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| quote: | Originally posted by Krypton
Nice work lebez...
We need to withdraw before the end of the year. That is my thought. |
A year ago I would have agreed with you immediately, but now I am a bit torn on withdrawal. Granted, an exit plan should have been put into place years ago, but now it seems to me that Iraq is in a precarious position. The US was wrong to invade in the first place (or at least, wrong for both reasons given and means used to intervene... a true humanitarian intervention could have been another story, and one that the Security Council would have been far more receptive to), and we've certainly messed up the state-building enterprises we've undertaken. Political reform in Iraq remains non-existent, the training of police forces is way behind schedule and mostly ineffective, and establishment of human security five years later is further away than ever. We really screwed the place up.
And I think we'd be morally remiss if we withdrew now. We missed our window - after the invasion Iraq was a basket case. But it was stable. Now it is not. We should have withdrawn in 2004 and invited the UN in under a Chapter XII peace-keeping mandate. The UN would have saved face by cleaning up our mess, and the US would have been out of a sticky situation albeit without a democracy-building effort under our belt. But democracy is now an elusive goal at best, so it would have been better to cut our losses while we still could.
Today Iraq is a complete disaster - it is factionalized to a degree heretofore unseen. Co-existence, much less cooperation, seems impossible in the political arena. Radical militias control the streets, and fundamentalist clerics are gaining influence. Iran is cozying up to the government we installed. There are absolutely no security structures put in place right now to maintain order if the US withdraws. It's sad, but we've created a situation that could only be worse if we weren't there.
The United States Institute of Peace released a report prior to Petraeus' trip to Washington that lays some of this out, and offers a harrowing prediction: if the United States withdraws, the fighting in Iraq will escalate to the point of ethnic cleansing and possibly genocide. I'm skeptical on the genocide bit, but it does strike me as similar to the situation in Darfur circa 2002. In Darfur, the Sudanese Liberation Army (Darfur rebels) may have had a larger constituency a la the Sunnis, but they were vastly overwhelmed in firepower by the various janjaweed militias that were supplied by the government (substitute Shia militias for the janjaweed and Iran for the Sudanese government in this metaphor). The factionalization of both the rebels in Darfur and the janjaweed militias that have proven willing to sell their services to the highest bidder have made it impossible to start a peace process, much less finish one. In any case, this comparison is neither here nor there.
I suggest you read the USIP report. It is pretty fascinating (and frightening) stuff. I'm the last person in the world to agree with John McCain on anything (100 years ffs!), but I do think an ounce of pragmatism is needed here. Biden and Lugar seem to have latched on to a key idea here - Iraq policy has been horribly misguided and has created more problems than it has solved. But is it right to throw up our hands and say, "welp, we obviously created a lot of problems here, I guess we'll leave you folks to sort them out yourselves"? At what point are we morally culpable for the situation we've created?
An excerpt from the USIP Report:
| quote: | U.S. Interests, Risks and Requirements
Each of these policies places different priority on the U.S.’s five critical interests in Iraq, and poses different risks and requirements:
Full, Unconditional Commitment:
- Platform for Terrorism: Major positive. Provides strategic denial to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as long as Awakenings and U.S. forces remain in place.
- Restore capacity and credibility: Major negative. U.S. troops are not freed up for use elsewhere. On the positive side, the U.S. may generate credibility by sustaining its commitment to its announced goals.
- Regional Stability: Mixed. A large U.S. force presence prevents a major regional conflagration but could also serve as a justification for regional interference in Iraq.
- Iranian Influence: Slight positive. This policy focuses on curbing Iranian-sponsored militancy, but leaves the door open to Iranian political influence. Over time, if a national dialogue is successful, the emergence of an “Iraqi center" could work to balance out Iranian influence.
- Single State: Major positive.
Reduced, Conditional Commitment:
This assessment of interests assumes that bargaining succeeds. If bargaining does not succeed, see below.
- Platform for Terrorism: Positive. Encourages Sunni buy-in to the political process and therefore also helps deny a safe haven. A residual force will also be in place to combat AQI when necessary and facilitate intelligence gathering.
- Restore capacity and credibility: Positive with regard to maintaining U.S. capacity Mixed effect on prestige and credibility, largely depending on execution.
- Regional Stability: Slight negative. Radical decentralization and reduced force presence risk greater instability, but a residual presence mitigates this.
- Iranian Influence: Slight negative. Radical decentralization and reduced force presence invite greater interference.
- Single State: Negative. Though technically a single state would be maintained, it might be radically decentralized.
This approach requires less than the current policy in terms of financial, political and military commitment. However, it leaves the U.S. with less control over the situation, and depends for its success on the will of the various Iraqi factions to stick to their commitments. It could lead to greater instability, but leaves the U.S. with a capacity to intervene if its vital interests are threatened.
Unconditional, Near-Total Reduction of Military Commitment:
- Platform for Terrorism: Negative. The U.S. is less able to act against terrorists in Iraq with no force presence there. This is partially mitigated by the lack of the U.S. presence as a spur to extremism plus a strengthened external military presence designed for containment.
- Restore capacity and credibility: Mixed. Reduces financial and human cost, facilitates restoration of U.S. military capacity, frees up U.S. diplomatic and other resources for other issues and eliminates international grievance against the U.S. On the negative side, the perception of U.S. defeat is highly likely.
- Regional Stability: It could go either way. If the Iraqi state fails and massive conflict ensues, this policy has a major negative effect on regional stability. If no major regional conflagration occurs and the Iraqi state holds, withdrawal would help regional stability by removing a source of friction and a target for terrorists.
- Iranian Influence: Negative. Iran has a freer hand to act in Iraq without U.S. opposition. However, this policy frees the U.S. to strike Iran without the risk of retaliation against U.S. forces in Iraq.
- Single State: Difficult to predict. This policy leaves political development entirely in the hands of the Iraqis. The absence of U.S. forces may facilitate Iraqi reconciliation and make a united Iraq more likely, or it may lead to a break up.
This policy risks a complete failure of the Iraqi state, massive chaos and even genocide. Should genocide occur, advocates of this policy believe the U.S. would have to intervene to stop it. The credibility the U.S. will generate with the international community by withdrawing from Iraq may increase the likelihood that others would assist in this effort. This policy also requires that the neighboring states accept an increased U.S. military presence and not interfere in the U.S. withdrawal. |
http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_b...iraq_surge.html
Obviously the current strategy needs to be changed. But I worry that withdrawing completely and quickly could swing the pendulum the other way - whereas now we are hated for being there and stirring up trouble, tomorrow we could be hated for leaving Iraq to destroy itself. Because you know once we leave we won't be going back - humanitarian intervention will not not on the agenda in Washington or at the UN, and you better believe that the terrorists and insurgents over there know it. So I think we need to make sure something can be put into place to replace the US security presence (as incomplete and inadequate as it has been). The UN is having a difficult enough time filling it's mandate for a force in Darfur, and I imagine donor states won't be thrilled about filling the troop requirements for the large-scale peace-keeping mission that would be needed. Perhaps a regional organization could be authorized by the Security Council to conduct a Chapter XIII mission... but I don't know who that would be. Perhaps the EU, but I don't know that they have the political will to expend that much in the way of resources.
Things don't look good for Iraq - but they don't look any better if we leave.
/rant
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