I think that' this's the best article
about the Iranian support of violance in Iraq
by the

British American Security Information Council

So i will start from that part:

Scepticism over US claims

Full article:
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/iran03.pdf

quote:

Scepticism over US claims Despite efforts by the Bush administration to confirm the strength of evidence presented, doubt still surrounds the case against Iran, particularly with regard to the degree of direct involvement of the Iranian leadership. Indeed, many comparisons have been made with the build-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when then Secretary of State Colin Powell told the UN Security Council that the evidence of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons was irrefutable.Contradictory statements regarding the degree to which any Iranian connection can be directly linked to the Iranian government have emerged. At the briefing, officials said that the highest levels of the Iranian government were thought to be directing the use of weapons killing US troops. But the following day Marine Gen. Peter Pace,Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he had no evidence that Iran’s government was directing the supply of weapons to Shia insurgent groups in Iraq. Iran Discussion Paper No.3 May 2007 ----------------------------------------------------------- Page 9 Significant debate has taken place over the origin of EFPs, which American officials claim to know have come from Iran. US assertions centre on the fact that certain EFP components – most notably the metal discs – are not thought to be manufactured in Iraq, whereas it is known that the expertise and equipment are available in Iran.However, there are difficulties with this analysis. In November 2005, US troops raided a Baghdad machine shop and found a pile of copper discs stamped out as part of what looked to be an ongoing order, suggesting that production may also be taking place on Iraqi territory. In addition, individuals with experience working with explosives in the petroleum industry, of which there would be a considerable number in Iraq, would likely have the expertise to manufacture shaped charges for EFPs.Once the principle of manufacturing such devices has been learnt, it can be replicated quickly and cheaply.As one Pentagon analyst commented, the cost of producing an EFP would be no more than $30.In addition, seeking to pinpoint the source of a particular piece of technological know-how is very difficult, as it is likely to have been leaked into an informal network, and EFPs are not exclusive to Iran, but are in fact relatively common around the world. With regard to other weapons found in Iraq and alleged to have come from Iran, the link is again hard to confirm. In common with many countries, Iran sells munitions on the international arms market, and so Iranian weapons may surface in various countries without the direction of Iranian authorities. In an illustration of the loose nature of the international arms trade,Oxfam reported in 2006 that bullets manufactured in the US,Greece, Russia and China all ended up in the Democratic Republic of Congo, despite a UN arms embargo. On the private, grey and illicit markets it is probable that Iranian weapons, or more likely components, could move from Iran to Iraq in a few months. Although not part of the February 2007 evidence briefing, it has also been previously alleged that Iran has contributed to the Iraqi violence through its weak border controls. In November 2004 an Iraqi official said that over 100 volunteer fighters had entered southern Iraq from Iran that year. Brig. Gen. Douglas Raaberg, Deputy Director of Operations for US Central Command, asserted that Iran was allowing insurgents to cross into Iraq. deliberate Iranian strategy to allow jihadis passage into Iraq, however, is difficult to ascertain. The mountainous border region between the countries is 800 miles long, and notoriously difficult to police beyond official crossing points. Smuggling has long been endemic in the area. Also important to note is that, according to a UK diplomat, and corroborated by additional evidence, of the foreign fighters in Iraq, most jihadis are thought to arrive from Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In sum, the evidence thus far of Iranian involvement in Iraqi roadside bombs and other support of militia groups is somewhat patchy. It is very difficult to track the flow of funds, arms and personnel across Iraq’s porous borders with Iran. What has been discovered so far may represent small elements of a bigger picture, but at this stage experts are left trying to extrapolate from limited certainties to form broader conclusions. American intelligence on the ground is limited in Iran, and resembles the intelligence gaps before the invasion of Iraq. This is especially true in relation to understanding of the internal Iranian decision-making structure, and knowledge of who controls centres of power. ------------------------------------------------------ Conclusion It is difficult to prove that Iran is directly connected to the continuing violence in Iraq. Direct confrontation with US and other foreign troops, and increasing instability in the country more generally, are unlikely to further Iranian interests. Rather, Iran’s interest lies in supporting and training allies to influence their political positioning in a post-war, post-occupation Iraq. Whilst Tehran does not wish to see Iraq become a become a severe and direct security threat. If the Iraqi civil war were to get out of hand, Iran might feel obliged to help its Shia co-religionists more pro-actively against Sunni death squads,risking a spiralling involvement in the Iraqi conflict. Long-term,a failed state would have unpredictable consequences and would impact on economic relations with a major trading partner. For these reasons, although official Iranian policy opposes the US presence in Iraq, suggestions of a relatively fast US withdrawal are prompting a degree of unease in Tehran. However, although spiralling Iraqi violence poses considerable risk to Iran, this cannot be taken to mean that Tehran is not supporting such activity across the border. Many western intelligence and Middle East experts believe that Tehran is pursuing a policy of ‘managed chaos’ in Iraq. According to such thinking, US plans for the country are disrupted without a state of complete lawlessness emerging, creating political space for Iran to seek to shape a new Iraqi government. be supporting militia activity in order to align itself with the likely power-holders in a future Iraq. In May 2007 a British adviser to the local police force in Basra described most of the force as being under the control of different factions and militias,including Moqtada al-Sadr’s forces, and the Badr Brigade.play a role; Iran finds the nationalist rhetoric of Moqtada al-Sadr problematic, but the maintenance of ties with the popular and high profile Mahdi Army leader may prove beneficial. Indeed, backing being given by Tehran to the Mahdi Army and the Badr Corps may be intended as much to build and maintain relations as to support violent activity. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Iran has an incentive to avoid involving itself more directly militarily in Iraq, as this might provoke armed confrontation with the United States, and possibly wider regional conflict. Thus deniability is likely to be a key factor in any Iranian military strategy in Iraq, as far as such a coordinated plan exists.Conversely, however,Tehran also stands to gain from asserting the importance of Iranian input into any regional political settlement, an end which might conflict directly with efforts to ensure plausible deniability of involvement in Iraq. Most beneficial for Tehran would be the emergence of a friendly, preferably Shia,Iraqi government, strong enough to keep Iraq together but too weak to pose a military threat. Such a situation in Iraq would provide a security buffer zone for Iran against foreign invasion,and the political dominance of Iraqi Shia would likely deter future US aggression against Iran, as US fortunes in Iraq would depend on Shia cooperation. There is a clear rationale for Iran to seek to shape developments in Iraq, and although convincing evidence is limited as to whether this includes a military strategy, there are strong indications that elements of the Iranian regime are operating to this end. If this is in fact the case, such activity will not have begun just in the last few months.Indeed, in October 2005, William Patey, then British ambassador to Iraq, told reporters that Iran had been supplying technology used to kill British troops in Basra.This has prompted some to ask why the US administration decided to produce the evidence of Iranian involvement when it did. One explanation might be that only now has the accumulated evidence become substantial enough to make a strong case against Tehran. Another reason could be the rising death toll from EFPs in recent months, as the number of attacks against coalition forces nearly doubled in 2006. Whatever the true extent and nature of Iranian military action in Iraq, few independent analysts believe Tehran is playing a decisive role in the sectarian warfare and insurgency. suggests that other, more strategic motives also lie behind the considerable US political energy being expended on highlighting the Iranian role in Iraq. Iran may present a useful scapegoat to divert the blame for failures in Iraq away from the occupying powers. Recent allegations must also be considered in the context of the current crisis surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme. If Tehran can be cast as a source of regional instability in the eyes of the international community, then the US administration’s hand will be strengthened as it seeks support for stronger measures to oppose Iranian nuclear ambitions. In particular, should the administration decide to embark on a military strike – an option which it says is still ‘on the table’ – then garnering public and political support in advance would be vital. Without it, the global unpopularity for military action would likely greatly exceed the opposition to the invasion of Iraq. In light of the long-standing connections between Iran and Iraq, and the history of relations between Iran and militia groups in the region, it is certainly plausible that Tehran is providing key military and logistical support to certain militia groups in Iraq. Although further information has emerged since the US presentation in February 2007, the broader picture remains unclear. Whilst claims of Iranian foul play may yet be further substantiated, it is important also to acknowledge that Tehran has a legitimate right to be involved in certain ways within Iraq. Iran is justified in seeking to shape events to its own benefit in a peaceful and constructive manner, and so a distinction needs to be maintained between Iranian ‘meddling’ and other, lawful activities. Until the exact nature and extent of this Iranian activity can be ascertained more fully it is inevitable that evidence presented by US and UK authorities will be treated with scepticism. Few are ready to accept a repeat of the intelligence debacle which contributed to the 2003 Iraq war.

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"Politics is too serious a matter to be left to the politicians."



Charles de Gaulle

Last edited by M.Johan on Jun-12-2007 at 19:49