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The Existence of God: Does it Matter?
First of all, I want to stress that I'm not creating this topic to debate the existence of God. If you want to debate that specific issue then there are plenty of other threads here for you to do that in. For this topic, however, the arguments for or against God are largely irrelevent and I would prefer it if they weren't raised.
Keeping that in mind, that question I'm basically asking here is: "Presuming God exists, what are the implications for us as human beings?". If you're confused about the purpose of my question here, I'm basically asking the the question from the perspective of a lay-existentialist in the sense that I'm interested in what it might mean to exist as a human being and how it is that we might endeavour to live. While it should be apparent that the demonstrable existence of God would change the way we view the universe - if only in the most abstract sense - I'm more interested in asking how demonstrating the existence of a God might, in a practical sense, change our lives.
I think Sartre reflects my views on the issue pretty closely in this passage from his lecture, Existentialism as a Humanism:
| quote: | [N]othing will be changed if God does not exist.
[...]
Existentialism is not atheist in the sense that it would exhaust itself in demonstrations of the non-existence of God. It declares, rather, that even if God existed that would make no difference from its point of view. Not that we believe God does exist, but we think that the real problem is not that of His existence; what man needs is to find himself again and to understand that nothing can save him from himself, not even a valid proof of the existence of God. |
I believe that in forging our own meaning and purpose in life (perhaps the most significant of all higher human pursuits) a "valid proof" of the existence of God will not dramatically alter our circumstances, even less so as we try to find a God that we can legitimately accomodate in our understanding of the universe (that is, that the possible nature of God - the "God of the Gaps" - becomes less significant or less relevent as our understanding of the universe in which we live becomes more lucid). Ironically, while I believe that proof of the existence of a God may revolutionise our understanding in areas of human inquiry where religion has recently been marginalised (science, certain aspects of philosophy etc.) the domains where religion is seen today as being most significant - areas concerning human morality, meaning, purpose etc. - will be left largely unchanged as a result of the demonstration of the existence of a God. As Sartre put it, even under these circumstances where we find that God exists, man will still be left "to find himself".
Naturally a definition of God is in order here, but for the purposes of this post I am happy for the definition to be flexible (indeed, I will be examining several different conceptions of God in the course of the post). Basically I take God to mean any sort of supernatural force that, by definition, transcends the natural order of the universe. It (God) needn't be omnipotent or omnipresent, but it must necessarily be more powerful than (in the sense that it is capable of trascending) the discernable laws that govern existence (i.e. the laws of physics, chemistry, thermodynamics etc.). Anything less than this and the so-called "God" can be considered no more than a natural force, constrained by the same forces that all other things are. One could hardly call such force "God" as, in being constrained by the natural, it cannot rightly be called "supernatural".
However, within this broad definition there are several possible interpretations of the divine that need to be addressed more specifically if we are going to understand the full range of implications for a demonstration of the existence of a God. It shouldn't need to be pointed out that the implications would differ if the existent God resembled the God of the Deists rather than the God of the fundamentalist Muslims.
At the broadest possible level, however, the God could take one of two forms: it could be interventionalist or it could be non-interventionalist. The exact nature of the intervention isn't particularly relevent: either it has interefered with the order of the universe at some point in the history of the universe, or it hasn't. This would seem to be a pretty clear dichotemy to me. Let's begin with the latter:
- Implications for the demonstrable existence of a Non-Interventionalist God:
If we presume that there is a God with the power to intervene in the universe (if it did not have this power then, as per my earlier definition, I'd question on what grounds it could be classified as a God at all) but that has not actually intervened at any point in its history, then it should be fairly apparent that the implications for human beings are largely negligible. Whether or not this God is the creator of the universe - and whether or not this God created the universe with the specific foresight of having humans come into existence after 12 billion years of natural, universal flux - doesn't change our circumstances: for all intents and purposes, we remain abandoned. It could be argued that the knowledge that we are the product of the divine may offer us some solace, but the bigger questions remain unanswered: "Why do we exist?", "How should we live?", "What does it mean to be moral?".
I must admit that I am perplexed as to why people go to the trouble of trying to argue for the existence of such a God. Even if this perspective could be proven, it should be apparent that, sub specie aeternitatis (to borrow from Spinoza who argued for a God of a similar nature), nothing would be changed. Our science books may have to be edited so that any reference to the big bang is prefaced with the phrase "In the beginning, God..." but that is just about the full extent to which such a God will affect our lives. Put simply, I expect that there would be little difference between a non-interventionalist God and no God at all.
But suppose that the God was an interventionalist God: would that change anything? Obviously the nature of the intervention would determine the nature of the implications, but again I believe that we can break down the nature of this interventionalism into three categories that should cover most of the conceptions of such a God that I have ever encountered.
These are:
- The God has intervened in the past, the nature of this intervention is inapprehensible and the God is not intervening now.
- The God is intervening now (and possibly in the past) but the nature of this intervention is inapprehensible.
- The God has intervened either now or in the past and the nature of this intervention is apprehensible.
This is where my point could get lost in a flood of semantics, so again I want to stress that my definition of "apprehensible" - as with my definition of "God" - is fairly flexible. Basically, if this God has performed an action that can be - to any extent really - rationally and / or empirically "discerned" and "understood" as a divine action, then I would classify this as an "apprehensible" intervention of God. Where an action cannot be classified in such a way, I would classify this intervention as "inapprehensible". Hopefully this will become more clear as I procede, but I want to stress that my point doesn't really hinge on the definition of the word "apprehensible" so try not to make this debate a semantic one unless you find it to be particularly necessary.
Anyway, to begin with the first of these three catagories:
- Implications for the demonstrable existence of a God that has intervened in the past, where this intervention is inapprehensible and where the God does not continue to intervene:
It's difficult to place this theology on the map of current, conventional theologies, but if I had to try then I would suppose that this is the God of Intelligent Design theory, of strong deists (weak deists being more inclined towards the idea of a non-interventionalist God) and perhaps of some weak theists as well. This God, as well as creating the universe, has also played some part in aiding the development of the universe in some way: according to most of the theologies mentioned, this probably pertains to the development of humans specifically as well. The nature of this intervention isn't particularly important (given that the actions of the God are "inapprehensible" anyway) but it may include things like creating life on Earth, aiding the evolution of human beings and perhaps interacting with human beings on some level as well (although nothing like appearing in burning bushes or handing out commandments - I would classify these as "apprehensible" interventions). Again though, given that these interventions are in some sense "inapprehensible", even if it could be proven that they took place (which is the assumption of this post), we could not know exactly how or why this God decided to perform them.
The implications for humans of the existence of this sort of God do not appear to be differ greatly from the implications of the existence of a non-interventionalist God. While, again, we may gain some solace from the knowledge that this God may have aided our development in the past and that it is the reason we exist, this knowledge does not radically change our current circumstances. If God did imbibe us with a particular purpose or with a definitive moral guide, then they are completely inapprehensible to us and therefore of little pragmatic value. It could, of course, be argued that this God is the reason we have morals in the first place, but surely this explanation can be of no more use to us than natualistic explanation for the origin of morality. Really, the important question is not whether humans have a moral imperitive (ostensibly we do) or what precisely the origin of this moral imperitive may be, but rather how we may best use it: "What is right?", "How are we to act?" et cetera. Even if we presume that such a God exists, it cannot help us to answer these questions.
With regards to purpose and meaning, the demonstration of the existence of such a God may well tell us that there is a reason why we exist and that God did create us with a specific purpose in mind, but given that we cannot possibly know what this "reason" or "purpose" is, how do our circumstances actually improve with this knowledge? We are still responsible for the forging of our own purpose, for our own way of being, and so this God can be of no use to us in this respect. Again, while such a God may require us to rewrite the science text-books, given that he no longer chooses to interfere with our world, we remain abandoned here in our corner of the universe, our deepest questions remaining unsolved. Knowing how we got here and that we are here for a reason does not alleviate our condition, or comfort us in the face of the knowledge that, to again paraphrase Sartre, we are condemned to define ourselves. The existence of this sort of God cannot change how we live.
- Implications for the demonstrable existence of a God that is intervening now (and possibly in the past) but where the nature of this intervention is inapprehensible:
Now I think we are beginning to approach a definition of God compatible with those of the major religions and therefore compatible with the beliefs of most people around the world. Every religion that I am familiar with that postulates a God, also postulates the idea that this God continues to directly intervene in the everyday events of the world. This interpretation of God as a being that intervenes in the world but whose interventions cannot be "apprehended", though, is probably closer to the beliefs of more "liberal" or "weak" theists than conventional ones, but the idea of God as a constant, influential presense that cannot be understood by human minds is - I think - a common one.
Firstly, I've already addressed the inconsequentiality of past inapprehensible interventions in the previous section so I'm not going to repeat myself, but where this conception of God differs from the last is in the idea that such a God takes an active interest in our lives and to some extent (and in some capacity) is both willing and able to intervene in them. The question is, does that change anything?
The fact that such a God does not intervene in any apprehensible manner should give us the indication that, as such, it could not intervene in a manner that is discernably rational or consistent, and this is something that, I would say, would be consistent with our understanding of the universe at the current time (that is, there does not seem to be any indication of divine interventions that are either demonstrably rational or consisent nature). The practical consequence of this would seem to be that prayer, or appeals to this God, either do not work or are answered only arbitrarily. As it pertains to humans, yet again this can only mean that we are still - at least to the extent to which we have control over our circumstances - completely on our own. To again quote Sartre, even presuming the existence of this conception of God, "nothing can save [man] from himself" - or, at least, nothing upon which we can consistently depend.
But even if we cannot depend on this God to physically help us, could we not draw comfort from the fact that he is there and that he is influencing the world? Again, not if his interventions are indiscernable from natural forces. This God could not (or will not) grant us anything that isn't already apportioned to us by the natrual world or that we couldn't already grant ourselves. The man who can draw solace or meaning from a God who acts so seemingly arbitrarily would do just as well to place his faith in the sterile indifference of the universe around him. He is in the same position as the atheist from the beginning: he must still find his own purpose, forge his own morality and act upon his own will. In a universe where such a God existed, again, I fail to see how we are any better off than would would be in a universe where it didn't exist at all. A God who intervenes in an manner inapprehensible to humans cannot possibly be of much use to us.
- Implications for the demonstrable existence of a God that has intervened either now or in the past and where the nature of this intervention is apprehensible.
Now we reach the God of the theists and - I suspect - the God of the majority of the people around the world. This is the God that answers prayers, that dishes out systems of morality, that provides people with a clear purpose and a way to live, interacts with people in apprehensible ways (perhaps he talks with them directly or perhaps he just fills their heart with "peace") and that metes out rewards and punishments according to how successfully people fulfill its will. This God is in charge and it wants people to know it.
Firstly - and I want to get this out of the way, even though it isn't really relevent to my argument - I think it is plainly clear that such a God does not exist. Even if such a God did, at one stage, delineate its plan for us on how we are supposed to live, that plan is now long lost. Perhaps one of the existent religions today has it right, but we ultimately have no way of knowing. In the real world, even presuming the existence of such a God, we are right back where we started: we do not know anything about it and it remains, therefore, inapprehensible to us. Presuming there is a God and it, at one stage, made itself apprehensible, to the extent we in the present age are concerned, it is of no consequence. We are still condemned to decide these things for ourselves.
But as I said, this isn't relevent. This post is about what would be changed if such a God existed, not whether this God actually exists. The question, therefore, is if hypothetically such a God was to make itself - and therefore its plan for us, its system of morality by which it expects us to act etc. - apprehensible to us, what would be changed? Fundamentally, yet again I should think not very much.
Let's presume that such a God made itself apparent to us in a manner similar to that depicted in the Old Testament (no reason for this other than it's a theology I'm familiar with). Under this theology, God gave people very specific moral codes to live by and - perhaps in a more indirect way - a definite purpose for their existence (that is, to obey God). There were, for the ancient Jews, direct pay-offs for this: by obeying God and by living in the manner he demanded, they would be rewarded (whether in the form of manna from heaven, smiting opposition armies or anything similar). Conversely, failing to live in the manner demanded by God would result in swift retribution: the destruction of temples, the introduction of plages and - in the Christian theology particularly - eternal damnation. In other words, such a God differs fundamentally from the kind of Gods that I've described earlier in that it has directly and unambiguously given human beings a guide by which they should endeavour to live. In existentialist terminology, given that it is the creator of man, it has inexorably defined man's essense prior to his creation and has subsequently revealed the nature of this essense to us. It tells us what we are and then, therefore, how we may best live.
So, from the perspective of the overall theme of my post, surely this is an implicit recognition that the demonstration of the existence of such a God would essentially solve the questions I asked at the beginning, namely "what might it mean to be a human being and how might we endeavour to live"? It may be of some assistance, especially with the first question, but even the demonstrable existence of such a God does not give us an absolute answer on how it is that we should live, due to one small reality; a reality acknowledged (so far as I know) by every major theology on the planet: we have free will. If we have the capacity to act freely then we also have the capacity to reject the fatalistic will of any Gods.
Even if a God did define our essense and give us a pre-ordained purpose by which to live, it would still our choice to accept that purpose or not and - ultimately - the question must be asked as to how we are under any more obligation to follow the commandments of this God than to follow any other commandments, perhaps even those we invent for ourselves. We could of course choose to follow all these commandments, but we could just as easily choose to follow some or none of them. What is important, though, is that regardless of how powerful the authority may be, the choice to define who we are and how we act is still our own. Fully apprehensible God or not, we are back where we started: we are still condemned to choose.
Naturally, the argument could be raised here that such a God's moral commandments would carry more weight than any other conceivable moral commandments because it has the power to punish or reward according to how faithfully they are observed, but I would argue "how"? All this highlights are that the moral imperitives issued by such a God are punitive, hypothetical imperitives no different - except in scope - to a legal system created by humans. "You shouldn't murder IF you don't want to go to hell" is no different to saying "You shouldn't murder IF you don't want to go to jail". In both of these cases, neither approach posits a compelling, categorical imperitive as to why we should not murder in the first place, at least so far as you are willing to risk going to jail or hell. I can only think back to Sartre again when he says "everything is permissible": theist and atheist alike, so long as you are willing to risk the consequences, there is no activity - no matter how heinous - that we are not permitted to commit. We are all free (and yet condemned!) to decide how it is that we should act and how it is that we should live for ourselves. Regardless of whether there is a God - and regardless of what the nature of this God is - this is the inexorable reality of our circumstances. Definitive proof of a God will not and can not change this.
So I guess the point in this inadvertently, ridiclously long post was to show why I don't believe that the question of God is worth pursuing. I am not an agnostic: I do not believe that the question of God is not worth pursuing because it is unanswerable, but rather because it makes no practical difference to our essential circumstance. Even if - in the most extreme example - we were able to establish that there is a God and were able to establish what his will is, we would still face exactly the same set of existential problems that we faced at the very beginning of our enquiry. A God, in this regard, would solve none of the problems that religious inquiry is traditionally meant to assist in solving, so why would we allow ourselves to be troubled by it? For me, the question of God is irrelevent: it will change nothing.
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http://eschatonnow.blogspot.com/
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