What do you mean HTML virus? That's impossible... HTML is just a scripting language, its harmless... it would have to be something serverside like perl or php...

It infects all files with the extension .html....

___________________

That's just one of the benifits of doing a site all in .swf (FLASH)!!

___________________
Real Eyes, Realize, Real Lies.

Twitter | YouTube | Instagram | Soundcloud | MixCloud | BLOG

quote:

Originally posted by Stylez That's just one of the benifits of doing a site all in .swf (FLASH)!!

u forgot???u can only access a swf within an html

___________________
www.elkdee.com
Soundcloud sampler: www.soundcloud.com/elkdee

Hummm, well thanx for the info, there is ways of locking the script, but this sounds like it will b hard to stop

___________________

I remember this one

Nimda is Admin spelt backwards for all you dummies , it scans this

GET /scripts/root.exe?/c+dir
GET /MSADC/root.exe?/c+dir
GET /c/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /d/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /_vti_bin/..%5c../..%5c../..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /_mem_bin/..%5c../..%5c../..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /msadc/..%5c../..%5c../..%5c/..\xc1\x1c../..\xc1\x1c../..\xc1\x1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..\xc1\x1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..\xc0/../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..\xc0\xaf../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..\xc1\x9c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..%35c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..%35c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /scripts/..%2f../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir

Note: The first four entries in these sample logs denote attempts to connect to the backdoor left by Code Red II, while the remaining log entries are examples of exploit attempts for the Directory Traversal vulnerability.

Payload
The email addresses targeted for receiving the worm are harvested from two sources

the .htm and .html files in the user's web cache folder
the contents of the user's email messages retrieved via the MAPI service
These files are passed through a simple pattern matcher which collects strings that look like email addresses. These addresses then receive a copy of the worm as a MIME-encoded email attachment. Nimda stores the time the last batch of emails were sent in the Windows registry, and every 10 days will repeat the process of harvesting addresses and sending the worm via email.

Likewise, the client machines begin scanning for vulnerable IIS servers. Nimda looks for backdoors left by previous IIS worms: Code Red II [IN-2001-09] and sadmind/IIS worm [CA-2001-11]. It also attempts to exploit various IIS Directory Traversal vulnerabilities (VU#111677 and CA-2001-12). The selection of potential target IP addresses follows these rough probabilities:

50% of the time, an address with the same first two octets will be chosen
25% of the time, an address with the same first octet will be chosen
25% of the time, a random address will be chosen
The infected client machine attempts to transfer a copy of the Nimda code via tftp (69/UDP) to any IIS server that it scans and finds to be vulnerable.
Once running on the server machine, the worm traverses each directory in the system (including all those accessible through file shares) and writes a MIME-encoded copy of itself to disk using file names with .eml or .nws extensions (e.g., readme.eml). When a directory containing web content (e.g., HTML or ASP files) is found, the following snippet of Javascript code is appended to every one of these web-related files:



This modification of web content allows further propagation of the worm to new clients through a web browser or through the browsing of a network file system.

In order to further expose the machine, the worm

enables the sharing of the c: drive as C$
creates a "Guest" account on Windows NT and 2000 systems
adds this account to the "Administrator" group.
Furthermore, the Nimda worm infects existing binaries on the system by creating Trojan horse copies of legitimate applications. These Trojan horse versions of the applications will first execute the Nimda code (further infecting the system and potentially propagating the worm), and then complete their intended function.

___________________

" You bet your ass we're all alike... we've been spoon-fed baby food at school when we hungered for steak... the bits of meat that you did let slip
through were pre-chewed and tasteless. We've been dominated by sadists, or ignored by the apathetic. The few that had something to teach found us will-
ing pupils, but those few are like drops of water in the desert."

ok i got the infection process but how do we sheild ourselves from it?

any ideas?

___________________
www.elkdee.com
Soundcloud sampler: www.soundcloud.com/elkdee

quote:

Originally posted by DJ RozzeR I remember this one Nimda is Admin spelt backwards for all you dummies , it scans this GET /scripts/root.exe?/c+dir GET /MSADC/root.exe?/c+dir GET /c/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /d/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /_vti_bin/..%5c../..%5c../..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /_mem_bin/..%5c../..%5c../..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /msadc/..%5c../..%5c../..%5c/..\xc1\x1c../..\xc1\x1c../..\xc1\x1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..\xc1\x1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..\xc0/../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..\xc0\xaf../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..\xc1\x9c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..%35c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..%35c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /scripts/..%2f../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir Note: The first four entries in these sample logs denote attempts to connect to the backdoor left by Code Red II, while the remaining log entries are examples of exploit attempts for the Directory Traversal vulnerability. Payload The email addresses targeted for receiving the worm are harvested from two sources the .htm and .html files in the user's web cache folder the contents of the user's email messages retrieved via the MAPI service These files are passed through a simple pattern matcher which collects strings that look like email addresses. These addresses then receive a copy of the worm as a MIME-encoded email attachment. Nimda stores the time the last batch of emails were sent in the Windows registry, and every 10 days will repeat the process of harvesting addresses and sending the worm via email. Likewise, the client machines begin scanning for vulnerable IIS servers. Nimda looks for backdoors left by previous IIS worms: Code Red II [IN-2001-09] and sadmind/IIS worm [CA-2001-11]. It also attempts to exploit various IIS Directory Traversal vulnerabilities (VU#111677 and CA-2001-12). The selection of potential target IP addresses follows these rough probabilities: 50% of the time, an address with the same first two octets will be chosen 25% of the time, an address with the same first octet will be chosen 25% of the time, a random address will be chosen The infected client machine attempts to transfer a copy of the Nimda code via tftp (69/UDP) to any IIS server that it scans and finds to be vulnerable. Once running on the server machine, the worm traverses each directory in the system (including all those accessible through file shares) and writes a MIME-encoded copy of itself to disk using file names with .eml or .nws extensions (e.g., readme.eml). When a directory containing web content (e.g., HTML or ASP files) is found, the following snippet of Javascript code is appended to every one of these web-related files: This modification of web content allows further propagation of the worm to new clients through a web browser or through the browsing of a network file system. In order to further expose the machine, the worm enables the sharing of the c: drive as C$ creates a "Guest" account on Windows NT and 2000 systems adds this account to the "Administrator" group. Furthermore, the Nimda worm infects existing binaries on the system by creating Trojan horse copies of legitimate applications. These Trojan horse versions of the applications will first execute the Nimda code (further infecting the system and potentially propagating the worm), and then complete their intended function.

That all sounds very worrying. Oh and i was watchin The Net last night, with sandra bollcok, hehe, sorry bullock. And it was a crap film, but it is bloody scary to think that your whole life is acessible to anyone on the net if they have the right knowledge.

So it makes me thinkn wether i should become more anonamous on the net

___________________

quote:

Originally posted by DJ El Kay Dee ok i got the infection process but how do we sheild ourselves from it? any ideas?

Just rename them to .php

___________________
▲▲▲▲▲▲▲▲▲▲

LOL I dont think so what you say there, if its true then in a week all internetpages all over the world are fucked if they want.
So no way, isnt possible

___________________


Best of the best:
Laurent Garnier - sambu

quote:

Originally posted by DJ El Kay Dee u forgot???u can only access a swf within an html

not true; look at http://members.aol.com/anotherway83/bex.swf, just an example