|
| quote: | Originally posted by Arbiter
I think our disagreement may to some degree be one of language as opposed to substance. I certainly agree that if we assume some particular goal(s) or valuation(s) we can create a framework with respect to which we might evaluate the truth of moral assertions. The issue is that I find that the nature of this framework necessarily reduces to a matter of opinion. |
I don't think "opinion" is quite the right term though.
Let's say I believe (as I happen to) that my getting poked in the eye is likely to lead to suffering on my part. I don't disagree that such an assertion is entirely subjective: no-one else can make such a judgement for me, and that judgement is therefore inherently subjective in construction. (I would baulk at labelling such a judgement an "opinion" as a consequence, but that may just be semantic quibbling.) However, the second you poke me in the eye and I start crying like a little girl, my suffering is no longer subjective: it is an objective fact, apprehensible to anyone who happens to possess functioning mirror-neurons. Given the universality of the human anatomy, I can therefore project my suffering onto others and argue that - as an objective rule of thumb - poking people in the eye leads to suffering and is therefore something we should seek to avoid during the natural course of daily affairs.
| quote: | | When you say "logic is only useful in moral decisions if we start with a simple moral norm such as 'suffering is bad' which informs the logical process from the beginning," you are saying exactly what I mean. At some foundational level, we must simply assume some moral proposition (in this case, that suffering is bad.) |
As above, I can only point to the universality of human experience. Perhaps there are some individuals who would claim to enjoy suffering: again, that would be their subjective judgement which I could have no business second-guessing. However, I would argue that such individuals are exceedingly rare and could be comfortably classified as pathologically abnormal (I don't think the word "masochist" quite captures it). To that extent, the opposing maxim - that "suffering isn't bad" - can be discounted, as no sane individual would be willing to adopt such a sentiment as a universal maxim (and, in doing so, necessarily invite suffering upon themselves).
This wouldn't, I hesitate to add, make "suffering is to be avoided" an absolute moral maxim (one can always find exceptions, afterall) but it does make - at the very least, I think - a solid objective maxim upon which to judge the morality of human actions.
| quote: | | I do not find there to be any objective basis upon which to judge what, if any, such foundational moral propositions ought to be assumed. If the underlying assumptions cannot be said to be a matter of fact, then what follows from them cannot either. We can, however, still evaluate the validity of the reasoning by which that which follows is reached (if any.) |
Well there are two objective facts upon which such moral propositions can be founded:
1) The suffering of other human beings is largely objective.
2) No human being would will for his own suffering, and could therefore not wish for the adoption of suffering as a universal maxim.
In light of this, I would argue that suffering (at the hands of another human being) is something that can be avoided and should be avoided. Logic (vis a vis qua logical consitency) is important to the realisation of the latter point, but it is our subjective apprehension of the internal states of others in the former point that makes morality possible in the first place. Suffering is an objective matter of fact, therefore morality (to the extent that it is bound to human suffering) is as well.
| quote: | | Again, I agree with much of what you say. Moral thinking definitely appears to have its origins in the brain's emotional centers. That is precisely what I would expect of an opinion, however. An individual's favorites, likes, dislikes, et cetera are all likely to be consequences of emotional states... |
I would argue that subjective emotional states can realise themselves objectively - and, again, I'm going to have to quibble about your use of the word "opinion" - but other than that, yeah, I think we probably agree with more on this issue than we disagree about.
Last edited by Renegade on Sep-21-2008 at 18:37
|
