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Are We Doing Enough For Africa?
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| Lebezniatnikov |
This thread should be open up to the West in general, but in light of President Bush's recent multi-state trip to the continent, there has been a lot of debate about the role that the United States plays in Africa and the degree of success that we have achieved there. Common sentiments seem to be that through initiatives like PEPFAR and working more closely with democratically-elected governments in Liberia and Nigeria we are effecting some good in terms of stability and development... however... a lot of experts disagree.
I have a lot of thoughts in a lot of different directions, so for now I'll offer three disparate view points and see where people want to take the conversation.
From the International Crisis Group:
| quote: | "Bush in Africa: A Continent Adrift",
Donald Steinberg in YaleGlobal Online
18 February 2008
YaleGlobal Online
Internal weakness exacerbated by mistaken international approach has destabilized Africa
The long-awaited Africa visit by President Bush may disappoint many, as the president steers clear of the continent’s problem areas. But this should not come as a surprise. The modernizing African nations that Washington once counted on as “regional anchors” to serve as engines of growth and sources of stability have themselves emerged as destabilizers.
In 1995 as the president’s special assistant for Africa, I argued that the two dominant prisms through which the US had long viewed the continent – Cold War competition for client states and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa – had been shattered, and we could adopt a clearer vision for the continent. I suggested Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Kenya as anchors for the promotion of democracy, good governance, poverty reduction, military demobilization, debt relief and improvements in health, education and other social indicators.
With large populations, vibrant economies, democratizing regimes, and internal stability, these countries could serve as entrepots, sources of energy and transport infrastructures, channels of trade and investment, sources of negotiators and peacekeeping forces, models of proper behavior, and havens for refugees.
In light of recent developments, it’s no surprise that the crisis-averse president is not visiting any of these countries.
? In Nigeria, the promise of civilian rule after General Sani Abacha’s death has given way to instability caused by another flawed election, unrest and inequality in the oil-rich Delta region, rampant corruption and a lingering legacy of ethnic division.
? The hopeful outlook for Côte d’Ivoire after Félix Houphouët-Boigny yielded to growing north/south and ethnic tensions, erupting into civil war that required international mediation and thousands of foreign peacekeepers.
? Zimbabwe’s successful transition from Ian Smith’s racist regime is a distant memory as the current regime has essentially declared war against its own population, spreading millions of refugees throughout Southern Africa.
? Ethiopia and its brothers in Eritrea, having thrown off the yoke of Mengistu Haile Mariam, turned on one another in a senseless and brutal boundary war and engaging in destabilizing proxy wars throughout the Horn of Africa, engulfing most notably Somalia in its fire.
? And now Kenya, seemingly the most stable of the regional anchors, is engulfed in a post-electoral dispute that has unleashed latent ethnic, class and regional divides.
Havens of regional stability have themselves become destabilizers. While internal factors largely caused these misfortunes, the international community, including the US, deserves blame as well.
A serious miscalculation has been to focus on African leaders as supposed agents of change rather than promoting political and economic reform. While outwardly rejecting the “Big Men” era in Africa, the US in particular stood behind leaders we believed were the forbearers of an African Renaissance. The period of infatuation differs from country to country, but applies to past visions of Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Bédié in Côte d’Ivoire, Meles in Ethiopia, Obasanjo in Nigeria and Kibaki in Kenya. We persuaded ourselves that they were reformers whose interest in democracy, transparency, social transformation and equality mirrored our own.
Subsequently, President Bush made the “war on terror” our dominant foreign policy theme after September 11, 2001, which harmed American engagement in Africa in two ways:
First, it diverted attention, financial resources and military engagement from the continent and toward other priorities, especially the war in Iraq. While paying welcome attention to fighting HIV/AIDS and expanding trade with Africa, the Bush administration responded tepidly or not at all to the evisceration of democracy, good governance and social services in these anchors.
Second, Bush generally supported existing leaders who were smart enough to proclaim themselves “allies” in the fight against Al Qaeda and other terrorists – similar to the professions of anti-Communism that emanated from cynical African leaders during the Cold War – often through military aid that strengthened repressive regimes. The US has supported so-called anti-terrorist campaigns, such as the ill-advised Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006-2007, no matter the consequences for regional stability, refugee flows and humanitarian impact.
These considerations weigh heavily in Kenya, where American support for President Mwai Kibaki blinded the US to impending tragedy. The announcement last December that Kibaki won the presidential elections plunged the country into unprecedented political, security and humanitarian crisis. Six weeks later, protest riots, repression by security forces and revenge killings have caused more than 1000 deaths and displaced 300,000 or more people. Beyond the loss of life, Kenya’s economy had lost about $1.5 billion by early February. The country remains tense and volatile.
The violence shattered Kenya’s reputation as a haven of stability. Images of Kisumu city center burned to the ground, Nairobi and Mombasa slums on fire, and a church with 30 people inside torched by vigilantes in the Rift Valley illustrated the fragility of the national fabric. Beneath the surface of Kibaki’s pro-Western, anti-terrorist rhetoric is the reality of a country with a gaping disparity between the rich and the poor, where land distribution is lopsided, where politics have been turned ethnic, and where the wounds created by Daniel Arap Moi’s divide-and-rule policies during the 1990s remain open. Although calm has partially returned, this political battle could easily spiral into renewed large-scale violence, which already took a dangerous ethnic turn. Reports of militia mobilizing and arming on both sides have been confirmed.
Kenya long accepted refugees from neighboring conflicts in Somalia and Ethiopia; provided transport links for Uganda, Rwanda, eastern Congo and southern Sudan; hosted regional peace talks; and served as a conduit for investment throughout the Horn of Africa. Now it cannot now perform these tasks. In effect, the doctor has become the patient.
Immediate goals for the mediation team led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan are to end the violence, address the humanitarian crisis, resettle displaced persons, and resolve the electoral crisis. But stopping there would represent another attempt at a quick-fix solution that would repeat the mistakes of the past in the regional anchors.
A legitimately elected government should remain the goal, along with fundamental institutional and economic reforms and an internationally monitored transitional justice and disarmament process to help heal the wounds of two decades of inter-ethnic violence and prevent its resumption.
The international mediation should pursue a settlement that includes, among others steps, the launching of an internationally supported review of electoral procedures to ensure that fraud does not recur and that the Kenyan judiciary can adjudicate disputes; a transition period to restore democratic governance, including a power-sharing deal among parties and constitutional reform; an agreement on transition policies with respect to economic reforms, resettlement of the displaced and settlement of land grievances; establishment of an independent commission to address ethnic violence, ensure accountability for crimes committed in the post-election violence, and guarantee security for all ethnic groups; and establishment of a process to disarm and dismantle party-supported militias.
These steps to create responsive and transparent government, address tragic social inequalities, and mend class, ethnic and regional divisions are essentially the same measures required in the other so-called African anchors. Clear-minded international attention to these challenges – supported by appropriate incentives, sanctions and support – can ensure that these regional anchors not only secure themselves, but buoy the efforts to revitalize Africa.
Donald Steinberg is deputy president for policy at International Crisis Group. He previously served as President Clinton’s special assistant for African Affairs and American ambassador to Angola.
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu |
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5303&l=1
From the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS):
| quote: | President Bush’s Africa Trip
Stephen Morrison
February 19, 2008
President Bush’s five-country Africa tour reminds us that presidential travel to Africa has become a new norm, following President Clinton’s visits (in 1998 and 2000) and President Bush’s 2003 trip. It brings to our attention just how much U.S. engagement in Africa has expanded over the past seven-plus years and asks us to ponder what has been gained, what leverage does the United States truly possess, and what more can and should be done to strengthen the U.S. approach to Africa.
When President Bush entered office in 2001, there were low expectations that Africa would merit much if any attention. This month’s tour, near the end of President Bush’s tenure in the White House, highlights four signature policy initiatives that have had significant impact in Africa, changed the pattern of U.S. foreign assistance delivered to the continent, and generally enjoyed broad bipartisan support among Americans. The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) will have expended over $18.8 billion by the end of September, at the close of its first five year phase, will have put close to 2 million persons on life-sustaining therapies. Some 65 to 70 percent of resources and persons reached are in Africa. The President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), a three-year $1.2 billion program centered in Africa, has brought dramatic gains in several focal countries; in 1997, U.S. malaria programs in Africa were $1 million per year. This year it will be $338 million. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an experiment in forging five year compacts with reasonably well-governed states, the majority in Africa, has substantial programs in 11 Africa countries, accounting for 65
percent of the over $5.5 billion committed worldwide. Liberia, the fourth priority focus of the president’s trip, involved U.S. military support to a regional intervention in 2003, followed by support to a UN peace operation, an electoral transition, and ongoing efforts at postwar reconstruction, including U.S.-led reform of the security sector.
What brought about this surprising shift? A multitude of factors: 9/11 fundamentally changed the U.S. foreign policy view of poverty, weak or failing states, and the threat of unchecked global infectious diseases. These were no longer strictly humanitarian considerations, but rather factors integral to global security. America’s religious conservatives rallied increasingly on humanitarian grounds for a more expansive U.S. approach to Africa, joined by new celebrity advocates
such as Bono and new powerful foundations like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. U.S. hard interests—energy security, counterterror, competition with China—rose steadily and became more visible. At home, Africa occupied an unusual space politically, generally free of partisan rancor. A bipartisan consensus on doing more in Africa, strengthened during the Clinton era, endured into the Bush years, even as polarization worsened on multiple other fronts, borne of Iraq,
Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo.
Has this shift brought major rewards, in terms of support within Africa for the Bush administration and American interests? The results are fluid and mixed. President Bush does not have the same star power that President Clinton enjoyed in Africa. Many Africans have taken
offense at Bush administration policies in such areas as Iraq, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto treaty on climate change. Many openly question U.S. counterterrorism actions in Somalia, actively oppose placing a U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) presence on the continent, and have already begun to look past President Bush to the next administration. More positively, Africa’s opinion climate vis-à-vis the United States, as documented by the Pew Global Attitudes survey and other instruments, has held better that other regions, where opinion of the United States has deteriorated precipitously. Liberians, historically linked to the United States, have been enthusiastic toward President Bush, and we can expect during his visit to Monrovia public outpourings of support, though not likely on the scale of the half-million Ghanaians who gathered for President Clinton in 1998. And many African leaders still look to the United States to apply leadership in resolving conflicts in Africa, in Kenya and Sudan in particular.
President Bush was wise to dispatch Secretary Rice to Kenya on February 18 in support of former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan’s mediation efforts. He was wise also to highlight in his pre-trip Smithsonian speech the continued importance of attending to Sudan’s ongoing Darfur crisis, and earlier in the year to appoint Ambassador Richard Williamson as the new U.S. special envoy to Sudan.
But in Kenya and Sudan alike, the United States has significant untapped leverage. Additional sustained high-level engagement by the United States is essential if there is to be progress in each of these countries It is the United States, not the Chinese or the French or the British, who have the special status and power to press Khartoum and the government of Southern Sudan to move forward the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Accord of 2005 and avoid an utter breakdown: to
hold a census, pass a new electoral law, complete troop withdrawal agreements, and settle outstanding administration and security issues in the special Abyei zone. It is the United States more than other powers that is best positioned to see the steady deployment of the 26,000 strong AU/UN force into Darfur. For the United States to be effective in this regard, Ambassador Williamson has to be empowered to bargain: to bring to the table in discussions with Khartoum real carrots and real sticks, free of undue interference from campaigners and advocates with a narrow, single issue focus on punishing
Khartoum.
Kofi Annan’s mediation efforts are essential to a solution in Kenya—the parties cannot resolve this crisis on their own— and require an intensive, sustained effort over several months, followed by strong oversight and monitoring. Secretary Rice’s intervention is important in raising pressure for interim governing arrangements, a change of rhetoric, an audit of the December elections, and constitutional reforms. That visit now needs to be matched by the appointment of a
prominent American figure to work alongside Annan on a close, regular basis.
Stephen Morrison is director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in these publications should be understood to be solely those of the authors. |
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs...africa_trip.pdf
From The New Republic:
| quote: | The New Republic
Heart of Darkness by Joshua Kurlantzick
President Bush has been celebrated for his Africa policies by conservatives and liberals alike. Is that some kind of cruel joke?
Post Date Monday, February 25, 2008
With the nation's press corps consumed by the election and the economy shuddering, President Bush head to Africa this week. It was his latest in a series of efforts to claim some positive legacy for his presidency. On his five-nation trip, Bush mostly avoided Iraq, terrorism, and his other normal themes. Instead, he visited supposed success stories like Rwanda and Ghana and touted his administration's generous commitment to aiding these nations as loudly as he could. "I'm here to really confirm to the people of Benin and the people on the continent of Africa that the United States is committed to helping improve people's lives,'' Bush declared on his first stop. To showcase compassion in action, and highlight his administration's focus on HIV, Bush visited a hospital in Tanzania for a photo opportunity and then declared that his aid programs were "God's work."
On the ground, however, Bush's Africa record hardly looks divine, which might come as a shock to those, including Democrats, who feel as if Africa has been one of the few successes of the Bush presidency. In a column entitled "Bush, A Friend of Africa," New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof wrote, "Mr. Bush has done much more for Africa than Bill Clinton ever did," citing Bush's new African aid programs. And there's no question that Bill Clinton's Africa legacy is weak. He intervened disastrously in Somalia and then did not intervene, also disastrously, during the genocide in Rwanda. But Clinton at least generally tried to promote democratic reform in Africa, building links to emerging democrats like South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, helping promote democratic change in strife-torn nations like Mozambique, and making good governance and political reform centerpieces of his Africa policy.
Consumed by the war on terror, Bush has taken a far different approach. Rather than supporting democratic institutions and criticizing a new generation of African authoritarians, the Bush administration has backed whatever African leader claims to be battling militant Islam. For example, the White House has developed a close relationship with Ethiopia's thuggish leader Meles Zenawi, supposedly an ally in the war on terror and a partner in battling militancy in neighboring Somalia. The administration has provided military aid to Ethiopia with virtually no conditions on the assistance. It has also offered advisers to support Ethiopia's invasion of neighboring Somalia, an invasion which only led to more chaos in that benighted nation. Meanwhile, in recent years Zenawi's government has overseen a massive crackdown on opposition activists and a brutal offensive in the country's Ogaden region; in 2005, after disputed elections, the Ethiopian government arrested over 30,000 of its own people.
As in Ethiopia, so too across the continent. In building a string of counterterrorism allies, the White House has strengthened its links with some of Africa's most brutal regimes, from Algeria to Chad.
At the same time, desperate to wean America off Middle Eastern oil, the administration has courted West African nations with substantial offshore deposits. A worthy goal, but only up to a point. The White House's welcome for Equatorial Guinea tyrant Teodoro Obiang, for one, casts shame on Bush's vow to spread a "freedom agenda" around the world. Though Obiang ranks among Parade magazine's list of the world's worst dictators-- he allegedly oversees prisons that are torture factories and has been accused (rather outlandishly) of eating his rivals--in 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice publicly hosted him at Foggy Bottom, saying, "You are a good friend."
Even on aid to Africa, Bush's claims do not stand up to scrutiny. The president has made foreign aid a priority of his administration, nearly tripling the overall budget for foreign assistance from where it stood in 2000. And many in his administration, like former speechwriter Michael Gerson, as well as aid advocates in Congress, like Kansas Senator Sam Brownback, have increased conservatives' interest in Africa. But the administration has spent much of the aid money on unilaterally created programs that neither learn from existing efforts nor respond effectively to Africans' real needs.
And it shows. One of the White House's major aid initiatives, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), has wasted much of its funds on scientifically questionable programs designed to please American religious conservatives. Though studies show that only a comprehensive approach, including condom distribution, sexual education, and antiretrovirals, could reduce HIV, the White House insisted that PEPFAR spend one-third of its behavioral prevention budget on programs that promote abstinence until marriage. It also refused to let PEPFAR money go for programs like needle exchanges and aggressive condom promotion. Recipient nations had to sign an American pledge vowing to oppose prostitution, even though prostitutes are major carriers of HIV in Africa, and signing the pledge could scare PEPFAR recipients out of helping sex workers. Virtually no other major multinational donor agreed with PEPFAR's strategy. Even the administration's own inspector general responsible for overseeing aid couldn't prove that its methods had worked. (As a footnote, Randall Tobias, the administration official responsible for overseeing AIDS programs, including the prostitution pledge, resigned after his number was discovered on the D.C. Madam's infamous call lists.)
The White House's other major new aid initiative hasn't proven to be much more effective. The Millenium Challenge Corporation, first launched in 2002, was supposed to be a new kind of aid program, one that selected recipient nations based upon a range of indicators that show their ability to govern well. But MCC has also suffered from going it alone. According to one study by the Center for Global Development, the leading Washington think-tank focusing on aid, although experience had shown that donors worked best when they coordinated their efforts in a country, "MCC tended to steer clear ... much to the dismay and frustration of other donors." With few staff and little organization, the MCC moved very slowly. In fiscal year 2007, according to another analysis by the Center for Global Development, the MCC only disbursed 6.8 percent of the money it was allocated. Worse, it clearly has drained funds from longtime, critical aid programs: In 2007 the administration slashed aid for extreme poverty programs, like child survival initiatives in Africa.
Because of the MCC's poor results, Congress has grown less supportive of the program. In the most recent congressional appropriations cycle, Republican Senator Richard Lugar tried to write a provision that would give the MCC only half of its appropriated money upfront, because of skepticism that it wouldn't spend its whole allocation. In the long run, this skepticism might threaten Congress' broader support for African aid. God's work, indeed.
Joshua Kurlantzick is a Special Correspondent to The New Republic. |
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.h...01-134ee4c0437b
And lastly, from today's NYTimes:
| quote: | Op-Ed Columnist
A Genocide Foretold
By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF
Published: February 28, 2008
JUBA, Sudan
The Sudanese government started the first genocide of the 21st century in Darfur, and now it seems to be preparing to start the second here among the thatch-roof huts of southern Sudan.
South Sudan is rich in oil, but its people are among the poorest in the world, far poorer than those in Darfur. Only 1 percent of girls here finish elementary school, meaning that a young woman is more likely to die in pregnancy or childbirth than to become literate. Leprosy and Ebola linger here. South Sudan is the size of Texas, yet it has only 10 miles of paved road and almost no electricity; just about the only running water here is the Nile River.
The poverty is mostly the result of the civil war between North and South Sudan that raged across the southern part of the country for two decades and cost 2 million lives. For many impoverished villagers, their only exposure to modern technology has been to endure bombings by the Sudanese Air Force. The war finally ended, thanks in part to strong American pressure, in 2005 with a landmark peace agreement — but that peace is now fraying.
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is backing away from the peace agreement, and prodding Arab militias to revive the war with the South Sudan military forces. Small-scale armed clashes have broken out since late last year, and it looks increasingly likely that Darfur will become simply the prologue to a far bloodier conflict that engulfs all Sudan.
Even my presence here is a sign of the rising tensions and mistrust. The Sudanese government refuses me visas, but the authorities in the south let me enter from Kenya without a visa because they want the word to get out that war is again looming.
The authorities in disputed areas such as the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile State also welcomed me, rather than arresting me, even though those areas technically are on the northern side of the dividing line. Local officials in both areas warned that President Bashir and his radical Arab political party are preparing to revive the war against non-Arab groups in the south and center of the country.
“If things go on as they are now, war will break out,” said Sila Musa Kangi, the commissioner of Kormuk in Blue Nile. “And it can break out at any time.”
Although people speak of renewed “war,” the violence is more likely to resemble what happens in a stockyard. If it is like the last time, government-sponsored Arab militias will slaughter civilians so as to terrorize local populations and drive them far away from oil wells.
Under the 2005 deal that ended the war, Sudan is supposed to hold elections early next year, but President Bashir is unlikely to allow them because he almost surely would lose. Likewise, Mr. Bashir is unlikely to abide by his commitment to allow the south to hold a referendum in 2011 to decide whether to separate from Sudan because southerners would likely vote overwhelmingly for independence — and more than three-quarters of the country’s oil is in the south.
Already, the Sudanese government is backtracking on its commitments under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or C.P.A.: It still hasn’t withdrawn all of its troops from the south; it hasn’t accepted a boundary commission report for the oil-rich border area of Abyei; it keeps delaying a census needed for the elections; and it appears to be cheating the south of oil revenues. And the U.S. and other countries have acquiesced in all this.
“We say to the international community, ‘you midwifed the C.P.A., and then you left,’ ” said Rebecca Garang, the widow of the longtime southern leader, John Garang. “You must come back and check the baby.”
Those who focused on Sudan’s atrocities in Darfur, myself included, may have inadvertently removed the spotlight from South Sudan. Without easing the outrage over Darfur — where the bloodshed has been particularly appalling lately — we must broaden the focus to include the threat to the south.
One of the lessons of Darfur, Rwanda and Bosnia is that it is much easier to avert a genocide ahead of time than to put the pieces together afterward. So let’s not wait until gunshots are ringing out again all over the south.
There are steps that the U.S. can take to diminish the risk of a new war. We can work with the international community to raise the costs to President Bashir of defying his treaty obligations.
We can warn Sudan that if it starts a new war, we will supply anti-aircraft weapons to the south to make it harder for the north to resume bombing hospitals, churches and schools. We can also raise the possibility of protecting the south with a no-fly zone, which might be enough to deter Mr. Bashir from starting yet another genocide. |
Any thoughts? That opens up a whole lot of topics from HIV/AIDS prevention to conflict resolution/prevention efforts to international development topics.
What role should the West play in the future of Africa? What role should China? |
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| Krypton |
My policy. . .
1. Stop wars of aggression.
Then and only then, can we concentrate on humanitarian issues with the majority of our focus.
2. Get people working.
Once people have jobs, they usually refrain from violent activity such as civil wars.
3. Help the people feed themselves.
These poor countries must learn how to produce their own food instead of rely on food imports. At the very least, these country's economies should be well enough to where they can at least buy food on the market, instead of always relying on donated food, which does force out domestic food producers.
4. US self-suffiency in energy.
The US must separate itself fundamentally from violent regions of the world which have no problem declaring the only good American is a dead American. This is the fundamental strategic dilema the US faces. It is because of this, that we have Islamist terrorists and hatred of America. |
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| Arbiter |
For the most part, I think that it is too early to judge the success of recent U.S. policy pertaining to Africa. As the first article you posted shows, apparent short-term gains have in the past produced unwarranted optimism. Consequently, the long-term effects, if any, of our recent initiavites will probably not be apparent until quite some time has passed. And really, while making things better in the short term is not entirely without worth, it is long-term improvements that should be our objective.
As a result, I find attempts to analyze Bush's "record" on Africa based on current evidence to be, at best, a little naïve. Certainly, we can speculate on what will come of our recent initiatives, but the product of such thinking should be regarded as a hypothesis, not a result.
Personally, I am rather skeptical that our recent policy towards Africa will yield long-term gains. PEPFAR, to me, represents part of the unordinate focus on AIDS which has characterized many of our health initiavites, and to make matters worse, its "conservative" methodology would appear to compromise its probable efficacy as well.
I am also troubled by the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of weapons, military training, and other military resources as part of our counter-terrorism efforts. We have put weapons in the hands of questionable regimes which may well use them against their own people, and, more generally, I find it hard to believe that an influx of weapons can be good for Africa regardless of the intent.
As far as I can see, this represents a part of a general shift in U.S. policy towards Africa where, instead of properly regarding Africa as a continent where poverty, disease, and oppression are problems which warrant attention on their own merits, Africa is instead seen as a continent full of unstable nations which must be brought under "control" to limit the possible spread of terrorism.
Under the latter paradigm, humanitarian concerns are of secondary importance -- a dubious set of priorities which seems nonetheless to be in full swing with the establishment of AFRICOM. With the establishment of AFRICOM, U.S. humanitarian, diplomatic, and economic policy towards Africa will increasingly fall under the purview of the U.S. Department of Defense. No one should be under any illusions that this is a good thing for Africa. To my chagrin, however, the Bush administration seems to have successfully inveigled many humanitarians into the belief that they are actually making African humanitarian concerns a priority.
The goal of democratizing Africa is also one which has recieved great focus recently. It is clearly an important policy objective -- otherwise, the response to the disputed Kenyan election would have been much less tepid. It's pretty obvious that it is more to the strategic advantage of the U.S. for Kibaki to hold power, and that we did not overwhelmingly support him shows that the establishment of legitimate democracy (or at least, the appearance of legitimate democracy) is highly prioritized as well. Though well-intentioned, I am inclined to regard this as a mistake. The problem that I see, stated as simply as possible, is that the political institutions of a country must reflect the social and cultural reality of that country, and the social and cultural reality of most of Africa cannot be reflected by a democracy.
That is, of course, an issue which would require a great deal more explanation than is probably appropriate here to explore fully. So instead, I will say that I am concerned about our apparent focus on the structure of government. Instead, we should be more concerned about the operational behavior of government (insofar as it contributes to regional stability and national development). It seems to be taken for granted that democratically elected leaders tend to behave better in those regards, but I am very skeptical of that premise and, consequently, the value of immediate democratization.
Speaking of "democratically" elected African leaders, Robert Mugabe has obviously had a disastrous effect on Zimbabwe. Unfortunately, the U.S. response has been quixotic, to say the least. Our economic sanctions on the Zimbabwean government and those complicit in it's opressive regime do not appear to have had any effect on the ability of the regime to hold power. At the same time, it seems almost unavoidable that they have worsened the already dreadful state that the ordinary Zimbabwean citizen finds himself or herself in, as the government responds to the external economic pressures by hoarding an even larger share of national resources. The idea that the regime would lose or relinquish power as a result of the imposed sanctions is, frankly, stupid. And beyond that, they appear to have little function except to create the illusion that we are "doing something" about the situation. Well, count me among those who aren't buying it.
Well, that's already quite long and I've really just been speculating on the efficacy of recent U.S. policy towards Africa. I haven't even addressed what role we ought to be playing. I guess I'll try to address that in a bit. |
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| Lebezniatnikov |
| quote: | Originally posted by Krypton
My policy. . .
1. Stop wars of aggression.
Then and only then, can we concentrate on humanitarian issues with the majority of our focus.
2. Get people working.
Once people have jobs, they usually refrain from violent activity such as civil wars.
3. Help the people feed themselves.
These poor countries must learn how to produce their own food instead of rely on food imports. At the very least, these country's economies should be well enough to where they can at least buy food on the market, instead of always relying on donated food, which does force out domestic food producers. |
I don't think you're going to find anyone that disagrees with these basic goals... but the question the international community has grappled with is the how. It's a universally-held belief that peace + employment + sustainability will lead to prosperity. But how can the West assist in attaining these goals?
You mention that stopping "wars of aggression" is a fundamental step we must take. How? In the context of Africa, many conflicts have no clear-cut aggressor. Patrimonial economics is often a de facto casus belli and not any territorial or political disagreement.
What I'm trying to say is "stop wars and foster economic growth" doesn't get us any further than we were in 1945 - international institutions were created for these very reasons, and up to this point we have seen moderate successes in some cases and failures in others. How do we move beyond this point?
| quote: | 4. US self-suffiency in energy.
The US must separate itself fundamentally from violent regions of the world which have no problem declaring the only good American is a dead American. This is the fundamental strategic dilema the US faces. It is because of this, that we have Islamist terrorists and hatred of America. |
I don't really see how this is relevant to the topic at hand... in actuality, Angola's recent surge in development (albeit limited to Luanda) is a direct product of an increase in demand for its oil reserves.
And Chinese investments of $45 billion in the past 20 years would probably not have been made were they not in part pursuing lucrative resource contracts. |
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| Lebezniatnikov |
And furthermore, in efforts to resolve ongoing conflicts, create job growth, and improve sustainability, what sort of resources should the West bring to bear?
And are these even the underlying problems in African societies? The continent is ravaged by HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and treatable tropical water diseases... governments lack the basic institutional infrastructure to extend their influence and services to the entire population - most noticeably in large populous states like the DRC. With the erosive effect of poor overall health, minimal education (women in Sudan are far more likely to die in child birth than they are to become literate), patrimonial economic linkages that perpetuate the status quo in terms of class structures and political influence, and entrepreneurial opportunists that launch incursions to seize spheres of influence from the state in order to profit off the black market, is "stopping wars of aggression" an adequate, or sufficient, policy to adopt? Where's the nuance? |
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| Krypton |
| quote: | Originally posted by Lebezniatnikov
I don't think you're going to find anyone that disagrees with these basic goals... but the question the international community has grappled with is the how. It's a universally-held belief that peace + employment + sustainability will lead to prosperity. But how can the West assist in attaining these goals? |
Set up manufactoring sectors. A successful industrialization will be marked by an exodus of the rural population to the cities, where jobs, having been created by manufactoring, are made plentiful. Examples being Asia's resurgence.
| quote: | | You mention that stopping "wars of aggression" is a fundamental step we must take. How? In the context of Africa, many conflicts have no clear-cut aggressor. Patrimonial economics is often a de facto casus belli and not any territorial or political disagreement. |
US wars of aggression primarily. The most recent case being the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopa, with direct support from the US. The US should not be taking sides in these conflicts. If the US wants to help, then help, but we need to stop trying to change foreign country's politics. If the people hate us, how can we help???
| quote: | | What I'm trying to say is "stop wars and foster economic growth" doesn't get us any further than we were in 1945 - international institutions were created for these very reasons, and up to this point we have seen moderate successes in some cases and failures in others. How do we move beyond this point? |
If we can help economically, I am sure wars can be stopped in these third world countries. If the people have opportunities outside of joining the local militia, I think that would go a long way, especially towards self-sufficiency.
| quote: | | I don't really see how this is relevant to the topic at hand... in actuality, Angola's recent surge in development (albeit limited to Luanda) is a direct product of an increase in demand for its oil reserves. |
The US is a slave to its oil demand. This forces us to behave in ways contridictory to the American creed of peace and respect, etc. If the people of the world hate us, then trying to help them, no matter how sincere the effort will ultimately fail.
| quote: | | And Chinese investments of $45 billion in the past 20 years would probably not have been made were they not in part pursuing lucrative resource contracts. |
Fine, let the Chinese have it. Let the Chinese divert yuans from China and put it in Africa. If we Americans can become self-sufficient to the point of becoming an energy exporter once again, we can keep all of our dollars here in America, where they can be invested in products other than oil. We would be in a much better position to help the world!!! Imagine that! I hope to help make this a reality. I want America to be an energy exporter, and that would be one of my goals if I were running for president in 2008. |
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| Krypton |
| quote: | Originally posted by Lebezniatnikov
And furthermore, in efforts to resolve ongoing conflicts, create job growth, and improve sustainability, what sort of resources should the West bring to bear?
And are these even the underlying problems in African societies? The continent is ravaged by HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and treatable tropical water diseases... governments lack the basic institutional infrastructure to extend their influence and services to the entire population - most noticeably in large populous states like the DRC. With the erosive effect of poor overall health, minimal education (women in Sudan are far more likely to die in child birth than they are to become literate), patrimonial economic linkages that perpetuate the status quo in terms of class structures and political influence, and entrepreneurial opportunists that launch incursions to seize spheres of influence from the state in order to profit off the black market, is "stopping wars of aggression" an adequate, or sufficient, policy to adopt? Where's the nuance? |
There was a reason Africa was colonized by Europe. They have plenty of natural resources. The problem is curruption, dependance on foreign aid, and economic instability. The most important place I would start if I was to try to help say Zimbabwe, is the economy. I believe economic stability is the catalyst towards sustained development. If the men especially have no work, natural tendicies will prevail. Militias form. Civil wars are started. Fighting becomes the only job available to these men. |
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| Lebezniatnikov |
| quote: | Originally posted by Krypton
Set up manufactoring sectors. A successful industrialization will be marked by an exodus of the rural population to the cities, where jobs, having been created by manufactoring, are made plentiful. Examples being Asia's resurgence.
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This is an argument I've heard before from some international political economists... but I don't really buy it. There are just too many societal differences between the Asian tigers at the time of their ascendancy and the average African state today.
For one, the Asian states didn't have nearly so many problems as Africans do today - sure, there was poverty, but nothing comparable to the level seen in sub-Saharan Africa, where nearly 40% of the population lives on less than a dollar a day. The Asian states did not struggle from the fallout of de-colonization, and had at minimum a lengthy history of self-governance. Societal rifts were either non-existent (Korea and Japan) or denied expression (China). And the health crises plaguing swaths of the continent were absent in East Asia as well.
I think this argue does a pretty good job of outlining some of the fundamental advantages the Asian Tigers had over contemporary African states:
| quote: | Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and the
East Asian Tigers: A Summary of Paul Kennedy’s Argument
The East Asian tigers share five characteristics that together explain their rapid economic growth:
1. An emphasis on education. Writes Kennedy: "This derives from Confucian traditions of competitive examinations and respect for learning, reinforced daily by the mother of the family who complements what is taught at school." The effect of this stress on learning is evident, for example, in the fact that by 1980 there were as many engineers graduating from South Korean institutions as in Germany, Sweden and the UK combined. Moreover, students in South Korea and the other Asia tigers always place well ahead of American students in standardized math and science tests.
2. A high savings level. Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, the governments of the Asian tigers encouraged their citizens to save much of their money by preventing them from investing abroad, limiting the import of foreign goods, and imposing high taxes on consumer goods. The citizens placed their savings in banks. Banks used the savings to make loans at low interest rates for investment in manufacturing and commerce. In contrast, the savings levels of Americans are among the lowest in the world; economic growth in the USA is based mainly on high levels of consumption, even if that means going into debt.
3. A political system that fosters economic growth. Certain industries are targeted for growth by governments and are assisted by export subsidies, training grants and tariff protection from foreign competition. At the same time, trade unions have been restricted in their activities and full democracy was not permitted until recently. This has kept labor costs low and enabled the population to concentrate on economic growth rather than political competition. In the USA, on the other hand, the government does not usually get involved in this sort of economic planning. Trade unions and political parties are among the freest in the world.
4. A commitment to exports. Unlike the consumer-driven US economy, the economies of the four tigers are export-driven. The governments of the four tigers do everything in their power to help industry sell domestically-produced goods to the world. For example, managers and workers are trained to produce what foreign customers wanted, and currency values are kept low so domestic goods will sell cheaply abroad.
5. A local model of success. Japan had followed similar policies since the end of World War II, emphasizing the need for education, savings, state-guided targeting of industries and markets, and exports. Japanese success showed South Korea and the other Asian tigers what was possible in the region.
The contrast with sub-Saharan Africa could not be stronger. Africa is the only region of the world expected to experience more poverty in the 21st century than it does now. Its economic future is disastrous for six main reasons:
1. A mushrooming population. The African population is now doubling in size every 20 years because improved medical techniques introduced since the 1960s have quickly decreased infant mortality and increased life expectancy. The following chart compares population growth in the developing and less developed parts of the world from 1750 to 2100:
World Population, 1750 - 2100 (in millions)
World Population, 1750 - 2100 (in millions)
Adapted from Roderic Beaujot "Population," in Robert J Brym ed.
New Society: Sociology for the 21st Century,
(Toronto: Harcourt Brace Canada, 1995) p. 19.11
2. Declining productivity. Drought, overgrazing, and deforestation have prevented farm output from rising much.
3. Falling prices for exports and rising costs of imports. The world prices of many African exports (cocoa, palm oil, rubber, coffee, tea, etc.) have fallen in the past couple of decades as the cost of imports (particularly petroleum products) have risen.
4. A skyrocketing debt. In the 1960s, governments borrowed large sums to build economic infrastructure (harbors, steel plants, airports, etc.). Since the 1970s , they have borrowed large sums to pay for petroleum and food imports. By the mid-1980s, half of Africa’s export earnings were being used just for foreign loan payments. The following chart demonstrates how debt has increased in the less developed countries between 1970 and 1995:
Total International Debt of Developing Countries,
1970-95 (in $US millions)
Total International Debt of Developing Countries, 1970-95 (in $US millions)
Source: Adapted from World Debt Tables:
External Finance for Developing Countries,
Vol 1 (Washington DC: The World Bank, 1996) p. 192.
5. Political instability. When Britain, France and other European powers colonized Africa in the 19th century, they drew borders without regard for tribal and ethnic group boundaries. Competing groups were held in check by colonial administrations, but once the African states declared independence beginning in the 1960s, tribal and ethnic rivalries resurfaced. As a result, wars and coups are now commonplace.
6. Low investment in human resources. Science, technology and entrepreneurship are sadly neglected in Africa. In general, educational levels are the lowest in the world. Sweden and Angola have about the same size in terms of population but Angola has only 2.6% as many university students as Sweden.
Adapted from Paul Kennedy"Preparing for the 21st Century: Winners and Losers," in The New York Review of Books (40, 4: 11 February 1993) pp. 32-44. Reprinted in Robert J. Brym, ed. Society in Question: Sociological Readings for the 21stCentury (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Canada, 1996) pp.316-335. |
http://www.nelson.com/nelson/harcou...act1/act1r.html
| quote: | | US wars of aggression primarily. The most recent case being the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia, with direct support from the US. The US should not be taking sides in these conflicts. If the US wants to help, then help, but we need to stop trying to change foreign country's politics. If the people hate us, how can we help??? |
I don't know if you understand the context of the Ethiopian invasion. That had far more to do with incursions by the United Islamic Courts (which had illegitimately seized control of parts of Somalia from the internationally-recognized coalition government) into the Somali-populated Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The US capitalized on the situation by running two bombing missions against specific targets (the planners behind the bombings of US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya), but had very little to do with the campaign itself operationally-speaking.
| quote: |
If we can help economically, I am sure wars can be stopped in these third world countries. If the people have opportunities outside of joining the local militia, I think that would go a long way, especially towards self-sufficiency. |
Help economically in what way? Aid? Loans?
The trend in international development thinking (even at the World Bank!!!) has been increasingly away from these types of economic actions, and towards fostering active civil societies, transparency, and anti-corruption measures. Debt forgiveness, however, has increasingly been on the global agenda for discussion at Davos, etc.
The US is a slave to its oil demand. This forces us to behave in ways contridictory to the American creed of peace and respect, etc. If the people of the world hate us, then trying to help them, no matter how sincere the effort will ultimately fail.
| quote: |
Fine, let the Chinese have it. Let the Chinese divert yuans from China and put it in Africa. If we Americans can become self-sufficient to the point of becoming an energy exporter once again, we can keep all of our dollars here in America, where they can be invested in products other than oil. We would be in a much better position to help the world!!! Imagine that! I hope to help make this a reality. I want America to be an energy exporter, and that would be one of my goals if I were running for president in 2008. |
Eesh. This makes me very nervous. Energy independence is great, but a long way off. In the past eight years African states have turned away from the United States and toward China as an alternative economic partner. Don't for a second think that it isn't a mutually-beneficial relationship. China's investments may not accrue profits until the long-term, but you are already seeing a huge influx of Chinese corporations into African markets (in some cases pushing out indigenous small businesses AND American companies already operating there) and political fallout - nearly thirty African states have reneged on their recognition of Taiwan in the past few years alone, building a pretty good case for China to claim national sovereignty over Taiwan in front of the General Assembly.
In any case, I don't think fostering an industrial revolution in Africa is feasible at the moment (and possibly not even desirable given comparative advantages elsewhere), and I certainly don't think rescinding US foreign policy and economic interests in the region will help matters for us or the continent. |
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| Lebezniatnikov |
| quote: | Originally posted by Krypton
There was a reason Africa was colonized by Europe. They have plenty of natural resources. |
That had very little to do with the beginning of colonialism, though it certainly factored into the delay of independence. And anyhow, there is a whole body of academic research that shows the correlation between significant natural resources and underdevelopment - what Paul Collier terms "the resource trap" --
| quote: | More controversially, they claim that dependence on natural resources, as measured by the percentage of GDP stemming from primary commodity exports, increases the risk of civil war in two ways: first, dependence limits economic diversification, increases vulnerability to external price shocks, and contributes to corruption and other forms of bad governance, and thus increases incentives for rebellion; this could be called the “resource curse” (Ross, 1999). Second, the existence of valuable natural resources can encourage attempts by rebel organizations to secede or hijack the state as a means of controlling their revenue streams, which is sometimes called the “honey pot” effect (de Soysa, 2000). Even when seizing the honey pot is not the principal motivation, Collier et al. argue that natural resources fuel civil wars by financing rebel activities.
According to some (including at times the authors), these findings suggest that an abundance (or greater endowment) of natural resources is the problem, which is the inverse of the popular neo-Malthusian claim that scarcity drives conflict (see also Pearce, 2002). |
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.c...m&news_id=56795
| quote: | How the bottom billion are trapped
By Martin Wolf
Published: May 13 2007 18:45 | Last updated: May 15 2007 17:32
The Bottom Billion
by Paul Collier
Oxford University Press £16.99, $28
Paul Collier, the director of the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford university, has devoted three decades to the study of African economics. In this splendid book he has used that work to answer the most important question in development: why are so many countries now failing?
About 80 per cent of the population of developing countries lives in countries whose populations are becoming better off. Billions live in countries that are developing very swiftly. But almost a billion people – 70 per cent of whom live in sub-Saharan Africa – are in economically stagnant or declining countries. In all, 58 countries are in this desperate condition. Yet, as Collier remarks: “An impoverished ghetto of 1bn people will be increasingly impossible for a comfortable world to tolerate.”
Collier argues that these countries have fallen into one, or more, of four traps from which it is virtually impossible to escape. These are the “conflict trap”, the “natural resources trap”, the trap of being “landlocked with bad neighbours” and the trap of “bad governance in a small country”.
Seventy-three per cent of people in the bottom billion have been through civil war, 29 per cent are in countries dominated by the malign politics of natural resources, 30 per cent are in landlocked, resource-poor countries with bad neighbours and 76 per cent are in countries that have suffered long periods of bad governance and poor economic policies. Many have fallen into more than one of these traps.
What is to be done? Collier argues that trade, for all its potential benefits, will not help the bottom billion. These countries are uncompetitive exporters of labour-intensive goods and services, given the low costs and established positions of Asian producers. They cannot compete with China or Vietnam. Similarly private capital does not flow to these countries, except to exploit their natural resources. The problem is the reverse: huge capital flight. Collier estimates that almost 40 per cent of Africa’s private wealth was held abroad in 1990.
Collier is also sceptical of the ability of aid to make much of a difference, at least on its own. He believes aid can help – and has helped – the bottom billion. But it has been a holding operation, rather than the start of sustained growth. He is particularly sceptical of the view that unconditional budget support will work. We have, after all, already had an experiment with the consequences of unconditional finance: oil revenues. Debt relief – the darling of the aid lobbies – is the closest thing to oil revenues that the aid industry can provide, a point its proponents ignore.
Aid will not get countries out of the traps. It cannot stop conflict, though it can help after one is over. It can do nothing about the natural resources trap: indeed, it is similar to possessing just another natural resource. It may help landlocked countries with improved transport infrastructure, but cannot eliminate the catastrophe of having bad neighbours.
So what else is needed to help countries in the bottom billion? Collier makes three suggestions: first, military intervention; second, laws, statutes and charters for improved governance; and, third, trade preferences.
The case for military intervention is most obvious, if controversial. Civil wars are so costly that well-timed military actions are quite likely (though not certain) to be cost-effective.
The second area demands changes in high-income countries: ceasing to take money looted from the poorest countries is one such change; elimination of bribery by their companies is another. It also needs charters of better governance for countries in the bottom billion: transparent management of natural resources is among the most important, the UK’s extractive industries transparency initiative being a good start. The book also suggests charters for democracy, budget transparency, post-conflict situations and investment.
This idea sounds very naive. But the European Union has shown that external standards can make a big difference. Why should countries not sign up to charters of better governance in return for large quantities of aid? This is not imperialism. It is a bargain made in the interests of their own people.
The third suggestion is unrestricted access to the markets of high-income countries for labour-intensive exports from the bottom billion. Only thus, suggests Collier, are the resource-poor countries ever likely to break into world markets for manufactures.
The book is rich in both analysis and recommendations. I particularly enjoyed the attack on the misguided economics of many non-governmental organisations. Collier sheds much light on how the world should tackle its biggest moral challenge. It shows, too, how far western governments and other external actors are from currently giving the sort of help these countries desperately need.
Read this book. You will learn much you do not know. It will also change the way you look at the tragedy of persistent poverty in a world of plenty.
The writer is an FT columnist
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008 |
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4858ed7e-...0b5df10621.html
| quote: | | The problem is curruption, dependance on foreign aid, and economic instability. The most important place I would start if I was to try to help say Zimbabwe, is the economy. I believe economic stability is the catalyst towards sustained development. If the men especially have no work, natural tendicies will prevail. Militias form. Civil wars are started. Fighting becomes the only job available to these men. |
What are the underlying causes driving unemployment? Zimbabwe is something of an anomaly because of particularly disastrous government policy - you are right in pointing out that unemployment creates a very strong incentive to join armed resistance groups that at least offer the promise of looting, but I think the case of Zimbabwe doesn't serve that point well as there has been no conflict even as unemployment reaches above 50%. Burundi would be a much better example - and efforts by the International Rescue Committee and other organizations at creating job training centers, etc. have made some headway, but can't adjust for the fact that there simply isn't demand in the economies for new jobs (for some of the reasons that Collier points out). |
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| Lebezniatnikov |
| quote: | Originally posted by jerZ07002
NO!!!! |
:p |
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| Fir3start3r |
| quote: | | Is Africa doing enough for itself? |
Fixed for a more legitimate question...;) |
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