Reading this today, I couldn't help but see some similarities, though I don't hear much criticism about how bad FDR was for not preventing something that was so clearly telegraphed. Amazing how history can repeat itself in so many ways.

From a morning missive of sorts...

quote:

On this day in 1941, the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Forces pulled off a major surgical strike (before that term became popular). In less than 110 minutes, they severely damaged or sank eight huge battleships, three light cruisers and a score of lesser vessels. In addition, they destroyed almost 200 aircraft and killed nearly 3,000 men. And for the next five decades, American schoolboys have learned of the "surprise" attack on Pearl Harbor. But it shouldn't have been a surprise. First, nearly ten hours before the attack Americans intercepted a fourteen part Japanese radio message. They managed to decipher that by about 4:30 a.m. (Washington time). But the message stayed in the code room awaiting the arrival of the officer of the day so he could see if it was important enough to awaken the President. FDR got it at 7:30 a.m. (still plenty of time.) After some discussion it was determined by the Chief of Naval Operations to send the message to all areas of the Pacific. Because of re-encoding (so the Japanese wouldn't know we knew) the message was not sent till 11:00 a.m. (still a little time.) Out it went to everywhere but Hawaii because...the code receiver was not working. By the time it was relayed to Pearl the "Arizona" had been on the harbor bottom for a bit over three hours. A second reason it should not have been a surprise was a book titled "The Great Pacific War". In the book, the author predicted a Japanese "sneak attack" to destroy the American fleet. When it was published (in 1925), it was the cover feature of a N.Y. Times Book Review. That happened to be the same year that a Japanese Ensign named Yamamoto was a Consular Aide in Washington D.C. The final reason it shouldn't have been a surprise is that it was an American idea. Ten years earlier, U.S. Adm. Harry Yarnell had tried to prove the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor. The plan he devised and demonstrated in 1932 was copied and used by the Japanese right down to the exact course that their carriers would use and the exact spot at sea for launching the planes. In a series of investigations after the war, congressmen refused to believe the Japanese had actually used Yarnell's plan. No wonder they were skeptical. Who ever heard of someone taking an innovative American idea, shaping it to their own designs and exploiting it against the Americans themselves.