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Disabled citizens finally catch a break, sort of
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| MisterOpus1 |
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tm...scotus_disabled
My question is, why the hell was this not a 9-0 vote? What the hell were the far-right conservative judges voting against this for?
To paraphrase Scalia:
"The man was offered to be carried up the steps, and that is enough in accordance to the Constitution."
Unf$cking believable. Can these 4 be any more discriminatory?
Edit:
Oh, I looove Rhenquist's line:
"Congress utterly failed to identify any evidence that disabled persons were denied constitutionally protected access to judicial proceedings,"
So disabled folks in wheelchairs who can't make it up the damn steps unless someone carries them is what the Constitution implies, according to his view?
This is making me sick. |
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| occrider |
Perhaps they voted in favor of keeping to strict adherence of the 11th amendment?
11th amendment:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
STATE IMMUNITY
Purpose and Early Interpretation
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has become over the years esoteric and abstruse and the decisions inconsistent. At the same time, it is a vital element of federal jurisdiction that ''go[es] to the very heart of [the] federal system and affect[s] the allocation of power between the United States and the several states.'' 1 Because of the centrality of the Amendment at the intersection of federal judicial power and the accountability of the States and their officers to federal constitutional standards, it has occasioned considerable dispute within and without the Court. 2
The action of the Supreme Court in accepting jurisdiction of a suit against a State by a citizen of another State in 1793 3 provoked such angry reaction in Georgia and such anxieties in other States that at the first meeting of Congress following the decision the Eleventh Amendment was proposed by an overwhelming vote of both Houses and ratified with, what was for that day, ''vehement speed.'' 4 Chisholm had been brought under that part of the jurisdictional provision of Article III that authorized cognizance of ''controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State.'' At the time of the ratification debates, opponents of the proposed Constitution had objected to the subjection of a State to suits in federal courts and had been met with conflicting responses--- on the one hand, an admission that the accusation was true and that it was entirely proper so to provide, and, on the other hand, that the accusation was false and the clause applied only when a State was the party plaintiff. 5 So matters stood when Congress, in enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789, without recorded controversy gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction of suits between States and citizens of other States. 6 Chisholm v. Georgia was brought under this jurisdictional provision to recover under a contract for supplies executed with the State during the Revolution. Four of the five Justices agreed that a State could be sued under this Article III jurisdictional provision and that under section 13 the Supreme Court properly had original jurisdiction. 7
The Amendment proposed by Congress and ratified by the States was directed specifically toward overturning the result in Chisholm and preventing suits against States by citizens of other States or by citizens or subjects of foreign jurisdictions. It did not, as other possible versions of the Amendment would have done, altogether bar suits against States in the federal courts. 8 That is, it barred suits against States based on the status of the party plaintiff and did not address the instance of suits based on the nature of the subject matter. 9 The early decisions seemed to reflect this understanding of the Amendment, although the point was not necessary to the decisions and thus the language is dictum. 10 In Cohens v. Virginia, 11 Chief Justice Marshall ruled for the Court that the prosecution of a writ of error to review a judgment of a state court alleged to be in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States did not commence or prosecute a suit against the State but was simply a continuation of one commenced by the State, and thus could be brought under Sec. 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 12 But in the course of the opinion, the Chief Justice attributed adoption of the Eleventh Amendment not to objections to subjecting States to suits per se but to well-founded concerns about creditors being able to maintain suits in federal courts for payment, 13 and stated his view that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits against the States under federal question jurisdiction 14 and did not in any case reach suits against a State by its own citizens. 15
In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 16 the Court, again through Chief Justice Marshall, held that the Bank of the United States 17 could sue the Treasurer of Ohio, over Eleventh Amendment objections, because the plaintiff sought relief against a state officer rather than against the State itself. This ruling embodied two principles, one of which has survived and one of which the Marshall Court itself soon abandoned. The latter holding was that a suit is not one against a State unless the State is a named party of record. 18 The former holding, the primary rationale through which the strictures of the Amendment are escaped, is that a state official possesses no official capacity when acting illegally and thus can derive no protection from an unconstitutional statute of a State. 19
Expansion of the Immunity of the States .--Until the period following the Civil War, Chief Justice Marshall's understanding of the Amendment generally prevailed. But in the aftermath of that conflict, Congress for the first time effectively gave the federal courts general federal question jurisdiction, 20 and a large number of States in the South defaulted upon their revenue bonds in violation of the Contracts Clause of the Constitution. 21 As bondholders sought relief in federal courts, the Supreme Court gradually worked itself into the position of holding that the Eleventh Amendment, or more properly speaking the principles ''of which the Amendment is but an exemplification,'' 22 is a bar not only of suits against a State by citizens of other States, but also of suits brought by citizens of that State itself. 23 Expansion as a formal holding occurred in Hans v. Louisiana, 24 a suit against the State by a resident of that State brought in federal court under federal question jurisdiction, alleging a violation of the Contracts Clause in the State's repudiation of its obligation to pay interest on certain bonds. Admitting that the Amendment on its face prohibited only the entertaining of a suit against a State by citizens of another State, or citizens or subjects of a foreign state, the Court nonetheless thought the literal language was an insufficient basis for decision. Rather, wrote Justice Bradley for the Court, the Eleventh Amendment was a result of the ''shock of surprise throughout the country'' at the Chisholm decision and reflected the determination that that decision was wrong and that federal jurisdiction did not extend to making defendants of unwilling States. 25 The amendment reversed an erroneous decision and restored the proper interpretation of the Constitution. The views of the opponents of subjecting States to suit ''were most sensible and just'' and those views ''apply equally to the present case as to that then under discussion. The letter is appealed to now, as it was then, as a ground for sustaining a suit brought by an individual against a State. The reason against it is as strong in this case as it was in that. It is an attempt to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of.'' 26 ''The truth is, that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States. . . . The suability of a State without its consent was a thing unknown to the law.'' 27 Thus, while the literal terms of the Amendment did not so provide, ''the manner in which [Chisholm] was received by the country, the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the light of history and the reason of the thing,'' 28 led the Court unanimously to hold that States could not be sued by their own citizens on grounds arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Then, in Ex parte New York (No. 1), 29 the Court held that, absent consent to suit, a State was immune to suit in admiralty, the Eleventh Amendment's reference to ''any suit in law or equity'' notwithstanding. ''That a State may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence . . . of which the Amendment is but an exemplification. . . . It is true the Amendment speaks only of suits in law or equity; but this is because . . . the Amendment was the outcome of a purpose to set aside the effect of the decision of this court in Chisholm v. Georgia . . . from which it naturally came to pass that the language of the Amendment was particularly phrased so as to reverse the construction adopted in that case.'' 30 Just as Hans v. Louisiana had demonstrated the ''impropriety of construing the Amendment'' so as to permit federal question suits against a State, so ''it seems to us equally clear that it cannot with propriety be construed to leave open a suit against a State in the admiralty jurisdiction by individuals, whether its citizens or not.'' 31
And in extending protection against suits brought by foreign governments, the Court made clear the immunity flowed not from the Eleventh Amendment but from concepts of state sovereign immunity generally. ''Manifestly, we cannot . . . assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against nonconsenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. There is the . . . postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.''' 32
The Nature of the States' Immunity
A great deal of the difficulty in interpreting and applying the Eleventh Amendment stems from the fact that the Court has not been clear, or at least has not been consistent, with respect to what the Amendment really does and how it relates to the other parts of the Constitution. One view of the Amendment, set out above in the discussion of Hans v. Louisiana, Ex parte New York, and Principality of Monaco, is that Chisholm was erroneously decided and that the Amendment's effect, its express language notwithstanding, was to restore the ''original understanding'' that Article III's grants of federal court jurisdiction did not extend to suits against the States. That view finds present day expression. 33 It explains the decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 34 in which the Court held that a State could properly raise its Eleventh Amendment defense on appeal after having defended and lost on the merits in the trial court. ''[I]t has been well settled . . . that the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court.'' 35 But that the bar is not wholly jurisdictional seems established as well. 36
Moreover, if under Article III there is no jurisdiction of suits against States, the settled principle that States may consent to suit 37 becomes conceptually difficult, inasmuch as it is not possible to confer jurisdiction where it is lacking through the consent of the parties. 38 And there is jurisdiction under Article III of some suits against States, such as those brought by the United States or by other States. 39 And, furthermore, Congress is able in at least some instances to legislate away state immunity, 40 although it may not enlarge Article III jurisdiction. 41 The Court has recently declared that ''the principle of sovereign immunity [reflected in the Eleventh Amendment] is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III,'' but almost in the same breath has acknowledged that ''[a] sovereign's immunity may be waived.'' 42
Another explanation of the Eleventh Amendment is that it recognizes the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which was clearly established at the time: a state was not subject to suit without its consent. 43 The Court in dealing with questions of governmental immunity from suit has traditionally treated interchangeably precedents dealing with state immunity and those dealing with fed eral governmental immunity. 44 Viewing the Amendment and its radiations into Article III in this way provides a consistent explanation of the consent to suit as a waiver. 45 The limited effect of the doctrine in this context in federal court arises from the fact that traditional sovereign immunity arose in a unitary state, barring unconsented suit against a sovereign in its own courts or the courts of another sovereign. But upon entering the Union the States surrendered their sovereignty to some undetermined and changing degree to the national government, a sovereign that does not have plenary power over them but which is more than their coequal. 46
Thus, outside the area of federal court jurisdiction, there is the case of Nevada v. Hall, 47 which perfectly illustrates the difficulty. The case arose when a California resident sued a Nevada state agency in a California court because one of the agency's employees negligently injured him in an automobile accident in California. While recognizing that the rule during the framing of the Constitution was that a State could not be sued without its consent in the courts of another sovereign, the Court discerned no evidence in the federal constitutional structure, in the specific language, or in the intention of the Framers that would impose a general, federal constitutional constraint upon the action of a State in authorizing suit in its own courts against another State. The Court did imply that in some cases a ''substantial threat to our constitutional system of cooperative federalism'' might arise and occasion a different result, but this was not such a case. 48
Within the area of federal court jurisdiction, the issue becomes the extent to which the States upon entering the Union gave up their immunity to suit in federal court. Chisholm held, and the Eleventh Amendment reversed the holding, that the States had given up their immunity to suit in diversity cases based on common law or state law causes of action; Hans v. Louisiana and subsequent cases held that the Amendment in effect codified an understanding of broader immunity to suits based on federal causes of action. 49 Other cases have held that the States did give up their immunity to suits by the United States or by other States and that subjection to suit continues. 50
Still another view of the Eleventh Amendment is that it embodies a state sovereignty principle limiting the power of the Federal Government. 52 In this respect, the federal courts may not act without congressional guidance in subjecting States to suit, and Congress, which can act to the extent of its granted powers, is constrained by judicially-created doctrines requiring it to be explicit when it legislates against state immunity. 53
In the 1980s four Justices, led by Justice Brennan, argued that Hans was incorrectly decided, that the Amendment was intended only to deny jurisdiction against the States in diversity cases, and that Hans and its progeny should be overruled. 55 But the remaining five Justices adhered to Hans and in fact stiffened it with a rule of construction quite severe in its effect. 56 The Hans interpretation has been solidified with the Court's ruling in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Supp.1 that Congress lacks the power under Article I to abrogate state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. That too, however, was a 5-4 decision, with the four dissenting Justices believing that Hans was wrongly decided. Supp.2
Not that I necessarily agree with their desent ... just answering your question. You could read their entire disent argument if you want to be fair and avoid selective quotations from the article. Bear in mind the case was about suing states, not bringing states up to ADA standards. I suppose the fear is that the decision could be loosely translated into a whole range of lawsuits against states for a number of reasons. |
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| MisterOpus1 |
I appreciate your response. Just out of curiousity, where'd you get your source?
I knew that the 4 dissenters, esp. Scalia, have a tendency to take the Constitution verbatum with very little room for interpretation. I find this disheartening because I tend to feel that not only was this not the intention of the framers of the Constitution, but that laws and interpretations must change in accordance to the changes in society (I could have worded that last phrase better, but you get my drift). It seems that Scalia just won't have any part in this.
Is he and the other 3 are correct in their strict standard of the Constitution? Perhaps, perhaps not. Once again I've been thorougly busted in not reading the entire dissent (does anyone really read them all? Kinda like a War and Peace novel in Russian, isin't it?). I understand the possible implications of where this interpretation may go in regards to states' rights, but I also have confidence in future cases that would set these potential issues straight.
The bottom line seems that the states did nothing in accordance to the ADA standards, and the US Supreme Court had to intervene in order to keep the states in line with the ADA law. How else would this have been enforced? |
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| occrider |
| quote: | Originally posted by MisterOpus1
The bottom line seems that the states did nothing in accordance to the ADA standards, and the US Supreme Court had to intervene in order to keep the states in line with the ADA law. How else would this have been enforced? |
That's why I disagree with the disent ;)
Oops here was my source:
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/...nt11/index.html |
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| NeoPhono |
| Just remember though, every "right" has its consequence. Not to harp upon it again, but the book "The Death of Common Sense" proves this point well. Minority rights are important, but only to the extent that they do not punish the majority, which the ADA has done many times over. Much the same way I will never be an NBA Superstar those with disabilities must also know their limitations. This story is also troubling to me, because if I remember correctly the man was actually scheduled for his second trial date on the first floor, but refused in order to make his point. |
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| Arbiter |
Finally? Disabled citizens catch nothing but breaks. In nature they'd be fodder for the next predator to happen upon them. It is not the role of society to compensate for the mental or physical weakness of its members to create some prima facie "equality."
The ADA is just another example of the federal government blatantly whoring itself out to a special interest group. Does anyone honestly believe that this act is the product of rational debate? Please.
Let's say it again together:
Rights are not "entitlements to" but rather "freedoms from".
The ADA doesn't protect anyone's rights. It gives entitlements to disabled people at the expense of "able" society. We ought to stick the ADA right where it belongs: in the recycling bin. |
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| MisterOpus1 |
| quote: | Originally posted by Arbiter
Finally? Disabled citizens catch nothing but breaks. In nature they'd be fodder for the next predator to happen upon them. It is not the role of society to compensate for the mental or physical weakness of its members to create some prima facie "equality."
The ADA is just another example of the federal government blatantly whoring itself out to a special interest group. Does anyone honestly believe that this act is the product of rational debate? Please.
Let's say it again together:
Rights are not "entitlements to" but rather "freedoms from".
The ADA doesn't protect anyone's rights. It gives entitlements to disabled people at the expense of "able" society. We ought to stick the ADA right where it belongs: in the recycling bin. |
Why stop there? If we are to follow your argument to its logical end, we should rid ourselves of all disabled individuals, since they contribute significantly less to society as a whole, right?
At the very least, we should ship them all onto a secluded island and away from the rest of our progressive civilized society.
Then we can have a disabled, "Survivor" with a number of obstacles and tasks in hopes to vote each disabled person off one by one. But since they can't join society, we may as well kill off the losers of each Tribal Council meeting that have been voted off. Of course, since they're disabled, none will be very successful at any physical tasks given, so it's really a crapshoot for the whole lot. May as well just have a Tribal Council every night, vote the "most disabled" off the show, kill him/her, and that would be it. Hell, I think it would only be about 15 minutes. They could actually run it alongside with Adult Swim on the Cartoon Network late at night, since it's kinda gruesome, killing a weaker person every night and all, but it would run pretty good next to Sealab 2021 since that always seems to have a little blood and gore involved along with a few laughs (ha ha ha!). Heck, maybe since it'll be on the Cartoon Network running alongside some of the funny adult toons, we might as a civilized society get a few laughs out of the "Disabled Survivor" show as well! Hey, I'm all for it!
Whoa, sorry there, not sure where the hell I went. But while I'm at it, where the hell were you going with your line of reasoning? |
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| NeoPhono |
I think that the point of his post and mine was that people need to realize their limitations.
Society can help these people to become more "assimilated," but at the same time there are things that a para/quadraplegic needs to know he can't do. When the "rights" demanded by disabled individuals infringe on those of the majority, even if a sensible alternative is available, then as said before, they are not gaining rights but entitlements.
When a two-story homeless shelter cannot be built in New York because the nuns that want to run it cannot afford an elevator, you damn hundreds so that a few can have an elevator that is not even needed. When disabled individuals demand that every bus in New York be wheelchair friendly, even though the city already offers FREE point to point transportation for the disabled, and picking up a person in a wheelchair adds between 15 and 30 minutes to everyone's commute, where are the undisabled's rights?
This country was built on comprimise and that "rights" are things that cannot be taken away, not entitlements that should be given. I feel for disabled individuals, but they must also realize the position they are in and it is not the duty of others to give up their rights so that they can feel a little more "normal." The ADA completely does away with this ability to compromise, even in cases where it just makes common sense to do things differently. It forces everyone to suffer needlessly in some way or another for the plight of a few. |
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| MisterOpus1 |
| quote: | Originally posted by NeoPhono
I think that the point of his post and mine was that people need to realize their limitations.
Society can help these people to become more "assimilated," but at the same time there are things that a para/quadraplegic needs to know he can't do. When the "rights" demanded by disabled individuals infringe on those of the majority, even if a sensible alternative is available, then as said before, they are not gaining rights but entitlements.
When a two-story homeless shelter cannot be built in New York because the nuns that want to run it cannot afford it, you damn hundreds so that a few can have an elevator that is not even needed. When disabled individuals demand that every bus in New York be wheelchair friendly, even though the city already offers FREE point to point transportation for the disabled, and picking up a person in a wheelchair adds between 15 and 30 minutes to everyone's commute, where are the undisabled's rights?
This country was built on comprimise and that "rights" are things that cannot be taken away, not entitlements that should be given. I feel for disabled individuals, but they must also realize the position they are in and it is not the duty of others to give up their rights so that they can feel a little more "normal." The ADA completely does away with this ability to compromise, even in cases where it just makes common sense to do things differently. It forces everyone to suffer needlessly in some way or another for the plight of a few. |
Is that to say that you didn't like my "Disabled Survivor Island" idea?:D
Gotta run. I'll comment more on this tomorrow. |
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| Arbiter |
| quote: | Originally posted by MisterOpus1
Why stop there? If we are to follow your argument to its logical end, we should rid ourselves of all disabled individuals, since they contribute significantly less to society as a whole, right?
[...]
At the very least, we should ship them all onto a secluded island and away from the rest of our progressive civilized society.
Whoa, sorry there, not sure where the hell I went. But while I'm at it, where the hell were you going with your line of reasoning? |
That post was... different. Entertaining anyway. :)
There is a very important distinction between harming someone and refusing to help them.
I would not advocate in any way the harm or "cleansing" of disabled people, nor do I necessarily oppose providing them with aid. What I do oppose is the federal government forcing individuals or institutions to provide special accomodations for disabled people.
I have four serious objections to such a policy:
1. It oversteps the fundamental role of government
It is my belief that government has two functions:
1. To protect its members from being harmed by establishing a rule of law and justice rather than rule of force.
2. To promote the prosperity of its members to the greatest extent possible without violating the individual sovereignty of any member or members.
A policy which enforces "accessibility" standards for disabled persons, for example, does not protect its members from being harmed, but rather forces some of its members to aid other members. It does promote the prosperity of disabled persons, however it violates the individual sovereignty of those who are forced to expend additional resources in order to accomodate the disabled.
Whether or not my proposed role of government is reasonable is perhaps an issue fundamental to this one - that would be somewhat of a tangent perhaps deserving of a seperate thread.
2. Almost all classifications of "disabled" or "not disabled" are either dangerously subjective or arbitrary.
There is an extensive list of conditions which might be considered disabilities. However, I'm not sure if there is a reasonable objective standard for the classification of an individual as "disabled" and therefore deserving of special accomodation under such an act. If such a standard exists, it certainly isn't in use.
Consider:
- At what point does extreme physical weakness become a disability?
- At what point does extreme mental weakness become a disability?
- "Depression" is considered a disability. However, there are no objective criteria for its diagnosis.
If such as policy were to be put into place, issues like these would have to be resolved beforehand. They were not, nor has progress been made towards resolving these issues ex post facto. Instead, an arbitrary set of guidelines of dubious quality has been set forth. Even if such a policy was fundamentally justified, it would be imprudent to implement it in the absence of concrete, well-thought-out answers to fundamental questions and issues such as these.
3. The underlying principle can't be universalized.
Although we like to say that "all people are equal" we must be wary of equivocating the word "equal." In the sense that we all embrace the notion that we are all equal, equality is a measurement of inherent value. In no way does this mean we are all equally capable of performing each and every mental or physical operation.
Perhaps this problem is easiest to explain if I start with an example. Suppose a man in a wheelchair is unable to enter a building because there are steps leading up to the door. The underlying problem is:
cannot perform because s/he is physically unable to
Note the complex cause: another reason the cannot perform is because the building does not provide a ramp.
It should be obvious that it cannot be universalized that whenever a person cannot perform an action because s/he is physically unable to, the government should enforce special accomodations for that person by law. In some cases, this inability to perform an action can be remedied by special accomodation (i.e. by constructing a ramp). But it can't be universalized because someone with a mental handicap can't be expected to be specially admitted to Yale.
If the government wants to assist the disabled people, it should do so by attacking the fundamental problem (that they are disabled) not the circumstantial problem (that the building doesn't have a ramp) - by purusing stem cell research and such. :eek:
4. Such legislation frequently prevents good rather than promoting good
This is purely a utilitarian concern, but is a serious one. NeoPhono mentioned "The Death of Common Sense" which described several situations in which this occurred.
The underlying problem is this:
Suppose that some organization wanted to construct some facility to benefit the public. However, due to financial or logistical constraints it would not be possible to make the facility accessible to all disabled persons. Faced with the two choices:
1. Construct the facility without accomodation for the disabled and face or being shut down.
or
2. Decide not to construct the facility.
The organization makes the logical choice (don't construct the facility), and the public misses out on the benefits they would have otherwised reaped. Disabled people don't benefit either, since the nonexistence of the facilities doesn't help them in any way.
Hence, the act has prevented good to no positive end.
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These concerns are why I am opposed to legislation which requires accomodations for disabled persons. While the fundamental idea behind it is good: helping the disadvantaged and promoting equality, it appears to me that it cannot be accomplished equitably by these means.
I welcome any comments anyone would like to make - particularly about how these issues might be resolved for the mutual benefit of the disabled and the rest of society. |
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