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just some food of thought (if anyone could be bothered reading). This is a presentation paper I wrote last semester, which has some historical reference to rupert's post. It focuses, as you will discover, on the Nixon and to a lesser extent the Carter presidencies. I must admit that the role played by Kissinger throughout this period was nothing short of amazing. His understanding of international relations is something which I truly admire and have great respect for.
Tutorial Paper: What were vital American interests in the Middle East?
Throughout the period of the Nixon and Carter presidencies, American vital interests in the Middle East firmly resided in securing Arab Oil. For American policymakers this has often been complicated with their underlying support for the Jewish state of Israel. Kissinger was Nixon’s talisman in the Middle East throughout 1973 and his resolve was firmly put to the test with the outbreak of the fifth Arab-Israeli War. Israel suffered major military setbacks, including the successful Arab offensive during the Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur, on October 6, 1973, which placed Nixon and Kissinger in a difficult predicament. Continuos military and economic support for Israel would undoubtedly place their vital interest of Oil under serious risk, with the looming possibility of an Arab Oil embargo, while they could not abandon their close friend in the Middle East. Although the Great Oil Embargo of 1973 weakened US resolve, Kissinger was able to establish diplomatic relations with Egypt. This inevitably secured America’s vital interest, when on March 18, 1974 the Arab states lifted the Oil embargo. Carter was elected to the American presidency in November 1976 and vital Oil interests in the Middle East undoubtedly remained. Although Carter’s greatest achievement was the peace deal brokered between Egypt and Israel, Iran firmly remained central to vital Oil interests in the Middle East. Yet, Carter’s failure to deal with the impeding theological threat of the Ayatollah Kohmeni had ominous consequences for America’s principal supplier of oil.
America’s vital interest in the Middle-East throughout 1973 undoubtedly remained Oil. However, securing its most sought after resource from the region became ever more difficult with the outbreak of the fifth Arab Israeli, October 1973. Arab patience had reached its limit with the failure of successive diplomatic attempts to ensure the return of its territories occupied by Israel in 1967. On October 6, 1973, during the Jewish religious holiday of Yom Kippur, the Egyptian and Syrian armies, virtually simultaneously, began air and tank attacks on the Israeli front lines and on the Suez front. Much to the surprise of many, including Kissinger, Israeli forces were driven off the Golan Heights, along the Suez, while the Egyptians destroyed the heavily defended Bar-Lev defensive line, which the Israelis had deemed impregnable. It appears clear that throughout the planning for the military operations in the October war, the Egyptians were under no illusions about their capacity to defeat Israel. Various pressures began to operate on Nixon and Kissinger, if Israel continued to be defamed by the Arabs. While they could not abandon a close friend in Israel, they were anxious not to allow the major Arab oil-producing states a means by which they could mount significant pressures in the form of an Oil Embargo. The Sunday times asserted the following analysis:
Kissinger wanted a limited Israeli defeat. The nicety lay in calculating the optimum of this defeat: big enough to satisfy the Arabs and avoid any form of Oil restriction to Europe; bearable enough to avoid the collapse of Mrs Meir’s government and its replacement by right intransigent.
However, it must be said that Nixon and Kissinger badly underestimated the political use of Oil and continued to fund Israel’s military operations. This had detrimental effects on America’s vital Oil interests, as the Arabs imposed a total oil embargo on the United States.
The Great Oil Embargo of 1973 clearly put Nixon and Kissinger’s resolve to the test, as the potential consequences for America’s vital Oil interests were now increasingly evident. During the previous decade, the American government had been aware of the prime importance of oil shipments on reasonable terms to Europe. This is evident between 1968 and 1973, where European and Japanese dependence upon Middle Eastern petroleum dramatically increased and the United States, having steadily increased its own oil consumption, had itself come to depend upon petroleum imports much more than in the past. Oil was the State Departments obsession and the so-called “oil weapon” implemented by the Arabs had to be quickly neutralised. Kissinger’s diplomatic skills, as a result, became central to vital American Oil interests in the Middle-East.
Kissinger’s step-by-step diplomacy and implementation of Security Council resolution 242, is directly attributed to the lifting of the Oil Embargo by the Arab States. Although the resolution did not tackle serious questions concerning the status of Jerusalem or a homeland for the Palestinians , it did secure America’s vital Oil interests when on March 18, 1974 the Arab states lifted the Oil embargo and vital oil shipments to Europe resumed. Kissinger’s ability to adopt an even handed approach towards both sides is of crucial importance to this achievement. To the Israelis he said “All the world is against you, and you cannot stand against the whole world”. To the Arabs he said “Only the United States can persuade Israel to retreat from the conquered territory, but you cannot expect the United States to invest so much time and energy in an operation that is so clearly in the Arab interest as long as you withhold your oil”. Washington now focused primary attention on maintaining its Oil interests throughout the Middle East. This legacy of Oil dependence would continue through the Carter presidency.
Jimmy Carter was elected to the American presidency in November 1976 and vital Oil interests in the Middle East undoubtedly remained. Although Carter played a pivotal role in bringing about a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, Iran remained the US entrance into Middle Eastern Oil. Carter praised the Shah for offering ‘enlightened leadership’ to Iran, to which America was bound with ‘unbreakable ties’ and an ‘unshakeable’ economic pact. This was predominantly reflected through the fact that American oil companies were largely providing the Iranians with technicians, financing and general guidance. This essentially followed the Nixon and Kissinger legacy, who maintained that the Shah was central to American Oil interests in the Middle East. Although Carter was full of praise for the Shah, when he stated in his visit to Tehran on New Years Eve 1977 that “Iran is an island of stability in one of the most troubled areas of the world” he failed to realise that what was brewing at this time in Iran, was a state of full revolutionary activity. This not only jeopardised America’s vital Oil interests, but also its sanctity.
The Carter Administration hardly knew what to make of the Ayatollah Khomeini and clearly failed to adjust to the impending fundamentalist religious revolution that had been in the process. A week after Carter’s visit, on 9 January 1978, demonstrations broke out in the holy city of Qom after the publication of a government article scorning Khomeini. Iran was now in full revolutionary activity and Carter responded quickly by imposing complete economic embargo against Iran and severing diplomatic relations. This consequently ruptured America’s Oil interests in Iran, while Carter’s immediate failure to deal with the hostage situation, where a total of sixty-three Americans were held in the Tehran embassy, essentially depicted the United States as a “pitiful helpless giant”. In September 1980, Kohmeini stated four conditions for the release of the hostages: The United States must (1) return the Shah’s wealth (2) cancel all financial claims against Iran (3) free Iranian assets frozen in the United States and promise (4) promise never to interfere in Iranian affairs. With seemingly no short term end to the crisis and the added fact that by 1980 the bill for imported oil had reached $73 billion , Carter needed to implement a new strategy to secure his Oil interests. This was achieved through the development of strategies which aimed at seeking alternative sources of energy. However, as President Carter was ousted from his duty and replaced by Ronald Reagan in 1980, a deal was brokered with the American’s on the release of the hostages. This coincided with a slip in oil prices and the various energy saving programs dropped by the Reagan administration. Vital United States oil interests in the Middle East continued throughout the 1980’s.
In conclusion, it can be seen that throughout the Nixon and Carter Presidencies, vital American interests throughout the Middle East resided in securing Oil. Although the outbreak of the Fifth Arab Israeli War and the Great Arab Oil embargo of 1973 momentarily threatened America’s vital interests, Henry Kissinger was evidently able to bring his diplomatic skills to the fore, and regain America’s foothold into Arab Oil. The Carter Presidency also aimed to secure America’s vital Oil interests in the Middle East and this was predominantly achieved through his close relationship with the Shah of Iran. Yet, his failure to deal with the ominous threat of Ayatollah Khomeini significantly destabilised America’s prime import. Carter’s eventual removal from the Presidency in 1980 and the implementation of the Reagan administration re-asserted America’s vital Oil interests in the Middle East.
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