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I am a Strange Loop. [Philosophy/Logic Content] (pg. 3)
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| Zild |
Yeah that is one thing about philosophy. It doesn't solve problems.
The same questions are still being addressed. |
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| pkcRAISTLIN |
| quote: | Originally posted by RJT
The difficulty with just "getting into" philosophy for many people (certainly not all) is that so much of the fundamental reading is very, very dense and difficult to initially interpret |
as well as being ing boring. not all by any means, but after a while philosophy for me became little more than serious masturbation.
take plato and his "forms". everything in existence is merely an inferior "copy" of the ideal form that's in heaven.
just a ing stupid concept to begin with. why was i being forced to read this in the 20th century? yawns. i should've gone out and made an implement for raping babies which would imply there's an ultimate baby raper in heaven :rolleyes:
philosophy that has contributed good to mankind gets a thumbs up from me :) but too much of it is a colossal wank-a-thon. |
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| Zild |
| quote: | Originally posted by pkcRAISTLIN
as well as being ing boring. not all by any means, but after a while philosophy for me became little more than serious masturbation.
take plato and his "forms". everything in existence is merely an inferior "copy" of the ideal form that's in heaven.
just a ing stupid concept to begin with. why was i being forced to read this in the 20th century? yawns. i should've gone out and made an implement for raping babies which would imply there's an ultimate baby raper in heaven :rolleyes:
philosophy that has contributed good to mankind gets a thumbs up from me :) but too much of it is a colossal wank-a-thon. |
Hold on. That's what I believe. You can't believe what I believe. Damn you. I almost finished a degree in philosophy before I woke up and realized it is just a bunch of people not really saying anything definite. You can't refute someone if they don't say anything real. |
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| evil_cookie |
| quote: | Originally posted by RJT
The difficulty with just "getting into" philosophy for many people (certainly not all) is that so much of the fundamental reading is very, very dense and difficult |
...no it's not - it is actually very simple to understand, and that's the problem with funamentals.
perfect example below. people who think they understand concepts by studying the basics.
| quote: | Originally posted by pkcRAISTLIN
take plato and his "forms". everything in existence is merely an inferior "copy" of the ideal form that's in heaven.
just a ing stupid concept to begin with. why was i being forced to read this in the 20th century? yawns. i should've gone out and made an implement for raping babies which would imply there's an ultimate baby raper in heaven :rolleyes:
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| pkcRAISTLIN |
| see- wankers. |
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| RJT |
| quote: | Originally posted by evil_cookie
...no it's not - it is actually very simple to understand, and that's the problem with funamentals.
perfect example below. people who think they understand concepts by studying the basics. |
Ok, pal. Good for you, it's nice that's what you think.  |
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| Lira |
| quote: | Originally posted by Dervish
But I just had a thought reading this. Is philosophy ever proved of disproved or will it forever be theory? I mean on the big questions (maybe questions) like "who am I what am I?".
Or will it forever grow legs like a fractal pattern? |
| quote: | Originally posted by Zild
Yeah that is one thing about philosophy. It doesn't solve problems.
The same questions are still being addressed. |
That's like complaining Hoovers don't take your kids to school.
First of all, to say that philosophy doesn't solve problems is pretty naïve. Science, as we know today, is a product of philosophy, reason why scientists were called natural philosophers until quite a few centuries ago. It just happened to be more fruitful because the knowledge acquired by natural philosophers ended up being applied more in a more concrete way.
And, now this is the real kicker, science is no different from philosophy in the sense that:
- Theories both in philosophy and science are either systematically replaced or modified at one time or another:
Science: The reason why we say we use Copernicus' heliocentric model in Astronomy is because he was responsible for a major paradigm shift in this field of knowledge. However, his theory is still being adapted over the centuries in order to fit the data, to the point it doesn't even resemble the original theory.
Not to mention that theories held as being the ultimate truth, such as some of Newton's ideas, ended up being replaced by more robust explanations.
Philosophy: The opposition between rationalists (beginning with Descartes) and empiricists (beginning with John Locke) has been outstandingly productive in the history of modern thought. Without that, psychology, linguistics and artificial intelligence would be, if not absent, seriously crippled.
- Both philosophy and science are influenced by their historicity. Therefore, one might argue that they will never (ever!) be able to give universal explanations, and still be probably right. Our contemporary ideas in science, for example, depends on how we, living in the 21st century, perceive the world. As time passes by, perspectives change, and if science is not the cause of this shift, this shift will cause such changes in science. The same applies to philosophy, reason why theories seems to crumble that easily.
So, in the end, theories in philosophy and science are interwoven to such an extent that to say one is useless is pretty much a fundamental misunderstanding of the other.
Here's some recommended reading from Stanford's Encyclopaedia of Philosophy:
;) |
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| pkcRAISTLIN |
| quote: | Originally posted by Lira
to say one is useless is pretty much a fundamental misunderstanding of the other. |
but where's your long-winded response to "philosophy is often chronic masturbation" ? :toothless |
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| Lira |
| quote: | Originally posted by pkcRAISTLIN
but where's your long-winded response to "philosophy is often chronic masturbation" ? :toothless |
Kant's *fap* Philosophy *fap* of *fap* Science
Kant's *fap* philosophy *fap* of *fap* science *fap* has *fap* received *fap* attention *fap* from *fap* several *fap* different *fap* audiences *fap* and *fap* for *fap* a *fap* variety *fap* of *fap* reasons. *fap* It *fap* is *fap* of *fap* interest *fap* to *fap* contemporary *fap* philosophers *fap* of *fap* science *fap* primarily *fap* because *fap* of *fap* the *fap* way *fap* in *fap* which *fap* Kant *fap* attempts *fap* to *fap* articulate *fap* a *fap* philosophical *fap* framework *fap* that *fap* places *fap* substantive *fap* conditions *fap* on *fap* our *fap* scientific *fap* knowledge *fap* of *fap* the *fap* world *fap* while *fap* still *fap* respecting *fap* the *fap* autonomy *fap* and *fap* diverse *fap* claims *fap* of *fap* particular *fap* sciences. *fap* More *fap* specifically, *fap* Kant *fap* develops *fap* a *fap* philosophy *fap* of *fap* science *fap* that *fap* departs *fap* from *fap* (i) *fap* broadly *fap* empiricist *fap* views *fap* — *fap* such *fap* as *fap* David *fap* Lewis's, *fap* according *fap* to *fap* which *fap* purely *fap* contingent *fap* events *fap* in *fap* space *fap* and *fap* time *fap* (along *fap* with *fap* considerations *fap* of *fap* simplicity, *fap* etc.) *fap* determine *fap* what *fap* the *fap* laws *fap* of *fap* nature *fap* ultimately *fap* are *fap* — *fap* and *fap* (ii) *fap* certain *fap* necessitarian *fap* views *fap* — *fap* such *fap* as *fap* David *fap* Armstrong's, *fap* according *fap* to *fap* which *fap* the *fap* laws *fap* of *fap* nature *fap* consist *fap* of *fap* necessitation *fap* relations *fap* between *fap* universals, *fap* which *fap* place *fap* constraints *fap* on *fap* what *fap* events *fap* occur *fap* in *fap* space *fap* and *fap* time. *fap* Kant *fap* does *fap* so *fap* by *fap* holding *fap* that *fap* (i) *fap* scientific *fap* laws *fap* do *fap* involve *fap* necessity, *fap* but *fap* that *fap* (ii) *fap* this *fap* necessity *fap* is *fap* based *fap* not *fap* on *fap* (purely *fap* metaphysical *fap* and *fap* hence *fap* inaccessible) *fap* relations *fap* between *fap* universals, *fap* but *fap* rather *fap* on *fap* certain *fap* subjective, *fap* a *fap* priori *fap* conditions *fap* under *fap* which *fap* we *fap* can *fap* experience *fap* objects *fap* in *fap* space *fap* and *fap* time.
Kant's *fap* scientific *fap* writings *fap* are *fap* also *fap* of *fap* interest *fap* to *fap* historians *fap* of *fap* modern *fap* philosophy, *fap* historians *fap* of *fap* science, *fap* and *fap* historians *fap* of *fap* philosophy *fap* of *fap* science. *fap* Historians *fap* of *fap* modern *fap* philosophy *fap* are *fap* especially *fap* interested *fap* in *fap* determining *fap* how *fap* Kant's *fap* views *fap* on *fap* science *fap* might *fap* complement *fap* or *fap* clarify *fap* his *fap* distinctive *fap* metaphysical *fap* and *fap* epistemological *fap* doctrines *fap* (e.g., *fap* as *fap* expressed *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Critique *fap* of *fap* Pure *fap* Reason). *fap* Historians *fap* of *fap* science *fap* reflect *fap* on *fap* the *fap* way *fap* in *fap* which *fap* Kant's *fap* position *fap* fits *fap* in *fap* with *fap* the *fap* views *fap* of *fap* other *fap* natural *fap* philosophers *fap* of *fap* the *fap* period, *fap* such *fap* as *fap* Newton *fap* and *fap* Leibniz, *fap* including *fap* his *fap* novel *fap* account *fap* of *fap* the *fap* formation *fap* of *fap* the *fap* solar *fap* system *fap* according *fap* to *fap* Newtonian *fap* principles. *fap* Historians *fap* of *fap* philosophy *fap* of *fap* science *fap* investigate, *fap* among *fap* other *fap* things, *fap* Kant's *fap* work *fap* in *fap* the *fap* conceptual *fap* foundations *fap* of *fap* physics *fap* — *fap* in *fap* particular, *fap* his *fap* matter *fap* theory *fap* (e.g., *fap* the *fap* infinite *fap* divisibility *fap* of *fap* matter, *fap* attractive *fap* and *fap* repulsive *fap* forces, *fap* inertia, *fap* atoms *fap* and *fap* the *fap* void) *fap* and *fap* his *fap* dynamical *fap* account *fap* of *fap* the *fap* laws *fap* of *fap* mechanics.
Because *fap* physics *fap* was *fap* Kant's *fap* primary *fap* (though *fap* not *fap* exclusive) *fap* focus *fap* over *fap* the *fap* course *fap* of *fap* his *fap* lengthy *fap* career, *fap* his *fap* views *fap* on *fap* physics *fap* during *fap* his *fap* pre-Critical *fap* (1746-1770), *fap* Critical *fap* (1781-1790), *fap* and *fap* Post-Critical *fap* periods *fap* (after *fap* 1790) *fap* will *fap* be *fap* discussed *fap* in *fap* separate *fap* sections. *fap* Subsections *fap* will *fap* be *fap* devoted *fap* to *fap* each *fap* of *fap* the *fap* chapters *fap* of *fap* Kant's *fap* most *fap* influential *fap* work *fap* in *fap* philosophy *fap* of *fap* science, *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations *fap* of *fap* Natural *fap* Science *fap* (1786). *fap* Kant's *fap* basic *fap* positions *fap* on *fap* other *fap* sciences, *fap* including *fap* psychology, *fap* chemistry, *fap* and *fap* history, *fap* will *fap* be *fap* presented *fap* thereafter.
1. *fap* Physics: *fap* The *fap* Pre-Critical *fap* Period
Kant's *fap* early *fap* pre-Critical *fap* publications *fap* (1746-1756) *fap* are *fap* devoted *fap* primarily *fap* to *fap* solving *fap* a *fap* variety *fap* of *fap* broadly *fap* cosmological *fap* problems *fap* and *fap* to *fap* developing *fap* an *fap* increasingly *fap* comprehensive *fap* metaphysics *fap* that *fap* would *fap* account *fap* for *fap* the *fap* matter *fap* theory *fap* that *fap* is *fap* required *fap* by *fap* the *fap* solutions *fap* to *fap* these *fap* problems. *fap* Kant's *fap* first *fap* publication, *fap* Thoughts *fap* on *fap* the *fap* True *fap* Estimation *fap* of *fap* Living *fap* Forces *fap* (1746), *fap* explicitly *fap* attempts *fap* to *fap* solve *fap* the *fap* vis *fap* viva *fap* controversy, *fap* which *fap* had *fap* been *fap* hotly *fap* contested *fap* ever *fap* since *fap* Leibniz's *fap* attack *fap* on *fap* Descartes' *fap* laws *fap* of *fap* motion *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Acta *fap* Eruditorum *fap* in *fap* 1686. *fap* While *fap* Kant *fap* attempts *fap* to *fap* occupy *fap* an *fap* intermediary *fap* position *fap* between *fap* the *fap* Cartesian *fap* and *fap* Leibnizian *fap* positions *fap* by *fap* maintaining *fap* that *fap* both *fap* mv *fap* and *fap* mv² *fap* could *fap* be *fap* conserved *fap* in *fap* different *fap* contexts, *fap* what *fap* is *fap* of *fap* particular *fap* note *fap* is *fap* how *fap* his *fap* solution *fap* in *fap* Parts *fap* II *fap* and *fap* III *fap* rests *fap* on *fap* the *fap* conception *fap* of *fap* force *fap* developed *fap* in *fap* Part *fap* I. *fap* According *fap* to *fap* this *fap* conception, *fap* force *fap* is *fap* understood *fap* in *fap* terms *fap* of *fap* the *fap* activity *fap* of *fap* substances, *fap* an *fap* activity *fap* that *fap* Kant *fap* then *fap* uses *fap* to *fap* explain *fap* how *fap* the *fap* motions *fap* of *fap* bodies *fap* are *fap* generated, *fap* to *fap* solve *fap* the *fap* mind-body *fap* problem, *fap* and *fap* to *fap* account *fap* for *fap* both *fap* the *fap* possibility *fap* of *fap* other, *fap* actually *fap* existing *fap* worlds *fap* and *fap* the *fap* three-dimensionality *fap* of *fap* space.
Kant *fap* develops *fap* his *fap* account *fap* of *fap* the *fap* nature *fap* of *fap* substance *fap* in *fap* greater *fap* detail *fap* in *fap* A *fap* New *fap* Elucidation *fap* of *fap* the *fap* First *fap* Principles *fap* of *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Cognition *fap* (1755). *fap* While *fap* the *fap* first *fap* two *fap* sections *fap* of *fap* this *fap* work *fap* undertake *fap* revisions *fap* of *fap* Wolff's *fap* principles *fap* of *fap* non-contradiction *fap* and *fap* sufficient *fap* reason, *fap* the *fap* third *fap* section *fap* argues *fap* for *fap* two *fap* substantive *fap* principles *fap* that *fap* are *fap* alleged *fap* to *fap* follow *fap* from *fap* the *fap* principle *fap* of *fap* sufficient *fap* (or *fap* rather, *fap* following *fap* Crusius, *fap* determining) *fap* reason, *fap* namely *fap* the *fap* principles *fap* of *fap* succession *fap* and *fap* coexistence. *fap* The *fap* main *fap* thrust *fap* of *fap* the *fap* principle *fap* of *fap* succession *fap* is *fap* directed *fap* against *fap* Leibnizian *fap* pre-established *fap* harmony, *fap* arguing *fap* that *fap* only *fap* causal *fap* connections *fap* between *fap* substances *fap* can *fap* bring *fap* about *fap* changes *fap* in *fap* their *fap* states. *fap* Kant's *fap* position *fap* appears *fap* to *fap* be *fap* designed *fap* to *fap* account *fap* primarily *fap* for *fap* changes *fap* of *fap* bodily *fap* states *fap* (with *fap* changes *fap* in *fap* mental *fap* states *fap* being *fap* parasitic *fap* upon *fap* them, *fap* as *fap* was *fap* explicitly *fap* asserted *fap* in *fap* the *fap* True *fap* Estimation). *fap* For *fap* he *fap* maintains *fap* that *fap* mutual *fap* changes *fap* of *fap* state *fap* require *fap* mutual *fap* interaction, *fap* where *fap* it *fap* is *fap* clear *fap* that *fap* changes *fap* in *fap* motion *fap* are *fap* precisely *fap* the *fap* kind *fap* of *fap* mutual *fap* change *fap* that *fap* he *fap* has *fap* in *fap* mind *fap* (since *fap* one *fap* body *fap* cannot *fap* move *fap* closer *fap* to *fap* another *fap* without *fap* the *fap* other *fap* body *fap* moving *fap* closer *fap* to *fap* it). *fap* The *fap* principle *fap* of *fap* coexistence *fap* then *fap* argues *fap* that *fap* harmonious *fap* causal *fap* interaction *fap* between *fap* otherwise *fap* isolated, *fap* independently *fap* existing *fap* substances *fap* is *fap* possible *fap* only *fap* by *fap* means *fap* of *fap* God's *fap* coordination *fap* (just *fap* as *fap* Leibniz *fap* thought *fap* was *fap* required *fap* for *fap* harmonious *fap* relations *fap* between *fap* the *fap* states *fap* of *fap* such *fap* substances).
Kant's *fap* Physical *fap* Monadology *fap* (1756) *fap* takes *fap* as *fap* its *fap* task *fap* the *fap* reconciliation *fap* of *fap* the *fap* infinite *fap* divisibility *fap* of *fap* space, *fap* as *fap* maintained *fap* in *fap* geometry, *fap* with *fap* the *fap* simplicity *fap* of *fap* substances, *fap* which *fap* Kant *fap* believes *fap* is *fap* required *fap* in *fap* metaphysics. *fap* As *fap* was *fap* the *fap* case *fap* with *fap* his *fap* earlier *fap* works, *fap* the *fap* essential *fap* feature *fap* of *fap* his *fap* reconciliation *fap* lies *fap* in *fap* the *fap* way *fap* in *fap* which *fap* his *fap* matter *fap* theory *fap* is *fap* supported *fap* by *fap* his *fap* metaphysical *fap* views. *fap* Specifically, *fap* Kant *fap* asserts *fap* that *fap* simple *fap* substances *fap* fill *fap* space *fap* not *fap* by *fap* means *fap* of *fap* their *fap* mere *fap* existence, *fap* but *fap* rather *fap* in *fap* virtue *fap* of *fap* their *fap* spheres *fap* of *fap* activity. *fap* As *fap* a *fap* result, *fap* any *fap* division *fap* of *fap* the *fap* relevant *fap* spheres *fap* of *fap* activity *fap* does *fap* not *fap* compromise *fap* the *fap* simplicity *fap* of *fap* the *fap* substances *fap* themselves, *fap* since *fap* the *fap* spatial *fap* properties *fap* of *fap* substances *fap* (including *fap* the *fap* infinite *fap* divisibility *fap* of *fap* space) *fap* arise *fap* from *fap* the *fap* interaction *fap* between *fap* their *fap* activities *fap* rather *fap* than *fap* from *fap* their *fap* intrinsic *fap* features. *fap* In *fap* the *fap* course *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Physical *fap* Monadology, *fap* Kant *fap* also *fap* argues *fap* for *fap* the *fap* necessity *fap* of *fap* attractive *fap* and *fap* repulsive *fap* forces *fap* and *fap* attributes *fap* a *fap* significant *fap* role *fap* to *fap* the *fap* force *fap* of *fap* inertia. *fap* Kant's *fap* acceptance *fap* of *fap* such *fap* Newtonian *fap* principles *fap* represents *fap* an *fap* important *fap* change *fap* of *fap* position *fap* over *fap* the *fap* True *fap* Estimation, *fap* where *fap* Kant *fap* rejects *fap* the *fap* principle *fap* of *fap* inertia *fap* and *fap* pursues *fap* a *fap* dynamical *fap* theory *fap* much *fap* more *fap* in *fap* line *fap* with *fap* Leibniz's *fap* views.
In *fap* addition *fap* to *fap* these *fap* works, *fap* which *fap* bridge *fap* the *fap* gap, *fap* as *fap* it *fap* were, *fap* between *fap* physics *fap* and *fap* metaphysics, *fap* during *fap* this *fap* period *fap* Kant *fap* is *fap* interested *fap* in *fap* a *fap* series *fap* of *fap* specific *fap* issues *fap* in *fap* cosmology *fap* and *fap* empirical *fap* physics. *fap* For *fap* example, *fap* Kant *fap* writes *fap* several *fap* short *fap* exclusively *fap* scientific *fap* essays *fap* between *fap* 1754 *fap* to *fap* 1757, *fap* including *fap* "Brief *fap* Outline *fap* of *fap* Certain *fap* Meditations *fap* on *fap* Fire," *fap* "Investigation *fap* of *fap* the *fap* question *fap* of *fap* whether *fap* the *fap* Earth *fap* has *fap* suffered *fap* changes *fap* in *fap* its *fap* axial *fap* Rotation," *fap* "The *fap* Question *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Aging *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Earth, *fap* considered *fap* physically" *fap* as *fap* well *fap* as *fap* three *fap* papers *fap* on *fap* earthquakes. *fap* Of *fap* much *fap* greater *fap* significance *fap* is *fap* his *fap* Universal *fap* Natural *fap* History *fap* and *fap* Theory *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Heavens *fap* (1755), *fap* which *fap* represents *fap* an *fap* important *fap* contribution *fap* to *fap* science *fap* as *fap* such. *fap* For *fap* in *fap* it *fap* Kant *fap* explains *fap* how *fap* one *fap* can *fap* explain *fap* the *fap* formation *fap* of *fap* the *fap* solar *fap* system *fap* from *fap* an *fap* initial *fap* state, *fap* in *fap* which *fap* matter *fap* is *fap* dispersed *fap* like *fap* a *fap* cloud, *fap* solely *fap* by *fap* means *fap* of *fap* the *fap* interaction *fap* of *fap* attractive *fap* and *fap* repulsive *fap* forces. *fap* In *fap* 1796, *fap* LaPlace, *fap* unaware *fap* of *fap* Kant's *fap* argument, *fap* would *fap* develop *fap* a *fap* very *fap* similar *fap* derivation, *fap* with *fap* the *fap* result *fap* that *fap* the *fap* view *fap* is *fap* now *fap* typically *fap* referred *fap* to *fap* as *fap* the *fap* Kant-LaPlace *fap* nebular *fap* hypothesis.
Later *fap* in *fap* his *fap* pre-Critical *fap* period *fap* (1763-1770), *fap* Kant *fap* attempts *fap* to *fap* build *fap* a *fap* comprehensive *fap* metaphysical *fap* account *fap* on *fap* the *fap* basis *fap* of *fap* the *fap* framework *fap* that *fap* he *fap* had *fap* established *fap* in *fap* his *fap* first *fap* works. *fap* Thus, *fap* in *fap* his *fap* The *fap* Only *fap* Possible *fap* Basis *fap* for *fap* a *fap* Demonstration *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Existence *fap* of *fap* God *fap* (1763) *fap* he *fap* attempts *fap* to *fap* extend *fap* his *fap* reasoning *fap* to *fap* fundamental *fap* issues *fap* in *fap* both *fap* philosophical *fap* theology *fap* and *fap* teleology, *fap* presenting, *fap* for *fap* the *fap* first *fap* time, *fap* his *fap* now *fap* famous *fap* criticisms *fap* of *fap* the *fap* three *fap* traditional *fap* arguments *fap* for *fap* the *fap* existence *fap* of *fap* God, *fap* while *fap* developing *fap* a *fap* new *fap* theistic *fap* proof, *fap* based *fap* on *fap* the *fap* idea *fap* that *fap* God *fap* is *fap* necessary *fap* as *fap* a *fap* real *fap* ground *fap* of *fap* the *fap* possibilities *fap* of *fap* things. *fap* After *fap* reading *fap* Hume's *fap* Enquiry *fap* concerning *fap* Human *fap* Understanding *fap* in *fap* German *fap* translation *fap* sometime *fap* after *fap* 1755, *fap* Kant *fap* distinguishes *fap* between *fap* real *fap* and *fap* logical *fap* grounds/opposition *fap* in *fap* his *fap* Attempt *fap* to *fap* Introduce *fap* the *fap* Concept *fap* of *fap* Negative *fap* Magnitudes *fap* into *fap* Philosophy *fap* (1763) *fap* in *fap* order *fap* to *fap* avoid *fap* Hume's *fap* objection *fap* that *fap* there *fap* is *fap* no *fap* logical *fap* contradiction *fap* in *fap* the *fap* existence *fap* of *fap* one *fap* thing *fap* not *fap* following *fap* the *fap* existence *fap* of *fap* another. *fap* But *fap* in *fap* this *fap* work *fap* he *fap* is *fap* also *fap* interested *fap* in *fap* exploring *fap* the *fap* notion *fap* of *fap* a *fap* real *fap* ground/opposition *fap* further *fap* by *fap* applying *fap* it *fap* more *fap* widely, *fap* e.g., *fap* to *fap* bodies, *fap* mental *fap* states, *fap* etc. *fap* Also *fap* relevant *fap* is *fap* Kant's *fap* Concerning *fap* the *fap* Ultimate *fap* Foundation *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Distinction *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Directions *fap* in *fap* Space *fap* (1768) *fap* which *fap* modifies *fap* his *fap* earlier *fap* account *fap* of *fap* space *fap* insofar *fap* as *fap* he *fap* seems *fap* to *fap* hold *fap* that *fap* certain *fap* spatial *fap* properties *fap* may *fap* not *fap* be *fap* able *fap* to *fap* be *fap* explained *fap* entirely *fap* on *fap* the *fap* basis *fap* of *fap* the *fap* interaction *fap* between *fap* fundamental *fap* substances. *fap* In *fap* his *fap* so-called *fap* Inaugural *fap* Dissertation *fap* (1770), *fap* Kant *fap* continues *fap* to *fap* develop *fap* a *fap* more *fap* comprehensive *fap* philosophical *fap* system, *fap* which *fap* would *fap* encompass *fap* the *fap* principles *fap* of *fap* both *fap* the *fap* sensible *fap* and *fap* the *fap* intelligible *fap* world, *fap* and *fap* in *fap* so *fap* doing *fap* modifies *fap* his *fap* account *fap* of *fap* space *fap* and *fap* time *fap* even *fap* further. *fap* Over *fap* the *fap* course *fap* of *fap* the *fap* next *fap* ten *fap* years, *fap* during *fap* which *fap* he *fap* published *fap* almost *fap* nothing, *fap* Kant *fap* would *fap* revise *fap* his *fap* views *fap* more *fap* systematically, *fap* with *fap* the *fap* publication *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Critique *fap* of *fap* Pure *fap* Reason *fap* in *fap* 1781 *fap* representing *fap* the *fap* first *fap* major *fap* step *fap* in *fap* his *fap* "critical *fap* turn."
Adickes *fap* (1924), *fap* Harman *fap* (1982), *fap* Friedman *fap* (1992), *fap* Laywine *fap* (1993), *fap* Schönfeld *fap* (2000), *fap* Kuehn *fap* (2001), *fap* Lefevre *fap* & *fap* Wunderlich *fap* (2000), *fap* and *fap* Watkins *fap* (1997, *fap* 2001, *fap* 2003) *fap* have *fap* emphasized *fap* the *fap* importance *fap* of *fap* scientific *fap* issues *fap* in *fap* the *fap* development *fap* of *fap* Kant's *fap* thought *fap* during *fap* his *fap* pre-Critical *fap* period, *fap* as *fap* he *fap* reacted *fap* to *fap* Leibniz, *fap* Newton *fap* and *fap* other, *fap* more *fap* immediate *fap* predecessors *fap* (such *fap* as *fap* Christian *fap* Wolff, *fap* Christian *fap* August *fap* Crusius, *fap* Leonard *fap* Euler, *fap* Pierre *fap* Louis *fap* Moreau *fap* de *fap* Maupertuis, *fap* and *fap* Martin *fap* Knutzen).
2. *fap* Physics: *fap* The *fap* Critical *fap* Period *fap* (Metaphysical *fap* Foundations *fap* of *fap* Natural *fap* Science)
Though *fap* Kant *fap* discusses *fap* issues *fap* relevant *fap* to *fap* physics *fap* in *fap* various *fap* works *fap* throughout *fap* the *fap* Critical *fap* period *fap* (esp. *fap* the *fap* Critique *fap* of *fap* Pure *fap* Reason), *fap* his *fap* views *fap* on *fap* this *fap* topic *fap* are *fap* developed *fap* most *fap* explicitly *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations *fap* of *fap* Natural *fap* Science *fap* (1786), *fap* which *fap* consists *fap* of *fap* a *fap* preface *fap* and *fap* four *fap* chapters.
2.1 *fap* Preface
In *fap* the *fap* Preface *fap* to *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations *fap* Kant *fap* (i) *fap* analyzes *fap* the *fap* concepts *fap* of *fap* nature *fap* and *fap* science *fap* so *fap* as *fap* to *fap* establish *fap* what *fap* conditions *fap* must *fap* be *fap* met *fap* for *fap* a *fap* body *fap* of *fap* knowledge *fap* to *fap* constitute *fap* natural *fap* science *fap* in *fap* the *fap* proper *fap* sense, *fap* (ii) *fap* explains *fap* why *fap* science *fap* so *fap* understood *fap* requires *fap* "a *fap* pure *fap* part" *fap* (4:469) *fap* and *fap* what *fap* criteria *fap* would *fap* have *fap* to *fap* be *fap* satisfied *fap* for *fap* such *fap* a *fap* pure *fap* part *fap* to *fap* exist, *fap* (iii) *fap* argues *fap* that *fap* chemistry *fap* and *fap* psychology *fap* cannot *fap* at *fap* present *fap* meet *fap* these *fap* criteria, *fap* and *fap* (iv) *fap* describes *fap* what *fap* procedure *fap* should *fap* be *fap* followed *fap* to *fap* satisfy *fap* these *fap* criteria *fap* and *fap* thus *fap* to *fap* provide *fap* the *fap* "pure *fap* part" *fap* that *fap* science *fap* proper *fap* requires.
The *fap* feature *fap* of *fap* Kant's *fap* conception *fap* of *fap* natural *fap* science *fap* proper *fap* that *fap* is *fap* most *fap* immediately *fap* striking *fap* is *fap* how *fap* restrictive *fap* it *fap* is. *fap* It *fap* requires *fap* that *fap* cognition *fap* (i) *fap* be *fap* systematically *fap* ordered *fap* (ii) *fap* according *fap* to *fap* rational *fap* principles *fap* and *fap* (iii) *fap* be *fap* known *fap* a *fap* priori *fap* with *fap* apodictic *fap* certainty, *fap* i.e., *fap* with *fap* "consciousness *fap* of *fap* their *fap* necessity" *fap* (4:468). *fap* Because *fap* properly *fap* scientific *fap* cognition *fap* must *fap* satisfy *fap* these *fap* strict *fap* conditions, *fap* it *fap* requires *fap* "a *fap* pure *fap* part *fap* on *fap* which *fap* the *fap* apodictic *fap* certainty *fap* that *fap* reason *fap* seeks *fap* can *fap* be *fap* based" *fap* (4:469). *fap* But *fap* since *fap* Kant *fap* identifies *fap* pure *fap* rational *fap* cognition *fap* that *fap* is *fap* generated *fap* from *fap* concepts *fap* with *fap* metaphysics, *fap* it *fap* follows *fap* that *fap* science *fap* proper *fap* requires *fap* a *fap* metaphysics *fap* of *fap* nature. *fap* He *fap* then *fap* specifies *fap* that *fap* such *fap* a *fap* metaphysics *fap* of *fap* nature *fap* could *fap* consist *fap* in *fap* either *fap* a *fap* "transcendental *fap* part," *fap* which *fap* discusses *fap* the *fap* laws *fap* that *fap* make *fap* possible *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* a *fap* nature *fap* in *fap* general *fap* — *fap* "even *fap* without *fap* relation *fap* to *fap* any *fap* determinate *fap* object *fap* of *fap* experience" *fap* (4:469) *fap* — *fap* or *fap* a *fap* "special *fap* metaphysical" *fap* part, *fap* which *fap* concerns *fap* a *fap* "particular *fap* nature *fap* of *fap* this *fap* or *fap* that *fap* kind *fap* of *fap* things" *fap* for *fap* which *fap* an *fap* empirical *fap* concept *fap* is *fap* given.
Kant's *fap* very *fap* conception *fap* of *fap* natural *fap* science *fap* proper *fap* thus *fap* immediately *fap* gives *fap* rise *fap* to *fap* several *fap* systematically *fap* important *fap* questions. *fap* First, *fap* if *fap* the *fap* "transcendental *fap* part" *fap* of *fap* the *fap* metaphysics *fap* of *fap* nature *fap* can *fap* be *fap* identified *fap* with *fap* the *fap* results *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Critique *fap* of *fap* Pure *fap* Reason, *fap* then *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations *fap* is *fap* a *fap* work *fap* in *fap* special *fap* metaphysics. *fap* But *fap* what *fap* exactly *fap* is *fap* a *fap* special *fap* metaphysics? *fap* In *fap* particular, *fap* what *fap* particular *fap* natures *fap* or *fap* kinds *fap* of *fap* things *fap* could *fap* be *fap* its *fap* object? *fap* And *fap* how *fap* precisely *fap* can *fap* an *fap* empirical *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* such *fap* things *fap* be *fap* given *fap* without *fap* compromising *fap* the *fap* necessity *fap* required *fap* of *fap* the *fap* pure *fap* part *fap* of *fap* natural *fap* science? *fap* Second, *fap* how *fap* is *fap* the *fap* special *fap* metaphysics *fap* provided *fap* by *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations *fap* supposed *fap* to *fap* be *fap* related *fap* to *fap* the *fap* transcendental *fap* part *fap* of *fap* the *fap* metaphysics *fap* of *fap* nature *fap* that *fap* was *fap* established *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Critique *fap* of *fap* Pure *fap* Reason? *fap* Does *fap* the *fap* former *fap* presuppose *fap* the *fap* principles *fap* of *fap* the *fap* latter *fap* or *fap* are *fap* they *fap* logically *fap* independent, *fap* but *fap* still *fap* related *fap* to *fap* each *fap* other *fap* in *fap* some *fap* other *fap* way?
First, *fap* Kant *fap* suggests *fap* that *fap* in *fap* special *fap* metaphysics *fap* the *fap* principles *fap* of *fap* the *fap* transcendental *fap* part *fap* "are *fap* applied *fap* to *fap* the *fap* two *fap* species *fap* of *fap* objects *fap* of *fap* our *fap* senses" *fap* (4:470). *fap* Thus, *fap* the *fap* particular *fap* kinds *fap* of *fap* things *fap* that *fap* could *fap* be *fap* investigated *fap* in *fap* a *fap* special *fap* metaphysics *fap* are *fap* (i) *fap* the *fap* objects *fap* of *fap* outer *fap* sense, *fap* i.e., *fap* matter, *fap* and *fap* (ii) *fap* the *fap* objects *fap* of *fap* inner *fap* sense, *fap* i.e., *fap* thinking *fap* beings, *fap* which *fap* would *fap* thus *fap* result *fap* in *fap* a *fap* doctrine *fap* of *fap* body *fap* and *fap* a *fap* doctrine *fap* of *fap* soul. *fap* Kant *fap* then *fap* argues *fap* that *fap* because *fap* "the *fap* possibility *fap* of *fap* determinate *fap* natural *fap* things *fap* cannot *fap* be *fap* cognized *fap* from *fap* their *fap* mere *fap* concepts *fap* … *fap* it *fap* is *fap* still *fap* required *fap* that *fap* the *fap* intuition *fap* corresponding *fap* to *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* be *fap* given *fap* a *fap* priori, *fap* that *fap* is, *fap* that *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* be *fap* constructed" *fap* (4:470), *fap* which *fap* is *fap* a *fap* task *fap* that *fap* requires *fap* mathematics. *fap* This *fap* is *fap* Kant's *fap* justification *fap* for *fap* his *fap* famous *fap* claim *fap* that *fap* "in *fap* any *fap* special *fap* doctrine *fap* of *fap* nature *fap* there *fap* can *fap* be *fap* only *fap* as *fap* much *fap* proper *fap* science *fap* as *fap* there *fap* is *fap* mathematics *fap* therein" *fap* (4:470). *fap* This *fap* argument *fap* suggests *fap* that *fap* the *fap* necessity *fap* required *fap* of *fap* the *fap* pure *fap* part *fap* of *fap* natural *fap* science *fap* derives *fap* from *fap* the *fap* necessity *fap* of *fap* the *fap* rules *fap* by *fap* which *fap* the *fap* mathematical *fap* construction *fap* of *fap* determinate *fap* things *fap* must *fap* proceed.
Kant *fap* then *fap* uses *fap* the *fap* claim *fap* that *fap* science *fap* proper *fap* requires *fap* the *fap* construction *fap* of *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* the *fap* object *fap* in *fap* a *fap* priori *fap* intuition *fap* to *fap* exclude *fap* the *fap* possibility *fap* that *fap* chemistry *fap* and *fap* psychology, *fap* at *fap* least *fap* as *fap* they *fap* were *fap* practiced *fap* at *fap* that *fap* time, *fap* could *fap* count *fap* as *fap* science *fap* proper. *fap* In *fap* the *fap* case *fap* of *fap* chemistry, *fap* the *fap* problem *fap* is *fap* that *fap* "no *fap* law *fap* of *fap* the *fap* approach *fap* or *fap* withdrawal *fap* of *fap* the *fap* parts *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* can *fap* be *fap* specified *fap* according *fap* to *fap* which *fap* … *fap* their *fap* motions *fap* and *fap* all *fap* the *fap* consequences *fap* thereof *fap* can *fap* be *fap* made *fap* intuitive *fap* and *fap* presented *fap* a *fap* priori *fap* in *fap* space *fap* (a *fap* demand *fap* that *fap* will *fap* only *fap* with *fap* great *fap* difficulty *fap* ever *fap* be *fap* fulfilled)" *fap* (4:471). *fap* Since *fap* its *fap* principles *fap* are *fap* "merely *fap* empirical," *fap* it *fap* can, *fap* at *fap* best, *fap* be *fap* a *fap* "systematic *fap* art" *fap* (ibid.). *fap* The *fap* case *fap* of *fap* psychology *fap* is *fap* more *fap* complex, *fap* since *fap* Kant *fap* provides *fap* (at *fap* least) *fap* two *fap* separate *fap* reasons *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Preface *fap* for *fap* denying *fap* it *fap* the *fap* status *fap* of *fap* natural *fap* science *fap* proper. *fap* First, *fap* Kant *fap* claims *fap* that *fap* mathematics *fap* is *fap* inapplicable *fap* to *fap* the *fap* phenomena *fap* of *fap* inner *fap* sense *fap* and *fap* their *fap* laws, *fap* though *fap* he *fap* grants *fap* that *fap* the *fap* law *fap* of *fap* continuity *fap* (discussed, *fap* e.g., *fap* at *fap* A207-209/B253-255 *fap* and *fap* A228-229/B281 *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Critique *fap* of *fap* Pure *fap* Reason) *fap* ought *fap* to *fap* apply *fap* to *fap* changes *fap* in *fap* our *fap* representations *fap* as *fap* well. *fap* He *fap* downplays *fap* the *fap* significance *fap* of *fap* this *fap* application *fap* of *fap* the *fap* law *fap* of *fap* continuity, *fap* however, *fap* by *fap* noting *fap* that *fap* time *fap* has *fap* only *fap* one *fap* dimension, *fap* which *fap* does *fap* not *fap* provide *fap* enough *fap* material *fap* to *fap* extend *fap* our *fap* cognition *fap* significantly. *fap* Second, *fap* Kant *fap* also *fap* complains *fap* that *fap* empirical *fap* psychology *fap* cannot *fap* separate *fap* and *fap* recombine *fap* the *fap* phenomena *fap* of *fap* inner *fap* sense *fap* at *fap* will; *fap* rather, *fap* our *fap* inner *fap* observations *fap* can *fap* be *fap* separated *fap* "only *fap* by *fap* mere *fap* division *fap* in *fap* thought" *fap* (4:471). *fap* Kant's *fap* fuller *fap* views *fap* on *fap* chemistry *fap* and *fap* psychology *fap* will *fap* be *fap* discussed *fap* further *fap* below.
Second, *fap* in *fap* explaining *fap* how *fap* mathematics *fap* can *fap* be *fap* applied *fap* to *fap* bodies *fap* Kant *fap* asserts *fap* that *fap* "principles *fap* for *fap* the *fap* construction *fap* of *fap* the *fap* concepts *fap* that *fap* belong *fap* to *fap* the *fap* possibility *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* in *fap* general *fap* must *fap* first *fap* be *fap* introduced. *fap* Therefore *fap* a *fap* complete *fap* analysis *fap* of *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* a *fap* matter *fap* in *fap* general *fap* [must *fap* be *fap* provided *fap* in *fap* which *fap* it] *fap* makes *fap* use *fap* of *fap* no *fap* particular *fap* experiences, *fap* but *fap* only *fap* that *fap* which *fap* it *fap* finds *fap* in *fap* the *fap* isolated *fap* (although *fap* intrinsically *fap* empirical) *fap* concept *fap* itself, *fap* in *fap* relation *fap* to *fap* the *fap* pure *fap* intuitions *fap* in *fap* space *fap* and *fap* time, *fap* and *fap* in *fap* accordance *fap* with *fap* laws *fap* that *fap* already *fap* essentially *fap* attach *fap* to *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* nature *fap* in *fap* general" *fap* (4:472). *fap* Kant *fap* then *fap* explains *fap* that *fap* this *fap* means *fap* that *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* must *fap* be *fap* determined *fap* according *fap* to *fap* the *fap* Critique *fap* of *fap* Pure *fap* Reason's *fap* categories *fap* of *fap* quantity, *fap* quality, *fap* relation, *fap* and *fap* modality *fap* (4:474-476). *fap* Further, *fap* Kant *fap* holds *fap* that *fap* "a *fap* new *fap* determination" *fap* (4:476) *fap* must *fap* be *fap* added *fap* to *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* in *fap* each *fap* chapter *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations. *fap* This *fap* suggests *fap* not *fap* only *fap* that *fap* the *fap* principles *fap* argued *fap* for *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations *fap* are *fap* to *fap* be *fap* developed *fap* "in *fap* accordance *fap* with" *fap* the *fap* principles *fap* defended *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Critique *fap* of *fap* Pure *fap* Reason, *fap* but *fap* also *fap* that *fap* both *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* and *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations *fap* itself *fap* is *fap* structured *fap* according *fap* to *fap* the *fap* Critique *fap* of *fap* Pure *fap* Reason's *fap* table *fap* of *fap* categories.
Unfortunately, *fap* these *fap* points *fap* of *fap* clarification *fap* do *fap* not *fap* resolve *fap* all *fap* of *fap* the *fap* issues *fap* that *fap* are *fap* immediately *fap* raised *fap* by *fap* Kant's *fap* pronouncements *fap* about *fap* what *fap* is *fap* required *fap* for *fap* natural *fap* science *fap* proper. *fap* One *fap* further *fap* issue *fap* that *fap* is *fap* relevant *fap* here *fap* concerns *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* that *fap* is *fap* at *fap* the *fap* heart *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations. *fap* Kant *fap* introduces *fap* it *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Critique *fap* of *fap* Pure *fap* Reason *fap* (A847-848/B875-876) *fap* as *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* something *fap* that *fap* is *fap* impenetrable, *fap* extended, *fap* and *fap* inert. *fap* Yet, *fap* in *fap* the *fap* beginning *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Preface *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations, *fap* he *fap* describes *fap* it *fap* as *fap* whatever *fap* is *fap* an *fap* object *fap* of *fap* outer *fap* sense, *fap* and *fap* later *fap* he *fap* argues *fap* that *fap* the *fap* "basic *fap* determination *fap* of *fap* something *fap* that *fap* is *fap* to *fap* be *fap* an *fap* object *fap* of *fap* the *fap* outer *fap* senses *fap* had *fap* to *fap* be *fap* motion, *fap* because *fap* only *fap* thereby *fap* can *fap* these *fap* senses *fap* be *fap* affected" *fap* (4:476). *fap* Whatever *fap* weight *fap* one *fap* accords *fap* Kant's *fap* justification *fap* of *fap* the *fap* connection *fap* between *fap* matter, *fap* outer *fap* sense, *fap* and *fap* motion, *fap* one *fap* faces *fap* a *fap* dilemma. *fap* If *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* matter, *fap* most *fap* fundamentally, *fap* is *fap* simply *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* any *fap* object *fap* of *fap* outer *fap* sense, *fap* then *fap* how *fap* is *fap* it *fap* still *fap* empirical *fap* in *fap* any *fap* genuine *fap* sense *fap* (and *fap* what *fap* has *fap* become *fap* of *fap* the *fap* structural *fap* difference *fap* Kant *fap* draws *fap* between *fap* the *fap* Critique *fap* of *fap* Pure *fap* Reason *fap* and *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations)? *fap* If, *fap* by *fap* contrast, *fap* impenetrability, *fap* extension, *fap* and *fap* movability *fap* are *fap* deemed *fap* the *fap* basic *fap* traits *fap* of *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* matter, *fap* then *fap* how *fap* can *fap* one *fap* know *fap* a *fap* priori *fap* that *fap* any *fap* object *fap* we *fap* might *fap* encounter *fap* in *fap* outer *fap* sense *fap* must *fap* behave *fap* in *fap* accordance *fap* with *fap* the *fap* laws *fap* that *fap* would *fap* govern *fap* matter *fap* so *fap* defined?
Moreover, *fap* even *fap* if *fap* one *fap* can *fap* find *fap* an *fap* appropriately *fap* nuanced *fap* sense *fap* in *fap* which *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* is *fap* empirical *fap* while *fap* still *fap* allowing *fap* for *fap* an *fap* appropriate *fap* kind *fap* of *fap* necessity, *fap* questions *fap* can *fap* still *fap* be *fap* posed *fap* about *fap* the *fap* "new *fap* determinations" *fap* that *fap* are *fap* to *fap* be *fap* added *fap* to *fap* that *fap* concept *fap* in *fap* each *fap* chapter *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations. *fap* For *fap* example, *fap* what *fap* is *fap* the *fap* justification *fap* for *fap* each *fap* specific *fap* determination *fap* that *fap* is *fap* added *fap* when *fap* one *fap* thinks *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* as *fap* having *fap* a *fap* quantity, *fap* a *fap* quality, *fap* etc.? *fap* Also, *fap* what *fap* is *fap* the *fap* relationship *fap* between *fap* each *fap* new *fap* determination *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* and *fap* the *fap* various *fap* claims *fap* that *fap* Kant *fap* makes *fap* in *fap* each *fap* chapter *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations? *fap* In *fap* particular, *fap* when *fap* Kant *fap* explicitly *fap* invokes *fap* principles *fap* for *fap* constructing *fap* concepts *fap* belonging *fap* to *fap* the *fap* possibility *fap* of *fap* matter, *fap* is *fap* his *fap* idea *fap* that *fap* these *fap* principles *fap* are *fap* required *fap* insofar *fap* as *fap* they *fap* make *fap* experience *fap* of *fap* the *fap* relevant *fap* "new *fap* determination" *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* possible *fap* (so *fap* that *fap* Kant *fap* would *fap* be *fap* developing *fap* a *fap* transcendental *fap* argument *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations *fap* similar *fap* in *fap* many *fap* respects *fap* to *fap* the *fap* Critique *fap* of *fap* Pure *fap* Reason)? *fap* Answers *fap* to *fap* these *fap* questions *fap* depend *fap* on *fap* how *fap* one *fap* interprets *fap* the *fap* arguments *fap* Kant *fap* develops *fap* throughout *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations.
The *fap* conception *fap* of *fap* science *fap* that *fap* Kant *fap* presents *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Preface *fap* has *fap* been *fap* the *fap* focus *fap* of *fap* considerable *fap* attention *fap* over *fap* the *fap* past *fap* several *fap* decades. *fap* In *fap* the *fap* German *fap* literature, *fap* the *fap* issues *fap* raised *fap* above *fap* have *fap* been *fap* discussed *fap* at *fap* length *fap* by *fap* Plaass *fap* (1965), *fap* Schäfer *fap* (1966), *fap* Hoppe *fap* (1969), *fap* Gloy *fap* (1976), *fap* and *fap* Cramer *fap* (1985). *fap* Pollok *fap* (2001) *fap* has *fap* recently *fap* produced *fap* a *fap* detailed *fap* and *fap* comprehensive *fap* textual *fap* commentary *fap* on *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations. *fap* Important *fap* work *fap* has *fap* also *fap* been *fap* done *fap* in *fap* the *fap* English *fap* literature *fap* by *fap* Walker *fap* (1974), *fap* Brittan *fap* (1978), *fap* Buchdahl *fap* (1968, *fap* 1969, *fap* and *fap* 1986), *fap* Butts *fap* (1986), *fap* and *fap* Watkins *fap* (1998a). *fap* Friedman *fap* (1992, *fap* 2001, *fap* and *fap* 2002) *fap* has *fap* been *fap* especially *fap* influential *fap* on *fap* these *fap* issues *fap* as *fap* well.
2.2 *fap* Phoronomy
The *fap* first *fap* chapter *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations, *fap* the *fap* Phoronomy, *fap* considers *fap* the *fap* quantity *fap* of *fap* motion *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* and *fap* how *fap* it *fap* is *fap* to *fap* be *fap* constructed *fap* in *fap* intuition *fap* a *fap* priori *fap* (so *fap* as *fap* to *fap* produce *fap* the *fap* kind *fap* of *fap* rules *fap* that *fap* are *fap* necessary *fap* for *fap* our *fap* experience *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* in *fap* motion). *fap* Since *fap* extension *fap* and *fap* impenetrability *fap* are *fap* not *fap* directly *fap* relevant *fap* to *fap* how *fap* different *fap* magnitudes *fap* (or *fap* degrees) *fap* of *fap* motion *fap* can *fap* be *fap* represented, *fap* Kant *fap* restricts *fap* his *fap* discussion *fap* in *fap* this *fap* chapter *fap* to *fap* matter *fap* considered *fap* as *fap* a *fap* point. *fap* Since *fap* the *fap* motion *fap* of *fap* a *fap* point *fap* in *fap* space *fap* can *fap* be *fap* represented *fap* straightforwardly, *fap* the *fap* main *fap* issue *fap* is *fap* how *fap* to *fap* represent *fap* the *fap* composition *fap* of *fap* two *fap* different *fap* motions. *fap* Kant's *fap* primary *fap* claim *fap* in *fap* this *fap* chapter *fap* is *fap* that *fap* due *fap* to *fap* the *fap* relativity *fap* of *fap* space *fap* (i.e., *fap* the *fap* fact *fap* that *fap* every *fap* motion *fap* can *fap* be *fap* viewed *fap* arbitrarily *fap* as *fap* either *fap* the *fap* motion *fap* of *fap* a *fap* body *fap* in *fap* a *fap* space *fap* at *fap* rest, *fap* or *fap* as *fap* a *fap* body *fap* in *fap* a *fap* state *fap* of *fap* rest *fap* in *fap* a *fap* space *fap* which *fap* is *fap* in *fap* motion *fap* in *fap* the *fap* opposite *fap* direction *fap* with *fap* the *fap* same *fap* velocity) *fap* "the *fap* composition *fap* of *fap* two *fap* motions *fap* of *fap* one *fap* and *fap* the *fap* same *fap* point *fap* can *fap* only *fap* be *fap* thought *fap* in *fap* such *fap* a *fap* way *fap* that *fap* one *fap* of *fap* them *fap* is *fap* represented *fap* in *fap* absolute *fap* space, *fap* and, *fap* instead *fap* of *fap* the *fap* other, *fap* a *fap* motion *fap* of *fap* the *fap* relative *fap* space *fap* with *fap* the *fap* same *fap* speed *fap* occurring *fap* in *fap* the *fap* opposite *fap* direction *fap* is *fap* represented *fap* as *fap* the *fap* same *fap* as *fap* the *fap* latter" *fap* (4:490). *fap* The *fap* proof *fap* of *fap* this *fap* Theorem *fap* considers *fap* the *fap* three *fap* possible *fap* cases *fap* for *fap* the *fap* composition *fap* of *fap* two *fap* motions: *fap* (i) *fap* The *fap* two *fap* motions *fap* are *fap* in *fap* the *fap* same *fap* direction; *fap* (ii) *fap* the *fap* two *fap* motions *fap* are *fap* in *fap* opposite *fap* directions; *fap* (iii) *fap* the *fap* two *fap* motions *fap* enclose *fap* an *fap* angle. *fap* Kant *fap* then *fap* shows *fap* how *fap* one *fap* can *fap* construct *fap* a *fap* priori *fap* in *fap* intuition *fap* a *fap* single *fap* motion *fap* out *fap* of *fap* the *fap* two *fap* motions *fap* described *fap* in *fap* cases *fap* (i)-(iii).
Very *fap* little *fap* has *fap* been *fap* written *fap* directly *fap* on *fap* Kant's *fap* Phoronomy. *fap* (Kant's *fap* philosophy *fap* of *fap* mathematics, *fap* by *fap* contrast, *fap* has *fap* received *fap* considerable *fap* attention.) *fap* The *fap* most *fap* extensive *fap* discussions *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Phoronomy *fap* are *fap* by *fap* Palter *fap* (1972) *fap* and *fap* Pollok *fap* (2001).
2.3 *fap* Dynamics
The *fap* second *fap* chapter *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations, *fap* the *fap* Dynamics, *fap* considers *fap* how *fap* it *fap* is *fap* possible *fap* to *fap* experience *fap* matter *fap* as *fap* filling *fap* a *fap* determinate *fap* region *fap* in *fap* space. *fap* Propositions *fap* 1-4 *fap* are *fap* devoted *fap* to *fap* exhibiting *fap* the *fap* nature *fap* and *fap* necessity *fap* of *fap* repulsive *fap* forces. *fap* In *fap* Proposition *fap* 1 *fap* Kant *fap* argues *fap* that *fap* repulsive *fap* force *fap* is *fap* required *fap* for *fap* matter *fap* to *fap* fill *fap* space, *fap* since *fap* solidity, *fap* understood *fap* by *fap* "Lambert *fap* and *fap* others" *fap* as *fap* the *fap* property *fap* matter *fap* would *fap* have *fap* by *fap* means *fap* of *fap* "its *fap* mere *fap* existence" *fap* (4:497), *fap* cannot *fap* truly *fap* explain *fap* how *fap* one *fap* matter *fap* resists *fap* another *fap* matter's *fap* attempt *fap* to *fap* penetrate *fap* it. *fap* Kant *fap* then *fap* specifies *fap* several *fap* central *fap* features *fap* of *fap* repulsive *fap* forces *fap* in *fap* Propositions *fap* 2 *fap* and *fap* 3. *fap* Repulsive *fap* forces *fap* admit *fap* of *fap* degrees *fap* to *fap* infinity, *fap* since *fap* one *fap* must *fap* always *fap* be *fap* able *fap* to *fap* think *fap* of *fap* a *fap* slightly *fap* greater *fap* or *fap* lesser *fap* force, *fap* and *fap* although *fap* matter *fap* can *fap* be *fap* compressed *fap* to *fap* infinity, *fap* it *fap* can *fap* never *fap* be *fap* penetrated, *fap* since *fap* that *fap* would *fap* require *fap* an *fap* infinite *fap* compressing *fap* force, *fap* which *fap* is *fap* impossible.
In *fap* Proposition *fap* 4 *fap* Kant *fap* draws *fap* an *fap* important *fap* consequence *fap* from *fap* his *fap* characterization *fap* of *fap* repulsive *fap* forces, *fap* namely *fap* that *fap* matter *fap* is *fap* infinitely *fap* divisible *fap* (4:503). *fap* What *fap* is *fap* especially *fap* striking *fap* about *fap* this *fap* point *fap* is *fap* that *fap* it *fap* represents *fap* a *fap* significant *fap* departure *fap* from *fap* his *fap* own *fap* earlier *fap* Physical *fap* Monadology, *fap* where *fap* he *fap* had *fap* accepted *fap* attractive *fap* and *fap* repulsive *fap* forces, *fap* but *fap* denied *fap* the *fap* infinite *fap* divisibility *fap* of *fap* what *fap* ultimately *fap* constitutes *fap* matter, *fap* namely *fap* physical *fap* points *fap* or *fap* monads. *fap* It *fap* is *fap* true *fap* that *fap* part *fap* of *fap* Kant's *fap* rationale *fap* for *fap* his *fap* change *fap* of *fap* position *fap* on *fap* this *fap* point *fap* stems *fap* from *fap* the *fap* "critical *fap* turn" *fap* undertaken *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Critique *fap* of *fap* Pure *fap* Reason *fap* (and *fap* in *fap* its *fap* Second *fap* Antinomy *fap* in *fap* particular). *fap* For *fap* once *fap* one *fap* recognizes *fap* that *fap* both *fap* space *fap* and *fap* spatial *fap* properties *fap* such *fap* as *fap* divisibility *fap* are *fap* not *fap* properties *fap* of *fap* things *fap* in *fap* themselves *fap* but *fap* rather *fap* only *fap* appearances, *fap* one *fap* can *fap* reject *fap* the *fap* proposition *fap* that *fap* seems *fap* to *fap* necessitate *fap* the *fap* acceptance *fap* of *fap* simple *fap* substances, *fap* namely *fap* the *fap* idea *fap* that *fap* simple *fap* substances *fap* must *fap* precede *fap* the *fap* wholes *fap* they *fap* compose *fap* (4:506). *fap* However, *fap* Kant's *fap* proof *fap* also *fap* seems *fap* to *fap* depend, *fap* in *fap* its *fap* details, *fap* not *fap* merely *fap* on *fap* the *fap* idea *fap* that *fap* every *fap* space *fap* is *fap* filled *fap* by *fap* means *fap* of *fap* some *fap* repulsive *fap* force *fap* or *fap* other, *fap* but *fap* on *fap* the *fap* stronger *fap* claim *fap* that *fap* every *fap* space *fap* is *fap* divisible *fap* into *fap* smaller *fap* spaces *fap* that *fap* are *fap* filled *fap* by *fap* different *fap* repulsive *fap* forces.
Propositions *fap* 5-8 *fap* are *fap* all *fap* devoted *fap* to *fap* attractive *fap* force. *fap* In *fap* Proposition *fap* 5 *fap* Kant *fap* argues *fap* that *fap* matter *fap* must *fap* have *fap* an *fap* attractive *fap* force *fap* in *fap* order *fap* to *fap* fill *fap* space. *fap* Kant's *fap* argument *fap* is *fap* that *fap* if *fap* there *fap* were *fap* only *fap* repulsive *fap* forces, *fap* then *fap* matter *fap* "would *fap* disperse *fap* itself *fap* to *fap* infinity" *fap* (4:508) *fap* since *fap* neither *fap* space *fap* nor *fap* other *fap* matter *fap* could *fap* limit *fap* it. *fap* Proposition *fap* 6 *fap* argues *fap* that *fap* both *fap* attractive *fap* and *fap* repulsive *fap* forces *fap* must *fap* be *fap* considered *fap* essential *fap* to *fap* matter. *fap* That *fap* is, *fap* attractive *fap* forces *fap* alone *fap* are *fap* not *fap* sufficient *fap* to *fap* account *fap* for *fap* matter *fap* filling *fap* a *fap* space, *fap* since *fap* if *fap* matter *fap* consisted *fap* solely *fap* of *fap* attractive *fap* forces, *fap* there *fap* would *fap* be *fap* no *fap* force *fap* to *fap* counteract *fap* the *fap* attractive *fap* force *fap* being *fap* exercised *fap* and *fap* the *fap* universe *fap* would *fap* collapse *fap* into *fap* a *fap* single *fap* point. *fap* Proposition *fap* 7 *fap* then *fap* specifies *fap* how *fap* attractive *fap* forces *fap* are *fap* to *fap* be *fap* understood, *fap* namely *fap* as *fap* the *fap* immediate *fap* action *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* on *fap* other *fap* matter *fap* through *fap* empty *fap* space *fap* (and *fap* therefore *fap* at *fap* a *fap* distance). *fap* Kant *fap* thus *fap* directly *fap* confronts *fap* the *fap* metaphysical *fap* question *fap* of *fap* how *fap* to *fap* understand *fap* attraction *fap* that *fap* Newton *fap* attempted *fap* to *fap* avoid *fap* by *fap* positing *fap* it *fap* merely *fap* mathematically. *fap* As *fap* Kant *fap* interprets *fap* the *fap* situation, *fap* Newton *fap* "abstracts *fap* from *fap* all *fap* hypotheses *fap* purporting *fap* to *fap* answer *fap* the *fap* question *fap* as *fap* to *fap* the *fap* cause *fap* of *fap* the *fap* universal *fap* attraction *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* … *fap* [since] *fap* this *fap* question *fap* is *fap* physical *fap* or *fap* metaphysical, *fap* but *fap* not *fap* mathematical" *fap* (4:515). *fap* In *fap* response *fap* to *fap* the *fap* "most *fap* common *fap* objection *fap* to *fap* immediate *fap* action *fap* at *fap* a *fap* distance," *fap* namely *fap* "that *fap* a *fap* matter *fap* cannot *fap* act *fap* immediately *fap* where *fap* it *fap* is *fap* not" *fap* (4:513), *fap* Kant *fap* argues *fap* that *fap* action *fap* at *fap* a *fap* distance *fap* is *fap* no *fap* more *fap* problematic *fap* than *fap* action *fap* by *fap* means *fap* of *fap* physical *fap* contact *fap* (whether *fap* it *fap* be *fap* by *fap* collision *fap* or *fap* pressure), *fap* since *fap* in *fap* both *fap* cases *fap* a *fap* body *fap* is *fap* simply *fap* acting *fap* outside *fap* itself. *fap* Proposition *fap* 8 *fap* concludes *fap* by *fap* arguing *fap* that *fap* attractive *fap* forces *fap* act *fap* immediately *fap* to *fap* infinity *fap* and *fap* by *fap* adding *fap* a *fap* "preliminary *fap* suggestion" *fap* (4:518) *fap* as *fap* to *fap* how *fap* one *fap* might *fap* be *fap* able *fap* to *fap* construct *fap* the *fap* concept *fap* of *fap* cohesion *fap* (which *fap* Kant *fap* understands *fap* as *fap* attraction *fap* that *fap* is *fap* restricted *fap* to *fap* contact).
In *fap* the *fap* General *fap* Remark *fap* to *fap* Dynamics *fap* Kant *fap* addresses *fap* two *fap* main *fap* issues. *fap* First, *fap* Kant *fap* considers *fap* how *fap* it *fap* is *fap* that *fap* the *fap* specific *fap* varieties *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* (e.g., *fap* water *fap* as *fap* different *fap* from *fap* mercury) *fap* might *fap* be *fap* reduced, *fap* at *fap* least *fap* in *fap* principle, *fap* to *fap* the *fap* fundamental *fap* forces *fap* of *fap* attraction *fap* and *fap* repulsion. *fap* The *fap* second *fap* issue *fap* concerns *fap* the *fap* fundamental *fap* distinction *fap* between *fap* the *fap* "mathematical-mechanical" *fap* and *fap* the *fap* "metaphysical-dynamical *fap* mode *fap* of *fap* explanation". *fap* The *fap* former *fap* mode *fap* of *fap* explanation, *fap* which *fap* is *fap* associated *fap* with *fap* the *fap* postulation *fap* of *fap* atoms *fap* and *fap* the *fap* void, *fap* employs *fap* nothing *fap* more *fap* than *fap* the *fap* shapes *fap* and *fap* motions *fap* of *fap* fundamental *fap* particles *fap* and *fap* empty *fap* interstices *fap* interspersed *fap* among *fap* them. *fap* It *fap* contrasts *fap* with *fap* the *fap* metaphysical-dynamical *fap* mode, *fap* which *fap* employs *fap* fundamental *fap* moving *fap* forces *fap* (e.g., *fap* attraction *fap* and *fap* repulsion) *fap* in *fap* its *fap* explanations. *fap* Kant *fap* grants *fap* that *fap* the *fap* mathematical-mechanical *fap* mode *fap* has *fap* an *fap* advantage *fap* over *fap* the *fap* metaphysical-dynamical *fap* mode, *fap* since *fap* its *fap* fundamental *fap* posits *fap* can *fap* be *fap* represented *fap* (indeed, *fap* "verified" *fap* (4:525)) *fap* mathematically, *fap* whereas *fap* he *fap* repeatedly *fap* admits *fap* that *fap* the *fap* possibility *fap* of *fap* fundamental *fap* forces *fap* can *fap* never *fap* be *fap* comprehended, *fap* i.e., *fap* their *fap* possibility *fap* can *fap* never *fap* be *fap* rendered *fap* certain. *fap* However, *fap* Kant *fap* thinks *fap* that *fap* this *fap* advantage *fap* is *fap* outweighed *fap* by *fap* two *fap* disadvantages. *fap* First, *fap* by *fap* presupposing *fap* absolute *fap* impenetrability, *fap* the *fap* mathematical-mechanical *fap* mode *fap* of *fap* explanation *fap* accepts *fap* an *fap* "empty *fap* concept" *fap* at *fap* its *fap* foundation. *fap* Second, *fap* by *fap* giving *fap* up *fap* all *fap* forces *fap* that *fap* would *fap* be *fap* inherent *fap* in *fap* matter, *fap* such *fap* a *fap* mode *fap* of *fap* explanation *fap* provides *fap* the *fap* imagination *fap* with *fap* more *fap* freedom *fap* "than *fap* is *fap* truly *fap* consistent *fap* with *fap* the *fap* caution *fap* of *fap* philosophy" *fap* (4:525).
Given *fap* that *fap* the *fap* bulk *fap* of *fap* Kant's *fap* matter *fap* theory *fap* is *fap* presented *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Dynamics, *fap* it *fap* is *fap* unsurprising *fap* that *fap* it *fap* has *fap* received *fap* the *fap* greatest *fap* amount *fap* of *fap* attention *fap* in *fap* the *fap* literature. *fap* Of *fap* particular *fap* note *fap* are *fap* discussions *fap* by *fap* Buchdahl *fap* (1968, *fap* 1969), *fap* Brittan *fap* (1978), *fap* Kitcher *fap* (1983), *fap* Butts *fap* (1986), *fap* Carrier *fap* (1990), *fap* Friedman *fap* (1990), *fap* Malzkorn *fap* (1998), *fap* and *fap* Pollok *fap* (2002).
2.4 *fap* Mechanics
The *fap* third *fap* chapter *fap* of *fap* Kant's *fap* Metaphysical *fap* Foundations, *fap* the *fap* Mechanics, *fap* concerns *fap* how *fap* it *fap* is *fap* possible *fap* to *fap* experience *fap* matter *fap* as *fap* having *fap* a *fap* moving *fap* force, *fap* that *fap* is, *fap* how *fap* one *fap* matter *fap* communicates *fap* its *fap* motion *fap* to *fap* another *fap* by *fap* means *fap* of *fap* its *fap* moving *fap* force. *fap* Kant *fap* begins, *fap* in *fap* Proposition *fap* 1, *fap* by *fap* clarifying *fap* how *fap* the *fap* quantity *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* is *fap* to *fap* be *fap* estimated *fap* before *fap* stating, *fap* in *fap* Propositions *fap* 2-4, *fap* three *fap* Laws *fap* of *fap* Mechanics.
After *fap* first *fap* defining *fap* the *fap* quantity *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* and *fap* the *fap* quantity *fap* of *fap* motion *fap* (or, *fap* in *fap* contemporary *fap* terms, *fap* impulse, *fap* i=mv), *fap* Kant *fap* asserts *fap* that *fap* the *fap* quantity *fap* of *fap* matter, *fap* in *fap* comparison *fap* with *fap* every *fap* other *fap* matter, *fap* can *fap* be *fap* estimated *fap* only *fap* by *fap* the *fap* quantity *fap* of *fap* motion *fap* at *fap* a *fap* given *fap* speed *fap* (4:537). *fap* Kant's *fap* proof *fap* proceeds *fap* by *fap* way *fap* of *fap* elimination. *fap* The *fap* quantity *fap* of *fap* matter, *fap* which *fap* is *fap* the *fap* aggregate *fap* of *fap* the *fap* movable *fap* in *fap* a *fap* determinate *fap* space, *fap* cannot *fap* be *fap* estimated *fap* by *fap* counting *fap* the *fap* number *fap* of *fap* parts *fap* it *fap* has, *fap* since, *fap* as *fap* was *fap* established *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Dynamics, *fap* every *fap* matter *fap* is *fap* infinitely *fap* divisible. *fap* Nor *fap* can *fap* one *fap* estimate *fap* the *fap* quantity *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* merely *fap* by *fap* considering *fap* its *fap* volume, *fap* since *fap* different *fap* matters *fap* can *fap* have *fap* different *fap* specific *fap* densities. *fap* As *fap* a *fap* result, *fap* the *fap* only *fap* universally *fap* applicable *fap* way *fap* of *fap* estimating *fap* the *fap* quantity *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* is *fap* to *fap* hold *fap* the *fap* velocity *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* constant.
In *fap* Proposition *fap* 2, *fap* Kant *fap* states *fap* his *fap* First *fap* Law *fap* of *fap* Mechanics: *fap* the *fap* total *fap* quantity *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* remains *fap* the *fap* same *fap* throughout *fap* all *fap* changes *fap* in *fap* matter *fap* (4:541). *fap* His *fap* proof *fap* seems *fap* to *fap* rely *fap* (i) *fap* on *fap* the *fap* principle *fap* of *fap* the *fap* First *fap* Analogy *fap* of *fap* Experience *fap* that *fap* no *fap* substance *fap* arises *fap* or *fap* perishes *fap* throughout *fap* any *fap* change *fap* in *fap* nature *fap* and *fap* (ii) *fap* on *fap* the *fap* identification *fap* of *fap* what *fap* in *fap* matter *fap* must *fap* be *fap* substantial. *fap* On *fap* this *fap* latter *fap* point, *fap* Kant *fap* quickly *fap* assumes *fap* that *fap* the *fap* ultimate *fap* subject *fap* of *fap* all *fap* accidents *fap* inhering *fap* in *fap* matter *fap* must *fap* be *fap* the *fap* movable *fap* in *fap* space, *fap* and *fap* that *fap* its *fap* quantity *fap* is *fap* the *fap* aggregate *fap* of *fap* the *fap* movable *fap* in *fap* space. *fap* In *fap* his *fap* remark *fap* to *fap* this *fap* proposition, *fap* Kant *fap* explicitly *fap* notes *fap* that *fap* there *fap* is *fap* a *fap* crucial *fap* difference *fap* between *fap* spatial *fap* and *fap* non-spatial *fap* substances, *fap* since *fap* the *fap* latter, *fap* unlike *fap* the *fap* former, *fap* could *fap* gradually *fap* fade *fap* away *fap* by *fap* degrees. *fap* (Kant *fap* cites *fap* the *fap* possibility *fap* of *fap* consciousness *fap* as *fap* a *fap* concrete *fap* example.) *fap* Kant *fap* uses *fap* this *fap* difference *fap* to *fap* argue *fap* that *fap* since *fap* the *fap* quantity *fap* of *fap* matter *fap* consists *fap* in *fap* a *fap* plurality *fap* of *fap* real *fap* things *fap* external *fap* to *fap* each *fap* other *fap* that *fap* cannot *fap* fade *fap* away *fap* (as *fap* consciousness *fap* might), *fap* the *fap* only *fap* way *fap* to *fap* decrease *fap* its *fap* quantity *fap* is *fap* by *fap* division.
Kant's *fap* Second *fap* Law *fap* of *fap* Mechanics, *fap* stated *fap* in *fap* Proposition *fap* 3, *fap* is *fap* that *fap* every *fap* change *fap* in *fap* matter *fap* has *fap* an *fap* external *fap* cause. *fap* (Immediately *fap* after *fap* this *fap* principle, *fap* Kant *fap* adds *fap* in *fap* parentheses *fap* a *fap* version *fap* of *fap* the *fap* law *fap* of *fap* inertia *fap* that *fap* is *fap* much *fap* closer *fap* to *fap* Newton's: *fap* "every *fap* body *fap* persists *fap* in *fap* its *fap* state *fap* of *fap* rest *fap* or *fap* motion, *fap* in *fap* the *fap* same *fap* direction, *fap* and *fap* with *fap* the *fap* same *fap* speed, *fap* it *fap* is *fap* not *fap* compelled *fap* by *fap* an *fap* external *fap* cause *fap* to *fap* leave *fap* this *fap* state" *fap* (4:543). *fap* Since *fap* Kant's *fap* Second *fap* Law *fap* of *fap* Mechanics *fap* is *fap* not *fap* identical *fap* to *fap* Newton's *fap* law *fap* of *fap* inertia, *fap* it *fap* would *fap* require *fap* argument *fap* to *fap* show *fap* that, *fap* and *fap* by *fap* means *fap* of *fap* what *fap* additional *fap* assumptions, *fap* the *fap* former *fap* entails *fap* the *fap* latter.) *fap* The *fap* proof *fap* of *fap* the *fap* main *fap* principle *fap* depends *fap* on *fap* the *fap* Second *fap* Analogy *fap* of *fap* Experience *fap* (which *fap* asserts *fap* that *fap* all *fap* changes *fap* occur *fap* in *fap* accordance *fap* with *fap* the *fap* law *fap* of *fap* cause *fap* and *fap* effect *fap* and *fap* thus *fap* entails *fap* that *fap* every *fap* change *fap* in *fap* matter *fap* has *fap* a *fap* cause) *fap* as *fap* well *fap* as *fap* on *fap* the *fap* further *fap* assumption *fap* that *fap* matter *fap* has *fap* no *fap* internal *fap* grounds *fap* of *fap* determinations *fap* (such *fap* as *fap* thinking *fap* and *fap* desiring), *fap* but *fap* rather *fap* only *fap* external *fap* relations *fap* in *fap* space. *fap* In *fap* his *fap* remark *fap* to *fap* this *fap* proposition, *fap* which *fap* clarifies *fap* this *fap* "law *fap* of *fap* inertia," *fap* Kant *fap* explains *fap* that *fap* inertia *fap* is *fap* to *fap* be *fap* contrasted *fap* with *fap* life *fap* or *fap* the *fap* ability *fap* of *fap* a *fap* substance *fap* to *fap* determine *fap* itself *fap* to *fap* act *fap* from *fap* an *fap* internal *fap* principle. *fap* Thus, *fap* a *fap* body's *fap* inertia *fap* "does *fap* not *fap* mean *fap* a *fap* positive *fap* striving *fap* to *fap* conserve *fap* its *fap* state" *fap* (4:544), *fap* but *fap* rather *fap* what *fap* it *fap* does *fap* not *fap* do, *fap* its *fap* lifelessness.
Kant *fap* also *fap* asserts *fap* that *fap* the *fap* very *fap* possibility *fap* of *fap* natural *fap* science *fap* proper *fap* depends *fap* on *fap* the *fap* law *fap* of *fap* inertia, *fap* since *fap* the *fap* rejection *fap* of *fap* it *fap* would *fap* be *fap* hylozoism, *fap* "the *fap* death *fap* of *fap* all *fap* natural *fap* philosophy" *fap* (4:544). *fap* In *fap* a *fap* later *fap* remark *fap* in *fap* the *fap* Mechanics, *fap* Kant *fap* explicitly *fap* objects *fap* that *fap* "the *fap* terminology *fap* of *fap* inertial *fap* force *fap* (vis *fap* inertiae) *fap* must *fap* be *fap* entirely *fap* banished *fap* from *fap* natural *fap* science, *fap* not *fap* only *fap* because *fap* it *fap* carries *fap* with *fap* it *fap* a *fap* contradiction *fap* in *fap* terms, *fap* nor *fap* even *fap* because *fap* the *fap* law *fap* of *fap* inertia *fap* (lifelessness) *fap* might *fap* thereby *fap* be *fap* easily *fap* confused *fap* with *fap* the *fap* law *fap* of *fap* reaction *fap* in *fap* every *fap* communicated *fap* motion, *fap* but *fap* primarily *fap* because *fap* the *fap* mistaken *fap* idea *fap* of *fap* those *fap* who *fap* are *fap* not *fap* properly *fap* acquainted *fap* with *fap* the *fap* mechanical *fap* laws *fap* is *fap* thereby *fap* maintained *fap* and *fap* even *fap* strengthened" *fap* (4:550). *fap* Kant *fap* goes *fap* on *fap* to *fap* point *fap* out *fap* that *fap* if *fap* inertia *fap* were *fap* to *fap* entail *fap* an *fap* active *fap* force *fap* of *fap* resistance, *fap* then *fap* it *fap* would *fap* be *fap* possible *fap* that *fap* when *fap* one *fap* moving *fap* body *fap* hits *fap* another, *fap* the *fap* moving *fap* body *fap* has *fap* to *fap* apply *fap* part *fap* of *fap* its *fap* motion *fap* solely *fap* to *fap* overcome *fap* the *fap* inertia *fap* of *fap* the *fap* one *fap* at *fap* rest *fap* and *fap* might *fap* not *fap* have *fap* any *fap* motion *fap* left *fap* over, *fap* as *fap* it *fap* were, *fap* to *fap* set *fap* the *fap* body *fap* at *fap* rest *fap* into *fap* motion, *fap* which *fap* is *fap* contrary *fap* to *fap* experience *fap* (and *fap* Proposition *fap* 2).
Kant's *fap* Third *fap* Law *fap* of *fap* Mechanics, *fap* expressed *fap* in *fap* Proposition *fap* 4, *fap* asserts *fap* the *fap* equality *fap* of *fap* action *fap* and *fap* reaction *fap* in *fap* the *fap* communication *fap* of *fap* motion. *fap* Kant *fap* formulates *fap* a *fap* version *fap* of *fap* the *fap* Third *fap* Analogy *fap* of *fap* Experience *fap* (according *fap* to *fap* which *fap* all *fap* external *fap* action *fap* in *fap* the *fap* world *fap* |
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| pkcRAISTLIN |
:stongue: :stongue: :stongue:
you are the ing man lira! :)
oh, don't forget we're all gonna want our custom football sigs for euro 2008! :) |
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| Clovis |
| This thread delivers. |
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