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| quote: | Originally posted by trancaholic
Ok. I've always considered "disbelief in A" to be synonymous with "belief in not A", but it's your language, so I'll adopt this semantics. |
There is a distinction. From a link I posted in one of my earlier posts:
| quote: | | "Basic atheism is not a belief. It is the lack of belief. There is a difference between believing there is no god and not believing there is a god--both are atheistic, though popular usage has ignored the latter [...]" - Dan Barker |
| quote: | | "The average theologian (there are exceptions, of course) uses 'atheist' to mean a person who denies the existence of a God. Even an atheist would agree that some atheists (a small minority) would fit this definition. However, most atheists would stongly dispute the adequacy of this definition. Rather, they would hold that an atheist is a person without a belief in God. The distiniction is small but important. Denying something means that you have knowledge of what it is that you are being asked to affirm, but that you have rejected that particular concept. To be without a belief in God merely means that yhe term 'god' has no importance or possibly no meaning to you. Belief in God is not a factor in your life. Surely this is quite different from denying the existence of God. Atheism is not a belief as such. It is the lack of belief." - Gordon Stein |
I know it's a bit trite to make these sort of distinctions, but - especially in debates such as this one where we're arguing over small differences in belief (or lack of) - the distinction is important. Strong atheism is taken as a positive belief, an important foundation upon which other beliefs may be built. Weak atheism is merely the lack of a postive set of theistic values.
As a case in point, look at the existentialism of Sartre. He said:
| quote: | | Existentialism is not atheistic in the sense that it would exhaust itself in demonstrations of the non-existence of God. It declares, rather, that even if God existed that would make no difference from its point of view. |
This would be a weak atheistic position as the hypothesis (of existentialism) is not dependant on a demonstration of the non-existence of God. It does generally not accept the hypothesis of God, of course (although Kierkegaard and others are classified as Christian existentialists), but it does not require proof of the non-existence of God to remain a valid hypothesis. If existentialism depended on the non-existence of God to remain a valid hypothesis, then it would be a doctrine of strong atheism.
Hope this makes some sort of sense?
| quote: | | Well, as a weak agnostic is just a kind of weak atheist, you must have seen me as a strong agnostic? Well, I guess I can come across as that, when I'm frustrated by my failures to convey my ideas clearly. |
Well before this debate I always thought you were a deist of some sort for some reason. 
But yeah, even if you're hard to classify along this theological spectrum, I do understand your position more clearly now.
| quote: | | You're making your point quite clear, but I do not agree that weak atheism is a position you need to take (temporally) before that you can take on the weak agnostic position. I used to be a theist, but became an agnostic the moment I became a weak atheist. I didn't consider myself an atheist, and then "opened up" to the possibility of a god existing. |
It's not an issue of temporality though. I'm not saying that before becoming an agnostic you have to adopt a solely atheistic position for x amount of time before being permitted to progress towards agnosticism, I'm simply saying that - logically - agnosticism is dependant on the rejection of belief in God.
Think about it: you say that you moved towards agnosticism from a theistic position. Logically, it is impossible to be a theist / deist and an agnostic simultaneously - the former holds a belief in God, the latter doesn't (how can one simultaneously hold and suspend belief?). Ergo agnostics can't be theists, so the position of agnosticism must, at all times, be preceded by a lack of deistic and theistic beliefs which - put simply - represents a position of atheism.
Now your adoption of the agnostic mindset may have been instantaneous upon the rejection of your theistic beliefs, but the fact remains: your agnosticism was dependant on the rejection of said theistic beliefs which, if you accept the definitions I've used (which you aren't obliged to, by the way), is a position of weak atheism. So, in other words, based on what you've told me, your journey towards agnosticism was - logically, if not temporally - preceded by the acceptance of a weak atheistic mindset.
| quote: | | Using the definitions we do in this thread, you're perfectly right. However, these definitions are not used by your average Joe or Joanne. When I meet new people and the conversation turns to belief systems, I introduce myself as an agnostic, because stating that I'm an atheist is likely to produce the wrong impression in the other person. Same way with introducing my political stance to US citizens: I don't call myself "liberal", even though that *is* the correct term for what I am, but rather use "libertarian". |
You're obviously under no obligation to use these technical terms in the "real world". The role of communication is to be understood and if by labelling yourself an "atheist" you're running the risk of people misunderstanding your position, then I see nothing wrong with using "their" definitions to ensure that you are understood. Besides, I never said that you can't be an agnostic as well as an atheist, just that the agnostic mindset is necessarily preceded by an atheistic one and that I don't see any rational reason to progress from a position of weak atheism to weak agnosticism.
(Also, I'm not sure I'd use the term "libertarian" to describe your political position for fear of being associated with Badnarik and all those other loonies. I use the term "classical liberal" to describe my own beliefs, which is like American liberalism but without the psuedo-socialistic overtones and like libertarianism without the neo-liberal economic rationalism. Think Locke, Paine et al.)
| quote: | | And why doesn't the rejection of the belief in God require any cause/evidence? (Bear in mind that I am not currently accepting your assumption that weak atheism is a position that must be held prior to some shift in belief to agnosticism.) It seems to me that your argument somehow assumes that weak atheism is the natural/default belief. |
This is one of the points I'm trying to make though. Weak atheism is the default belief system. It's the complete absence of belief with regard to God and theology, so if it isn't the default position than what is? We aren't born worshipping Gods, nor have we considered the issue of God and opted to suspend belief on the issue. To utilise the tabla rasa theory, all people are born with a blank mental state - they don't (and can't) believe in God any more than they can believe in horses or global warming when they're first born. Of course, as they grow up, they begin to see evidence for horses by reading about them or seeing them on the farm. They begin to read up on scientific papers and develop a belief in global warming. They begin to read the Bible and develop a belief in God. However, until these concepts are first encountered either first hand or through the testimony of others, a "lack" of belief - in all these cases - is the default belief. With regards to theological issues - again, presuming you accept my definitions - this is a position of weak atheism.
| quote: | | Yes, it does. I don't agree, though, because I don't like to mix vague concepts such as "enough" and "sufficient" with a classification of shifts in the ontology of the individual into "rational" and "irrational". |
To be honest, I agree with you here in the sense that the point at which there is a level of evidence "sufficient" enough to make a "rational" shift in belief systems is somewhat arbitrarily defined, but I still make the claim that to make this shift for no reason or for reasons that cannot be justified is "irrational". That is, I do not believe it is "rational" - by any definition of the word - to shift belief systems arbitrarily without any justifiable cause.
| quote: | | Say, there are loads of reported instances of divine/supernatural events in history books and modern day tabloids. These can all be drawn into doubt and explained away. |
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. If you want to claim that there is an omnipotent God that exerts constant influence on the world, that loves each and every one of us and sent his own son down to die for our transgressions, then you're going to require a greater standard of evidence than the testimony of some young girls in the 19th century who say they saw the silluette of the virgin Mary in the kitchen once before you can say that such beliefs are "rational". Again, while the definition is somewhat arbitrary, if we can identify a point at which beliefs cease being rational, then basing an entire world view on the scattered, inconsistent testimonies of people throughout the ages - not one of which can be independantly verified - surely must qualify.
| quote: | | The same goes for all the evidence for global warming taking place, and the same was true for the evidence that Iraq had WMDs. It seems rather arbitrary to me that the some piles of shaky evidence is "enough" to justify suspension of belief as being "rational" and others are not. |
But there is evidence that we can point to that would suggest that global warming is taking place or that there were WMDs in Iraq. While these views may be wrong, and I may have "sufficient" cause to "rationally" disagree with these conclusions, these views are at least "rational" in the sense that they are supported by corroborative evidence. Excepting contrary evidence, these beliefs can be considered "rational" in the sense that they are supported and / or caused by available evidence, not by some arbitrary, unjustified shift that occurred for little other reason than because the holder of said beliefs wanted them to be true.
| quote: | | Why is "postponing judgment on the ontological status of that for which no evidence exists" not "consistent with reason"? It is (trivially) consistent with the evidence and standard logical inference rules? |
The position of "postponing judgment on the ontological status of that for which no evidence exists" is consistent with "standard logical inference rules", again, if there is a justifiable reason (i.e. evidence) to postpone said judgement. That is, there is nothing inherently illogical or irrational about agnosticism in itself, but it does become irrational or illogical if the shift from atheist to agnosticism cannot be justified.
So, to talk in particulars here, what specific reasons can you offer to justify making this shift in belief systems?
| quote: | | At this point I'm wondering if all you have written so far doesn't apply equally well to strong atheism (which you claim to lean towards yourself)? |
Oh absolutely, of course it can. Like I said, strong atheism - in its most literal interpretation - is a leap of faith as strong as that of any theistic belief. While I hesitate to call myself a strong atheist on logical grounds (in the sense that it is impossible to prove positively that God does not exist) in practise I do hold to a fairly strong atheistic position. That is, I feel fairly certain that there is no God.
The difference between me, however, and a lot of other theists I've met, is that my positive claims concerning the non-existence of God can - I feel - be justified logically and empircally, whereas theirs cannot. I know it sounds arrogant, but I'm still waiting for someone to come along to knock me off my perch...
| quote: | | I know that it does not relate to the current debate, I'm just curious to know if you see any problem with applying your guns to that target? |
I'm a Cartesian in the sense that I believe that knowledge - and true confidence in one's own beliefs - can only arise by systematically casting doubt over everything you think you know. Most of my beliefs hold up most of the time (if they didn't I wouldn't retain them as beliefs) but I'd also like to think that my perspectives are mallaeble as soon as evidence is encountered to cast doubt on these perspectives. If you go back through my posting history on these forums, for instance, I think you'll find that my political outlook has changed a fair bit over the past couple of years (although my distaste for the GOP and conservatives still remains ).
With regards to my theological beliefs (or lack thereof) a shift in my position is inevitable as soon as a justifiable cause for a shift in my beliefs is encountered. Suffice to say, such a cause has not yet come about.
| quote: | | If we assume that the starting point is weak atheims and some sort of (possibly flawed) reasoning process takes you to the faith determined belief system, then yes. However, if the starting point *is* the belief determined by faith, then there's nothing irrational about holding onto it in absense of detrimentary evidence. |
Refer to what I said earlier. I do believe that weak atheism is the default perspective.
However, if we were to run with your reasoning here, then surely it would make just as much sense to presume that unicorns, goblins, quorgnaxes (which I just made up) or any other type of beings exist as a default position - but where would this leave us? Would you say that believing in quorgnaxes before you even can even possibly know what they are constitutes a "rational" perspective?
| quote: | | "2001: A Space Odyssey" is incomprehensible to me. However, it is a film, and I can certainly detect its existence. Maybe I'm using the word "incomprehensible" in the wrong manner here (I'm not a native English speaker), but I think that "comprehensible" means that something can be understood completely. If something is not "comprehensible", then it is "incomprehensible". If this is the correct interpretation of "incomprehensible" then I think that the difference between undetectable and incomprehensible is quite clear? |
It's all semantics I guess, but when I said incomprehensible I meant it, to quote dictionary.com yet again, to refer to something that is "impossible to know or fathom". So my question is, to put it another way, what is the difference between a God that cannot be "empirically" understood ("undectable") and a God that cannot be "rationally" understood ("incomprehensible"). Then, pragmatically, what is the difference between these two gods and no god at all?
All these Gods are inaccessible to us. None can exert any influence on our lives. Is there any point in distinguishing semantically between the three types (the "undetectable" God, the "incomprehensible" God and the "non-existent" God) when all result in the same conclusion (we humans are alone and abandoned in the universe)? Is there any way of determining which, of the three, is the most likely hypothesis?
| quote: | | No. I prefer to suspend belief on this issue. I think that it is possible that the limitations of the senses prevents us from detecting any gods that may exist, but it is also possible that we someday detect the existence of a god through our senses. |
But how does that alter the circumstances of our current paradigm? Quite literally anything "may" exist or be shown to exist in the future, so what do we gain by making baseless speculations that are inconsistent with what we currently understand about the universe?
| quote: | | I *do* believe that humans are incapable of understanding the "values" of any gods that may exist, or to put it in another way, the "why" of existence. John D. Barrow has written a book called "Pi in the Sky", which contains a made up story of human beings creating a super computer, and starting a simulation of the physical laws on it in order to study some phenomenon X experimentally. The simulation runs for a very long time, and eventually sim-structures of sim-molecules are arrived at, which exhibit the defining characteristics of life. This life evolves and finally ends up becoming self-aware. However, as all the input this simulated and self-aware life has access to is other parts of the simulation, there is no way for it to ever be able to know about X (as it is outside the simulation), and hence it can never get to know about the purpose of its existence. Further, imagine that the simulation was constructed to follow other rules than those of the physical laws (or even none at all), and self-aware life emerged nevertheless. Then the concepts the self-aware life uses to reason about its environment wouldn't necessarily correspond to any counterparts in the real world. It would thus not only be unable to guess the purpose of its existence, it would most likely also not know about the concepts "purpose" and "existence", but be philosophising about something different of something else. I believe that we humans, if under the supervision of, created by, or ruled by some god, are bound by the same kind of restrictions, but I do recognize that this is only a belief. |
That's an interesting analogy, but again it doesn't help us in our current situation. We may be the product of forces we can never understand, but if we cannot possibly understand them, in what sense does speculating on their existence assist us? Is there "rational" cause to speculate on their existence, or on the existence of any other sort of forces inaccessible to us?
Again, stepping away from the God question, would it make sense to speculate on the existence of anything else that cannot be detected or comprehended? If so, on what grounds? If not, why should we allow such logical leniency with regards to the issue of the existence of God?
| quote: | Eh. I'm not sure I can answer this question, as my answer to the first part of it was "no". |
Let me put it another way: do you consider yourself an agnostic (or, at least, view agnosticism as a tenable position) solely due to the fact that our senses are fallible and that some events must therefore exist beyond their scope, or are there other reasons for your leaning towards this view?
| quote: | | Even though I do not acknowledge the validity of your presumptions, I'll have a go at answering the last question: If somethings existence would imply some inconsistency with evidence, then it can be disproven to exist. Say, I can definately say that "the God who made Earth explode on April 14th 2005" does not exist. |
Agreed. But the dragon in my garage - as I've defined him - is not inconsistent with available evidence either. Does that mean - even though I made him up just then - it is possible for him to exist?
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Last edited by Renegade on Apr-19-2005 at 17:56
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