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MacroMavens...
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Monetization Math
Score one for the bond bears. The day they've been waiting for finally arrived. After 17 years, 7 months and 20-some odd days, the great bond bull appears to have drawn its last breath. It's demise insinuated by the action in Treasuries since 3/25/09. It was then that the Fed put Operation: Helicopter Money into action. Yet, despite some $100B in outright Treasury purchases over the past 6 weeks, Ben and the Gang have failed to prevent 10-year yields from climbing 35bps (from 2.8% to 3.17%). It would seem that even the Fed's manufactured demand is no match for the deluge of supply.
With over $2t in gross (and $1.6 in net) Treasury issuance forecast this year, serious people are getting seriously concerned about how we are going to finance these gargantuan deficits. Whiel Obama stands resolute in his determination to halve the deficit by 2011, the counter-cyclical (spending and tax) measures required to achieve that goal are sure to destroy whatever green-shoots are presently budding. Of course, if the budget deficit maintains its torpid state and rates keep rising at their current pace (Fed monetization be damned) we'll be looking at 5.8% on the 10-year this time next year. That level, lest memory has dimmed, was sufficient to bring Enron and the Subprime mortgage sector to their knees. Presumably, it would prove equally destructive to the storied green-shoots today.
CHART: 10 year treasury yield from 1973 through today, essentially showing that lower and lower rates over time with cycle peaks occurring in tandem with significant events like Continental Illinois (1985), Black Monday(1987), S&L Crisis(1991), Russia LTCM(1998), Dot.com bust (2001), Subprime(1007)...
As loyal readers know, the U.S. economy's eroding threshold of interest rate pain (on pathetic display in the above chart) has imbued our confidence that the bond bears were wrong. Well, not wrong, but unlikely to reap the bounty that was their due. For, scarcely would rates begin to rise toward levels that might provide adequate compensation for financing our voluminous deficits than the entire economy would disintegrate. And the dollar would be left to do the heavy lifting. By placing our assets on red-light special, a massive dollar decline would lure buyers to our markets without all the unpleasantness of higher borrowing costs. The prospect that the dollar (not rates) would be the outlet for our policy sins seemed foreshadowed by gold, which parted company from bonds when Ben proposed his Helicopter Solution. And, more recently, by the Fed itself, which all but rubber-stamped a collapse in the dollar in a working paper entitled: "Currency Crashes in Industrial Countries: Much Ado About Nothing?".
We've spent considerable time and spilled considerable ink making our case. But these will soon be abstract considerations no more. With both interest rates and the dollar on the move, the day of reckoning is drawing near. Soon we will have an answer to the question of how we will pay for our policy sins. How much pain will be meted out on the dollar and/or interest rates? Whichever it ends up being--the dollar or rates or some combo of the two--the degree of pain will be determined by the size of the gap between Treasury supply and demand...akathe amount the Fed is forced to monetize. So, this week, we thought to roll up our sleeves and try to...arrive at a number. |
5 pages of reading and great charts later...
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So let's see...we've got $220b poosible from pension funds, $735B from households (excluding T-bills) and another $79b from banks. That sums to roughly $1.7t...almost exactly the amount of net Treasury issuance this fiscal year! Ha! And here you thought this pre/post Greenspan analysis was too cheeky by half!
The symmetry is truly delicious...until you realize that the deficit is recurring and the Treasury purchases are not. Doh! Worse yet, the recurring deficits seem likely to expand (not contract) in size. This prospect underscored by the rapidly browning green shoots, to say nothing of the teetering fortunes of the PBGC and the State of California. If they (and others) are added to the bailout list, $1.7t might well look like a gift.
Besides, even if the deficit disappeared tomorrow (was that a pig that just flew past my window?) it would take some time for pension funds and banks to accomplish their rebalancing risk...and longer still for deleveraging households. In the meantime, Ben and his printing press won't be getting any rest. They will be busy picking up the financing slack.
You can play with the monetization math, plugging in your own assumptions as to whether and how quickly domestic purchasers restore their Treasury allocations of yore. If it took a decade, then the $170b in annual purchases would scarcely make a dent. If it took half that time, Ben would still be mopping up $1t/plus a year for the next few years. The point is, if you think the Fed's balance sheet is bloated now...
But in addition to highlighting the grim monetization math, the other point of this rant is to suggest that investors might apportion a share of their US debt financing consternation for private sector "risk" claims. (You know, the ones they are presently clamoring into). For, should our thesis prove correct and we find ourselves standing at the doorstep of a generational shift in the appetite for risk, the slack in credit demand will be equally, if not more, manifest in risk assets as in Treasuries. Remember, these deficits didn't emerge in a vacuum. They are the response to an economic and financial crisis like none we've witnessed in our lifetimes. One that, we suspect, will leave a lasting impression--manifest as a generational reduction in the appetite for 'risk'.
If so, not only will the Fed's balance sheet swell, it will stink as it endeavors to arrest the rise in private sector borrowing costs as well. The improvement in household balance sheets associated with a rebalancing of risk will be mirrored in the degradation of the Fed's. |
That's all I care to type. I can't show the good chart work she does. I will just add that her assumptions for who can finance all of this via Treasury purchase is based on using 40-year average historical rates for the various cohorts she's referring to. Anyway, that was your sample of Pomboy. I hope you enjoyed it.
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