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| quote: | Originally posted by occrider
Ah I think your last statement should come to the forefront before I proceed with any of my arguments . I am not a Friedman monetarist in the classical sense, and I am not well versed in all the historical implementation of "monetarism". Today, I'm primarily from the monetarist/neo-classical camp with some cautious leanings towards keynesian economics during stress scenarios. |
Yep, that's fair enough. I'm certainly not dogmatically Keynesian either - nor am I averse to modern monetarist or neo-classical theory - I just find that my economic ideology, such that it is, is closer to that of the Keynesianism than anything else. This is not merely for ideological reasons, I might add: empirically, I find that economies with an active government presence (e.g. the Scandinavian countries) out-perform the economies without such governmental involvement, even in areas - such as economic efficiency and competitiveness - that neo-classicalism predicts them to fail in:
http://internationaltrade.suite101....itive_countries
| quote: | | Well this is actually what I consider to be the most interesting part of your post. I would consider Volker's policies to be driven largely by the main precepts of monetarism, and most would say that the Volker Fed played a large part in reducing inflation. Are you arguing that there was a corollary influence? I really don't find your Marxist analogy to be particularly applicable without substantive explanation. |
Sorry, I didn't phrase that very well.
The point I was trying to make is that any given economic policy should not be judged by its success in acheiving a single, specific economic target (in this case, low inflation) but rather by its effect on the economy as a whole. Afterall, we could get any of the major economic indicators (inflation, GDP growth, unemployment etc.) to virtually any level we wanted so long as we were willing to make large enough sacrifices in other areas. For instance, we could get GDP growth up to 20% if we were willing to cut taxes in half and cease our worrying about inflation. We could get unemployment to 0% if we were willing to nationalise industry and sacrifice productive efficiency. In each of these cases, though, the sacrifices - or oppurtunity costs - are too large to consider them as anything even approaching good economic policy.
So, with regards to the implementation of strict monetary controls in the late 70s, they certainly reduced inflation successfully - no question about that - but at what cost? GDP growth was in the negatives for the best part of 3 years. Unemployment ballooned. Interest rates increased far beyond expectations. In the UK - where expansionary fiscal policy was not employed - the problems persisted for much of the decade. As per my analogy with Marxism and the elimination of inequality, an economic target was certainly reached here, but it came with a great opportunity cost. I guess the question here is, if the consequences of the introduction of Friedman's monetary theory could have been seen before time, would they still have been implemented?
It's a fairly weak appeal, I know, but that's what it comes down to. If, with the glorious benefit of hindsight, we can look back on an action and suggest that it should not be repeated if we could have our time over again, can we really call it anything other than a "failure"?
| quote: | | Granted the economy did not flourish under Volker, but I don't think that very many economists maintained such delusions considering the primary concern was to ward off inflation by enacting tremendous interest rate hikes. Would you have a more appropriate solution to decrease inflation and increase growth in a stagflating economy? I don't think that that is a failure of monetarism so much as it is a failure of there not being a 'perfect' solution to every problem. |
I agree that there can be no perfect solution to any problem (which goes for all pursuits, with the possible exception of mathematics: this isn't merely an issue confined to economics), but that doesn't mean that there aren't gradiations in the quality of imperfect solutions.
This isn't something I've studied in any great depth, but my understanding is that inflation in the 1970s can be traced back, primarily, to a sharp rise in oil prices (no surprise that the stagflationary pressures first appeared shortly after the advent of OPEC) and inflexible and inefficient supply-side conditions. With the benefit of hindsight yet again, labour-reform, supply-side liberalisation and perhaps modest contractionary policy (either fiscal or monetary) would have succeded in reducing inflation, may have helped unemployment (depending on the nature of the labour and supply-side reforms) and would certainly not have impacted on GDP growth any more severely than monetarist policies did.
I've got no way of proving that such policies would have been "successful", but my point here is that there were surely alternatives available to policy-makers at the time and that many of these would have been more successful than the ones that were eventually implemented. On these grounds, yet again, I can't help but see the monetarist policies that were implemented as - in some sense, at least - failures.
| quote: | It was a relatively new theory at the time, give it some leeway . |
I appreciate that fact, I really do. I don't want to come across as a dick by self-righteously sitting here, 30 years in the future, criticising people who made decisions that, at the time, must have made a lot of sense, but nevertheless I am a big supporter of the primacy of objective truth and empirical fact in economic (and virtually all other) matters and in this context it's hard to say that the decisions made at the time were - objectively or empirically - the "right" ones. This isn't a personal judgement on Friedman or the other early monetarists, it's merely what I consider to be a sterile matter of fact.
| quote: | | I don't mean to denigrate your argument, and as a matter of fact I cannot argue you about 'classical' monetarism. You would appear to be more learned than me. |
Haha well I doubt it, but thanks anyway. 
I want to point out that my argument here isn't against monetary theory - which I am nowhere near equipped to argue against - but rather its outcomes. Early-monetarism may well have been the greatest economic theory ever advocated, but - in my eyes at least - it failed the empirical test which immediately erodes its legitimacy.
| quote: | | However, my argument is that monetarism was quintessential towards eliminating the systemic economic risks |
Monetarism in general, or the specific monetary policies that were implemented in the 70s and 80s? I don't necessarily disagree with the former, but would certainly take issue with the latter.
| quote: | | and once that was done, fiscal policies were implemented to stimulate economic growth ... not that it was a necessity. |
To be honest, I would argue that it was necessary.
The US and the UK employed nearly employed nearly identical monetary policies. The US employed massive fiscal expansionary measures shortly after, the UK didn't. The US economy recovered, the UK economy didn't for the best part of a decade. Granted we're comparing two different economies here, but the question still has to be asked: aside from fiscal policy, what else could explain the differences in fortune?
| quote: | | If Keynesian policy was needed to save the economy "yet again" why did it fail when originally implemented? |
But I don't think it did "fail when originally implemented": in fact, I would argue that the rapid growth experienced in the world economy between 1945 and the mid 1970s can be directly attributed to Keynesian policy. The failures that the world economy experienced in the mid 1970s - due to oil prices and supply-side rigidity - could have been solved (at least theoretically, perhaps through the measures I mentioned earlier) through Keynesian policy as well.
On the other hand, I don't want to give the impression that the inability to address stagflation during that time was not a severe failure on behalf of the Keynesian economic orthodoxy of the time. I think they saw inflation and unemployment as enjoying a naturally inverse relationship and froze when that turned out not to be the case. There was a need to re-adjust economic thinking during that period and the advent of monetarism certainly succeded in that regard. Whether we can therefore say that the monetarist policies of the time were "successful" though is quite another matter.
| quote: | | Why does it have more of a minimal role today? |
Does it though? Was the US rescued from recession earlier this decade through fastidious controls on the supply of money or through tax-cuts and corresponding budget-deficits of unparalleled magnitude? How frequently are economic issues solved through governmental intervention?
Keynesianism may not be explicitly endorsed by the powers that be all that often any more, but the principles remain in practice. The government is still an undeniably important variable in the overall economic equation.
| quote: | | Well now I have to ask you in what way do you consider it a "failure" in a way that we can consider fiscal policies a "success" under similar economic circumstances? There are no empirical evidence for fiscal/keynesian economic failures? |
I'm not denying that Keynesianism, in general, has not had failures, but I would still argue that its success to failure ratio over the past century surpasses that of any of its rivals. The best performing economies have, historically, required large-scale government involvement: I believe that the current success of China and India, for instance, can be attributed to well-placed governmental involvement.
Now, admittedly, in the long-run, capitalistic economies need to tend towards market liberalism to sustain growth and that is certainly not something I would argue against as a nominal Keynesian. I believe in no more governmental involvement than is necessary to achieve a stable, growing economy. I do not, however, believe that an economy can acheive stable growth over a sustained period of time without principled and well-judged governmental intervention. Yet again, I believe that the historical facts will vindicate me on this point.
| quote: | | Well it would seem like we're talking about peas and carrots here. If you want to probe me with classical Keynes and I respond with classical Friedman than we can spend all day talking. |
Haha, well it was never my intention to begin a debate about the merits of Keynesianism when I first posted in this thread, believe me. My point there wasn't that the theory of monetarism is essentially flawed (as a second year student, I still lack the theoretical grounding necessary to argue that point) but rather that monetarism - through the policies implemented in the 1970s and 1980s - was a largely unsuccessful enterprise. I don't think we need to introduce meta-debates about the viability of Keynesianism or neo-classicalism to reach a consensus about that.
| quote: | | My frame of mind is neo-classicalism, neo-keynesian, and neo-monetarism ... all of which are a completly seperate debates altogether. If you want to get into a classical (whatever) vs. a classical (whatever) debate that's fine, however, I don't find the value of engaging in a classical (whatever) vs. neo-classical (whatever) debate to be honest. |
Too late. 
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Last edited by Renegade on Nov-24-2006 at 16:44
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