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| quote: | Originally posted by shaolin_Z
Prior knowledge of attacks? FACT |
not true. prior knowledge of potential attacks at some stage. not the same thing, and its dishonest of you to say that it is.
| quote: | Originally posted by shaolin_Z
Failure to take any action (let alone effective action or preventive measures)? FACT |
which is evidence of what exactly? no, couldnt be government incompetence! never! mustve been the most illogical scheme of all time!
| quote: | Originally posted by shaolin_Z
Unusual change in chain of command and interference with standard NORAD protocols resulting in attack on pentagon that would never have happened if standard procedures were allowed to take place? FACT | ]
total bullshit.
| quote: |
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NORAD
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NORAD/FAA response
Background
The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was established in 1958 through a bilateral U.S.-Canada agreement. Its mission was, and is, to defend the airspace of North America and protect the continent. That mission does not distinguish between internal and external threats; but because NORAD was created to counter the Soviet threat, it came to define its job as defending against external attacks.
Soviet threat
The threat of Soviet bombers diminished significantly as the Cold War ended, and the number of NORAD alert sites was reduced from its Cold War high of 26. Some within the Pentagon argued in the 1990s that the alert sites should be eliminated entirely. In an effort to preserve their mission, members of the air defense community advocated the importance of air sovereignty against emerging "asymmetric threats" to the United States: drug smuggling, "non-state and state-sponsored terrorists," and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology.
NORAD perceived the dominant threat to be from cruise missiles. Other threats were identified during the late 1990s, including terrorists' use of aircraft as weapons. Exercises were conducted to counter this threat, but they were not based on actual intelligence. In most instances, the main concern was the use of such aircraft to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
Prior to 9/11, it was understood that an order to shoot down a commercial aircraft would have to be issued by the National Command Authority (a phrase used to describe the president and secretary of defense). Exercise planners also assumed that the aircraft would originate from outside the United States, allowing time to identify the target and scramble interceptors. The threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the United States-and using them as guided missiles-was not recognized by NORAD before 9/11.
Notwithstanding the identification of these emerging threats, by 9/11 there were only seven alert sites left in the United States, each with two fighter aircraft on alert. This led some NORAD commanders to worry that NORAD was not postured adequately to protect the United States.
NORAD structure
NORAD is based out of Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station and Peterson Air Force Base near Colorado Springs.
In the United States, NORAD is divided into three sectors:
* Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) - Rome, New York
* Southeast Air Defense Sector - Tyndall Air Force Base (Florida)
* Western Air Defense Sector - McChord Air Force Base (Washington State)
On the morning of 9/11, NEADS could call on two alert sites, each with one pair of ready fighters:
* Otis Air National Guard Base on Cape Cod, Massachusetts
* Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia.
Other facilities, not on "alert," would need time to arm the fighters and organize crews.
NEADS reported to the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters, in Panama City, Florida, which in turn reported to NORAD headquarters, in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
FAA and NORAD
Main article: Federal Aviation Administration
On 9/11, air defense of the United States relied on close cooperation between the NORAD and the FAA.
Previous hijackings
The most recent hijacking that involved U.S. air traffic controllers, FAA management, and military coordination had occurred in 1993.
The FAA and NORAD had developed protocols for working together in the event of a hijacking. As they existed on 9/11, the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government.101
FAA guidance to controllers on hijack procedures assumed that the aircraft pilot would notify the controller via radio or by "squawking" a transponder code of "7500"-the universal code for a hijack in progress. Controllers would notify their supervisors, who in turn would inform management all the way up to FAA headquarters in Washington. Headquarters had a hijack coordinator, who was the director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security or his or her designate.102
If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator on duty to contact the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC) and to ask for a military escort aircraft to follow the flight, report anything unusual, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency. The NMCC would then seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance. If approval was given, the orders would be transmitted down NORAD's chain of command.103
The NMCC would keep the FAA hijack coordinator up to date and help the FAA centers coordinate directly with the military. NORAD would receive tracking information for the hijacked aircraft either from joint use radar or from the relevant FAA air traffic control facility. Every attempt would be made to have the hijacked aircraft squawk 7500 to help NORAD track it.104
The protocols did not contemplate an intercept. They assumed the fighter escort would be discreet, "vectored to a position five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft," where it could perform its mission to monitor the aircraft's flight path.105
In sum, the protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that
* The hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear;
* There would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command; and
* Hijacking would take the traditional form: that is, it would not be a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.
9/11
On 9/11, the defense of U.S. airspace depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the FAA and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
On the morning of 9/11, the existing protocol for hijackings was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen.
American Airlines Flight 11
Main article: American Airlines Flight 11
NEADS received notification of the hijacking 9 minutes before American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m.
Although the Boston Center air traffic controller realized at an early stage that there was something wrong with American 11, he did not immediately interpret the plane's failure to respond as a sign that it had been hijacked. At 8:14, when the flight failed to heed his instruction to climb to 35,000 feet, the controller repeatedly tried to raise the flight. He reached out to the pilot on the emergency frequency. Though there was no response, he kept trying to contact the aircraft.
At 8:21, American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately degrading the information available about the aircraft. The controller told his supervisor that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane, although neither suspected a hijacking. The supervisor instructed the controller to follow standard procedures for handling a "no radio" aircraft.
The controller checked to see if American Airlines could establish communication with American 11. He became even more concerned as its route changed, moving into another sector's airspace. Controllers immediately began to move aircraft out of its path, and asked other aircraft in the vicinity to look for American 11.108
At 8:24:38, the following transmission came from American 11:
We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you'll be okay. We are returning to the airport.
The controller only heard something unintelligible; he did not hear the specific words "we have some planes." The next transmission came seconds later:
Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.
The controller told us that he then knew it was a hijacking. He alerted his supervisor, who assigned another controller to assist him. He redoubled his efforts to ascertain the flight's altitude. Because the controller didn't understand the initial transmission, the manager of Boston Center instructed his quality assurance specialist to "pull the tape" of the radio transmission, listen to it closely, and report back.
Between 8:25 and 8:32, in accordance with the FAA protocol, Boston Center managers started notifying their chain of command that American 11 had been hijacked. At 8:28, Boston Center called the Command Center in Herndon to advise that it believed American 11 had been hijacked and was heading toward New York Center's airspace.
By this time, American 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south. At 8:32, the Command Center passed word of a possible hijacking to the Operations Center at FAA headquarters. The duty officer replied that security personnel at headquarters had just begun discussing the apparent hijack on a conference call with the New England regional office. FAA headquarters began to follow the hijack protocol but did not contact the NMCC to request a fighter escort.
The Herndon Command Center immediately established a teleconference between Boston, New York, and Cleveland Centers so that Boston Center could help the others understand what was happening.
At 8:34, the Boston Center controller received a third transmission from American 11:
Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid moves.
In the succeeding minutes, controllers were attempting to ascertain the altitude of the southbound flight.
Military Notification and Response
Boston Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the initiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA's Cape Cod facility. The center also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out. At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS. This was the first notification received by the military-at any level-that American 11 had been hijacked:
FAA: Hi. Boston Center TMU [Traffic Management Unit], we have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there, help us out.
NEADS: Is this real-world or exercise?
FAA: No, this is not an exercise, not a test
NEADS ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles away from New York City. The air defense of America began with this call.
At NEADS, the report of the hijacking was relayed immediately to Battle Commander Colonel Robert Marr. After ordering the Otis fighters to battle stations, Colonel Marr phoned Major General Larry Arnold, commanding general of the First Air Force and NORAD's Continental Region. Marr sought authorization to scramble the Otis fighters. General Arnold later recalled instructing Marr to "go ahead and scramble them, and we'll get authorities later." General Arnold then called NORAD headquarters to report.
F-15 fighters were scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base. But NEADS did not know where to send the alert fighter aircraft, and the officer directing the fighters pressed for more information: "I don't know where I'm scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a destination." Because the hijackers had turned off the plane's transponder, NEADS personnel spent the next minutes searching their radar scopes for the primary radar return. American 11 struck the North Tower at 8:46. Shortly after 8:50, while NEADS personnel were still trying to locate the flight, word reached them that a plane had hit the World Trade Center.
Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. Lacking a target, they were vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast. To avoid New York area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the fighters were brought down to military airspace to "hold as needed. "From 9:09 to 9:13, the Otis fighters stayed in this holding pattern.
In summary, NEADS received notice of the hijacking nine minutes before it struck the North Tower. That nine minutes' notice before impact was the most the military would receive of any of the four hijackings.
Theories
Stand down order?
Theory
The government intentionally stood down NORAD, and any attempt to intercept the hijacked flights.
Military intercepts
Theory
The military is perfectly capable of intercepting commercial aircraft.
Fact
The hijackers turned of the aircraft transponders, making it much more difficult to locate the aircraft (as radar blips, among all the many radar blips from all aircraft). Further, bureaucratic problems and incompetency inhibited the government from a quick, efficient, timely response to the hijackings.
Some conspiracy theorists point to the 1999 NORAD intercept of Payne Stewart's Learjet before it crashed. There was already a F-16 in flight, on training, and available. Unlike the hijacked 9/11 aircraft, the transponder in the Learjet was never turned off. These two facts made it possible to make the intercept.
References
* FAA Believed Second 9/11 Plane Heading Towards NY for Emergency Landing - National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 165, George Washington University (September 9, 2005)
* Bronner, Michael (September 2005) "9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes", Vanity Fair.
Retrieved from "http://www.debunk911myths.org/topics/index.php?title=NORAD" |
| quote: | Originally posted by shaolin_Z
Seismic data consistent with controlled demolition theory? FACT |
how? how is the data consistent with controlled demolition? you slide these assumptions in as fact. more 9/11 dishonesty.
| quote: | Originally posted by shaolin_Z
Expansion of excecutive branch and tyrannical bills/law butchering constituionaly guaranteed protection from state and abuse of power? FACT |
oh. i see. political opportunism after a catalytic event means that demolition charges were planted in the WTCs.
| quote: | Originally posted by shaolin_Z
Clear abuse of power and convicted criminals appointed in key governmental positions? FACT |
i dont know about this.
| quote: | Originally posted by shaolin_Z
Illegal and unwarranted domestic spying on grassroots organizations, peace groups, and political advesaries? FACT |
well, why arent you blaming hoover or mcarthy for the attacks then? 
| quote: | Originally posted by shaolin_Z
War based on blatant lies and deliberate manipulation of intelligence considered faulty by agencies in the first place and produced under pressure from executive branch? FACT |
more evidence of fuck all from you mate.
| quote: | Originally posted by shaolin_Z
Illegal destruction and removal of forensic evidence from crime scene? FACT |
bullshit. ive argued this with you before. how do you explain all the steel tested by NIST? 
| quote: | Originally posted by shaolin_Z
Executive branch blocking independet investigation into 9-11 and 9-11 commission only being formed after families of victims pressuring the Government? FACT |
oh, ok. the commission mightve been imperfect but thats hardly evidence of complicity or anything more sinister. and all those external experts were just pressured and bought off by the administration im sure! 
hey, and wheres your criticism of WTC7? you used to whinge on and on about it. why not now? wouldnt be that you realised your error and now youre clinging to what you have left of the movement? haha.
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