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| quote: | Originally posted by trancaholic
I'm not sure of what you mean, and most certainly not whether you consider me a "determinist" (given that I've stated that I think that free will is an illusion), so this reply might make a lot, some, or no sense at all. |
My post was made generally and was never speficially directed at your posts. As for whether or not you're a determinist, while you don't have to be a determinist to reject the notion of free will, it does help. 
| quote: | | As far as I can understand your point, you think that "we" are equivalent to the structure of our synapses, the electrical signals between these, and any other physical processes that alter the states of our synapses (such as gas concentrations in the brain). If this is the correct interpretation of your stance, then I can of course find no logical flaws in it. However, I do think that most people define "I" as only a strict subset of these signals/synapses/processes, or to put it in mental terms, consider the I to be those parts of our selves that we can reason about and communicate to others. |
But when you examine the neurological nature of consciousness, you'll find that there is no fixed place in which the "I" resides. The "I" - that is, the sensation of "I" - is simply the composite result of different areas of the brain firing in a certain way. The "I" that listens to music, is inherently different to the "I" playing sport which is inherently different again from the "I" which writes these posts. In this sense, there is no fixed "I" and consciousness is simply the sensation we experience when different parts of the brain function in tandem.
This is why I tend to view consciousness and the Freudian "Ego" as a process rather than as an entity in itself. This is a post I wrote on another forum, and while it deals more with the impossiblity of heaven and the impermanency of the self, I think it's relevent to what I'm talking about here (i.e. the nature of consciousness):
| quote: | The most important part of understanding death, for me at least, is that consciousness (that is, who we are) is not an entity, it's a process. We are not our brains, we are the processes that occur within those brains. As such, once the process comes to an end (that is, the electrical and chemical impulses within our brain cease) so does consciousness and - as such - our very existence.
Think of it like fire. As material combusts, we witness the emergence of flames. These flames, however, are not really what we could classify as objects or entities in themelves, they're merely the manifestation of a process (in this case, the combustion of matter). Now when the fire is extinguished and the flames disappear, they haven't really "gone" anywhere, it's just that the process (the combustion of matter) has ceased and with it the physical manifestation of that process (that is, the fire). In this sense, it doesn't really make sense to ask where fire goes after the process of combustion ceases, as the fire is itself just the manifestation of this very process - does this make sense?
Therefore, if we think of consciousness the same way, once the neurological processes stop, so too does consciousness. It doesn't go anywhere, because it never really existed (in the conventional sense of the word, at least) at all. When we die our brains cease their internal combustion and the flames of consciousness are left forever extinguished. Unless there is a way to make these biological processes go on for ever (which there isn't), there isn't really anywhere for consciousness to "go" once these processes do cease, anymore than there is anywhere for fire to go once the processes of combustion cease. I know it might not make a lot of sense, especially since I'm not much good at explaining scienctific stuff (should... have sent... a poet!) but if you can get your head around thinking about consciousness in this way, then issue of human mortality probably won't seem quite so vexing. |
| quote: | | If your definition of "I" is taken to heart, one must deal with a string of consequences that conflict with everyday/common sense perception. For instance, it follows that I am in control of my dreams. |
Depending on how you define "I", the self most definitely controls dreams. They are not controlled by a conscious self (as you are, by definition, unconscious when they happen) but they are still "created" by the processes of certain parts of your brain.
With regards to free-will, you cannot "choose" the nature of your dreams, but - neurologically at least - they are, depending on your definition anyway, most certainly controlled by the self.
| quote: | | Not only that, I also arrange them, and decide to forget them. |
Forgetting dreams is more of a physical / biological issue than a free will issue. You cannot choose to forget your dreams (which you will if you awake more than a few seconds after REM sleep) any more than you can choose to digest the food resting in your stomach. This process is still ultimately controlled by your brain, but you do not have any "choice" in the matter.
| quote: | | Furthermore, when the I is seen as being the grand sum of the processes in the brain, notions such as "consciousness" and "subconsciousness" become vaguely defined. |
Precisely. 
As I said, consciousness is not fixed. It is the sensation acheived when different parts of the brain fire in tandem. Our thought process may be influenced by parts of the brain that we cannot directly "sense" and this forms the basis of much of the body of psychological theory (particularly early psychological theory, like those of Freud and Jung). Given this, the conscious decisions we make - as the determinists argue - are not directly under our conscious control, but if you define consciousness as the pattern of neurological activity that - at any given point - allows us to be "aware" of what it is that we are doing, then choices, at the very least, are made "consciously". The determinists argue that choice is an illusion because we cannot directly influence all the factors (neurological or otherwise) that go into us making a choice, but I would argue that this is irrelevent. The self (or, rather, the processes that compose the self) cannot choose in the sense that we cannot transcend that which we deterministically are, but the self can, nonetheless, make conscious choices. It is this consciousness, for me, that make choice real and I do not believe that the facticity of human nature precludes the possiblity of free choice.
In other words, if consciousness is the result of all these neurological factors, then the fact that we cannot transcend our deterministic facticity and alter these processes does not alter the possibility of free choice, so long as we can say that these choices are, indeed, made consciously (that is, we are "aware" of the choices we are making). If consciousness is the result of neurological processes and choices are the result of the same neurological processes, how can anyone say that "we" (that is, our conscious self) are not making these decisions ourselves?
| quote: | Similarly with "the will" (which we are debating here). So when your definition is accepted, the original question of whether the will is free loses its meaning.
When I'm stating that the will is not free, I'm equating the will with consciousness, and what I think it is bound by is the preferences and mental mechanisms of the subconsciousness. |
I think you're creating too great a schism between the conscious and the subconscious. As I said, we may not be aware of absolutely every mental process that is involved in a decision - and we certainly don't have autonomous control over the nature of these processes - but we still make that decision consciously, otherwise it wouldn't be a decision at all, it would be the action of base instinct.
As for whether a decision is entirely free? It depends on your definition of "free", I suppose. We are not - and by definition cannot be - free from our environment and the mental processes that compose consciousness (and therefore the processes that dictate conscious choice) when we make a decision. However, given that our facticity cannot be transcended, again, I can only ask, if conscious choice is merely "illusory" choice, then what is the nature of "free" choice? What, practically, is the difference? Every decision that is made by a human - or even any decision made by a being that exists beyond our own anthropic contraints (like a deity, for instance) - is still going to be made entirely within the nature of that being. Insofar as a being cannot transcend its own facticity (how can it escape what it is?) then, by the arguments of the determinists, free choice cannot be real. But if real choice is impossible, how can it, in any sense, considered real in the first place?
As I suggested earlier, I still have never been given a satisfactory answer by those who deny the possiblity of free will, as to what the difference between "real" choice and "illusory" choice actually is.
| quote: | | If one or more of these are "wrong" (say, your sex drive craves people of your own sex rather than those of the opposite, and your desire to fit in with others is low) then your choices will be "wrong" as well. |
Have you ever read Sartre? This sounds suspiciously like his argument against the existential authenticity of homosexuality... 
In any case, coming from the angle of existential authenticity, if you are conscious that a certain mode of action is wrong, then to act in that fashion regardless is to act in a state of mauvaise fois or, in English, in "bad-faith". In other words, as much as you can argue that an action was encouraged by factors beyond your control (be they neurological, environmental or anything else) so long as you are conscious that the action is wrong, then there can be no excuses. And this, ultimately, is what I'm saying: consciousness of choice amounts, to some degree at least, to freedom of choice. If you are aware, before performing an action, that the action is wrong, then to perform that action is wrong or, at best, "inauthentic".
| quote: | | There's something to be gained if you have a spiritual inclination, I think: If your choices are only illusionary, then God cannot give you guidance, but only control you directly by affecting your sense input. Furthermore, the notions of sin and repent become meaningless, as your consciousness has no possibility for vetoing along the way or initiating remorse for its actions anyway. So even if the question of real vs. percepted is irrelevant from many a philosophical viewpoint (including yours and mine), it does matter for some people. |
I'm not saying that the differences between real and perceived choices are irrelevent, I'm saying that, for all intents and purposes, they are indistinguishable. Again, if you believe, as you have stated, that free will is an illusion ("I think that free will is an illusion") then you're going to need to define what real choice is, what illusory choice is and how, exactly and in practical application, they differ.
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http://eschatonnow.blogspot.com/
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) but my point is that saying, as the determinists do, that choice is necessarily illusory because "we" do not have any control over the processes that create that choice, is to miss the point. We are, ultimately, those processes that are making the choice. We cannot consciously alter these processes (which is perhaps what the determinists are arguing) but these process are our consciousness, they are who we are. The determinists would probably argue that it is the very fact that we cannot alter the nature of these processes that makes free choice an illusion, but I'll ask again: if choice is only illusory because we cannot transcend what we are (by going beyond the processes that constitute our consciousness and altering them), then what is to be gained by talking of a "real" state of choice that cannot ever be acheieved? Again, what is the practical difference between the choices we feel we are making and "real" choices?
