. So the capacity for empathy, I would argue, is a necessary prerequisite for moral behaviour, while the capacity for logic is not. That is not to say that actions and moral decisions cannot (or should not) be informed by reason: in fact I would argue that they should. But any moral action guided by reason must also begin with a moral norm that cannot be arrived at via logic alone. That is to say, logic is only useful in moral decisions if we start with a simple moral norm such as "suffering is bad" which informs the logical process from the beginning. Blind logic, however, will not get us very far, as every rational investigation into the nature of morality throughout the history of philosophy has shown us.

Again, I agree with much of what you say. Moral thinking definitely appears to have its origins in the brain's emotional centers. That is precisely what I would expect of an opinion, however. An individual's favorites, likes, dislikes, et cetera are all likely to be consequences of emotional states...

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Originally posted by Arbiter At some foundational level, we must simply assume some moral proposition (in this case, that suffering is bad.) I do not find there to be any objective basis upon which to judge what, if any, such foundational moral propositions ought to be assumed. If the underlying assumptions cannot be said to be a matter of fact, then what follows from them cannot either.

yeah, but even if i accept that ^^ as correct, the almost nihilistic texture still rubs me the wrong way :/ why believe anything or advocate any point of view if ultimately everything is equal? and how can you have a username like that if you've just said that there can be no worthwhile arbiter?

i dunno. there exists a wonderful equilibrium in the universe's state of nature, i like thinking that ideas like 'suffering is bad' is a sociologist's E=MC2

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Originally posted by Krypton Is truth relative or absolute?

is reality relative or absolute? i think reality is absolute.

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Originally posted by pkcRAISTLIN is reality relative or absolute? i think reality is absolute.

I think reality is absolute, but our perception of reality, is relative. Beside, we can only sense a part of reality. As we all know, there are parts of reality completely beyond our senses.

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Originally posted by Krypton I think reality is absolute, but our perception of reality, is relative. Beside, we can only sense a part of reality. As we all know, there are parts of reality completely beyond our senses.

but im not talking about perception. imo truth is reality.

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Originally posted by pkcRAISTLIN but im not talking about perception. imo truth is reality.

So truth is absolute. But our perception of truth is relative.

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Originally posted by Krypton So truth is absolute. But our perception of truth is relative.

it's a vicious circle isn't it?

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Originally posted by Arbiter I think our disagreement may to some degree be one of language as opposed to substance. I certainly agree that if we assume some particular goal(s) or valuation(s) we can create a framework with respect to which we might evaluate the truth of moral assertions. The issue is that I find that the nature of this framework necessarily reduces to a matter of opinion.

I don't think "opinion" is quite the right term though.

Let's say I believe (as I happen to) that my getting poked in the eye is likely to lead to suffering on my part. I don't disagree that such an assertion is entirely subjective: no-one else can make such a judgement for me, and that judgement is therefore inherently subjective in construction. (I would baulk at labelling such a judgement an "opinion" as a consequence, but that may just be semantic quibbling.) However, the second you poke me in the eye and I start crying like a little girl, my suffering is no longer subjective: it is an objective fact, apprehensible to anyone who happens to possess functioning mirror-neurons. Given the universality of the human anatomy, I can therefore project my suffering onto others and argue that - as an objective rule of thumb - poking people in the eye leads to suffering and is therefore something we should seek to avoid during the natural course of daily affairs.

quote:

When you say "logic is only useful in moral decisions if we start with a simple moral norm such as 'suffering is bad' which informs the logical process from the beginning," you are saying exactly what I mean. At some foundational level, we must simply assume some moral proposition (in this case, that suffering is bad.)

As above, I can only point to the universality of human experience. Perhaps there are some individuals who would claim to enjoy suffering: again, that would be their subjective judgement which I could have no business second-guessing. However, I would argue that such individuals are exceedingly rare and could be comfortably classified as pathologically abnormal (I don't think the word "masochist" quite captures it). To that extent, the opposing maxim - that "suffering isn't bad" - can be discounted, as no sane individual would be willing to adopt such a sentiment as a universal maxim (and, in doing so, necessarily invite suffering upon themselves).

This wouldn't, I hesitate to add, make "suffering is to be avoided" an absolute moral maxim (one can always find exceptions, afterall) but it does make - at the very least, I think - a solid objective maxim upon which to judge the morality of human actions.

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I do not find there to be any objective basis upon which to judge what, if any, such foundational moral propositions ought to be assumed. If the underlying assumptions cannot be said to be a matter of fact, then what follows from them cannot either. We can, however, still evaluate the validity of the reasoning by which that which follows is reached (if any.)

Well there are two objective facts upon which such moral propositions can be founded:

1) The suffering of other human beings is largely objective.
2) No human being would will for his own suffering, and could therefore not wish for the adoption of suffering as a universal maxim.

In light of this, I would argue that suffering (at the hands of another human being) is something that can be avoided and should be avoided. Logic (vis a vis qua logical consitency) is important to the realisation of the latter point, but it is our subjective apprehension of the internal states of others in the former point that makes morality possible in the first place. Suffering is an objective matter of fact, therefore morality (to the extent that it is bound to human suffering) is as well.

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Again, I agree with much of what you say. Moral thinking definitely appears to have its origins in the brain's emotional centers. That is precisely what I would expect of an opinion, however. An individual's favorites, likes, dislikes, et cetera are all likely to be consequences of emotional states...

I would argue that subjective emotional states can realise themselves objectively - and, again, I'm going to have to quibble about your use of the word "opinion" - but other than that, yeah, I think we probably agree with more on this issue than we disagree about.

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Originally posted by Q5echo it's a vicious circle isn't it?

I get easily lost in this stuff...

No, Arbiter is right. Morality or ethics are just mere assumptions that carry no truth value in a logical framework.

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Originally posted by Krypton I think reality is absolute, but our perception of reality, is relative. Beside, we can only sense a part of reality. As we all know, there are parts of reality completely beyond our senses.

Reality might be absolute, relative, amorphous, or any number of crazy things inbetween or outside thereof.

Perception could very well be more absolute than reality itself... it is, afterall, defined by biological parameters which we cannot escape. 20,000Hz, infrared, etc. Let's chew on that one for a few.

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Originally posted by Renegade I don't think "opinion" is quite the right term though.

It is, if you can't prove it inductively, preferably in a formal proof, you can't claim it to have any truth value logically at all... or it would at least be very unsound reasoning.

useless debate! does it even matter?

i never understood why people ask questions that have no answers. society is better off when people utilize their efforts to tackle questions/problems with real answers/solutions.

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Originally posted by shaolin_Z It is, if you can't prove it inductively, preferably in a formal proof, you can't claim it to have any truth value logically at all...

Yep, like I said, "I don't think morality lends itself so easily to the demands of logic". My argument is that if morality has any truth value at all, then it is primarily an empirical truth rather than a logical truth.

To use an example, it can be empirically demonstrated that generally:

1) Murder causes suffering.

And:

2) Suffering is something that people seek to avoid.

We can syllogistically draw these premises together into the conclusion that "murder is therefore to be avoided", but the (logical) 'truth value' of this syllogism is still completely dependent on the (empirical) 'truth value' of the premises upon which it is founded. Fortunately the empirical truth of both these premises can be demonstrated, but otherwise you would be correct: in the absense of objective proof for human suffering, moral claims would have no "truth value logically at all..."

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