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No CIA involvement here PKC, none what so ever.....don't read this, nothing to see.
The Breeding-Ground and Birth of Al-Qaeda
The USA, via the CIA, originally backed the Islamic guerrilla resistance against the Marxist regime and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the late 1970s and 1980s. Its efforts focused increasingly on a hardline faction which was to spawn al-Qaeda in 1987-88.
Between 1978 and 1992, the US government poured in at least US $6 billion (some estimates range as high as $20 billion) worth of arms, training and funds to prop up the mujaheddin [in Afghanistan]. Other western governments, as well as oil-rich Saudi Arabia, kicked in as much again. Wealthy Arab fanatics, like Osama bin Laden, provided millions more. ...
Washington's favoured mujaheddin faction was one of the most extreme, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. ... Osama bin Laden was a close associate of Hekmatyar and his faction.
"How the CIA created Osama bin Laden"
As his unclassified CIA biography states, bin Laden left Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviet army in Afghanistan after Moscow's invasion in 1979. By 1984, he was running a front organization known as Maktab al-Khidamar ["Services Office"] — the MAK — which funneled money, arms and fighters from the outside world into the Afghan war.
What the CIA bio[graphy] conveniently fails to specify (in its unclassified form at least) is that the MAK was nurtured by Pakistan's state security services, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI, the CIA's primary conduit for conducting the covert war against Moscow's occupation.
During Ronald Reagan's second term as President, the US effort was stepped up. Casey, the Irish-Catholic head of the CIA, projected a Christian-Islamic alliance against Soviet communism, and sought to extend the fight into the Soviet Union itself. Milton Bearden, who "had drawn close to Casey a few years earlier", became CIA station chief in Pakistan's capital Islamabad in July 1986.
More and more Arabs were arriving in Pakistan to fight alongside the Afghan resistance. Azzam and bin Laden's MAK financed and funneled these volunteers.
Overall, the U.S. government looked favorably on the Arab recruitment drives. ... Some of the most ardent cold warriors at [CIA headquarters at] Langley thought this program should be formally endorsed and extended. ... [T]he CIA "examined ways to increase their participation, perhaps in the form of some sort of international brigade," ... Robert Gates [then-head of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence] recalled. ... At the Islamabad station Milt Bearden felt that bin Laden himself "actually did some very good things" ... But nothing came of it ...
[Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (Penguin, 2005 edn), pp.145-6, 155-6.]
Milt Bearden was the CIA's station chief in Pakistan's capital Islamabad in 1986-89; as such he oversaw the agency's efforts to back the mujaheddin. He later said, "The CIA did not recruit Arabs. ... There were hundreds of thousands of Afghans all too willing to fight." And the CIA denied any direct contact with bin Laden.
(Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2005 edn), pp.87, 147, 155-6, 208; Peter L Bergen, Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden [Weidenfield & Nicholson, London, 2001], pp.70-71; Tenet statement to the Joint Inquiry on 9/11, Oct. 17, 2002.)
But J. Michael Springmann, head of the non-immigrant visa section at the "CIA-dominated" US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1987-88, said he learned that the CIA had a "program to bring people to the United States for terrorist training, people recruited by the CIA and its asset Usama bin Laden, and the idea was to get them trained and send them back to Afghanistan to fight the then Soviets." "Their nationalities for the most part were Pakistani, Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese." These "recruits without backgrounds" were given visas over Springmann's protests.
(Transcript of Springmann interview, Fox TV, 18 July 2002, Center for Cooperative Research; transcript of Springmann interview with CBC, 3 July 2002, 9/11 Review )
On American soil, the CIA used Muslim charities and mosque communities as fronts for recruitment of fighters in their secret war against the USSR [Operation Cyclone] in the Hindu Kush. As Cooley writes in Unholy Wars: "One was in New York's Arab district, in Brooklyn along Atlantic Avenue ... Another was a private rifle club in an affluent community of Connecticut."
Bin Laden and a man named Mustafa Chalaby, who ran a jihad refugee centre in Brooklyn, were both protégés of Abdullah Azzam. ...
Cooley says that those directly recruited by the US went to Camp Peary — "the Farm", as the CIA's spy training centre in Virginia is known in the intelligence community ... At the Farm and other secret camps, young Afghans and Arab nationals from countries such as Egypt and Jordan learned strategic sabotage skills. Passed down to the younger jihad generation which filled the ranks of the bin Laden organisation, these skills would come back to haunt the US. ...'
[Giles Foden, "Blowback Chronicles", Guardian, 15 Sept. 2001; referring to John Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism (Pluto Press, no date given)]
The MAK, headed by the Palestinian-Egyptian Abdullah Azzam in conjunction with bin Laden, was based in Peshawar, Pakistan. Numerous branches were established in the USA under the name of al-Khifa. The first was set up in Tucson, amid the large Arab community there, in 1986. The 9/11 Commission's Report later noted that "A number of important al Qaeda figures attended the University of Arizona in Tucson or lived in Tucson in the 1980s and early 1990s".
The largest branch of al-Khifa was in Brooklyn's Atlantic Avenue, New York (in or next to the Farouq Mosque). Other branches were in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and elsewhere. Officially known as the al-Khifa Refugee Center and the associated Afghan Refugee Services, the Brooklyn centre provided the interface for "Operation Cyclone", the American effort to support the mujaheddin. The organization became known as the "Services Office", after its Peshawar original, and worked to raise funds and train recruits for the war effort.
Azzam is believed to have visited from time to time, and bin Laden was numbered among the financial supporters. Al-Khifa had a training camp (perhaps the "private rifle club") in Connecticut, where "Recruits received brief paramilitary training and weapons induction, according to evidence in [subsequent terrorist] trials". Several former members of the "active service" of the CIA were employed there as "expert consultants".
(Andrew Marshall, "Terror 'blowback' burns CIA: America's spies paid and trained their nation's worst enemies", Independent on Sunday [UK], 1 Nov. 1998; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (Penguin, 2005 edn), p.155; 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 2, p.58 [HTML version]; ibid, chapter 7, p.226 [HTML version]; Richard Labévičre, Dollars For Terror [Algora, 2000; translation of Les Dolleurs de la Terreur, Grasset, 1999], pp.223-4)
In 1986, bin Laden brought heavy construction equipment from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan. Using his extensive knowledge of construction techniques, (he has a degree in civil engineering), he built "training camps", some dug deep into the sides of mountains, and built roads to reach them.
These camps, now dubbed "terrorist universities" by Washington, were built in collaboration with the ISI and the CIA. The Afghan contra fighters, including tens of thousands of mercenaries recruited and paid for by bin Laden, were armed by the CIA. Pakistan, the US and Britain provided military trainers. ...
Al Qaeda (the Base), bin Laden's organisation, was established in 1987-88 to run the camps and other business enterprises. It is a tightly-run capitalist holding company — albeit one that integrates the operations of a military force and related logistical services with `legitimate' business operations.
Bin Laden split from the relatively conventional MAK in 1988 and established a new group, al-Qaida, that included many of the more extreme MAK members he had met in Afghanistan. ... Afghan vet[eran]s, or Afghanis ...
As the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan during 1988-9, a policy split emerged between the US State Department and the CIA. The State Department focused on moderate Afghan factions and a negotiated supersession of the Soviet-installed Najibullah regime. But the CIA continued military support, via Pakistan, of Hekmatyar and other Islamists. Meanwhile, Arabs continued to flow in to fight alongside the Afghan Islamists.
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