|
I am a Strange Loop. [Philosophy/Logic Content] (pg. 7)
|
View this Thread in Original format
| PETRAN |
So, is this similar to David Hume's "Bundle" theory of the self? Such as there is no difference between the perceiver and the perceived and what is perceived gives the illusion that someone is perceiving it? And that all self is an illusory concept that results from the sum of such perceptions ("bundles")? (to be more accurate in modern cognitive-psychology terms,bundles can be thought as mental representations, and when these representations represent other representations such as I look at the FLOWER, these become meta-representations). So is this "strange-loop" a "meta-representation" or in oder terms, a "bundle"?
:conf: |
|
|
| RJT |
| quote: | Originally posted by Lira
[*]I remember you like Chomsky's theories of language, and that made me curious. To Chomsky, babies are far from being blank slates, and posits so much pre-linguistic knowledge that I wonder whether it is just a dissonant opinion (compared to yours) or something else entirely, that I've mistakenly taken to refer to the same thing.
(I'm far from being Chomskian, mind you, so if there's any common phenomenon you guys are talking about, I'm far more likely to side with the whole generative enterprise :toothless)
[/list] |
I wonder whether or not the idea of a "blank slate" is really incompatible with Chomsky, though I'm not too familiar with his work, wouldn't he be more likely to say something along the lines of "within the human mind lies the inherent predisposition towards language"? And in that sense, wouldn't the mind be a bit like a blank slate that merely had the potential for language, rather than there actually being some tactile (and maybe dormant?) function inherent in the brain that has language unlocked from it?
I think that's the general idea that Hofstadter (not Sellars) is getting at with his discussion of the "I-ness" of babies. Sellars, on the other hand, would probably just say that you're completely blank from the get go and require the experience of "learning language" in order to even think or know in the first place.
| quote: | Originally posted by PETRAN
So, is this similar to David Hume's "Bundle" theory of the self? Such as there is no difference between the perceiver and the perceived and what is perceived gives the illusion that someone is perceiving it? And that all self is an illusory concept that results from the sum of such perceptions ("bundles")? (to be more accurate in modern cognitive-psychology terms,bundles can be thought as mental representations, and when these representations represent other representations such as I look at the FLOWER, these become meta-representations). So is this "strange-loop" a "meta-representation" or in oder terms, a "bundle"?
:conf: |
Hmmm, this is a good question and one I'm not sure I'm capable of giving a satisfactory answer to, but I will try.
I think that Hofstadter's loops probably do work somewhat analogously to Hume's bundle theory (as you've posited it - I have to admit I'm only vaguely familiar with this part of Hume). The one thing that I think seals it for me is that with Hume being part of the British Empiricist tradition and Hofstadter blatantly admitting that he's a reductionist-materialist, it does make sense to think they'd both account for self in a similar way.
Where I hesitate, however, is to make the bundle theory analogy with the paper I wrote, and even then I think my hesitation might be unwarranted. The only reason I say anything at all is that Sellars is highly suspicious of the empiricist project of accounting for knowledge in general, and would thus (I think) be very hesitant of any lines being drawn between the two. For him, the only knowledge we ever really talk about is relative knowledge and it will always stem from language - it certainly won't exist independent of us.
That might not have even come close to answering your question though. :( |
|
|
| pkcRAISTLIN |
| i like boobies. |
|
|
| PETRAN |
| quote: | Originally posted by RJT
I wonder whether or not the idea of a "blank slate" is really incompatible with Chomsky, though I'm not too familiar with his work, wouldn't he be more likely to say something along the lines of "within the human mind lies the inherent predisposition towards language"? And in that sense, wouldn't the mind be a bit like a blank slate that merely had the potential for language, rather than there actually being some tactile (and maybe dormant?) function inherent in the brain that has language unlocked from it?
I think that's the general idea that Hofstadter (not Sellars) is getting at with his discussion of the "I-ness" of babies. Sellars, on the other hand, would probably just say that you're completely blank from the get go and require the experience of "learning language" in order to even think or know in the first place.
Hmmm, this is a good question and one I'm not sure I'm capable of giving a satisfactory answer to, but I will try.
I think that Hofstadter's loops probably do work somewhat analogously to Hume's bundle theory (as you've posited it - I have to admit I'm only vaguely familiar with this part of Hume). The one thing that I think seals it for me is that with Hume being part of the British Empiricist tradition and Hofstadter blatantly admitting that he's a reductionist-materialist, it does make sense to think they'd both account for self in a similar way.
Where I hesitate, however, is to make the bundle theory analogy with the paper I wrote, and even then I think my hesitation might be unwarranted. The only reason I say anything at all is that Sellars is highly suspicious of the empiricist project of accounting for knowledge in general, and would thus (I think) be very hesitant of any lines being drawn between the two. For him, the only knowledge we ever really talk about is relative knowledge and it will always stem from language - it certainly won't exist independent of us.
That might not have even come close to answering your question though. :( |
For the first part, Chomsky is indeed extremely critical of "behaviourist blank slate" views. In a matter of fact his "universal grammar" theory was proposed as the radically contrasting view to the behaviourist-associative (possibly relativist) tradition. According to Chomsky, all humans come with a knowledge of innate linquistic rules which are collectively known as the "universal grammar". That is, the set of rules and parameters which are essential for language are innately embedded within the brain (and to be more precise, within certain brain areas. Recent research has shown that the so-called "Broca's area" situated in the pre-frontal lobe can be essentialy the "language organ" or Language Aquisition Device-LAD. that Chomsky proposed) This could explain many phenomena, such as the rapid aquisition of linquistic (grammatical and syntactic) rules by all children despite their culture, as well as the grammatical similarities which are shared between the languages of the world. Notice that this view represents the exact opposite of Watson's (and Skinner's) "blank slate" in which humans come completely empty (stripped) of any knowledge (of any kind), and that all information is gained by "conditioning", in which when spatial and temporal aspects allow, stimuli and responses are associated in random relativistic ways, building long chains (associations) of information. This certainly is true, this is what memory and categorisation (knowledge) are, but it is simply not the whole story of a human being's mental life.
As for the second part, i now understand that your project was actually about philosophy and not about the "self" per se. Giving a second look, it also looks similar to Dennett's "multiple drafts model of consciousness", which in a way is stolen from Minsky's "society of mind" which was inspired by the AI program "pandemonium" which was possibly inspired by Hume's "bundle" theory (also reflected in various psychological "cognitive" theories of personality and self). Heh, don't worry, i'm going to read the book anyway. Your essay looks well written by the way. ;) |
|
|
| RJT |
| quote: | Originally posted by PETRAN
For the first part, Chomsky is indeed extremely critical of "behaviourist blank slate" views. In a matter of fact his "universal grammar" theory was proposed as the radically contrasting view to the behaviourist-associative (possibly relativist) tradition. According to Chomsky, all humans come with a knowledge of innate linquistic rules which are collectively known as the "universal grammar". That is, the set of rules and parameters which are essential for language are innately embedded in the brain (to be precise in certain brain areas. Recent research has shown that the so-called "Broca's area" situated in the pre-frontal lobe can be essentialy the "language organ" or Language Aquisition Device-LAD. that Chomsky proposed) This could explain many phenomena, such as the rapid aquisition of language rules of all children despite culture and the grammatical similarities between all languages of the world. Notice that this represents the exact opposite of Watson's (and Skinner's) "blank slate" in which humans come completely empty of any knowledge of any kind, and that all information is gained by "conditioning", in which when spatial and temporal aspects allow, stimuli and responses are associated in random relativistic ways, building long chains (associations) of information. This certainly is true, this is what memory and categorisation (knowledge) are, but it is simply not the whole story of a human being's mental life. |
I should have been more clear, because I'm really not talking about (and am myself highly critical of) behaviorism. All that I meant by inherent predisposition towards language is exactly what you've described above (Chomsky's universal grammar - the so called "fertile ground" for language development), and certainly not even close to the kinds of behaviorist conditioning you're talking about.
It was my mistake for not being clear.
| quote: | Originally posted by PETRAN
As for the second part, i now understand that your project was actually about philosophy and not about the "self" per se. Giving a second look, it also looks similar to Dennett's "multiple drafts model of consciousness", which in a way is stolen from Minsky's "society of mind" which was inspired by the AI program "pandemonium" which was possibly inspired by Hume's "bundle" theory (also reflected in various psychological "cognitive" theories of personality and self). Heh, don't worry, i'm going to read the book anyway. Your essay looks well written by the way. ;) |
Thanks boss - what I *hoped* people would actually take away from it was just a different theory of knowledge acquisition, and (I guess on second look), a bit of dualist picture towards truth (insofar as I discuss objective and relative truths). Development of self is, perhaps unfortunately, more of an example of my theory of knowledge than it is really all that much an idea I've fleshed out in there. Maybe in the future.
Thanks for taking a look at it. :) |
|
|
| pkcRAISTLIN |
| in regards to chomsky the question becomes: what came first, language or the brain matter where language abilities are stored? |
|
|
| Lira |
| quote: | Originally posted by RJT
I wonder whether or not the idea of a "blank slate" is really incompatible with Chomsky, though I'm not too familiar with his work, wouldn't he be more likely to say something along the lines of "within the human mind lies the inherent predisposition towards language"? And in that sense, wouldn't the mind be a bit like a blank slate that merely had the potential for language, rather than there actually being some tactile (and maybe dormant?) function inherent in the brain that has language unlocked from it? |
Not really. At least, not linguistically. The most accessible refutation I can find is from Stanford's Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
In response to this question, most 20th century theorists followed Chomsky in holding that language acquisition could not occur unless much of the knowledge eventually attained were innate or inborn. The gap between what speaker-hearers know about language (its grammar, among other things) and the data they have access to during learning (the pld) is just too broad to be bridged by any process of learning alone. It follows that since children patently do learn language, they are not linguistic ‘blank slates.’ Instead, Chomsky and his followers maintained, human children are born knowing the ‘Universal Grammar’ or ‘UG,’ a theory describing the most fundamental properties of all natural languages (e.g., the facts that elements leave traces behind when they move, and that their movements are constrained in various ways). Learning a particular language thus becomes the comparatively simple matter of elaborating upon this antecedently possessed knowledge, and hence appears a much more tractable task for young children to attempt. [source]
So, even though, as that article states, a less bold version appeared in the 80's (in which the baby didn't act like a little scientist) he still theorises about a good deal of a priori knowledge.
The view of a mind "like a blank slate that merely had the potential for language" was quite common before Chomsky, and his reaction against this idea is the reason why his ideas got so much attention.
edit: Petran made my post completely useless, I'm a bit in a hurry here, and he was sure able to express Chomsky's ideas more eloquently :) |
|
|
| PETRAN |
| quote: | Originally posted by pkcRAISTLIN
in regards to chomsky the question becomes: what came first, language or the brain matter where language abilities are stored? |
In terms of evolution? These things go hand-in-hand, that is, a brain mutation would accidentally result in some linquistic abilities which would favour the mutant's survival, resulting in natural selection and so on.
In terms of children, brain growth comes first, and hence this marks the onset of a "critical period" in which the neuronal machinery (which already holds the rules and parameters) is "ready" to be modified and grow from the influx of environmental information. After that, the learning of new information "tunes" or "modifies" the "receptive synaptic plasticity", resulting in language (notice that these pre-determined rules embedded in the neural machinery constrain the transformations of incoming information and hence linquistic learning is fast, due exactly to this rule-learning process). This process lasts for a few years. Various ethological studies have also demonstrated that "critical periods" exist in animals and these are generated for various behavioural repertoires, such as flying in birds( e.g. Konrad Lorenz's studies on ducks or whatever) |
|
|
| Meat187 |
| quote: | Originally posted by Lira
That's like complaining Hoovers don't take your kids to school.
First of all, to say that philosophy doesn't solve problems is pretty naïve. Science, as we know today, is a product of philosophy, reason why scientists were called natural philosophers until quite a few centuries ago. It just happened to be more fruitful because the knowledge acquired by natural philosophers ended up being applied more in a more concrete way.
[...]
|
Science: When a tree of the mass m falls down with a velocity v it creates a sound of x dB.
Philosophy: But if there's no one there to hear it, will the falling tree also make a sound?
:gsmile: |
|
|
| RJT |
| quote: | Originally posted by Meat187
Philosophy: But if there's no one there to hear it, will the falling tree also make a sound?
:gsmile: |
Yes.
Philosophy doesn't make a habit of questioning the laws of physics/sound - at least not the productive kind. :p |
|
|
| PETRAN |
| quote: | Originally posted by Meat187
Science: When a tree of the mass m falls down with a velocity v it creates a sound of x dB.
Philosophy: But if there's no one there to hear it, will the falling tree also make a sound?
:gsmile: |
No, this actually is very loose. The "philosophical" question that you state is also encountered in standard scientific "Sensation & Perception" areas (that is perceptual psychology and physiology) and it is not only restricted in philosophical areas.
This is because a machine that measures vibrations in the air with great pricision is different then the concept of "sound". This is because "sound" is something that our brain constructs and not something that is really "out there". This would mean that when a tree falls there are vibrations in the air but no sound, since there is no perceiver with an auditory apparatus to perceive the qualities of these airwaves in terms of "sound perception". You could as well have an "alien" organism perceive these "vibrations of air molecules" in terms of "tactile" sensations or anything. It just happens that our perception of loudness, pitch etc. coincides with the the wave-form amplitude and frequency (and this is because our machines of measuring these physical qualities are "literally" extensions of our auditory sensual systems). |
|
|
| RJT |
| quote: | Originally posted by PETRAN
No, this actually is very loose. The "philosophical" question that you state is also encountered in standard scientific "Sensation & Perception" areas (that is perceptual psychology and physiology) and it is not only restricted in philosophical areas.
This is because a machine that measures vibrations in the air with great pricision is different then the concept of "sound". This is because "sound" is something that our brain constructs and not something that is really "out there". This would mean that when a tree falls there are vibrations in the air but no sound, since there is no perceiver with an auditory apparatus to perceive the qualities of these airwaves in terms of "sound perception". You could as well have an "alien" organism perceive these "vibrations of air molecules" in terms of "tactile" sensations or anything. It just happens that our perception of loudness, pitch etc. coincides with the the wave-form amplitude and frequency (and this is because our machines of measuring these physical qualities are "literally" extensions of our auditory sensual systems). |
So would you say that "sound" isn't defined by the vibrations in the air?
:conf:
Sounds a lot like the conceptual apparatus for language directing our ability towards thought.
If you take this line, does that mean that sound (as we use the word) is an exclusively human phenomenon? It just sounds a bit like right here:
| quote: | Originally posted by PETRAN
You could as well have an "alien" organism perceive these "vibrations of air molecules" in terms of "tactile" sensations or anything. |
You're taking the line that the perception of vibrations of air molecules within a specific range is what makes it qualify as "sound" - and that the perception of these vibrations only within a specific range and only while using a certain conceptual apparatus qualifies as sound.
I'm not sure I have a better definition of "sound" - but I hesitate to relegate it solely to the realm of humans. |
|
|
|
|
