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| quote: | Originally posted by Alex
It's interesting to note that most rich countries (well, the seven richest anyhow) never seem to leap into action whenever it's a major issue in Africa.
I've always wondered why, I read different books and what not with different explanations, some to do with racism, some that make the point of "what's in it for us?" but for the life of me I can't figure out why for any one reason why we don't try to "police" Africa quite the same way as we do the middle east/eastern europe etc.
I also can't help but feel that a large NATO presence in the worst parts of Africa would help, as the militias and militants the US + EU would be fighting would be vastly inferior to the well organized and well funded Taliban or Al Qaeda.
Not to say the African equivalents aren't funded or equipped at all, but they would probably lose a lot sooner, especially with help from the AU. Or maybe I'm wrong, who knows.
Maybe the real reason why we can't seem to turn most of Africa around is because it's just too huge a task to even fathom? |
It's a difficult question to grapple with. Undoubtedly if the international community pooled it's resources to tackle African conflicts with any sort of determination, a lot of things would be resolved. Problems would obviously still remain, but a lot of good could be accomplished. However, this isn't going to happen anytime soon.
There are a number of reasons I can think of, and self-interest certainly isn't the least important of those. The US experience in Somalia was a proverbial slap in the face. Citizens across the country demanded to know why US Marines were dying for African welfare, and why money continued to pour into humanitarian outreach in Mogadishu even as riots burned part of LA to the ground. It also plays a large role in why we don't get involved in places like Darfur. With economic linkages to the government of Sudan, and a crucial partnership in the War on Terror tenuously established, the United States actually stands to risk it's own interest by getting involved in a heavy-handed intervention in Darfur.
But there are other reasons as well. Intervention in Africa is generally frowned upon by Africans themselves, for many of the reasons our experience in Iraq is frowned-upon. What exit strategy exists for an intervention in a place where there is no real history of transparent governance? Will we inevitably have to rebuild society from the bottom up? How is that different than colonial domination? Africans fought tooth and nail for their independence, and many of those that sacrificed are still alive today - they are not eager to be "rescued" by the West. Advocating for an African solution to African problems will certainly take a lot of time, but there are plenty of critics that would rather wait for that sort of infrastructure to develop than rely once again on Western benevolence that they don't actually trust.
The institutional framework for intervening is also not fully developed. During the 1980's not a single humanitarian intervention was launched by the United States, United Nations, or any other external actor. After the fall of the Soviet Union the United Nations Security Council was left to seek out ways in which it remained relevant. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali came up with his now-famous An Agenda For Peace, which promoted the use of the Security Council and the United Nations for peace-support operations worldwide. The establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Organization quickly followed, and a whole array of missions were soon approved. However, the expectations for success far outpaced the institutional capacity of the missions. Donor states lauded the idea of missions, and then failed to donate enough equipment, manpower, and money in order to fulfill mandates. Rough starts in early missions (Somalia, etc.) often led to general chastising of the entire UN system. It was immediately apparent that to not act would garner criticism, but to act insufficiently could potentially be even more damaging to the legitimacy of the Security Council. So the number of approved missions declined through the 90's.
Today more emphasis is placed on regional bodies (NATO, the AU, ASEAN, ECOWAS, etc.). However, the capacity for these organizations to undertake missions varies widely, and the pros and cons of regional missions as opposed to truly international ones are well documented. The AU has had some success in small peacekeeping missions, but to implement a peace where one does not exist and then monitor it's success in a place as large as Darfur or the DRC is highly unrealistic - especially when considering the poverty of many AU donor states (as it is right now something like 90% of the AU budget is paid by only 7 of the 53 member states). Resources also remain an issue.
So as the international system develops to address the problems it seeks to address, there is a lot of confusion over who exactly is responsible for what. I think this is a product of the whole endeavor being relatively new - any new operation has some logistical kinks that need to be worked out. Hopefully this will happen sooner rather than later.
Another thing that should be mentioned is that peacekeeping missions gain more notoriety for their successes than their failures. People know of Rwanda and Darfur of course, but they may not know of successful missions elsewhere.
So yeah, that's a fairly rambling answer to your rhetorical question. 
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