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Principle of Alternative Possibilities...For the Philosophy/Morality dorks among us.
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| D-res |
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities states that one is morally responsible for their actions *only if* they could do otherwise. For example, it would state you're not morally responsible for, say, kicking a puppy if someone holds a gun to your head and says "kick that in' puppy!" because, at least logically, you have no other choice but to kick said puppy. The principle is associated with the proposition that coercion excuses moral responsibility in that when one is coerced to do something, their freedom to act otherwise is taken away, which I can't say I necessarily agree with. ANYway...
Harry Frankfurt speaks in his essay "Alternate Possibilities & Moral Responsibility" on this idea. Throughout, he shows how he feels the principle is ultimately false, but I'm not going to get into that; At least not right now...
In the beginning of his essay he brings up 4 different Jones'. Think of each Jones as a different individual with completely different personalities, wills, world-views etc.
-> Jones1 is a strong-willed individual and can make up his own mind. Someone come along and threatens him with some consequence unless he does precisely what the issuer of the threat says. In this case however Jones1 has already decided on his own to do the same action that the issuer of the threat asks him to do before being threatened, thus rendering the threat meaningless. It has no effect whatsoever on what Jones1 decides to do.
-> Jones2 is a very weak-willed individual. He gives into the slightest bit of pressure regardless of how he decides beforehand. Someone comes along and threatens him with something he finds unacceptable and he gives into the threat.
-> Jones3 is neither scared by the threat nor indifferent to it. He is "impressed" by it so that if he had not already made his mind up to do some action that coincided with the threat, the threat would coerce him to act in that way. It wasn't the threat that made him act a certain way, although he would have acted that way had he not already provided himself enough reason to do so. (Lets assume for the sake of discussion you can tell that he's acting from his own decision-making as it would be hard to distinguish in reality what the actual motivating factor is).
-> Jones4 knows a person called Black. Black has an agenda which includes an act he wants Jones4 to perform. Black will go to any length to ensure that Jones4 follows through with what Black wants but Black will only intervene if Jones4 decides to act in a way opposed to Black's wishes. Jones decides on his own to perform the action that Black wants without any notion of a threat from Black, if Jones4 is so inclined to act otherwise.
yay! visual aid:
X = Applies, O = Does not apply
My point of discussion is obviously to agree or disagree with anything posted or if you can think of any cases where, perhaps one is causally efficacious and morally responsible but has no other possibilities or where one is causally efficacious and there are alternate possibilities but one isn't morally responsible.
Discuss plz. |
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| Lira |
| Can you give us a link to his essay? I just found this e-print, but it's not purchasable :( |
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| D-res |
| quote: | Originally posted by Lira
Can you give us a link to his essay? I just found this e-print, but it's not purchasable :( |
I feel bad, what with it being copyrighted and all...
[[ LINK REMOVED ]]
:p |
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| Moral Hazard |
| I think the argument is flawed in that it presupposes that once a threat is made the threatened individual no longer has a choice. This is incorrect, the threatened person has a choice; they can choose to commit the immoral act or they can choose to risk having the threat executed. The moral choice would be to abstain from the immoral action and risk the execution of the threat. I find it funny that people are rarely willing to accept that some times maintaining one's moral or otherwise personal convictions has consequences and often involves sacrafice. |
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