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| quote: | Originally posted by Renegade
The Law of Truly Large Numbers can be best explained by walking along the beach. Stop at a random location, pick up a grain of sand and then look at it. Do you have any idea how small the odds are of you selecting that particular grain of sand at random? Literally billions upon billions to one. You'd have a greater chance of winning the lottery and getting struck by lightning on the same day. Yet is there anything miraculous about bending over and picking up a grain of sand? Must there be something divine about that grain of sand for you to have picked it up against seemingly impossible odds? |
to better illustrate the the question-begging nature of ID, i'd like to take your "sand on a beach" analogy a little further. you've shown that the improbability of picking up any one particular grain of sand is extremely low. however, as you have also shown, that probability is meaningless. it is meaningless unless there is some form of intent. now if someone, using a high powered microscope and a tiny laser, branded a grain of sand with a marking/number/picture and then placed it somewhere on a beach without you seeing where, and told you to go pick the branded grain up, and you went and picked it up on your first try... then that low probability would actually mean something. the problem with the ID argument, is that it doesn't differentiate between these two scenarios. it takes the first scenario (picking up any old grain of sand) and interprets that meaningless probability as being analogous to the second scenario.
| quote: | Originally posted by Renegade
The anthropic principle is a little harder to explain, but all it basically states is that these "impossible odds" do occur, and that we shouldn't feel as though it's a miracle in any sense that we do exist in a universe "configured" perfectly to our existence. If the universe wasn't configured like it is now, we wouldn't be around to notice, just as if the world had turned out in a different state (out of zillions of possible states) after the last 24 hours, we wouldn't know any differently. If there are a billion possible outcomes of equal importance - just as there may be a billion grains of sand to choose from at the beach - by definition, one of these billion to one shots must occur, just as, if we were to go to the beach with the intention of picking up a grain of sand, we must go home with one of the billion. There is nothing remarkable about events of a very low probability occuring because, paradoxically, billion to one outcomes must, by definition, occur. |
the anthropic principle is closely tied to my example above. however, a common argument in which IDists misuse the anthropic principle, is the Fine Tuning Argument. Basically, the argument goes, the physical constants of this universe are so finely tuned, that if they varied the slightest bit (like 1 in 6 x 10^23rd, or something like that), then life wouldn't exist. So IDists argue that because life is so improbable, this universe must have been designed to support life. The fallacy should be quite apparent already, since according to the anthropic principle, we should expect exactly the universe we see, and any after the fact probability calculation will beg the question. but in case there are some that don't see the fallacy yet, here is a thought experiment that should demonstrate the problem with this line of thinking.
Imagine that there are 10 possible universes (not to scale.. 10 is just easier for discussion than 6 x 10^23); each with different physical constants that would produce completely different universes: a b c d e f g h i j
Only universe a has physical constants that allow it to produce life. And if you picked just one universe at random, it is improbable that you would pick a universe that can produce life since there is only one of them. And that is how you get the low probability that is the basis for the fine-tuning argument.
But universe a is not any more improbable than universe j. Universe j is different from the rest of the possible universes just like a is, and the same "improbability" applies to all of the individual possible universes. However, the fine-tuning argument make a baseless assumption that intelligent-life-producing constants are diametrically opposed to all other constants, rather than giving all aspects of all possible universes equal consideration when making that probability calculation.
Implicit in that assumption, is the assumption that the purpose of any of those possible universes would be to produce intelligent life. The fine-tuning argument assumes that universe a accomplishes this a priori special purpose and that the others don't accomplish that purpose, in order to make the probability "a vs. bcdefghij" (improbable) rather than "a vs. b vs. c vs. d, etc...." (just as probable as any other). But to assume that purpose/intent is begging the question... Intent is what is trying to be proven from an improbability, but that improbability wouldn't "exist" (or have meaning) if intent wasn't assumed.
richard
"...imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in 'an interesting hole I find myself in 'fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!'" --Douglas Adams
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