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What's your favorite science? (pg. 13)
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| PETRAN |
| quote: | Originally posted by MrJiveBoJingles
But it isn't just "quantitative data" that makes something scientific. It's how the data is generated and how you use it to make predictions of some kind. I could collect data about how well the height of trees on roads correlated to the number of gum stains on the sidewalk, but I wouldn't be doing "science" by virtue of that.
:p
It doesn't have to involve a lab, either.
Physics can predict the movements of planets based on its laws.
Chemistry can predict how two substances will interact, even if they've been combined before.
Biology can predict how organisms will response to medications or environmental conditions, even if the organism has never come into contact with those things before.
Regarding Durkheim, how would a person go about testing his theory of "social integration" as an explanation for lower suicide rates in Catholic countries? And how would one know that "social integration" and not something else explains the data, given that Catholic and Protestant countries differ in plenty of other ways as well? |
First of all, if you find a relationship between gums and height of trees you would be doing science. Just because you can't find causality doesn't mean that you aren't "exploring" knowledge in systematic ways (science). You could still find (or not) find a relation, a relation which could further be explored. In my opinion you wouldn't find the current relation, so your theory would not attract much attention!
Second, Biology can't predict how organisms would react in certain conditons in the same way (accuracy) that physics and chemistry predict the planet rotations and molecule interactions repsectively. The reason is, that in physics and chemistry in which systems are comprised by a specific number of things, there are laws which (in the current case i guess linearly) predict the development of the system (good for predictions). In biology though, there are no laws for organisms due to the fact that organisms are supra-multi-factorial (wow i invented a word!) entities and hence the accuracy of prediciton falls. This is why those bloody microbial bastards suddenly gain resistance to the standard "we thought it killed everyhting but it seems it doesn't!" antibiotic, puzzling the dorctors, making them inform the patient "we did what we could but...only god can help now!" (which is not a very scientific phrase...). There are descriptions and facts here and there about how biological systems interact, but sometimes the complexity gets too high, making prediction rather difficult or impossible.
(the weather which is even more complex puzzles meteorologists a lot...)
As for this Durkheim's theory that you state, i don't have a clue about the current theory. But still,i guess that you can test it by various qualitative methods. That is, spending months or years collecting qualitative data from various Catholic and Protestantic communities (e.g. discourse analysis) and see what these qualitative data say in relation to Durkheim's theory. Furthermore, quantitative methods such as Statistical methods can also be used. E.g. Questionaires structured around Durkheim's hypothesis and other factors can be handled in both Communities. the results can be interpreted by factorial analysis, discovering in this way how multiple factors correlate, and see if any of them relate to Durkheim's position. There would be much more but these are the first ideas that came to mind.
I hope that you don't imply that all social science is not scientific...this would be stupid since it would suggest that that Economics and Archaeology are not scientific...stupid... |
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| Lira |
| quote: | Originally posted by MrJiveBoJingles
But it isn't just "quantitative data" that makes something scientific. It's how the data is generated and how you use it to make predictions of some kind. I could collect data about how well the height of trees on roads correlated to the number of gum stains on the sidewalk, but I wouldn't be doing "science" by virtue of that.
:p
It doesn't have to involve a lab, either.
Physics can predict the movements of planets based on its laws.
Chemistry can predict how two substances will interact, even if they've been combined before.
Biology can predict how organisms will response to medications or environmental conditions, even if the organism has never come into contact with those things before. |
True that, but I don't think implied that you'd just use quantitative data at random. Rather, it would just confirm (or not) a hypothesis you have. Roughly speaking, this is how it works:
- Someone claims X happen because of Y;
- Experiments are carried in order to find out whether or not Y is more likely to happen when X. If the data seems to support your theory, game on;
- Someone else claims X happen not because of Y, but because of Z!
- More experimentation takes place. The data could well support both theories for an undeterminate period of time;
- Scientists relentlessly try to show the theory they don't support is false. If either Y or Z turn out to have flaws, its proponents will try to fix it until it's not worth clinging;
- Religious people, who shouldn't even be here, somehow come to the conclusion that because God is not mentioned in any theory, they may lead to atheism. Therefore, they say something happen because that's how God works :D
Makes sense now?
| quote: | Originally posted by MrJiveBoJingles
Regarding Durkheim, how would a person go about testing his theory of "social integration" as an explanation for lower suicide rates in Catholic countries? And how would one know that "social integration" and not something else explains the data, given that Catholic and Protestant countries differ in plenty of other ways as well? |
It seems you forgot the two things philosophers and scientists have in common:
- Neither will take no for an answer;
- And neither will take yes for an answer :p
These questions have been asked quite a few times, not only by scientists themselves, but by philosophers of science. Basically, he would look for more data to corroborate his theory, and check whether individuals who didn't belong to groups were indeed more likely to kill themselves in other circumstances. Could this also be due to something else? Yeah, sure, it could happen to any other science - remember the time when phlogiston was still around in thermodynamic theory? It could explain quite a few things, and some phenomona could be explained both for positing the existence of phlogiston and/or the possibility of heat transfer. The theory only became obsolete when the claims it made couldn't explain a large number of experiments, leading to its demise. Hell, even the Geocentric theory in astronomy made sense, and could even explain more phenomena than the Heliocentric theory in the early days. |
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| Lira |
Well, MrJBJ, here's something you might want to take a look at:
| quote: | Sociology, theories of
Throughout the history of sociology, three types of theorizing have co-existed, sometimes uneasily. ‘Theories of’ provide abstract models of empirical processes; they function both as guides for sociological research and as sources for covering laws whose falsification or
validation is intended to provide the basis for a cumulative science. ‘Presuppositional studies’ abstract away from particular empirical processes, seeking instead to articulate the fundamental properties of social action and order; meta-methodological warrants for the scientific investigation of societies; and normative foundations for moral evaluations of contemporary social life. ‘Hermeneutical theory’ addresses these basic sociological questions mmore indirectly, by interpreting the meanings and intentions of classical texts.
The relation between these three forms of theorizing varies historically. In the post-war period, under the institutional and intellectual influence of US sociologists like Parsons and Merton,
presuppositional and hermeneutical issues seemed to be settled; ‘theories of’ proliferated and prospects seemed bright for a cumulative, theoretically-organized science of society. Subsequent social and intellectual developments undermined this brief period of relative consensus. In the midst of the crises of the 1960s and 1970s, presuppositional and hermeneutical studies gained much greater importance, and became increasingly disarticulated from empirical ‘theories of’. Confronting the prospect of growing fragmentation, in the late 1970s and early 1980s there appeared a series of ambitious, synthetical works that sought to reground the discipline by providing coherent examples of how the different forms of sociological theory could once again be intertwined. While widely read inside and outside the discipline, these efforts failed in their foundational ambitions.
As a result of this failure, over the last decade sociological theory has had diminishing influence both inside the discipline and without. Inside social science, economic and anthropological theories have been much more influential. In the broader intellectual arena, the most important presuppositional and hermeneutical debates have occurred in philosophy and literary studies. Sociological theorists are now participating in these extra-disciplinary debates even as they have returned to the task of developing ‘theories of’ particular
institutional domains. The future of specifically sociological theory depends on reviving coherent relationships between these different theoretical domains.
1 The forms of sociological theory
Theories of. Following what is taken to be the natural science approach, theorists have produced sets of highly general causal or descriptive propositions aimed at modelling empirical
processes (Stinchcombe 1968). These models have had a dual purpose. On the one hand, they are guides to more specific empirical studies of particular social processes. On the other hand, they are designed to produce putative covering laws which such particular empirical studies
will falsify or validate.
Max Weber’s famous essay on bureaucracy can be viewed as providing a classic example of theorizing along these lines. Weber presented a series of propositions about the structure and processes of bureaucratic authority that has provided the central reference for empirical studies, complementary elaborations, and competing general models in the sociological study of organizations over the last fifty years. In an effort to test the model’s insistence on rationality,
formal rules and hierarchical command, for example studies emerged that emphasized informal organization and decentralized, problem-oriented decision making; the limited, primarily short-term rationality of bureaucratic action; and even the ceremonial, merely ritualistic qualities of bureaucratic processes. Yet, because Weber’s original essay has been accepted as an empirically grounded ‘theory of’, the field of organizational studies has organized and
conceptualized itself as being guided by an accumulative, increasingly elaborated, essentially progressive theoretical model.
While few theoretical models have exercised comparable hegemony, in many empirical sub-fields of sociology one can find ‘theories of’ that have played similar roles for more limited periods of time.
Presuppositional studies. Rather than developing empirical generalizations to guide studies or provide covering laws, another kind of theoretical effort generalizes away from particular
empirical realms to consider fundamental issues that are held to undergird them (Alexander 1982).
Some of these theoretical efforts discuss issues like action and order: is social action practical and goal-oriented or is it normatively guided and oriented by aesthetic, emotional, or moral
concerns? Does the patterned nature of social activity derive from controls exercised over individuals by institutions, whether coercive or moral, or does it emerge from pragmatic negotiations between actors as they spontaneously confront the unpredictable contingencies of
everyday life?
Some presuppositional studies address more meta-methodological issues: should sociology be modelled after the nomological sciences that aim at producing covering laws and abstract away from the particular and idiographic, or should it be more hermeneutical and aim at producing
rich ethnographic interpretations of particular institutions and events?
Other presuppositional studies take the form of critical ideological and moral inquiry: is capitalism an oppressive social system? Is modernity healthy? What are the social obligations of scientists when they are faced with injustice or abuse?
If we consider the relationship of presuppositional studies to the earlier example of bureaucracy, we find an illuminating point of contrast with the ‘theories of’ approach. Rather than arguing on the basis of empirical studies that informal ties exist alongside formal rules, presuppositional theorists have argued that, because emotion is central to action and cooperation basic to order, bureaucratic institutions simply cannot be conceived or explained in the way Weber proposed. Arguing that Weber was, in fact, generalizing from only distinctively Prussian authority structures rather than from bureaucratic organizations as such, other presuppositional theorists have pushed for a case-study approach to organizations in different
countries and different historical milieu. Others, focusing on the moral dimension, have condemned both the idea and the practice of bureaucratic organization for ignoring the possibility of democratic self-regulation.
Hermeneutical. ‘Theories of’ and presuppositional studies are highly abstract enterprises, each broaching the question ‘what is society?’ in a direct way. By contrast, the third form of sociological theorizing is not abstracting but idiographic and concrete. Hermeneutical theory seeks to explain human society by explicating, through interpretive argument, the meaning of sociological texts whose consequentiality has given them a classical status (Levine 1995).
These textual efforts are neither historical nor literary. Rather than being primarily directed to questions of intellectual and social context or to questions of genre and aesthetic form, they
engage the hermeneutical method to investigate the traditional questions of sociology, albeit in an indirect and idiographic rather than direct and abstracting manner. By reinterpreting
canonical texts, hermeneutical readings challenge extant theories and empirical studies that derive their authority from the covering laws or the presuppositions espoused by these classics. By producing new and authoritative versions of canonical texts, the hermeneutical ambition is to re-orient theoretical and empirical practice.
Once again, Weber’s organizational studies provide an illustration. Arguing that Parsons’ translation of Weber’s term, Herrschaft, as ‘imperative coordination’ implied that Weber intended a consensual rather than coercive model of authority, hermeneutical theorists have
suggested that ‘domination’ is closer to the meaning Weber intended (Roth 1968). This translation challenge has, in fact, been part of the broader theoretical debate between functionalist and conflict-oriented ‘theories of’ various institutional realms (see Functionalism
in social science). Within the specific field of organizational studies, hermeneutical students of Weber’s corpus have argued that he envisaged his essay on bureaucracy primarily as a historical and comparative explanation of the development of Western authority structures over time rather than as an effort to model the processes involved in contemporary organizations as such. Making connections to the emphases on charisma and morality in Weber’s other historical studies, these hermeneutical theorists have, indirectly, tried to reframe his original bureaucracy model as one that can incorporate without contradiction the informal, emotional, and normative elements of organizational life.
Very similar kinds of hermeneutical arguments have been made in regard to the classical writings of Marx, Durkheim, and Parsons. Through translations and explications of his earlier writings, Marx has been reinterpreted as being more concerned with the qualitative, cultural,
and psychological problems of capitalism than with the quantitative and economic. By exposing the increasing influence of religion in Durkheim’s later and posthumously published work, Durkheim has been reinterpreted as aiming to produce a symbolic rather than morphological sociology. By emphasizing the disjuncture between the early and the later Parsons, hermeneutical theorists have indirectly argued against systems theory and in support of more pragmatic presuppositions about action and order (see Systems theory in social science §§1-2).
While these three forms of theoretical activity in sociology represent distinct and long-standing traditions, each of them has been the object of polemical challenges from champions of the other types. In practice, however, the three types have often interpenetrated one another. Thus, rather than taking as data only empirical studies, ‘theories of’ particular institutions have often justified their abstract models by making textual interpretations, challenging or elaborating classical works that earlier sought to explain the same institution. Presuppositional studies, for their part, are often deeply implicated in evaluative statements about the moral worth of
different approaches to action and order. Similarly, ideological debates are replete with explanatory claims about the empirical causes and effects of particular institutions.
The classical example of such a blurred genre is Talcott Parsons’ The Structure of Social Action (1937), perhaps the single most influential theoretical work of post-war sociology. Parsons presented the work primarily as a hermeneutical one, describing it as an investigation
of the writings of a group of important European social thinkers, Pareto, Marshall, Durkheim, and Weber. In the lengthy first section of his work, however, Parsons developed a series of highly abstract presuppositional arguments; while ostensibly provided to facilitate his subsequent textual interpretation, this discussion became a fundamental, sui generis theoretical argument in itself. Throughout his subsequent exegetical discussions, Parsons also produced
pointedly polemical ‘theories of’, using his textual interpretations to challenge existing empirical models of various institutions.
2 Sociological theory in the post-war world
While the three forms of sociological theorizing have, indeed, always interpenetrated in significant ways, over time there have been remarkable shifts in the relative importance of each genre in the theoretical field. These changes are caused not only by intellectual developments within sociology but also by developments outside of it, by shifts in the intellectual life of society and in the institutions of society itself. These shifts have had significant effects on the
relation of sociological theory to theory in other social scientific disciplines and to theoretical efforts in philosophy and aesthetics.
Despite the fundamental and continuing role of theories produced by classical sociological theorists - Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel and Mead - the story line of ‘modern’ sociological theory begins in 1937 with the publication of Parsons’ The Structure of Social Action. Despite its intrinsic intellectual power, this blurred genre made virtually no impact at the time. Under the impact of the Great Depression and massive social movements on the Left and Right, US and
European sociology was highly fragmented. No single institutional or intellectual centre dominated, and within each sociological community radically divergent theories struggled for recognition. In the wake of the world-historical realignment that followed the Second World
War, the social and intellectual situation was fundamentally changed. While European theorizing retained its distinctive forms and practices, the social stability, institutional power, and
ideological hegemony of the USA allowed it to emerge as the arbiter of sociology in its professionalized, disciplinary form.
In this new context, Parsons emerged as the dominant theorist of his time. A new generation of sociologists came to consider his (1937) work as having established the canonical foundations of a distinctively modern sociological theory. While this theory was termed
‘structural-functionalism’, it might more accurately be considered a version of Kantianism (Munch 1981). Rather than using biological models to establish an organicist model of society, Parsons actually devoted his efforts to describing the institutional, psychological, and cultural foundations of differentiated and pluralistic societies that could process economic, political, religious, and ethnic conflicts in democratic, fundamentally cooperative ways (Turner and
Holton 1986). Within this Parsonian framework, during the 1950s and early 1960s ‘theories of’ dominated other types of theoretical practice, and sociology increasingly was viewed as a maturing and cumulative science of society. This optimistic scientism was encouraged by the impression that the post-war explosion of large scale quantitative empirical studies were conducted within the rubric of functionalist thought, an illusion encouraged by the
institutionally-oriented, ‘middle level’ functionalist models of Parsons’ discipline (Merton 1967).
Because of its high degree of internal consensus, its cumulative character, and its high degree of intellectual creativity, in the post-war period US sociological theory achieved a high level of
influence, both inside the discipline of sociology and outside. Historians, political scientists, and anthropologists, for example, drew heavily upon the premises of modernization theory, which
was the historical foundation of Kantian functionalism. Literary critics drew upon sociological theory to investigate the origins of modern genres. While philosophy remained largely in the analytical mode, more historical and socially-oriented philosophical efforts also drew upon these sociological ideas.
The social and intellectual upheavals that rocked Western societies between the mid 1960s and the 1970s had the effect of displacing not only Kantian functionalism but the approach that emphasized ‘theories of’. Pragmatic, phenomenological, and behaviouristic traditions
re-emerged as ‘micro-sociological theories’, powerfully challenging Parsonian theory in various domains (Homans 1961; Garfinkel 1967). Conflict theories and Marxism became increasingly influential, constituting ‘macro’ challenges to functionalism’s optimistic and relatively consensual social models (Collins 1975). As both the models and the canon established by Parsons were put to the test, sociological theorists became increasingly involved in presuppositional and hermeneutical studies (see Pragmatism; Behaviourism in the social sciences).
By the end of the 1970s, Parsons’ challengers had triumphed. Sociology was proclaimed a ‘multi-paradigmatic’ field which, once again, was devoid of either an institutional or theoretical centre. Paradoxically, even as this dramatic sea change reached its climax, the historical context facilitating it dramatically changed. The waves of anti-Establishment protests subsided, backlash movements against them asserted increasing strength, and Western societies began to
experience conservative retrenchments. During the same period, state-communist societies began to crumble under their own weight.
These shifts placed sociological theory in a precarious position, even when its prestige was at its greatest height. Responding to the de-centred situation of sociology and to the broader sense of imminent transition in the intellectual and social world at large, the most influential theoretical works that emerged at this time were marked by their refusal to endorse the notion of pluralistic and relativistic social science. To the contrary, these highly ambitious theoretical
efforts stepped outside their respective traditions and created grand syntheses (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1984; Habermas 1984; Alexander 1982; Collins 1975). Despite marked differences, they had a common aim: to found a new era of intellectual cooperation and social progress in a
post-positivistic frame. Indeed, with their combination of hermeneutical, presuppositional, and explanatory ambitions, these efforts closely resembled Parsons’ earlier effort to overcome
intellectual and social fragmentation in 1937.
But the post-war world that had allowed Parsons’ earlier effort to succeed had been dramatically and fundamentally changed. Despite the fact that these ambitiously synthetical works were widely read and admired both inside and outside the discipline of sociology, they
turned out to have brought the curtain down on an era rather than ushering in a new one. In a fin-de-siècle world torn between deeply pessimistic moods of fragmentation and decline and wildly optimistic hopes of utopian rebirth, none of these synthetic efforts to recreate a new version of Neo-Kantian sociological theory succeeded in gaining hegemony or even in creating traditions that could convincingly establish coherent new lines of theoretical and empirical
work.
3 Sociological theory today
The failure of these synthetic efforts, and the continuing impact of the social and intellectual conditions that gave rise to them, has given rise to developments that have had significant repercussions for sociological theory.
Self-identified ‘sociological theorists’ have been increasingly less able to exert influence over the explanatory models and canonical texts inside the discipline of sociology. Instead, sociological theory is now increasingly viewed merely as one sub-field among many, one
ddevoted to hermeneutical reconstructions of the origins of classical texts, on the one hand, and to ‘meta-theoretical’ commentaries and arguments about presuppositions, on the other (Ritzer 1992). With the exception of the work of Bourdieu, whose influence, while substantial, remains relatively limited, there exists at present no over-arching general theory that combines hermeneutical and presuppositional arguments with sociological ‘theories of’ various institutional spheres. While empirical sub-fields continue to be organized theoretically, and the three different types of sociological theorizing flourish within each, these discussions are hermetically cut off from the more generalized theoretical debates in the discipline at large.
Distinctively sociological theories have lost their influence vis-à-vis theorizing in other social scientific disciplines. This is demonstrated by two contradictory developments. The model of society as based upon exchanges between rational actors, derived from economics, has become an international cross-disciplinary tradition that already exercises a deep influence in political science and, increasingly, in sociology (Coleman 1990). At the same time, cultural
models of symbolic action and ritual order, which emerged in anthropology (Geertz 1973), have had far-reaching theoretical and empirical effects in history and sociology.
The most influential presuppositional and hermeneutical studies, and even some of the most important theoretical discussions about the nature of contemporary societies (that is, ‘theories of’), now occur outside the social sciences in philosophy and literary studies. Under
the influence of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, deconstructionism and postmodernism have established an anti-universalist position that has had widespread repercussions throughout Western intellectual life, including the social sciences (Bauman 1995; Seidman 1991). In opposition to this position, Neo-Kantian theorizing about the possibilities for universalism and
democracy has been rejuvenated under the influence of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas (§1) (Cohen and Arato 1992). Between these two poles there have emerged arguments for new forms of pluralistic, identity-based democratic associations, arguments derived from Aristotle, Hegel, and US pragmatism and associated most significantly with the writings of Charles Taylor (§5), Richard Rorty, and Michael Walzer (Boltanski and Thevenot 1991; Warnke 1992).
4 Prospects
In considering the future development of sociological theory, it is important to observe two apparently contradictory developments within the work of those who participated in the creation of synthetic general theories in the 1980s. Leading sociological theorists are now
participating in the broader philosophical, political, and literary debates outside of the discipline itself (Calhoun 1992). At the same time, they have also turned towards empirically-focused topics and are developing ‘theories of’ particular institutional spheres. Only if and when these very different kinds of practices can be brought back together (Mouzelis 1995) will sociological theory regain the coherence, vitality, and intellectual power that allowed it to
exercise such wide influence in an earlier day.
JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER |
From the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philososphy. |
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| pkcRAISTLIN |
| quote: | Originally posted by Audious
Parazoology. |
drunk animals? |
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| Lipsochix |
| Astronomy, everyday . . . |
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| echosystm |
i like computer science. its fun to get computers to do stuff.
sexually. :gsmile: |
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| Sushipunk |
| quote: | Originally posted by echosystm
i like computer science. its fun to get computers to do stuff.
sexually. :gsmile: |
And how does your girlfriend feel about that? :p |
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| eckmek |
| quote: | Originally posted by Lira
Well, MrJBJ, here's something you might want to take a look at:
From the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philososphy. |
I'm so happy that you're posting in this thread Lira, as it really annoys me when people won't acknowledge sociology as a science (this is not directed at anyone in particular, but the general consensus in the thread early on seemed to be "sociology is not a science) :p .
I fear i lack the english skills to explain myself, but i'm studying sociology myself and that's why i like threads like this and people like you posting things like this :D |
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| MrJiveBoJingles |
| quote: | Originally posted by Lira
Well, MrJBJ, here's something you might want to take a look at:
From the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philososphy. |
All that babble, and in the end saying very little.
What I asked for was an example of a sociological hypothesis being falsified or proven by empirical evidence. But apparently it's exceedingly difficult to provide one, since I haven't seen any sociology-lovers do so yet.
Another thing, is there even any agreement among sociologists that there has been scientific progress of any kind within the field? And if there is some agreement about whether there has been progress, is there additional agreement about what specific findings or advances constitute that progress?
That's something you'll find among physicists, chemists, biologists, psychologists...but does it exist among sociologists?
I get the sense that sociological theories get more or less popular according to whatever set of political opinions and concerns happens to be fashionable rather than according to the throwing out of bad theories or the construction of new ones when the evidence dictates it. |
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| RJT |
| quote: | Originally posted by MrJiveBoJingles
Another thing, is there even any agreement among sociologists that there has been scientific progress of any kind within the field? And if there is some agreement about whether there has been progress, is there additional agreement about what specific findings or advances constitute that progress?
That's something you'll find among physicists, chemists, biologists, psychologists...but does it exist among sociologists?
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I don't believe that for even a minute. Chemistry, physics, and biology especially are all so rooted in the dogma of their own practices that the majority of their "discoveries" are more akin to completing a puzzle according to the established and accepted norms of their disciplines than they are "advances that constitute progress."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Kuhn
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_St...fic_Revolutions
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thomas-kuhn/
If I can find a copy of his article "The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research", I'll post it. Either way, I don't think much in the way of genuine scientific discovery really happens all that often, and could generally see far more "progress" in the study of societies than in the study of many aspects of natural science. |
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