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Peace theories
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| TranceGiant |
So after years of intellectually limited excessive and exclusive studying of law (this time-consuming uni won't let you have a glance into any other books) i participated in that philosophy class analyzing Edward Gibbon's classic "The Decline And Fall Of The Roman Empire". At the end we had to write whatever came up to our mind, concerning lessons that could be learned from the end of Rome. I thought i'd share with you, if only to ego-boost a little bit or even trigger a constructive debate.
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Jovian's Just Peace?
In the chapter describing Julian’s great defeat in the battle against Sapor’s troops Gibbon mentions the following sacrifice of five of the Tigirs provinces as one of the decisive turning points in the history of the Roman Empire.
“Since the foundation of the city, the genius of Rome, the god Terminus, who guarded the boundaries of the republic, had never retired before the sword of a victorious enemy.” (Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 463)
Jovian, portrayed as an irresolute, almost spineless and purely weak successor, signs a humiliating peace treaty in order to secure an empire at the expense of a few of its provinces. It is this act from which the new emperor never recovers and which supposedly costs him not only his reign but also his life. It is arguably this treaty and the ideology behind it which have lead to the decline and fall of the Roman Empire as a whole. Jovian trades “land for peace” – a formula used throughout history and only recently again as a possible solution in the Middle East conflict. From a historical point of view this formula seems to fail again and again. Not much time passes until Romans and Persians are battling each other again. In another historical example one should remember that the peace treaty of Versailles, regarded by the great majority of the German people as humiliating and unjust and later exploited as such by the National Socialists, served as a great source for a general feeling of “revenge” or at least the less severe desire for a historical correction. The lack of satisfaction on the other hand is often responded by the growing avidity on the other, the victorious side: Concessions are regarded as a sign of weakness motivating yet another try of gaining land and further weakening the enemy.
The aforementioned conclusions lead to the question whether a “just peace” is achievable at all and if yes, under which circumstances. It also raises the question if one-sided concessions can ever be a successful key to long-lasting peace.
1. Peace and Truce
Peace in the sense of a long-lasting state of non violent coexistence, mutual respect and cooperation goes beyond the negative definition of mere “absence of war”. The latter is better considered a simple truce which is mostly a temporary break from a still existing conflict. The reasons are pragmatic or strategic but can hardly serve as a basis for real peace since at least one party regards the problem as unsettled. A solution is not found, it is postponed.
Peace on the other hand requires the combined efforts for a final resolving. Both parties have to aim for a settlement that makes a new beginning possible. No points should be left aside, nothing should be “stepped over”. It is made out of the genuine conviction that there is no alternative. True peace is based on ideology rather than pragmatism or Realpolitik.
The difference between peace and truce is no other than the difference between juridical composition and the temporary resting of the case. Both seem to end a conflict but only the composition aims for ultimate closure. As long as problematic issues are hanging in the air at least one of the parties will remain unsatisfied. It will only be a matter of time until the volcano of conflict will erupt again.
Peace must therefore be made with the aim of final settlement. Conflicts need to be left behind not only on the written paper but also in the minds of the signing parties. Convincing the own people that once peace is made, there is no looking back, is therefore one of the main challenges leaders on both sides have to face following the formal procedure of shake hands and signatures.
2. Peace as an act of self-determination
For a peace treaty to be successful it is also vital that neither of the parties feels as if was forced upon them. Being eventually nothing more than a regular contract between two parties, it is obvious that the juridical theories of private autonomy are just as applicable and make just as much sense as in the cases of a simple sale contract. Contracts are the manifestation of one’s individual will and as such require physical and mental independence as well as the lack of any other influences on the freedom of choice.
This criteria turns out to be perhaps the most problematic one when “peace” is the subject of a contract. By definition peace requires its contrary as a predecessor. Whether it is a so called low intensity conflict or an ongoing full-scale war makes little difference. It is always this uncomfortable position from which both parties need to approach each other. Since it is mostly in nobody’s interest to keep the state of war forever, the element of autonomy is highly questionable. In general peace is made out of a necessity.
Considering the aforementioned consequences of dissatisfaction and especially the psychologically dangerous feeling of humiliation it is necessary to think of scenarios in which neither party considers peace as an external act – but as an act of true self-determination. Although rarely the case this feeling has to be conveyed to the people and if only by political tricks. The emotions of inferiority and weakness need to be replaced by self-confidence while keeping mutual respect.
It is thus of great importance that the peace treaty is formulated in accordance with the idea of voluntariness and regulations that evoke feelings of subjection need to be avoided.
Those requirements, however, can hardly be met since most peace agreements suppose the end of a conflict with one victorious and one
losing side.
3. Equality as the ideal basis for “just” peace
From the necessity of peace which respects both sides’ interests and maintains their free will one can draw the conclusion that the ideal peace is signed by equal parties.
Of course this equality mainly refers to the specific historical relation between the two and not so much, but nonetheless important, their specific military, economic and political qualities and strength. Wealthy nations are less likely to be drawn into armed conflicts as documented by various statistics and works on the subject. The “Marshall Plan” that helped rebuilding Europe after the horrors of the Second World War was one of the keys for the success of the post-WWII peace. It serves as a great example of a wise decision to make peace and urge equality instead of exploiting an imbalance and destructively celebrating victory.
For a peace to be considered “just” by both parties the lack of equality which probably led to the victorious outcome for one party on the battlefield needs to be compensated by a fair diplomatic process on the negotiating table. It is also in the victor’s best interest to establish equality if he wants the agreement to be long-lasting.
The undoubted strength and virtue required in order to detach from the specific outcome of the settled conflict and disregard of the divergency of power between both sides is arguably one of the key qualities leaders of the victorious side need to posses.
Exploitation of a military conflict can never be the quintessence of just, successful peace. It might lead to a one-sided short term satisfaction but on the long run it also endangers the victorious side.
Equality and free will are inherently linked. Both criteria have to be met so that the contract can be regarded a fair and just deal. The ideal and constructive peace contract incorporates the concerns of two parties facing each other on the same level, truly believing and feeling that their signing expresses their own wishes.
4. One-sided concessions as reasonable tools for peace?
Having concluded that, one must analyze to what extent the act of unilateral concessions is compatible with the postulated criteria. It is necessary to distinguish between concessions as part of a bilateral peace treaty, unilateral concessions out of weakness and those out of alleged strength.
It should be clear that concessions within a formal agreement, even when performed by one side only, are far more acceptable than the abandonment on positions and territory during the course of an ongoing conflict. The difference is, as most other ingredients for peace, primarily psychological. While concessions are often necessary keys for resolving conflicts by mutual agreements, the handover at the time of war is likely to be interpreted as weakness by the opposing party, while being vehemently condemned as unjustified by the people of the surrendering party. Peace agreements furthermore suppose the confession of errors on both sides and can therefore more easily compensate for the loss of one’s position. As long as the general notion of equality and self-determination as well as the goal of ultimate settlement are respected, the danger of destructive interpretations of unequal concessions is reduced to a minimum. It is also then, for instance, that the sensitive formula of “land for peace” might succeed.
Without a doubt unilateral concessions outside of a peace context and out of the pure necessity to survive are doomed. Sacrificing a little part so that a greater one can be saved is an ideology that seems reasonable for peace but dangerous during war. It would contradict the logic of war if this step could be considered as anything else but pure demonstration of impotence and weakness.
The second possibility of unilateral surrendering, the concessions out of “strength”, is a more complicated issue. Although technically superior, one party abandons a position in order to further strengthen its power by focussing on the main issues.
Another reason would be a gesture of good will in order to pave the way to a future peace and establish mutual trust. It raises the questions under which circumstances such steps could be regarded as what they are meant to be instead of what the opposing party wishes them to be.
Benevolence, generosity and cooperativeness are certainly helpful bridges between partners but it remains doubtful if they can serve as appreciated and respected measures between de facto enemies. It is especially problematic if such rewards are granted under no condition whatsoever. Factual concessions out of trust building efforts have thus to be responded with at least unspoken gestures of acceptance and equal benevolence.
While such concessions can surely open doors for final peace negotiations a certain risk can never be excluded.
5. Jovian’s sacrifice of the Tigirs provinces
Having experienced a great defeat against Sapor’s troops in Persia it is argued that the concessions done by the new emperor where just as humiliating as they were necessary. Gibbon expresses criticism, however, by emphasizing that the turnover marked a turn point in the Roman history. One has to wonder if Jovian had any realistic alternative at all of if the same procedure could have been done in a different fashion. The surrendering of the five provinces definitely destroyed the myth of an invincible army and an empire that would never give in when facing pressure. It was easily considered a true demonstration of weakness and further motivated the surrounding enemies of the Roman empire. The tendency of capitulation towards threats is later continued when the Armenian king is sacrificed following Persian discontent about the growing relationship between him and Rome.
The tough question whether concessions facing imminent threats are reasonable is the main dilemma when the right response to terrorism is discussed.
Considering the thoughts developed beforehand it is pretty clear that while an immediate crisis might be successfully ended, the underlying greater conflict only is at best postponed, at worst escalated.
Jovian abandoned a smaller part of the empire and did so in a formal peace agreement. However the contract could not be seen as self-determination act on an equal basis or a final settlement, but was substantially a truce in which the victor shamelessly exploited the defeated party. Not only was the peace making process performed in a harmful way, it could not even be considered a peace treaty by its very content. Jovian further harmed the Roman image by explicitly instructing the inhabitants of the surrendered provinces to avoid any attempts of bravely defending them.
6. Resume
Concluding it can be said that one and the same factual act, such as the surrendering of five provinces, can be both a productive step towards final peace or, on the other hand, a fatal decision that can lead to one’s downfall - depending on the context and the specific way such political measures are undertaken.
Out of all possible alternatives leaders must chose the ones that cause minimal harm to the people’s psyche. The feeling of humiliation is the nail on the coffin of each peace treaty. This might require the courage to resist immediate threats and be ready to risk smaller damage in order to be victorious on the long run. It could also require diplomatic skills and a trustworthy, wise partner for peace. As mentioned above the skill of “selling” a treaty to one’s people in a way that gives each party the feeling of having maintained one’s dignity and independence while keeping mutual respect is the key for solid, just peace. Lastly true peace requires belief.
It is not always the most comfortable solution since it can never be based solely – as opposed to truce - on pragmatism. But once both parties are convinced of its ideological importance there is no reason on earth why such a strong bond should ever break up again.
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| Fir3start3r |
An interesting parallel is in the game, "Civilization IV", when you are offering a truce, the game only allows the instigator of the truce to give concessions...(maybe they were wrong?)
Just some quick editing for you...changes and suggestions are in RED
| quote: |
Jovian's Just Peace?
In the chapter describing Julian’s great defeat in the battle against Sapor’s troops, Gibbon mentions the following sacrifice of five of the Tigirs provinces as one of the decisive turning points in the history of the Roman Empire.
“Since the foundation of the city, the genius of Rome, the god Terminus, who guarded the boundaries of the republic, had never retired before the sword of a victorious enemy.” (Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 463)
Jovian, portrayed as an irresolute, almost spineless and purely weak successor, signs a humiliating peace treaty in order to secure an empire at the expense of a few of its provinces. It is this act from which the new emperor never recovers and which <--don't need this word supposedly costs him not only his reign, but also his life. It is arguably this treaty and the ideology behind it which have lead to the decline and fall of the Roman Empire as a whole. Jovian trades “land for peace” – a formula used throughout history and only recently again as a possible solution in the Middle East conflict. From a historical point of view this formula seems to fail again and again. Not much time passes until Romans and Persians are battling each other again. In another historical example one should remember that the peace treaty of Versailles, regarded by the great majority of the German people as humiliating and unjust and later exploited as such by the National Socialists, served as a great source for a general feeling of “revenge” or at least the less severe desire for a historical correction. The lack of satisfaction on the other hand is often responded by the growing avidity on the other, the victorious side: Concessions are regarded as a sign of weakness, motivating yet another try of gaining land and further weakening the enemy.
The aforementioned conclusions lead to the question whether a “just peace” is achievable at all and if yes, under which circumstances. It also raises the question if one-sided concessions can ever be a successful key to long-lasting peace.
1. Peace and Truce
Peace, in the sense of a long-lasting state of non violent coexistence, mutual respect and cooperation, goes beyond the negative definition of mere “absence of war”. The latter is better considered a simple truce which is mostly a temporary break from a still existing conflict. The reasons are pragmatic or strategic but can hardly serve as a basis for real peace since at least one party regards the problem as unsettled. A solution is not found, it is postponed.
Peace on the other hand, requires the combined efforts for a final resolving. Both parties have to aim for a settlement that makes a new beginning possible. No points should be left aside, nothing should be “stepped over”. It is made out of the genuine conviction that there is no alternative. True peace is based on ideology rather than pragmatism or Realpolitik.
The difference between peace and truce is no other none other? than the difference between juridical composition and the temporary resting of the case. Both seem to end a conflict but only the composition aims for ultimate closure. As long as problematic issues are hanging in the air at least one of the parties will remain unsatisfied. It will only be a matter of time until the volcano of conflict will erupt again.
Peace must therefore be made with the aim of final settlement. Conflicts need to be left behind not only on the written paper but also in the minds of the signing parties. Convincing the own people that once peace is made, there is no looking back, is therefore one of the main challenges leaders on both sides have to face following the formal procedure of shake shaking hands and writing signatures. note: otherwise it sounds like they're shaking signatures as well :p
2. Peace as an act of self-determination
For a peace treaty to be successful, it is also vital that neither of the parties feels as if it was forced upon them. Being eventually nothing more than a regular contract between two parties, it is obvious that the juridical theories of private autonomy are just as applicable and make just as much sense as in the cases of a simple sale contract. Contracts are the manifestation of one’s individual will and as such, require physical and mental independence as well as the lack of any other influences on the freedom of choice.
This criteria turns out to be perhaps the most problematic one when “peace” is the subject of a contract. By definition, peace requires its contrary as a predecessor. Whether it is a so called low intensity conflict or an ongoing full-scale war makes little difference. It is always this uncomfortable position from which both parties need to approach each other. Since it is mostly<-- do you need this word? in nobody’s interest to keep the state of war forever, the element of autonomy is highly questionable. In general, peace is made out of a necessity.
Considering the aforementioned consequences of dissatisfaction and especially the psychologically dangerous feeling of humiliation it is necessary to think of scenarios in which neither party considers peace as an external act – but as an act of true self-determination. Although rarely the case, this feeling has to be conveyed to the people and if only by political tricks. The emotions of inferiority and weakness need to be replaced by self-confidence while keeping mutual respect.
It is thus of great importance that the peace treaty is formulated in accordance with the idea of voluntariness and regulations that evoke feelings of subjection need to be avoided.You may want to reword this sentence; lost me
Those requirements, however, can hardly be met since most peace agreements suppose the end of a conflict with one victorious and one
losing side.
3. Equality as the ideal basis for “just” peace
From the necessity of peace, which respects both sides’ interests and maintains their free will, one can draw the conclusion that the ideal peace is signed by equal parties.
Of course this equality mainly refers to the specific historical relation between the two and not so much, but nonetheless important, their specific military, economic and <--I'd replace 'and' with a comma political qualities and strength. Wealthy nations are less likely to be drawn into armed conflicts as documented by various statistics and works on the subject. The “Marshall Plan” that helped rebuilding rebuild Europe after the horrors of the Second World War, was one of the keys for the success of the post-WWII peace. It serves as a great example of a wise decision to make peace and urge equality instead of exploiting an imbalance and destructively celebrating victory.destructively celebrating victory?
For a peace to be considered “just” by both parties, the lack of equality which probably<-- can probably leave this word out; it'll give more strength to your arguement led to the victorious outcome for one party on the battlefield needs to be compensated by a fair diplomatic process on the negotiating table. It is also in the victor’s best interest to establish equality if he wants the agreement to be long-lasting.
The undoubted strength and virtue required in order to detach from the specific outcome of the settled conflict and disregard of the divergency of power between both sides is arguably one of the key qualities leaders of the victorious side need to posses.
Exploitation of a military conflict can never be the quintessence of just, successful peace. It might lead to a one-sided short term satisfaction but on the long run it also endangers the victorious side.
Equality and free will are inherently linked. Both criteria have to be met so that the contract can be regarded a fair and just deal. The ideal and constructive peace contract incorporates the concerns of two parties facing each other on the same level, truly believing and feeling that their signing expresses their own wishes.
4. One-sided concessions as reasonable tools for peace?
Having concluded that,concluded what? We're starting a new point (4.) by making a reference in the first sentence? I'd replace 'that' with which you refer. Pretend points 1-3 didn't exist and then read it. one must analyze to what extent the act of unilateral concessions is compatible with the postulated criteria. It is necessary to distinguish between concessions as part of a bilateral peace treaty, unilateral concessions out of weakness and those out of alleged strength.
It should be clear that concessions within a formal agreement, even when performed by one side only, are far more acceptable than the abandonment on positions and territory during the course of an ongoing conflict. The difference is, as most other ingredients for peace, primarily psychological. While concessions are often necessary keys for resolving conflicts by mutual agreements, the handover at the time of war is likely to be interpreted as weakness by the opposing party, while being vehemently condemned as unjustified by the people of the surrendering party. Peace agreements furthermore suppose the confession of errors on both sides and can therefore more easily compensate for the loss of one’s position. As long as the general notion of equality and self-determination as well as the goal of ultimate settlement are respected, the danger of destructive interpretations of unequal concessions is reduced to a minimum. It is also then, for instance, that the sensitive formula of “land for peace” might succeed.
Without a doubt unilateral concessions outside of a peace context and out of the pure necessity to survive are doomed. Sacrificing a little part so that a greater one can be saved is an ideology that seems reasonable for peace but dangerous during war. It would contradict the logic of war if this step could be considered as anything else but a pure demonstration of impotence and weakness.
The second possibility of unilateral surrendering, the concessions out of “strength”, is a more complicated issue. Although technically superior, one party abandons a position in order to further strengthen its power by focussing on the main issues. I'd cite an example here as to why is't so complicated and why it's superior, otherwise this is left hanging as an opinion.
Another reason would be a gesture of good will in order to pave the way to a future peace and establish mutual trust. It raises the questions under which circumstances such steps could be regarded as what they are meant to be instead of what the opposing party wishes them to be.Again, I'd cite an example
Benevolence, generosity and cooperativeness are certainly helpful bridges between partners but it remains doubtful if they can serve as appreciated and respected measures between de facto enemies. It is especially problematic if such rewards are granted under no condition conditions whatsoever <--Careful with these 'filler' words; they can be deemed unnecessary. Factual concessions out of trust and building efforts have thus to be responded with at least unspoken gestures of acceptance and equal benevolence.
While such concessions can surely open doors for final peace negotiations, a certain risk can never be excluded.
5. Jovian’s sacrifice of the Tigirs provinces
Having experienced a great defeat against Sapor’s troops in Persia, it is argued that the concessions done by the new emperor where just as humiliating as they were necessary. Gibbon expresses criticism, however, by emphasizing that, the turnover marked a turn turning point in the Roman history. history of Rome. One has to wonder if Jovian had any realistic alternative at all of if the same procedure could have been done in a different fashion. The surrendering of the five provinces definitely destroyed the myth of an invincible army and an empire that would never give in when facing pressure. It was easily considered a true demonstration of weakness and further motivated the surrounding enemies of the Roman empire. The tendency of capitulation towards toward threats is later continued when the Armenian king is sacrificed following Persian discontent about the growing relationship between him and Rome.
The tough question of whether concessions facing imminent threats are reasonable, is the main dilemma when the right response to terrorism is discussed.
Considering the thoughts developed beforehand, it is pretty clear that while an immediate crisis might be successfully ended, the underlying greater conflict only is at best postponed,; at worst, escalated.
Jovian abandoned a smaller part of the empire and did so in a formal peace agreement. However, the contract could not be seen as a self-determination act on an equal basis or a final settlement, but was substantially a truce in which the victor shamelessly exploited the defeated party. Not only was the peace making process performed in a harmful way, it could not even be considered a peace treaty by its very content. Jovian further harmed the Roman image by explicitly instructing the inhabitants of the surrendered provinces to avoid any attempts of bravely defending them.
6. Resume
Concluding, it can be said that one and the same factual act, such as the surrendering of five provinces, can be both a productive step towards final peace or, on the other hand, a fatal decision that can lead to one’s downfall - depending on the context and the specific way such political measures are undertaken.
Out of all possible alternatives, leaders must chose choose the ones that cause minimal harm to the people’s psyche. The feeling of humiliation is the nail on in the coffin of each peace treaty. This might require the courage to resist immediate threats and be ready to risk smaller damage in order to be victorious on in the long run. It could also require take a harder stance in your arguements, remember you're trying to win the approval of your reader. Words and phrases like, "Could, possibily, on the other hand, etc" only give the reader a backdoor in your argumentative persuasion. ;) Instead of, "It could require", I'd replace with, "It requires" diplomatic skills and a trustworthy, wise partner for peace. As mentioned above, the skill of “selling” a treaty to one’s people in a way that gives each party the feeling of having maintained one’s dignity and independence while keeping mutual respect is the key for a solid, just peace. Lastly, true peace requires belief.
It is not always the most comfortable solution since it can never be based solely – as opposed to truce - on pragmatism. But once both parties are convinced of its ideological importance there is no reason on earth why such a strong bond should ever break up again.
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Interesting essay and I agree with the overall premise, however you wouldn't convince me if I had thought otherwise before reading it.
As I mentioned before, be persuasive and stay away from wishy-washy words and phrases.
It's not a sin to take a stance in an essay.
Don't forget commas! They're not a sin either. You'll probably see quite a few dotted in here and there.
If you're unsure where to use a comma, read the sentence out loud.
Naturally, if a breath needs to be taken, then a comma should be inserted.
I hope I helped yea out a bit! Good luck. :D |
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